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S. Chokkalingam Pillai And Another v. M.S.S.M Ganesa Shanmugasundaram Pillai.
Factual and Procedural Background
This second appeal arises out of a suit for ejectment and for rent. The lease under which the plaintiff claimed, and on the basis of which he granted a sub-lease to the defendant, had expired. The plaintiff sought two reliefs: ejectment and rent. The courts below dismissed the suit on the ground that the lease was determined in favour of the defendant by the determination of the plaintiff’s title as lessee from the original owner. The appeal challenges the dismissal, particularly contesting the finding related to estoppel under Section 116 of the Evidence Act and the determination of the lease.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the courts below erred in rejecting the plaintiff’s claim of estoppel under Section 116 of the Evidence Act.
- Whether a threat of eviction by title paramount existed sufficient to determine the lease in favour of the defendant.
- Whether the plaintiff’s lease was valid given the status of the trustee who granted it and the effect of notices and rent deeds issued by the newly appointed managing trustees under the trust scheme.
- The applicability and interpretation of Section 111(c) of the Transfer of Property Act in determining the termination of the plaintiff’s interest as lessor.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The courts below wrongly held against the estoppel pleaded under Section 116 of the Evidence Act.
- There was no valid threat of eviction by title paramount against the defendant so as to determine the lease.
- The interest of the plaintiff as lessor did not terminate as required under Section 111(c) of the Transfer of Property Act.
- The scheme suit and subsequent notices by new trustees did not invalidate the plaintiff’s lease, which was granted by one trustee among several and not the managing trustee.
- The judgment and decree in the scheme suit did not declare the plaintiff’s lease invalid, leaving its validity open.
- The learned Subordinate Judge erred by relying on a prior judgment (Ex. D-7) related to a different property and person.
Respondent's Arguments
- The plaintiff’s title must be taken to have ended because the lessor who granted the lease was not the managing trustee and lacked authority.
- There was a sufficient threat of eviction by title paramount, as evidenced by notices and rent deeds issued by the managing trustees under the scheme.
- The question of threat of eviction by title paramount is a factual matter upheld by the lower appellate court’s findings, which should not be interfered with.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Jogendralal v. Moheshchandra, 66 Cal. 1013 (A.I.R. 1929 Cal 33) | Definition of threat of eviction by title paramount and its effect on lease determination | Used to explain the legal principle that a threat of eviction by a paramount titleholder can determine a lease without actual eviction |
| Bajkrishna Prasad v. Baraboni Coal Concern Ltd., 62 Cal. 346 (A.I.R. 1935 Cal. 368) | Clarification of eviction by title paramount and tenant's attornment | Supported the principle that attornment by tenant to a new titleholder following threat of eviction can end the lease |
| Alaga Pillai v. Ramaswami Thevan, A.I.R. 1926 Mad. 187 (91 I.C. 1024) | Concept of threat of eviction and its legal sufficiency without actual dispossession | Referenced to establish that threat alone, if bona fide, suffices to terminate lease rights |
| Valia Muhammad v. Savakutti, A.I.R. 1934 Mad. 197 (147 I.C. 1218) | Requirements for a valid threat of eviction by paramount title | Applied to confirm that legal process backing the threat makes it effective even without physical eviction |
| Krishna Prasad v. Adyanath, 22 Pat. 513 (A.I.R. 1944 Pat. 77) | Effect of threat of eviction by title paramount and tenant’s attornment on lease validity | Used to reinforce the principle that lease termination can occur by bona fide threat and attornment |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court carefully examined the facts surrounding the lease and the trust scheme governing the property. It noted that the plaintiff’s lease was granted by one trustee who was not the managing trustee, and that new trustees appointed under the scheme served notices on the defendant asserting their paramount title and demanding vacation of the premises. The defendant subsequently executed a rent deed in favor of the managing trustee.
The court analyzed the concept of eviction by title paramount as expounded in established case law and commentary on Section 116 of the Evidence Act. It emphasized that actual physical eviction is not necessary; a bona fide threat of lawful eviction backed by legal process suffices to determine a lease if the tenant attorns to the new titleholder against his will.
Applying these principles, the court found that there was a sufficiently effective threat of eviction by the paramount titleholders, justifying the defendant’s attornment to the managing trustee and thereby terminating the lease in favor of the defendant. Although the appellate court had misconstrued a prior judgment relating to a different property, the court declined to interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower courts, which were supported by sufficient evidence.
Holding and Implications
The second appeal is dismissed.
The direct effect of this decision is the affirmation of the lower courts’ rulings that the lease granted to the plaintiff was terminated by a bona fide threat of eviction by title paramount and the defendant’s attornment to the managing trustee. No costs were awarded. The decision does not establish a new precedent but reinforces existing principles regarding eviction by title paramount and lease determination under Section 116 of the Evidence Act and Section 111(c) of the Transfer of Property Act.
1. This second appeal arisea out of a suit for ejectment and for rent. So far as the first: relief is concerned, it is admitted that the lease under which the plaintiff claims and on the basis of which he has granted a sub lease to the defendant has expired. The second relief is however the practical relief with reference to which a decree must be given in favour of the plaintiff, if he is to succeed in his contention of estoppel against his tenant, the defendant. The Courts below have dismissed the suit on the ground that there was a determination of the lease in favour of the defendant by the determination of the title of the plaintiff as the lessee from the original owner.
2. In appeal it is contended that in holding against the estoppel under Section 116, Evidence Act, pleaded by the plaintiff, the Courts below have erred in the view that they have taken, that there was a threat of eviction by title para, mount from the original owner against) the defendant It is urged that there could be no determination of the lease in favour of the defendant so long as the interest of the plaintiff himself as the defendant's lessor did not; terminate in the manner contemplated by Section 111(c), T. P. Act.
3. The material facts are that there was a scheme suit in respect of the property which belonged to the trust, the original owner, in which the plaintiff as a lessee from one of the trustees then in management, one Kanthimathinatha Pillai, was impleaded but was given up at the trial, that afterwards the new trustees appointed by the scheme framed in that suits served two notices on the defendant, EX. p-9 dated 6-1-1943 and Ex. D-3 dated 17 5-1943 in both of which they asserted their title as trustees under the scheme, and in the latter of which they impeached the title of Kanthimathinatha Pillai to grant the lease to the plaintiff as he was only one of several trustees and not the managing trustee at the time, and called upon the defendant to vacate the premises, threatening him in default with proceedings for evictions and that thereafter the defendant; executed Ex. D-4 dated 23-6-1943, a rent deed, in favour of the managing trustee appointed under the scheme. These facts, it is contended for the appellant, do not constitute sufficient threat of eviction by title paramount such as would justify the attornment by the defendant to the managing trustee under the scheme so as to put an end to the relationship of lessor and lessee between himself and the defendant. The appellant further points out that the judgment and decree in the scheme suit do not at ail declare the invalidity of the lease in favour of the plaintiff by Kanthimathinatha Piliai but leave the question of the validity of his lease open. He also contends that the learned Subordinate Judge has made the mistake of supposing that there was a prior judgment, Ex. D-7, which by the way related to a lease of other property is favour of another person in which Kanthimathinatha Pillai had been declared by the High Court in the second appeal to which that judgment relates, not entitled to grant leases as he was only one of several trustees and not the managing trustee. It is not contended for the respondent that the learned Judge has not made this mistake. What is contended is that although the scheme judgment and decree did not pronounce upon the validity or invalidity of the lease in favour of the present plaintiff, the title of the plaintiff must be taken to have come to an end, because in fact Kunthirnathinatha Pillai was only one of several trustees and nob the managing trustee and could not therefore grant the lease to the plaintiff. It is also contended for the respondent that the question whether there was in fact a threat of eviction by title para-mount is a question of fact with the lower appellate Court's finding on which I ought not to interfere.
4. What exactly constitutes a threat of eviction by title paramount which results in the determination of a lease has been considered in several cases of which it is necessary for me to mention only the rulings in Jogendralal v. Moheshchandra, 66 Cal. 1013 : (A. i. R. (16) 1929 Cal 33) ; Bajkrishna Prasad v. Baraboni Coal Concern Ltd., 62 Cal. 346 : (A. I. R. (22) 1935 Cal. 368), Alaga Pillai v. Ramaswami Thevan, A. I. R. (13) 1926 Mad. 187 : (91 I. C. 1024), Valia Muhammad v. Savakutti, A. I. R. (21) 1934 Mad. 19T : (147 I. C. 1218) and Krishna Prasad v. Adyanath, 22 Pat. 513 : (A. I. R (31) 1944 pat. 77). What emerges from the relevant case law on the subject is neatly stated by Sar-kar on Evidence in his commentary to Section 116, Evidence Act. It is sufficient for me to say that in order to constitute an eviction by a person claiming under paramount title, it is not necessary that the tenant should be put out of possession or ejectment should be brought, and that a threat of eviction is sufficient and if the tenant, in consequence of such threat, attorns to the claimant, he can set this up as an eviction by way of Defence to an action for rent, subject to his proving the evictor's title, but there is no eviction if the tenant gives up possession voluntarily. If the true owner is armed with a legal process for eviction which cannot be lawfully resisted even though the tenant is not put out of possession, the threat to put him out of possession amounts in law to eviction. The threat by the third party as well as the submission to it by the tenant who attorns to him must be real and bona fide. For a threat of eviction by title paramount to constitute a good defence, the party evicting must have good title and the tenant must have quitted against his will.
5. Applying these considerations to the present case, I am fairly clear that there was a sufficiently effective threat of eviction by title paramount to justify the defendant's attornment to the newly appointed managing trustee under Ex D-4. That the lease in favour of the plaintiff must be held to be invalid is the concurrent view of both the Courts below, and although the judgment of the appellate Court was partly influenced by its misconstruction and misconception of Ex. D-7 I am not, in all the circumstances of the case, prepared to interfere with the finding of the Courts below in favour of the respondent, which is supported by sufficient evidence.
6. In the result the second appeal fails and is dismissed but in the circumstances without costs.
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