- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
N. Chinnakannu Pillai v. N.S Sundaram .
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This matter is a civil revision petition directed against an interlocutory order of the Subordinate Judge of Tuticorin in O.P. No. 33 of 1949 concerning a petition for the issue of a succession certificate under the Indian Succession Act, 1925. The petitioner in the revision contended that the Subordinate Judge of Tuticorin lacked jurisdiction to entertain the succession-certificate application because there was no Provincial Government notification under Section 388(1) of the Succession Act, 1925 empowering Subordinate Judges to issue succession certificates.
The dispute required consideration of multiple earlier government orders (G.Os) issued under the Succession Certificate Act, 1889 (Section 26) — specifically G.O. No. 391 dated 22-10-1921 (which named the Subordinate Judge of Tuticorin), G.O. No. 1731 dated 5-6-1924 (investing many Subordinate Judges and District Munsifs, with certain exceptions), and G.O. No. 24 dated 7-1-1925 (superseding G.O. No. 1731 as to District Munsifs). The court also noted subsequent High Court notifications made under Section 265 of the Succession Act and Section 29(1) of the Madras Civil Courts Act (as amended by Act XIV of 1926) authorising Subordinate Judges to take cognizance of proceedings under the Succession Act which could not be disposed of by "district delegates."
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Subordinate Judge of Tuticorin had jurisdiction to entertain the petition for a succession certificate under the Succession Act, 1925, given the absence (as alleged by the petitioner) of a Provincial Government notification under Section 388(1) of the 1925 Act.
- What is the legal effect of the earlier notifications issued under Section 26 of the Succession Certificate Act, 1889 (G.O. No. 391/1921, G.O. No. 1731/1924, and G.O. No. 24/1925) after repeal of the 1889 Act and re-enactment in the Succession Act, 1925; specifically, whether later G.Os repealed earlier ones by implication.
- Whether High Court notifications (issued under Section 265 of the Succession Act and Section 29(1) of the Madras Civil Courts Act as amended) conferred jurisdiction on Subordinate Judges to entertain applications for succession certificates, or whether their wording was to be interpreted narrowly or widely.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The Subordinate Judge of Tuticorin lacked jurisdiction because there was no Provincial Government notification under Section 388(1) of the Succession Act, 1925 empowering Subordinate Judges to issue succession certificates.
- The sequence of G.Os operated such that G.O. No. 1731 dated 5-6-1924 repealed G.O. No. 391 dated 22-10-1921, and in turn G.O. No. 24 dated 7-1-1925 repealed G.O. No. 1731; consequently, only District Judges and District Munsifs (except those at district headquarters) would have jurisdiction to issue succession certificates.
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent's specific arguments in this court.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| P.O. Karthiruma Goundan v. Rangammal, 55 Mad. 701 (A.I.R. 1932 Mad. 456) | Cited for a wide and literal interpretation of a High Court notification (adopting the language of Section 29(1) of the Madras Civil Courts Act), which would include proceedings under Part X of the Succession Act, 1925. | The court noted this decision as authority favouring a broad interpretation of the High Court notification but did not adopt this view as its decisive ground; it recorded the decision as representing one of two divergent judicial approaches. |
| G. Rengaraja Rao v. A. Dulasibai Ammal, 1949-1 M.L.J. 650 (A.I.R. 1949 Mad. 818) | Cited for a more restricted interpretation of the High Court notification, i.e., that the notification did not authorise Subordinate Judges to entertain applications for succession certificates. | The court described Panchapagesa Sastri J.'s restricted-interpretation reasoning as convincing when the 1925 Act is read in light of the history of preceding statutes; however, the court did not decide the point finally because the revision failed for other reasons. |
| Halsbury's Laws of England, vol. 31, p. 561 | Cited for the legal principle that repeal by implication should not be inferred lightly and only arises where a later enactment is plainly repugnant to an earlier one or takes away the entire subject-matter of the earlier provision. | The court relied on this principle to reject the petitioner's contention that G.O. No. 1731 (1924) or G.O. No. 24 (1925) had the effect of repealing G.O. No. 391 (1921) by implication; the court held the earlier notification remained in force. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded in several analytical steps strictly grounded in the material before it:
- Characterisation of the relevant instruments: the court identified three government orders issued under Section 26 of the Succession Certificate Act, 1889 — G.O. No. 391 (22-10-1921) specifically naming the Subordinate Judge of Tuticorin, G.O. No. 1731 (5-6-1924) investing many Subordinate Judges and District Munsifs except those at district headquarters, and G.O. No. 24 (7-1-1925) superseding G.O. No. 1731 as to District Munsifs. The court noted that the 1889 Act had been repealed and re-enacted as Part X of the Succession Act, 1925.
- Continuation of prior notifications: the court observed that Section 24 of the General Clauses Act preserves in force previously issued notifications unless the later Act expressly provides otherwise. The Succession Act, 1925, contained no express provision terminating prior notifications issued under the 1889 Act; therefore the earlier notifications were not automatically terminated on repeal and re-enactment.
- On the contention of repeal by implication: the court rejected the petitioner's submission that G.O. No. 1731 repealed G.O. No. 391 and that G.O. No. 24 in turn repealed G.O. No. 1731. The court reasoned that (a) G.O. No. 1731 did not purport to supersede or deprive powers granted specifically by G.O. No. 391, (b) insofar as G.O. No. 1731 overlaps G.O. No. 391 it does so only in part and does not cover all matters dealt with by G.O. No. 391, and (c) the doctrine of repeal by implication must be applied only where the implication is quite clear or where the later instrument plainly repugnant to the earlier or takes away its entire subject-matter. The court expressly cited Halsbury's statement of this principle.
- Result on jurisdiction: applying the foregoing, the court concluded that G.O. No. 391 remained effective and therefore the Subordinate Judge of Tuticorin retained jurisdiction to entertain the succession-certificate petition.
- On High Court notifications and their interpretation: the court stated it was unnecessary to determine conclusively the legal effect of the High Court notifications issued in 1939 under Section 265 of the Succession Act and Section 29(1) of the Madras Civil Courts Act. It observed that such notifications authorised "all Subordinate Judges to take cognizance of any proceedings under the Indian Succession Act, 1925, which cannot be disposed of by district delegates," and that there were conflicting judicial views — one favouring a wide literal interpretation (including Part X matters) and another favouring a restricted reading. The court acknowledged the historical complexity created by consolidating disparate earlier enactments into the 1925 Act and found the restricted-interpretation reasoning persuasive, but declined to decide that question because the petition failed on the G.O.-interpretation ground.
Holding and Implications
Holding: Revision dismissed with costs.
Implications and direct effect:
- The court held that G.O. No. 391 dated 22-10-1921 remained in force and conferred jurisdiction on the Subordinate Judge of Tuticorin to entertain the petition for the grant of a succession certificate. As a result, the civil revision petition against the interlocutory order was dismissed and costs were awarded.
- The court did not decide finally the broader, unresolved question whether High Court notifications (under Section 265 and Section 29(1) as amended) comprehensively authorised Subordinate Judges to entertain succession-certificate applications; the opinion records divergent judicial views on that point but expressly refrains from resolving them in this case.
- No broader precedent on the interpretation of the High Court notifications was established by this judgment; the decision turned on the interpretation and continuing force of the specific earlier government orders (G.Os) and the application of the principle that repeal by implication should not be lightly inferred.
This summary has been prepared strictly from the text of the provided opinion; no facts or legal conclusions beyond those set out in that opinion have been introduced.
1. This civil revision petition is directed against an interlocutory order of the Subordinate Judge of Tuticorin in O.P No. 33 of 1949, a petition for the issue of a succession certificate under Succession Act (XXXIX[39] of 1925), holding that he had jurisdiction to entertain the application. The contention of the petitioner in this Court is that the Subordinate Judge had no jurisdication. There is no notification of the Provincial Government under S. 388(1), Succession Act, 1925, empowering Subordinate Judges to issue succession certificates. Under Section 26, sub-Section (3) of the Succession Certificate Act (VII[7] of 1889) there were three notifications by the Local Government conferring jurisdiction on Courts inferior to a District Court to issue succession certificates. Effect of these successions issued under that Act is one of the matters that fall to be decided in this case. The provisions of Act XIV[14] of 1926 passed by the Indian Legislature, where by Section 29 of the Madras Civil Courts Act, 1873, was inserted in that Act, empowered the High Court, by notification, to invest ‘judicial officers with jurisdiction in matters arising under the Succession Act. Sections 265 and 388”, Succession Act, empower the High Court and the Provincial Government respectively, by notification, to invest any Court inferior in grade to that of a District Judge with power to exercise the functions of a District Judge under the Act in respect of the matters specified in those sections. The High Court has issued notifications in the exercise of the power conferred upon it under Section 265 of the Succession Act, and Section 29(1) of the Madras Civil Courts Act of 1873, as amended by Act XIV[14] of 1926 of the Indian Legislature authorising all Subordinate Judges to take cognizance of any proceedings under the Succession Act, 1925, which cannot be disposed of by “District Delegates” and appointing all subordinate Judges ex officio as “District Delegates” under the Succession Act, 1925, within the local limits of their respective jurisdiction. It is the effect of these several notifications that has to be considered in arriving at a decision on the question of jurisdiction raised in the present case.
2. Under Section 26(1) of the Succession Certificate Act, 1889, the Local Government by G.O No. 391 dated 22-10-1921 notified that the Subordinate Judge of Tuticorin would have jurisdiction to issue succession certificates. In a later G.O No. 1731 dated 5-6-1924, the Local Government invested all Subordinate Judges and District Munsifs except those at the headquarters of districts (subject to a few exceptions) with the powers of a District Court under the Succession Certificate Act, 1889, within the local limits of their respective jurisdiction. By another notification, G.O No. 24 dated 7-1-1925, superseding G.O No. 1731 (wrongly printed as G.O No. 371 at p. 274 of vol. 1 of the Civil Rules of Practice) the Local Government invested all Courts of District Munsifs in the Presidency except those situated at headquarters of districts, with jurisdiction to issue succession certificates. All these notifications were issued under Section 26 of the Succession Certificate Act, 1889, which has now been repealed and re-enacted as Part x of the Succession Act, 1925. It cannot be successfully contended that with the repeal of the Succession Certificate Act, 1889, and its re-enactment by the Succession Act, 1925, the life of the notifications issued under the earlier Act came to an end by reason of the omission in the later Act of a provision continuing the notifications issued under the earlier Act. Section 24, General Clauses Act, provides for the continuation in force of such notifications unless otherwise expressly provided in the later Act, and there is no such provision in the Succession Act, 1925. The argument of the petitioner is that the second G.O No. 1731 dated 5-6-1924, operated as a repeal of the first G.O No. 391 dated 22-10-1921, and the second G.O was, in its turn, repealed by the third G.O No. 24 dated 7-1-1925 and that the result of the several notifications is that District Judges and District Munsifs, except those at headquarters of districts, alone have jurisdiction to issue succession certificates.
3. I (am unable to accept this argument. While the third notification in terms supersedes the second, the second does not purport to supersede the first. It cannot be said that the first notification became otiose or wholly devoid of any effect after the issue of the second notification. The special notifications empowering certain selected Subordinate Judges' Courts, of which the Tuticorin Subordinate Judge's Court was one, to take cognizance of applications for grant of succession certificates, continued to be in force notwithstanding G.O No. 1731 dated 5-6-1924 because there was nothing in the later G.O depriving those Courts of the jurisdiction vested in them by the earlier notifications. To some extent, G.O No. 1731 dated 5-6-1933 (Sic) may overlap G.O No. 391 in cases where Courts of Subordinate Judges specially empowered by G.O No. 391, fall within the category of Subordinate Judges functioning at places other than headquarters of districts. With reference to Subordinate Judges functioning at the headquarters of districts and empowered by G.O No. 391 to take cognisance of applications for grant of succession certificates, their jurisdiction would remain unaffected by G.O No. 1731 dated 5-6-1924 which confers jurisdiction only on Subordinate Judges and District Munsifs not functioning at headquarters of districts. It is therefore not possible to say that the scope and ambit of G.O No. 1731 dated 5-6-1924 are comprehensive enough to provide for all matters for which G.O No. 391 made provision. In other words, the two G.Os can exist and have operation side by side. The doctrine of repeal by implication must not be resorted to unless the implication is quite clear. An enactment or a rule having the force of law cannot be held to be repealed by implication by a later enactment or statutory rule unless the provisions of the earlier enactment or rule are plainly repugnant to those of the subsequent enactment or rule and the entire subject-matter of the first is taken away by the second. If the two provisions standing together would lead to wholly absurd consequences or if the entire subject-matter of the earlier statutory provision is provided for by a later statutory provision, then there may be room for the application of the rule of repeal by implication. Repeal by implication is not to be lightly inferred and the mere inclusion in a later statutory provision of a portion of the subject-matter contained in an earlier statutory provision cannot by itself have the result of a repeal of the earlier provision. Repeal by implication is the consequence of contradictory or inconsistent legislation and should not be imputed to a legislative or rule-making authority unless one is driven to do so. See Halsbury's Laws of England, vol. 31, p. 561. Even in a case where there is repeal or amendment of an earlier Act by necessary implication, the repeal need not extend to the whole of the provisions of an earlier enactment and certain provisions: of the earlier enactment may survive the repeal or amendment. The present is such a case. In: my opinion, G.O No. 1731 dated 5-6-1924 neither expressly nor by necessary implication repeals the earlier G.O No. 391. In this view, the Subordinate Judge of Tuticorin would have jurisdiction to entertain the petition for the grant of succession certificate.
4. It is unnecessary to consider the effect of the notifications issued by the High Court in 1939 acting under the provisions of Section 26 of the Succession Act, 1925 and the provisions of Section 29(1) of the Madras Civil Courts Act, 1873, as amended by Act, XIV[14] of 1926. These notifications do not, in so many terms, confer jurisdiction on Subordinate Judges to take cognizance of applications for grant of succession certificates.
5. At the same time, the notification authorises
“all Subordinate Judges to take cognizance of any proceedings under the Indian Succession Act 1925, which cannot be disposed of by district delegates.”
District delegates had no place in the old Succession Certificate Act, and under the Succession Act of 1925, could not entertain applications for the issue of succession certificates. The words of the notification are, however, wide and quite general and, literally interpreted, would include proceedings under Part X of the Succession Act. There is a decision of this Court in P.O. Karthiruma Goundan v. Rangammal, 55 Mad. 701 : (A.I.R (19) 1932 Mad. 456) favouring such a wide and literal interpretation of the notification which adopts the language of Section 29(1) of the Madras Civil Courts Act, as amended by Act XIV[14] of 1926. Panchapagesa Sastri J. in the decision reported in G. Rengaraja Rao… v. A. Dulasibai Ammal…., 1949-1 M.L.J 650 : (A.I.R (36) 1949 Mad. 818), was inclined to place a more restricted interpretation on the scope of the notification and to hold that it did not authorise Subordinate Judges to entertain applications for the issue of succession certificates. It is unnecessary for me to express an opinion as to which of these divergent views represents the true intention of the Legislature. The difficulty has arisen from the Succession Act, 1925, assembling together different enactments which dealt with different topics without reference to each other, namely, the Succession Certificate Act, 1889, the Probate and Administration Act, 1881, the Succession Act, 1865, the Succession (Property Protection) Act, 1841, and the Hindu Wills Act, 1870. There was no place for a District delegate in the Succession Certificate Act 1889 while the Probate and Administration Act 1881 gave jurisdiction to a District delegate in non-contentious applications for probate or letters of administration. The Consolidating Act of 1925 has, to some extent, to be interpreted in the light of the history of the previous legislation embodied in the several enactments above referred to, and, if so interpreted, the reasoning of Panchapagesa Sastri J. if I may say so with respect, appears to me to be convincing. I need not pursue the matter further as the civil revision petition fails on my interpretation of G.O No. 391 of 1921 and the subsequent notifications issued by the Government.
6. The civil revision petition is therefore dismissed with costs.
C.R.K/D.H
7. Revision dismissed.
Alert