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S.K Murugesa Mudaly v. Baruda Arunagiri Mudaly And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The suit sought: (a) a declaration of the plaintiff's right of way across a public street (Othavadai street), (b) a direction to the defendants to remove obstructions they had erected on that street, and (c) a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from obstructing the plaintiff's use of the street.
Facts: The plaintiff and other residents of Big Street in Narasingapuram have backyards abutting Othavadai street. Some owners had direct doorways and drainage pits to Othavadai street. The defendants, owners of houses to the south of Othavadai street, constructed mud walls and fences which obstructed the plaintiff and others from using the street to take cattle, manure, hay and other items from their backyards to their fields.
Procedural history: The suit was instituted by the plaintiff without (a) the consent of the Advocate-General under Section 91 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), and (b) without being framed as a representative suit under Order I Rule 8 CPC. The District Munsif of Sholinghur found that the plaintiff had suffered special damage and decreed the suit. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge of Chittoor reversed that finding and dismissed the suit for want of maintainability (holding that the plaintiff had not proved special damage and therefore needed to proceed either as a representative suit or with the Advocate-General's sanction). The plaintiff then filed this second appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the suit by an individual for removal of obstructions in a public street is maintainable without the consent of the Advocate-General under Section 91 CPC or without being instituted as a representative suit under Order I Rule 8 CPC.
- Whether the plaintiff in this case had proved "special damage" sufficient to permit an individual suit rather than requiring the procedural measures mentioned above.
- Whether an obstruction to a village street that primarily affects residents of that village constitutes a "public nuisance" within the meaning of Section 91 CPC (and related penal provisions), thereby attracting the need for Advocate-General sanction.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's (Plaintiff's) Arguments
- The plaintiff asserted that, as an agriculturist, he had long used the street for carrying manure, fuel, hay and for taking his cart and cattle to his fields; the defendants' obstructions hampered those amenities and thereby caused him special damage.
- Even if other residents who are agriculturists suffer similar inconvenience, the plaintiff contended that the damage is nonetheless special to him as a user of the street for agricultural operations.
- The appellant also argued alternative legal characterizations of the defendants' acts — that the case might be regarded as trespass to the plaintiff's right of passage or as an infringement of village customary rights — relying on earlier authorities. (The court noted these contentions but found them unnecessary to decide given its primary conclusions.)
Respondents' (Defendants') Arguments
- The defendants contended that the suit was not maintainable unless the Advocate-General's consent was obtained under Section 91 CPC, because the obstruction concerned a public street; alternatively, the plaintiff should have sued in a representative capacity under Order I Rule 8 CPC.
- The defendants asserted that the plaintiff had not proved special damage — at most he suffered the same inconvenience shared by other residents — and therefore could not maintain an individual action without the procedural safeguards above.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Subbamma v. Narayanamurthi, 1949-1 M.L.J. 56 (A.I.R. 1949 Mad. 634) | Holds that an individual member of the public may maintain a suit for removal of an obstruction to a public highway which constitutes a nuisance without the sanction of the Advocate-General under Section 91 CPC, and even without proof of special damage. | The court relied on this ruling to support the proposition that infringement of the rights of village residents in respect of a public street does not necessarily constitute a public nuisance requiring Advocate-General sanction; thus even if special damage were not proved an individual could maintain the suit. The court noted differences in procedural posture (Subbamma was instituted under O.1 R.8) but applied the holding insofar as it removes the requirement of Advocate-General sanction when the wrong is not a public nuisance to the community at large. |
| Munuswami v. Kuppusami, I.L.R. (1939) Mad. 870 (A.I.R. 1939 Mad. 691) | A decision by Wadsworth J. accepting that an individual plaintiff may maintain suit concerning obstruction to a highway without being a representative plaintiff. | The court observed that Subbamma was founded upon this prior decision; it used Munuswami as supporting authority for the proposition that an individual, not suing as a representative, can maintain such a suit. |
| Manzur Hasan v. Mohammad Zaman, 47 All. 151 (A.I.R. 1925 P.C. 36) | Privy Council authority indicating that the English distinction between indictment and action in relation to what is done on a highway should not be applied in India; informs the availability of civil action by individuals. | The court invoked this decision to justify allowing an individual action in India for wrongs concerning highways even where similar wrongs might have been characterized differently under English law; it reinforced the view that the plaintiff need not be confined to representative procedure solely because the wrong affected more than one person. |
| Valan Pakkiri Taragan v. Subbayan Samban, 42 Mad. 271 (A.I.R. 1919 Mad. 674 F.B.) | Authorities on trespass or obstruction to rights of passage over a public way. | The court acknowledged this ruling as relevant to an argument that the defendants' acts could be treated as trespass, but stated it was unnecessary to consider it further because the court had already concluded the plaintiff suffered sufficient damage and that the suit was maintainable even absent special damage. |
| Lakshmi Dhar Misra v. Rangalal, 1950-1 M.L.J. 100 (A.I.R. 1950 P.C. 56) | Privy Council treatment of infringement of village customary rights. | The court noted this authority as supporting a contention about infringement of village customary rights but again found it unnecessary to decide the case on that basis because of its primary conclusions on maintainability and special damage. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded in a stepwise analysis anchored to the facts, the findings of the lower courts, and relevant authorities:
- Review of lower courts' findings: The District Munsif found on evidence (quoted extensively) that the plaintiff used the street for taking hay, manure, his cart and other purposes and that the defendants' enclosure forced the plaintiff to take a detour, causing special damage. The Subordinate Judge accepted that the defendants had effectively converted a public street into part of their backyards but concluded the plaintiff suffered no special damage beyond that shared by other residents; therefore, the suit was not maintainable except as a representative suit or with Advocate-General sanction.
- Analysis of "special damage" and maintainability: The High Court accepted the plaintiff's contention that, as an agriculturist, the plaintiff's loss of the amenities of the street for carrying manure, fuel, hay etc. constituted special damage. The court expressly held that even if the damage is of a kind shared by other agriculturists in the locality, the plaintiff is nonetheless entitled to maintain the suit.
- Reliance on precedent: The court relied on Subbamma v. Narayanamurthi and Munuswami v. Kuppusami to support the proposition that an individual member of the public may maintain a suit for removal of obstruction to a public highway without the Advocate-General's sanction and without proof of special damage in appropriate cases. The court reasoned that infringement of the rights of village residents in respect of a public street does not necessarily constitute a public nuisance within the meaning of Section 91 CPC (or Section 268 Penal Code), and thus the procedural requirement of Advocate-General sanction is not invariably triggered.
- Doctrinal point drawn from Privy Council authority: The court invoked Manzur Hasan v. Mohammad Zaman to reject the application of the English distinction between indictment and action to Indian circumstances and to justify civil remedies for highway obstructions by individuals.
- Alternative characterizations not necessary to decide: The plaintiff's additional contentions — that the case could be treated as trespass or as an infringement of a village customary right (supported by authorities such as Valan Pakkiri Taragan and Lakshmi Dhar Misra) — were noted. The court found it unnecessary to resolve those contentions because it had concluded that the plaintiff had proved special damage and, in any event, that the suit would be maintainable even without special damage under the authorities cited.
- Conclusion of analysis: On the combined basis of the evidence of use and damage, and of the precedents permitting individual suits in such contexts without Advocate-General sanction, the court held that the Subordinate Judge's dismissal for want of maintainability was incorrect.
Holding and Implications
Holding: APPEAL ALLOWED. The second appeal was allowed with costs in this Court and in the courts below. The High Court concluded that the plaintiff had proved special damage, and further that even in the absence of special damage an individual may maintain such a suit without the Advocate-General's sanction where the wrong complained of does not constitute a public nuisance to the public at large.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The Subordinate Judge's dismissal of the suit for want of maintainability was set aside; the District Munsif's decree (which granted declaration of right of way, directed removal of obstructions, and granted injunction) is effectively supported by the High Court's allowance of the appeal. Costs were awarded to the appellant in this Court and in the lower courts.
- Procedural significance: The court reaffirmed and applied existing authorities to the effect that an individual adversely affected by obstruction of a village street may bring a suit without first obtaining Advocate-General sanction under Section 91 CPC and without necessarily proceeding only by way of a representative suit under Order I Rule 8 CPC, particularly where the wrong does not amount to a public nuisance to the public at large.
- Broader precedent: The opinion applied and relied upon existing precedents (as catalogued above) but did not purport to lay down a novel legal principle beyond the application and reconciliation of those authorities to the facts of this case.
C.R.K/R.G.D
1. This second appeal arises out of a suit for a declaration of the plaintiffs-right of way across a public street, for a direction to the defendants to remove the obstructions put up by them on the street, and for a permanent injunction to restrain the defendants from obstructing the plaintiff in using the public street as such. The only answer to the suit which requires consideration in this second appeal is that it was not maintainable without the consent of the Advocate General in the absence of any special damage sustained by the plaintiff. The defence was rejected by the District Munsif of Sholinghur and the suit decreed on his finding that the plaintiff had suffered special damage. This finding was reversed on appeal by the learned Subordinate Judge of Chittoor who accordingly dismissed the suit. The plaintiff appeals.
2. The plaintiff and certain others are residents of the Big Street in Narasinga puram, Arkonam taluk. The backyards of their houses reach up to the Othavadai street of the same place marked ABCD in the plan attached to the plaint. Some owners have doorways leading to Othavadai street from their backyards and some others have not. Likewise, some of them have pits in that street for their backyard drainage water. The defendants who are owners of houses situate to the south of and facing Othavadai street happened to have constructed mud walls and put up fences and caused obstruction to the plaintiff and others owning houses with their backyards reaching up to Othavadai street in the matter of their taking cattle, manure, hay etc. from their backyards to their fields. The plaintiff on these allegations filed the suit for the reliefs mentioned above without obtaining the sanction, of the Advocate General or framing a Suit as one in a representative capacity under O. 1, R. 8 of the CPC The learned District Munsif took the view that the action complained of against the defendants caused special damage to the plaintiff for the reasons which he gives in para. 8 of his judgment. Says the learned District Munsif:
“… I am satisfied that the plaintiff has been using this street to take hay and manure from his backyard and that he has also used the same to take his cart, and for other purposes spoken to by him and his witnesses. There is little doubt that similarly other persons in the plaintiff's row have used the suit street and plaintiff has undoubtedly suffered by the obstruction caused by the defendants inasmuch as he is prevented from using the suit street to go from his backyard towards east to his lands. To take manure from his backyard to the land to the east of the suit street plaintiff must take a detour, which certainly would justify him in saying that be has suffered special damage. The defendants' case is that the plaintiff can still use his backyard through Ediga street, but it depends upon bow far defendant 1 is going to remain without enclosing that portion of the street into his backyard and it must put the plaintiff to a lot of inconvenience. I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that by defendants' action, plaintiff has suffered something that is special to him and not shared by others or common to all. It is well known that in the villages, if their backyards abut a street, the owners use their backyards freely only from that street, and it is a very valuable right which is curtailed by the defendants' action. Further if the plaintiff wants to construct a small building in the backyard with frontage along the suit street, he cannot do so and it would be very serious loss to him. I therefore hold that the plaintiff has proved special damage.”
In the result, the learned District Munsif decreed the suit as above stated.
3. On appeal taken by the defendants to the Subordinate Judge of Chittoor, it was held by him that on the facts found by the learned District Munsif the plaintiff must be taken to have suffered no more or further damage than the other residents of the some row in the locality and that therefore he had failed to prove special damage to entitle him to institute the suit otherwise than in a representative capacity under O. 1, R. 8 of the CPC, or with the sanction of the Advocate General under Section 91 of the CPC The learned Subordinate Judge has observed that “it is true that the defendants have high-handedly converted gramanatham public street into their backyards,” but has dismissed the suit in the view that he has taken of its unmaintainability.
4. It is urged for the plaintiff in this appeal that he sustained a special damage by the action of the defendants because in his capacity as agriculturist the amenities that he had all along enjoyed over the street for carrying his manure, fuel, hay etc., to his fields stood hampered by such action. It is said that the damage is nonetheless special, because other persons who also pursue the calling of agriculture may suffer the same inconvenience as the plaintiff as the result of the defendants' action. I accept this contention as well-founded and hold that although not instituted with the leave of the Court under O. 1, R. 8 of the CPC, or with the consent of the Advocate-General under Section 91 of the CPC, the present suit is maintainable.
5. My attention has been drawn in the course of the argument to the ruling of this Court in Subbamma v. Narayanamurthi, 1949-1 M.L.J 56 : (A.I.R (36) 1949 Mad. 634) which holds that:
“It is open to an individual member of the public to maintain a suit for removal of obstruction to a public highway which constitutes a nuisance without the sanction of the Advocate-General under Section 91 of the CPC, and even without proof of special damage.”
In that case, however, the suit was one instituted under O. 1, R. 8 of the CPC, and while it is true that the learned Judge who decided that case points out that very often Courts have to deal with the infringement of the rights of the residents of a village or a section of the community in pathways, wells and banks of rivers and so on, and that the infringement of such rights cannot be deemed to constitute a public nuisance within the meaning of Section 91 of the CPC, or S. 268, Penal Code, his conclusion is that a member of such a class can file a representative suit under O. 1, R. 8 of the CPC, for relief in respect of infringement of such rights. That is not the kind of suit which we have here and the ruling in question may not consequently appear to assist the appellant before me.
6. It will be seen, however, on a careful scrutiny of that decision that in holding as it does that it is open to an individual member of the public to maintain a suit for removal of obstruction to a public highway which constitutes a nuisance without the sanction of the Advocate-General under Section 91 of the CPC, and even without proof of special damage, it founds itself upon a prior decision that of Wadsworth J. to the same effect reported in Munuswami v. Kuppusami, I.L.R (1939) Mad. 870 : (A.I.R (26) 1939 Mad. 691). The case before Wadsworth J. was not itself a case of a suit instituted under O. 1, R. 8 of the CPC, but only in the individual capacity of the plaintiff who was entitled to maintain the suit.
7. After all, the provision of O. 1, R. 8, is only an enabling provision, and there is no reason why merely because the plaintiff happens to share the same inconvenience by the obstruction to the highway as other people do he should be debarred of his right to seek relief, when once in view of the Privy Council decision in Manzur Hasan v. Mohammad Zaman, 47 ALL. 151 : (A.I.R (12) 1925 P.C 36) it is realised that the distinction between indictment and action in regard to what is done on a highway which is a distinction peculiar to English law ought not to be applied to India. I am of opinion therefore that even if the damage suffered by the plaintiff in the present case is one which is shared by other residents of the same locality he is still entitled to maintain the present suit. I am also of opinion that the ruling in Subbamma v. Narayanamurthi, 1949-1 M.L.J 56 : (A.I.R (36) 1949 Mad. 634) governs the present case in so far as it lays down that even if proof of special damage is otherwise necessary in a case of this kind it becomes unnecessary because the wrong complained of in the present case does not constitute a public nuisance. As pointed out in that decision, once it is appreciated that infringement of the rights of the residents of a village in respect of a public street, does not constitute a public nuisance in the sense of a nuisance caused to the public in general, such infringement can well be sued upon by any member of the public who suffers from the wrong complained of. The case cannot, in that view, be regarded as one of public nuisance within Section 91 of the CPC, and the sanction of the Advocate-General accordingly is not required. Nor is it necessary to compel a person that suffers from such wrong to have recourse to the procedure prescribed by O. 1 R. 8, which, as already stated, is after all only an enabling and not a compulsory provision.
8. It has also been argued before me for the appellant that this case may well be regarded as one of trespass by the defendants in the sense of their obstruction to his right of passage over the public street which would fall within the rulings in Valan Pakkiri Taragan v. Subbayan Samban, 42 Mad. 271 : (A.I.R (6) 1919 Mad. 674 F.B) and Manzur Hasan v. Mahammad Zaman, 47 All. 151 : (A.I.R (12) 1925 P.C 36) or as one of the infringement of a village customary right such as the Privy Council has recently dealt with in Lakshmi Dhar Misra v. Rangalal, 1950-1 M.L.J 100 : (A.I.R (37) 1950 P.C 56). It is unnecessary for me to consider these contentions in the view that I have taken that there has been, as rightly found by the learned District Munsif, such damage caused to the plaintiff as is sufficient to support his present suit, and that even in the absence of any such special damage the present suit is maintainable.
9. This second appeal is accordingly allowed with costs here and in the Courts below. No leave.
C.R.K/R.G.D
10. Appeal allowed.
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