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V.K Murugappa Mudaliar v. P.M Desappa Nayanim Varu And Others.

Madras High Court
Oct 12, 1949
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Concise Analytical Summary of the Judgment (Delivered by The Chief Justice)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, appellant in O.S. No. 44 of 1946 before the Subordinate Judge of Chittoor, sued for a declaration of title to properties described in Schedule A and for an injunction restraining interference with possession of certain items described in Schedule B. The suit properties originally belonged to Megavarnam (father of defendants 1 and 2 and grandfather of defendant 5).

A decree in O.S. No. 45 of 1940 had been obtained by K.L. Narasimhachari against the present defendants 1 and 2 and the father of defendant 5, and execution proceedings followed. Attachments of the suit properties were ordered on 29 March 1942 in the execution proceedings (E.P. No. 3 of 1942). A transferee-decree-holder, Periya Dasappa Mudali, was brought on record on 10 December 1942.

On 2 January 1943 the Court made an order stating: “Attachment kept alive till the decree is fully satisfied. The petitioner may apply for the proclamation and sale of the attached property by means of a fresh petition accompanied with the D.S.P (Draft sale proclamation).” A fresh execution petition (E.P. No. 29 of 1943) was filed on 1 March 1943, sale proceedings followed, and the sale was ultimately held on 14 March 1944. The plaintiff purchased the properties at that court sale; the sale was confirmed and a sale certificate (Ex. P.1) was issued on 16 January 1945. Possession in some parcels (including the western half of Mamidi thota chenu, which is in Schedule B) was said to have been delivered by the court on 27 March 1945.

The lower Court (Subordinate Judge) dismissed the plaintiff’s suit. Key findings by the lower Court included that (a) a prior sale in favor of defendant 6 could not prevail against the plaintiff's sale because it was made subject to a subsisting attachment, but (b) the plaintiff’s sale was vitiated as against defendant 2 due to alleged failure to give notice to defendant 2 as a major, and (c) the plaintiff had not obtained possession of specific, demarcated portions and was not in possession of Schedule B lands at the time of suit. The plaintiff appealed on two principal grounds: validity of his sale vis-à-vis defendant 2, and his possession of the properties. Defendant 6 appealed the finding that his earlier sale could not prevail over the plaintiff’s subsequent court sale.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the sale in favour of defendant 6 (dated 12 December 1942) could prevail over the plaintiff's later court sale, which turns on whether a subsisting attachment existed on 12 December 1942.
  2. Whether the sale in favour of the plaintiff was invalid as regards defendant 2 because notice was not given to defendant 2 after he had attained majority (i.e., whether failure to notify him as a major vitiates the sale).
  3. Whether the plaintiff was in possession of the suit properties (particularly those in Schedule B) and therefore entitled to injunctive relief in respect of that possession.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff / Appellant

  • Attacked the lower Court's findings on: (i) validity of the sale in his favour vis-à-vis defendant 2; and (ii) that he was not in possession of the suit properties (Schedule B).
  • Pleadings and the plaint asserted that he obtained possession under the court sale and that defendants attempted trespass from May 1946.

Defendant 6

  • Contended that the order of 2 January 1943 should be treated as an order of dismissal of the execution petition for the decree-holder’s default and that, under Order 21, Rule 57 (as amended), attachment ceased from that date so that his sale (12 December 1942) was not subject to any subsisting attachment.
  • Relied on the Division Bench ruling in Venkata Rao v. Surya Rao Bahadur as authority for treating such an order as a dismissal that terminated attachment.

Defendant 2

  • Pleaded that he was a minor during execution proceedings but later attained majority and that no notice was given to him as a major prior to the sale, contending this vitiated the plaintiff's sale as against him. (An earlier challenge to the underlying decree on account of guardian appointment/fraud was not persisted in.)

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Venkata Rao v. Surya Rao Bahadur An order construed as a dismissal for the decree-holder's default may terminate an attachment even if the Court omitted expressly to state that the attachment would cease. The defendant 6 relied on this ruling to argue that the 2 January 1943 order should be treated as a dismissal terminating attachment. The Court examined the order and concluded it was not a dismissal (because it expressly stated "Attachment kept alive...") and therefore Venkata Rao did not control the outcome here; the attachment continued.
Tanguturi Jagannadhan v. Seshagiri Rao Where a judgment-debtor was a major but wrongly treated as a minor throughout execution proceedings (i.e., there was no notice to him as a major), a sale held in such execution proceedings may be set aside at his instance. The Court treated this case as distinguishable: Tanguturi involved a person who was a major throughout but was wrongly described as a minor from the start. In the present case the 2nd defendant was a minor during decisive steps and only (apparently) attained majority later; the Court found no Code provision making it obligatory on the decree-holder to have the erstwhile minor declared a major, and therefore held Tanguturi inapplicable to render the sale invalid.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by addressing the contested issues in turn, applying textual construction of the order dated 2 January 1943, analysis of evidentiary shortcomings, and distinctions between precedents relied upon by parties.

1. Construction of the 2 January 1943 order and the attachment question:

  • The decisive question for defendant 6's contention was whether a subsisting attachment existed on 12 December 1942 (the date of his sale). That, in turn, depended on the legal effect of the order of 2 January 1943.
  • Defendant 6 argued the order should be construed as a dismissal of the execution petition for the decree-holder's default, invoking Order 21, Rule 57 and the Division Bench decision in Venkata Rao v. Surya Rao Bahadur.
  • The Court compared the language of the 2 January 1943 order with the order construed as dismissal in Venkata Rao. In the present case the order began with the words “Attachment kept alive till the decree is fully satisfied,” and expressly permitted the decree-holder to apply afresh for proclamation and sale by a fresh petition with a draft sale proclamation.
  • On the facts and the wording, the Court held that the judge did not intend to dismiss the execution petition, and there was no indication of decree-holder default that warranted dismissal. Because the judge expressly kept the attachment alive, the legal consequence was that the attachment continued.
  • Therefore, on 12 December 1942 there was a valid subsisting attachment, and consequently the earlier sale in favour of defendant 6 could not prevail against the later court sale by which the plaintiff became purchaser. The Court agreed with the lower Judge on this point.

2. Whether failure to give notice to defendant 2 as a major invalidates the plaintiff's sale:

  • The Court noted that the 2nd defendant was a minor at the date of the decree and at the date of defendant 6's sale (12 December 1942). There was no direct evidence on record of the exact date when defendant 2 attained majority; the burden lay on him to produce evidence of the date of majority but he did not do so.
  • The 2nd defendant relied on an affidavit filed on 27 September 1943 in the execution proceedings in which the transferee-decree-holder stated that it was learned that the 2nd defendant had ceased to be a minor. An application to declare the 2nd defendant a major was not disposed finally until 22 June 1944, by which time the sale had already taken place.
  • The Court examined whether the Civil Procedure Code contains any provision obliging a decree-holder to bring to the Court's notice that a judgment-debtor has attained majority such that the decree-holder must procure a formal declaration and serve fresh notice. The Court found no specific provision of the Code creating such an obligation on the decree-holder.
  • The Court distinguished Tanguturi Jagannadhan v. Seshagiri Rao on its facts: Tanguturi concerned a person who was in fact a major throughout but wrongly treated as a minor from the very commencement of execution proceedings, so the entire proceedings were without notice to him. That factual situation is not present here, where the 2nd defendant was a minor at the decisive stages and only allegedly became a major later.
  • In the absence of a direct authority or Code provision obliging the decree-holder to obtain a declaration of majority for an erstwhile minor, and given that the 2nd defendant failed to prove when he attained majority, the Court concluded that the sale held without notice to the 2nd defendant as a major was not invalid as against him.

3. Possession issue:

  • The Court found it could not satisfactorily decide the possession question on the record before it. The plaintiff's plaint did not describe the boundaries of the portions he claimed to have obtained possession of through the Court sale; an application to amend at a late stage was dismissed by the trial Court and the appeal Court found that dismissal was correct.
  • On the evidence the Court was not satisfied that the plaintiff was in possession of the Schedule B properties at the time of instituting the suit. Nor was the evidence sufficient to show that the parcels belonging to the judgment-debtors were definitely demarcated such that the plaintiff had obtained possession through the Court of definite portions.
  • The Court suggested that the question of possession and demarcation would be more satisfactorily litigated in a separate suit in which other sharers (descendants of Megavarnam's brother) are also joined as parties.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The appeal is allowed in part; the decree of the lower Court is set aside, and the plaintiff is declared entitled to the properties set out in Schedule A by virtue of the Court sale held in execution of the decree in O.S. No. 45 of 1940. The plaintiff is not entitled to any other relief.

Implications and immediate consequences:

  • The Court held that there was a subsisting attachment on 12 December 1942; accordingly, the earlier private sale in favour of defendant 6 could not prevail against the later confirmed court sale under which the plaintiff purchased.
  • The plaintiff's sale is not invalid as to defendant 2 for failure to give notice to the 2nd defendant as a major, because there was no evidence of when he attained majority and no Code provision was shown to make the decree-holder obligated to procure a formal declaration of majority prior to the sale.
  • The question of possession of Schedule B lands was left undecided on the record; the plaintiff succeeds only to the limited declaratory relief with respect to Schedule A and is denied other reliefs such as injunctions based on the present pleadings and evidence.
  • The Court recommended that the possession and demarcation issues be litigated in a separate suit including other sharers (descendants of Megavarnam's brother) for a fuller adjudication.
  • Costs: Each party is to bear their own costs in both the appeal Court and the Court below.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down an expansive new precedent beyond its application to the facts; its conclusions are tied to the construction of the specific 2 January 1943 order, the evidentiary record on majority, and the distinctions drawn with cited authorities.
N.R.R
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JUDGMENT

(Delivered by The Chief Justice.)

The plaintiff in O.S No. 44 of 1946 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Chittoor is the appellant. The suit was for a declaration of his title to certain properties described in Schedule A to the plaint and for an injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with his possession and enjoyment of some of the items in schedule A described separately in schedule B.

The suit properties according to the plaintiff originally belonged to one Megavarnam Nayanim Varu, the father of defendants 1 and 2 and the grandfather of defendant 5. One K.L Narasimhachari obtained a decree in O.S No. 45 of 1940 on the file of the Sub Court, Chittoor, against the present defendants 1 and 2 and the father of defendant 5 for the amount due to him under a promissory note executed by Megavarnam. That decree was passed on 19th June 1940. After two applications filed in 1941, E.P No. 3 of 1942 was filed by the original decree-holder against the father of defendant 5, defendant 1 and defendant 2 who was then a minor represented by his mother as his guardian in which inter alia there was a prayer for attachment of properties belonging to the family including the suit properties. It is not disputed that the suit properties, meaning thereby the right, title and interest of Megavarnam's branch in Paimash Nos. set out in the schedule were attached on 29th March 1942. While this execution petition was pending another application E.P No. 149 of 1942, was filed by a person who sought to be brought on record as transferee-decree-holder, viz., Periya Dasappa Mudali. He was eventually brought on record as transferee on 10th December 1942. On 3rd December 1942 there was an order calling upon the decree-holders to produce a draft sale proclamation and further time was granted on 17th December 1942 till 2nd January 1943. On 2nd January 1943 the following order was made on the execution petition:

“Attachment kept alive till the decree is fully satisfied. The petitioner may apply for the proclamation and sale of the attached property by means of a fresh petition accompanied with the D.S.P (Draft sale proclamation).”

On 1st March 1943 a fresh execution petition (E.P No. 29 of 1943) was filed by the transferee-decree-holder. In this application also enforcement of the decree was sought against the father of defendant 5, defendant 1 and defendant 2 described as a minor represented by his mother as guardian. This petition prayed for attachment of properties not concerned in the suit and for sale of the suit properties after due proclamation. From the indorsement on this application we find that the respondents were served with the sale notice and on 22nd September 1943 the Court declared them ex parte and adjourned the proceedings to 27th September 1943 for settlement of proclamation. Eventually on 30th September 1943 there was an order directing the property to be sold on 28th December 1943. The sale was again postponed to 14th March 1944 on which date the sale was held and the suit properties were purchased by the plaintiff. The sale was duly confirmed and a sale certificate, Ex. P. 1, was granted to the plaintiff on 16th January 1945. The properties were described by paimash numbers with extents and with the remark,

“In these properties excluding the one half share belonging to Manikyam Naidu, that is the brother of Megavarnam, the one half share belonging to the defendants, i.e, the judgment-debtors.”

The property set out in schedule B is described as Mamidhi thota chenu in respect of which also what was sold was the half share of Megavarnam. According to the plaintiff in pursuance of this sale certificate he obtained possession of definite parcels of property which belonged to his judgment debtors. In the Mamidi thota chenu (property set out in schedule B) he obtained possession of the western half share belonging to his judgment debtors. The delivery was on 27th March 1945. The plaintiff alleged that he was in possession and enjoyment of the properties from the time he obtained possession through Court but that the defendants were attempting to trespass on the B schedule properties from May 1946. He therefore prayed both for a declaration of his title as well as for an injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with his possession of the B schedule lands.

The main contesting defendants were defendants 2 and 6. Defendant 6 claimed to be the purchaser of the suit properties, i.e, the half share belonging to Megavarnam under sale deed dated 12th December 1942 (Ex. D-2). He contended that his sale would prevail over the auction sale in favour of the plaintiff. Defendant 2's plea was that during the execution proceedings he attained majority but he was not declared a major and no notice was served on him as a major before the date of sale. There was also a plea that the decree in O.S No. 45 of 1940 was not valid and binding on him because there was no proper and valid appointment of guardian and because the guardian was guilty of gross negligence and fraud. But this plea has not been persisted in.

The learned Subordinate Judge found that the sale in favour of defendant 6 was pending a subsisting attachment and therefore did not prevail against the plaintiff's sale. But he held that as there was a failure to give notice to the 2nd defendant as major, the sale in favour of the plaintiff was vitiated by such failure and it was not binding on him. He also held that that the plaintiff did not obtain possession of any specific portions of the property as belonging to his judgment-debtors and that the plaintiff was not in possession of the B schedule lands at the time of the institution of the suit. In the result he held that the plaintiff was not entitled to the suit properties and was not in possession of the same and dismissed the suit.

Before us in appeal the plaintiff attacked the findings of the lower Court on two points, namely, (1) the validity of the sale in favour of the plaintiff so far as defendant 2 is concerned and (ii) possession of the suit properties by him. Defendant 6 in his turn attacked the finding of the learned Judge that the sale in his favour was of no avail against the plaintiff.

The question whether the sale in favour of defendant 6 can prevail over the sale in favour of the plaintiff depends entirely on whether in law there was a subsisting attachment on the date of the sale in his favour, i.e, 12th December 1942 and that attachment never ceased till the Court auction in 1944. The decision of this question eventually depends on the construction of the order passed by the learned Judge on 2nd January 1943 and on the determination of its legal effect. The learned Counsel for defendant 6 contended that this order must be treated in law as an order of dismissal of the execution petition on account of the decree-holder's default and therefore under the provisions of O. 21, R. 57, as amended by this Court the attachment, ceased on and from that date and there was no subsequent attachment of the suit properties before the sale in his favour. He relied upon the ruling of a Division Bench in Venkata Rao v. Surya Rao Bahadur(1). The order in that case which was construed by the learned Judges as an order of dismissal on account of the decree-holder's default was as follows:

“The petitioner had ample time even after filing the E.P Rejected.”

The reference is to the production of the encumbrance certificate. The learned Judges held that this was an order of dismissal and once it was construed as an order of dismissal on account of the default of the decree-holder, the attachment ceased even though the Court omitted to state that the attachment would cease. As was observed by the learned Judges in that case, it is not open to us to canvass the correctness of the order. The only question is whether the order dated 2nd January 1943 could be construed as an order of dismissal. The learned Judges in that case found no indications in the order to show that what the learned District Munsif wanted to do was merely to adjourn the petition. Ultimately, we have to determine on the circumstances and facts of the case before us what was intended and what was expressed by the learned Judge when he passed the order. In our opinion, it is clear that the learned Judge did not dismiss the application. Still less did he indicate that there was default on the part of the decree-holder which deserved a dismissal. On the other hand, the opening words of the order keeping the attachment alive make it abundantly clear that the Judge did not intend to dismiss the application and thereby to raise the attachment. What he did was to keep the attachment alive and to permit the decree-holder to apply for the proclamation of sale of the attached properties by means of a fresh petition. Once we hold that there was no dismissal of the execution petition for the default of the decree-holder, the law is clear that the attachment would continue especially when the Judge himself directed that it should continue till the decree was fully satisfied. It follows therefore that on the date of the sale in favour of defendant 6 i.e, on 12th December 1942, there was a valid attachment subsisting in pursuance of which eventually the Court sale took place and the plaintiff became the purchaser. We agree with the learned Judge's finding on this point.

It is difficult to follow the finding of the learned Judge that the sale in favour of the plaintiff cannot bind the 2nd defendant because of failure on the part of the decree-holder in O.S No. 45 of 1940 to give notice to the 2nd defendant as major. It is common ground that the 2nd defendant was a minor on the date of the decree. He was certainly a minor on the date of the sale in favour of defendant 6 i.e, on 12th December 1942. Thereafter when exactly the 2nd defendant attained majority there is no evidence on record, it was incumbent on him to have led evidence to show exactly when he attained majority. Instead of doing so, what he has chosen to do is to rely upon the statement in an affidavit filed on behalf of the transferee-decree-holder on 27 th September 1943 in E.P No. 125 of 1943 that after the prohibitory order was sent it was learn that he had ceased to be a minor. His application to declare the 2nd defendant, who was the third respondent in the execution petition a major, could not be disposed of finally till 22nd June 1944 by which time the sale had taken place. The position then is that one of the judgment-debtors who was admittedly a minor at the commencement of the proceedings in execution and continued to be a minor when decisive steps were taken by the decree-holder to enforce his rights under the decree, attained majority some time before the sale took place. From the record it appears notices were served on him as a minor by his guardian. The question is whether there is anything in the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code which compels a decree-holder to bring to the notice of the Court that one of the judgment, debtors had attained majority and after a declaration to that effect he should take out notice to that judgment-debtor as major. Learned Counsel for the contesting respondents was unable to point out any such specific provision in the Code. He relied on the ruling in Tanguturi Jagannadhan v. Seshagiri Rao, in support of his contention that a sale held without notice to one of the judgment-debtors who was a major but who had been wrongly described as a minor was liable to be set aside at the instance of that judgment-debtor. In that case the judgment-debtor was wrongly treated as a minor throughout the execution proceedings from their very commencement. Actually he had attained majority even before the decree though he was a minor at the time of the institution of the suit. That was not a case in which a judgment-debtor was a minor at the time of the commencement of the execution proceedings but had attained majority during the continuance of such proceedings. That case can be likened to a suit against a major described wrongly as a minor. Strictly speaking, such a person cannot be deemed in law to have been a party at all to the suit. On the same analogy, if a person, who was a major at the time of the commencement of the execution proceedings, was throughout the proceedings wrongly described as a minor and notice never went to him as a major, the result would be that the entire proceedings were without notice to him. A sale held in the course of such execution proceedings certainly cannot bind him. That however is not the case here. The 2nd defendant was certainly a minor at the time when O.P No. 3 of 1942 was filed and at the time when the transferee-decree-holder was brought on record, and there is nothing on record to show that he was not a minor even when E.P No. 29 of 1943 was filed on 1st March 1943. If thereafter he became a major, there is nothing in law which made it obligatory on the part of the decree-holder to have him declared as a major. If he had attained majority, he could have himself brought that fact to the notice of the Court. In the absence of any direct authority that the decree-holder is under an obligation to take steps to have it declared that an erstwhile minor judgment-debtor has attained majority, we are of opinion that the sale held in this case without notice to the 2nd defendant as major was not invalid.

There remains then the question of possession. We do not think that this question can be satisfactorily disposed of in this case. In his schedule to the plaint, the plaintiff did not describe the boundaries of the properties which according to him he obtained possession of through Court in pursuance of the sale certificate in his favour. No doubt he filed an application for amendment at a late stage; but that application was dismissed and rightly. We are not satisfied on the evidence on record that the plaintiff was in possession of the properties in schedule B. In any event, the evidence is not of such a character as to compel us to hold that the properties which belonged to the judgment-debtors in O.S No. 45 of 1940 were definitely demarcated and that the plaintiff obtained possession through Court of definite portions of what was certainly at one time the property belonging to undivided brothers. We think that it would be more satisfactory if this matter is fully thrashed out in a separate suit to which the other sharers i.e, the descendants of Megavaram's brother are also parties.

In our opinion therefore the plaintiff in this suit would only be entitled to a declaration that he is entitled to the properties set out in schedule A by virtue of the Court sale held in execution of the decree in O.S No. 45 of 1940. He will be entitled to no other relief.

The decree of the lower Court is set aside and the appeal is allowed in part and there will be a decree as indicated above. We think that in the circumstances of this case each party should bear his costs, both here and in the Court below.

N.R.R