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M.R.S. Mani v. District Magistrate, Mathurai

Madras High Court
Mar 21, 1949
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, I of 1947)

Factual and Procedural Background

This consolidated opinion arises from multiple applications filed under Section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code by persons detained in jail under Madras Act I of 1947 (the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act). The detained persons (detenus) raised broadly similar grounds challenging the legality of their preventive detention orders under S. 2(1)(a) of the Act and/or the subsequent treatment of those orders by the Provincial Government under S. 2(2) and S. 3. The Court heard argument on common legal questions of general importance before addressing particular petitions on their facts.

The opinion records that (i) many detentions were made initially by delegated authorities and later reported to the Provincial Government, (ii) in several instances there were delays in communicating grounds to detenu, delays in placing matters before the Advisory Council, and delays in passing final orders under S. 3(5), and (iii) the grounds communicated in many cases were challenged as vague, general or outside the ambit of S. 2(1). The Court considered both general legal principles and specific petitions (e.g., Cr. M. P. Nos. 190, 191, 192 of 1949) and, in those individual matters, directed release in some cases and dismissed others as recorded in the opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, and to what extent, an order of detention made under S. 2(1)(a) of Madras Act I of 1947 can be challenged in a proceeding under S. 491 Cr. P. C., particularly where the initial order alleges "satisfaction" of the detaining authority.
  2. What is the legal character of the "satisfaction" required by S. 2(1) — subjective (personal) or objective — and what scope has the Court to examine that satisfaction?
  3. Whether the detaining authority must "exercise its mind" on relevant material and, if it has not, whether the order is void for want of jurisdiction.
  4. When reasons or grounds communicated under S. 3(1) are vague, indefinite or outside the scope of S. 2(1), whether the continuance of detention becomes illegal.
  5. Whether non-compliance, inordinate delay, or substantial failure to comply with the procedural requirements of S. 2(2) and S. 3 (including S. 3(1), S. 3(2) and S. 3(5)) can render a detention that was lawful at inception illegal as to its continuance.
  6. What other defects (e.g., mala fides, identity, delegated authority, authenticity of order) are examinable by the Court under S. 491 Cr. P. C.?

Arguments of the Parties

Applicants' (Detenus') Arguments

  • Counsel for detenus urged that courts must exercise the powers under S. 491 Cr. P. C. freely and liberally to protect personal liberty against unjustifiable executive interference.
  • Applicants contended that many detentions were effected without compliance with statutory formalities (S. 2(2), S. 3(1), S. 3(2), S. 3(5)) and that inordinate delays in performing those steps rendered continuance of detention illegal.
  • It was argued that grounds furnished to many detenus were vague, general, lacking particulars and often stated membership of a political party without individualized acts, so the detenu could not make an effective representation.
  • Some applicants argued that making an order of detention where a person was already in custody under ordinary criminal procedure (e.g., S. 151 Cr. P. C.) evidenced mala fide intent to circumvent criminal process.
  • In particular petitions (e.g., Cr. M. P. No. 190), counsel contended the original detention order was void ab initio because the grounds communicated would not justify the detention.

Respondent (State / Government) Arguments

  • The State relied on the doctrine that the satisfaction required by S. 2(1) is a subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority (Provincial Government or delegate) and, if validly reached, is not open to the Court to interrogate as to sufficiency of material or reasonableness of inference in a S. 491 proceeding.
  • The Government invoked decisions (notably Venkataraman v. Commissioner of Police) to contend that where the initial order was valid at inception, subsequent non-compliance with procedural provisions (S. 2(2) and S. 3) would ordinarily be irregularities that do not invalidate the detention, particularly if the grounds and particulars were eventually furnished and the detenu had an opportunity to make representations before the Court heard the application.
  • The State implicitly relied on the emergency character of Act I of 1947 and the latitude given to the executive in matters of preventive detention for public safety and order.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rex v. Halliday [1917] A.C. 260 Illustration of English wartime regulations upholding detention without trial and refusal of habeas corpus; executive detention under emergency powers. Cited as part of the English authorities demonstrating that emergency regulations have been held to displace habeas corpus in times of crisis; the Court observed such cases influenced interpretation of Madras Act I of 1947, but emphasised that executive powers must be exercised strictly within statutory terms.
Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson (Liversidge's Case) Support for view that executive satisfaction under emergency regulations may not be justiciable in certain respects. The Court referenced Liversidge's Case as one of the English authorities that influenced interpretation; however, the opinion insists the detaining authority must still exercise its powers within the four corners of the statute and courts will insist on formal compliance.
Greene v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs (Green's Case) Court of Appeal and House of Lords held that discrepancies in documents furnished to detenu may be procedural irregularities that do not invalidate a valid order if no prejudice results. The opinion analyses Greene's case closely, noting the House of Lords applied a "prejudice" test; the Court distinguishes Greene and declines to accept that Gre ene establishes the broad proposition that subsequent non-compliance can never render continuance illegal. The Court adopts the prejudice and substantive-compliance-focused approach where applicable.
A. K. Gopalan v. District Magistrate, Malabar [1949] M.W.N. 105; Cr. 33 Observations (Subba Rao, J.) emphasising the Court's duty to ensure no illegal detention and that all statutory restrictions on liberty must be observed. The Court expressly agrees with Subba Rao J.'s observations and relies on them when stressing the duty of courts to protect personal liberty and to insist on strict compliance with statutory provisions.
G. Narayanaswami Naidu v. Inspector of Police, Mayavaram [1948] M.W.N. 853; Cr. 193 Held that an order under Act I of 1947 is open to challenge under S. 491 Cr. P. C. if not made in conformity with the Act. The opinion treats this Full Bench decision as establishing the limits of judicial inquiry — e.g., authentication, identity, bona fides, absence of required satisfaction — and relies on it as a foundation for examining challenges to detentions.
Basantha Chandra Ghose v. Emperor / Sibnath Banerji's Case Considered issues of validity of detention; decisions from Federal Court and appeal to Judicial Committee discussed how courts reviewed detention orders under emergency/regulatory provisions. The opinion cites Spens C. J.'s observations in the Federal Court and the Judicial Committee's affirmance as authority on the limits of judicial inquiry and on circumstances where an order may be upheld.
Keshav Talpade's case [1944] M.W.N. 28 Principle: where multiple reasons are given and some are bad, the court cannot be certain which reasons produced the detention; such uncertainty can vitiate the order. The Court applies this principle to hold that if satisfaction is derived from a mixture of relevant and wholly irrelevant considerations, detention is invalid because the court cannot tell what influenced the authority.
In Re Raj Dhar Kalu Patil Chagla C. J.: if a reason lies outside statutory scope the whole order is vitiated; distinction between extraneous reasons and vague/indefinite reasons which may be ignored. The opinion adopts Chagla C. J.'s distinction and uses it to hold that extraneous grounds vitiate an order, while vague particulars may be treated differently (ignored) if separable from valid grounds.
Venkataraman v. Commissioner of Police, Madras [1949] M.W.N. 9 Held that an order valid at inception does not necessarily become invalid by subsequent non-compliance with some procedural provisions; delayed compliance in that case was treated as irregularity cured before hearing. The Court analyses and contrasts Venkataraman: while acknowledging the case, the opinion questions the breadth of its conclusion and explains that where procedural non-compliance is substantial or results in prejudice/unexplained unreasonable delay, continuance may become illegal.
In re Venkatachala Thevar Delay in serving grounds was characterised as unconscionable but cured where reasons were furnished before the hearing. The Court cites this case as an instance where delay was cured by subsequent compliance; it treats such producing of reasons pre-hearing as potentially curing some procedural defects.
Murat Patwa v. Province of Behar [1949] A.I.R Pat 135 Full Bench decision holding that time for performing steps after initial detention must be reasonable and expeditious; unreasonable delays can render detention illegal. Used by the Court to support the proposition that statutory steps must be taken within a reasonable time and that unexplained unreasonable delay may vitiate continued detention.
Nek Muhammad v. Province of Behar [1949] A.I.R Pat I.F.B. High Court authority supporting the view that continuance may become illegal where particulars are indefinite and statutory formalities are not substantially complied with. Relied on by the Court as part of a body of High Court authority holding that lack of substantial compliance with S. 3 (or corresponding provisions) renders continuance illegal.
Durga Das v. Rex [1949] A.I.R All 48 (and related High Court decisions) Support for principle that vague/indefinite particulars constitute non-compliance and make continuance illegal. Cited among other High Court decisions to reinforce the conclusion that S. 3(1) must be complied with in substance and that vague grounds are insufficient.
Inder Prakash v. Emperor [1949] A.I.R All 37 Similar High Court treatment of preventive detention procedural requirements. Referenced as part of supporting High Court authority on the need for substantive compliance with procedural safeguards.
Dale's Case [L.R. 6 Q.B.D. 376] Rule that imprisonment or forfeiture under statutory power requires every step to be taken with strict regularity; irregularities may invalidate detention even if seemingly formal. The Court cites Brett L. J.'s strong language to support a principle that statutory powers that deprive liberty must be exercised in strict conformity with prescribed steps; used to bolster view that continuance of detention may become illegal for substantial non-compliance.
Johnson v. Lyttle's Iron Agency [1877] 5 Ch. D. 687 Departures from statutory form render notices and consequent resolutions invalid; strict compliance required. Quoted to illustrate strictness applied by courts in matters resulting in forfeiture or deprivation of rights; used analogically to emphasise strict compliance in detention cases.
Ezhugbayi Eleko v. Government of Nigeria Judicial Committee decision supporting principle that steps condition precedent to forfeiture/penalty must be strictly complied with. Cited to show analogous principle: deprivation of property or liberty without strict compliance with statutory steps is invalid.
Pramela Devi's Case Judicial Committee emphasised strict adherence to formalities in corporate forfeiture context. Referred to by analogy: the Court notes that similar strictness is demanded when statutory powers affect rights or property (here personal liberty).
In Re Srinivasan, Cr. M. P. No. 43 of 1949 Example cited where primary purpose of detention was to circumvent ordinary criminal processes; treated as mala fide exercise. Used as an example in the opinion to illustrate circumstances that may show mala fide exercise of preventive detention power.
Durgadas v. Rex; In re Krishnaji Gopal Brahma (A.I.R Bom. 360) High Court authorities holding that indefinite particulars amount to non-compliance with protective procedural provisions. Relied upon by the Court in support of the conclusion that vagueness or absence of particulars under S. 3(1) can render continuance illegal.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds in distinct steps, closely tracking the statutory scheme and the authorities cited. The Court's reasoning can be summarized as follows:

  1. Statutory stages of preventive detention:

    The Court identifies seven discrete stages in S. 2–3 proceedings: (1) the detaining authority's satisfaction that the person is acting/about to act/likely to act prejudicially to public safety or public order; (2) an order of detention under S. 2(1)(a); (3) reporting to the Provincial Government with grounds if the order is by a delegate (S. 2(2)); (4) communication to the detenu of the grounds and particulars sufficient to enable a representation (S. 3(1)); (5) reference to the Advisory Council with materials and any representation (S. 3(2)); (6) report by the Advisory Council (S. 3(4)); and (7) final order by Provincial Government confirming/modifying/canceling (S. 3(5)).

  2. Nature of "satisfaction" under S. 2(1):

    The Court holds that the required satisfaction is essentially a personal, subjective state of mind of the detaining authority: the detaining authority's satisfaction is the condition precedent to jurisdiction. Ordinarily the Court cannot probe the sufficiency of the materials or the reasonableness of the satisfaction in a S. 491 proceeding. The detaining authority may act on confidential information, hearsay, or material not disclosed to the detenu.

  3. Limits of judicial non-interference — exceptions:

    Despite the subjective character of satisfaction, the Court explains clear exceptions permitting judicial interference: (a) where the detaining authority did not in fact exercise its mind (i.e., the recital of satisfaction is a mere mechanical routine or outcome of police recommendation); (b) where the order is not duly authenticated or there is mistaken identity; (c) where the order is mala fide or a colourable exercise of power; and (d) where the grounds relied upon are wholly outside the ambit of S. 2(1). In these situations the order is not, in law, an order under S. 2(1) and is vulnerable to challenge under S. 491.

  4. Mixed grounds and the "taint" problem:

    The Court follows authority (Keshav Talpade, In Re Raj Dhar) that where the detaining authority's stated satisfaction is derived from a mixture of valid and wholly irrelevant considerations, the court cannot ascertain whether the invalid considerations influenced the decision; in such cases the detention is vitiated. Conversely, where some grounds are valid and some are merely vague or indefinite but not extraneous, the vague ones may be ignored and the order upheld on the definite grounds.

  5. Requirement of particulars under S. 3(1):

    The Court stresses that S. 3(1) imposes a peremptory duty on the Provincial Government to communicate the grounds and such particulars as are, in the Government's opinion, sufficient to enable the detenu to make a representation, subject only to the qualification that facts prejudicial to the public interest may be withheld. "Grounds" must convey facts and circumstances on which conclusions are based — not mere abstract conclusions or party affiliation alone. Vague, indefinite or universally-worded grounds that do not relate to the individual or do not disclose facts enabling a focused rebuttal will fail to satisfy S. 3(1) in substance.

  6. Effect of procedural non-compliance and delay:

    The Court carefully examines conflicting authority (Greene, Venkataraman, Venkatachala Thevar, Murat Patwa and other High Court Full Benches). It rejects an absolute rule that once an initial order is valid it can never become invalid by subsequent non-compliance. Instead, the Court holds that substantial compliance with the procedural safeguards of S. 2(2) and S. 3(1)–(5) is essential to sustain the legality of the continuance of detention. Unreasonable or unexplained delays in communicating grounds, placing matters before the Advisory Council, or passing final orders may render continued detention illegal. Whether delay or non-compliance is unreasonable is fact-sensitive and judged with reference to circumstances; generally, steps must be taken expeditiously and within a reasonable time.

  7. Bona fides and mala fides:

    The Court reiterates that lack of bona fides vitiates detention. Detention will be mala fide if actuated by personal malice, political animosity, to prevent lawful activities, to extend an ordinary sentence improperly, or to frustrate bail orders. Examples from earlier decisions and cases before the Court are used to illustrate when detention may be regarded as mala fide.

  8. Practical concerns — cyclostyle orders and administration:

    The Court notes administrative practices that reproduced the language of S. 2(1) mechanically in cyclostyle orders without specifying which of the three alternatives (acting / about to act / likely to act) applied. Such mechanical reproduction creates suspicion that the detaining authority did not exercise its mind. However, if the grounds communicated under S. 3(1) specify the actual reasons and particulars, any prejudice from a cyclostyle order may be cured.

  9. Remedies and their availability:

    The Court examines the practical availability of remedies. It questions the effectiveness of non-statutory remedies (mandamus, damages) against the Provincial Government in this statutory context and stresses the importance of S. 491 proceedings to test legality where statutory requirements are not substantially complied with.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court articulated and applied the following core holdings:

  • The satisfaction required by S. 2(1) is essentially subjective and the Court will not ordinarily examine the sufficiency of the materials or the reasonableness of that satisfaction in a S. 491 proceeding. However, this immunity is not absolute.
  • The Court may interfere under S. 491 when: (a) the detaining authority did not in fact exercise its mind (the recital of satisfaction is mechanical); (b) the grounds relied upon are outside the statutory ambit of S. 2(1); (c) the stated reasons are a mixture of relevant and wholly irrelevant considerations such that the court cannot determine what influenced the authority; (d) there is lack of bona fides (mala fides); (e) defects in authentication, identity or delegated authority exist; or (f) procedural non-compliance with S. 2(2) and S. 3(1)–(5) is substantial (e.g., unexplained, unreasonable delay or vagueness of grounds) so as to render continuance illegal.
  • Substantial compliance with S. 2(2) and S. 3(1)–(5) is essential to sustain the continuance of detention; unreasonable delay or failure to furnish grounds and particulars that enable effective representation can invalidate continued detention even if the initial order was valid ab initio.

Direct consequences in the decided petitions:

  • Cr. M. P. No. 190 of 1949 — the Court found the grounds vague and outside the scope of the Act and directed that the applicant be set at liberty forthwith.
  • Cr. M. P. No. 191 of 1949 — the Court found no compliance with S. 3(1) as particulars were not furnished; the petitioner was directed to be set at liberty forthwith.
  • Cr. M. P. No. 192 of 1949 — the Court found the grounds and particulars sufficient and dismissed the application.

Implications for future cases and administration:

  • Detaining authorities must genuinely exercise their minds and should avoid issuing routine/cyclostyle orders without specifying the precise statutory ground relied upon.
  • Provincial Governments must furnish grounds and particulars under S. 3(1) in substance — grounds must relate to the particular detenu and include factual circumstances enabling an effective representation (subject to withholding facts prejudicial to public interest where permitted by statute).
  • Procedural steps under S. 2(2) and S. 3 must be taken expeditiously and within a reasonable time; unexplained or unreasonable delay may render continued detention illegal.
  • Courts retain the power under S. 491 to examine certain aspects of detentions under the Act (authentication, identity, bona fides, whether the authority exercised its mind, scope of grounds, and substantial procedural compliance) notwithstanding the generally subjective nature of the required "satisfaction".

Note on precedent-setting: The opinion applies and reconciles existing authorities (English and Indian) and High Court decisions; it does not purport to state that it creates a fundamentally new principle beyond the careful application and synthesis of existing case law as recorded in the judgment.

Closing Observations from the Opinion

The judgment emphasizes the delicate balance between the executive's statutory power to detain in emergencies and the Court's sacred duty to protect individual liberty. The Court repeatedly underscores that emergency powers must be exercised strictly within statutory limits, that safeguards provided by S. 3 are not mere formalities, and that courts will act where the statutory protections are defeated by mala fide exercise, failure to exercise decision, extraneous reasons, unacceptable vagueness or unreasonable delay.

Show all summary ...

Viswanatha Sastri, J.: — We have, during the last few days, been hearing many applications filed under S. 491, Cr. P. C. by persons detained in Jail under Madras Act I of 1947. The grounds raised by the applicants in these applications are more or less the same and are of general importance. We heard arguments on the common questions arising for decision in these applications before considering them individually on their merits. We are indebted to the learned counsel for their assistance.

In these applications we have been repeatedly and forcibly reminded by counsel for the detenus that it is our duty to exercise our powers under S. 491, Cr. P. C. freely and liberally in order to protect the personal liberty of citizens against unjustifiable interference by executive authority. Language much more trenchant and even provocative, is employed in the affidavits filed by the detenus themselves in support of their applications. Madras Act I of 1947 professes to be an emergency measure and not a permanent part of the statute book. In the troublous times through which this country has recently been passing, interference with the personal liberty of citizens has been extended and legalised by the legislature to an extent which would not have been, considered as legitimate in normal times. These temporary encroachments on individual freedom have been made in the larger interests of the State, dictated as they are by the paramount needs of peace, order and good Government. It is the considered opinion of the Legislature as expressed in the preamble to Act I of 1947 that there is an urgent necessity for imposing, in the interests of public peace and tranquillity, and for ensuring the continuance of services vital to the life of the community, restraint on individual liberty. The Act has imposed the duty, and given the power of taking preventive action against persons acting or about to act in any manner prejudicial to public safety or the maintenance of public order, the Provincial Government or its duly constituted delegate. S. 16 (1) of the Act prevents an order made in the exercise of a power conferred by or under the Act from being called in question in any court. Preventive detention in connection with the maintenance of public order is within the legislative competence of the Provincial Legislature under the Government of India Act, 1935 (Schedule VII, list No. 2, entry No. 1) and it has not been contended before us that Act I of 1947 as a whole or S. 16 (1) in particular, is ultra wires the Provincial Legislature.

In England the House of Lords on two memorable occasions, in times of national crisis, upheld the legality of the imprisonment of British subjects without trial and opportunity of defence in court, if the Home Secretary thought it reasonable to imprison them in the interests of the public safety and for the due prosecution of the war. It was held that the executive was not even compellable to give its reasons for detention. The writ of habeas corpus, the most important writ known to English Constitutional Law and one of the privileges of Englishmen zealously guarded and maintained by the English Courts, was held to have been displaced in effect, though not in form, by the emergency powers of preventive detention vested in the executive by the legislature. The restraint was held not to be illegal because it was justified by the terms of the statutory regulation and the writ of habeas corpus was, therefore, refused. I am referring to the well-known “Regulation 14 (B) “ and “Regulation 18 (B) “ cases Rex v. Halliday [1917] A.C 260, Liversidge's Case2 and Green's Case3 which have largely influenced the interpretation of Madras Act I of 1947 notwithstanding the difference between the English Regulation and the Indian enactment. Neither the fact that drastic powers have been given to the executive authority nor the fact that they are liable to abuse, should stand in the way of our interpreting and giving effect to the terms of Act I of 1947 according to their plain and natural meaning. At the same time, as the Act empowers the executive to deprive a subject of his liberty without a trial and conviction, — indeed for no offence of his — the process being somewhat euphemistically called “preventive justice” or “preventive detention”, this Court ought to insist that the executive exercises its powers strictly in accordance with the terms of the statute and within its four corners and observes every formality prescribed by the Act. I respectfully agree with the following observations of Subba Rao, J. in A.K. Gopalan v. District Magistrate, Malabar [1949] M.W.N 105; Cr. 33. which arose under this Act.

It is the sacred duty of this Court to see that no citizen of this province, whether he is rich or poor, whether he belongs to this or that political persuasion is illegally detained for one minute …. No provision of the statute restricting the liberty of the citizen can be overlooked and no breach of any provision thereof can be condoned on the ground of administrative convenience.”

In spite of the enactment of S. 16 of Madras Act I of 1947 restricting the jurisdiction of courts, it is now well settled that an order of detention made under Act I of 1947 is open to challenge in an application under S. 491, Cr. P. C. on the ground that it was not made in conformity with the powers conferred by that Act: G. Narayanaswami Naidu v. Inspector Of Police, Mayavaram [1948] M.W.N 853; Cr. 193., Sibnath Banerji's Case6 on appeal from the Federal Court7 Basantha Chandra Ghose v. Emperor [1945] M.W.N 445, Cr. 91. Personal liberty is one of the most cherished rights of a citizen of this or any other civilized country of which he cannot be deprived except by and in strict conformity with the law. On what grounds then can the legality of an order of detention made under S. 2 (1) (a) of Madras Act I of 1947 be questioned by the person aggrieved?

An analysis of the provisions of the Act governing the preventive detention of persons reveals the following seven steps or stages in the proceedings connected with such a detention. (1) Satisfaction of the Provincial Government or its delegate empowered under S. 15, that a person is acting or about to act or likely to act in any manner prejudicial to public safety or the maintenance of public order [S. 2 (1)]. (2) Order directing the detention of such a person [S. 2 (1) (a)]. (3) Report to be made forthwith to the Provincial Government together with the grounds of detention and other particulars if the order for detention is made by a delegate of the Government [S. 2 (2)]. (4) Communication to the detenu or the grounds of the order for detention with particulars sufficient to enable him to make a representation against the order. (5) Reference by the Provincial Government to the Advisory Council of the case of the detenu together with the grounds for the detention and the representation of the detenu, if any [S. 3 (2)]. (6) Submission of its report by the Advisory Council to the Provincial Government [S. 3 (4)]. (7) Order of the Provincial Government confirming or cancelling or modifying the order made under S. 2 (1) [S. 3 (5)].

The first and second steps above enumerated are connected with the initial detention. Before at all exercising the power of detention and passing an initial order therefor the Provincial Government or its duly empowered delegate, must be satisfied that a person is acting or about to act or likely to act in a manner prejudicial to public safety or the maintenance of public order. This is a fundamental requisite essential to give jurisdiction to the detaining authority to act. It is the satisfaction of the detaining authority that matters. It is a personal or “subjective” and not an impersonal or “objective” standard of satisfaction. The court cannot examine the conscience of tee detaining authority to find out whether its reasons for satisfaction were sufficient. No outside decision is involved in this matter of satisfaction which rests solely with the detaining authority. The detaining authority can act on hearsay evidence and is not bound to derive its satisfaction from legal evidence. The information on which it acts is likely to be of a confidential character which need not be communicated to the detenu or disclosed in Court. If the detaining authority has acted in good faith and has come to decision on relevant materials placed before it that detention is necessary, the Court cannot enquire into the sufficiency of the materials or reasonableness of its satisfaction in regard to the matters of which it is required to be satisfied.

It is open, however, to the applicant, if he can, to establish that the detaining authority has not exercised its mind on the materials placed before it and has not satisfied itself about the necessity for the detention and therefore the order for detention, though purporting to be passed under S. 2 (1) (a), must be deemed not to be an order under the section. If there is sufficient material before the Court for holding that the recital in the order is inaccurate and that the order is merely a routine order mechanically passed or the mere outcome of police recommendation and not of a decision on the part of the detaining authority under S. 2 (1) then this court would interfere under S. 491, Cr. P. C.: Sibnath Banerji's Case on appeal from the decision in the Federal Court and G. Narayanaswami Naidu v. Inspector Of Police, Mayavaram. S. 3 (1) requires the Provincial Government to communicate, to the detenu the grounds on which an order for his detention has been made against him together with such particulars as it considers necessary to enable him to make a representation against the order for detention. If the grounds and particulars furnished disclose that the detaining authority had not exercised its mind at all or had applied its mind to and acted upon considerations, wholly irrelevant to and outside the ambit and scope of S. 2 of Act I of 1947, then, I should think it is open to this Court to hold that the detaining authority had not the requisite satisfaction regarding the necessity for detention and that the detention is bad for that reason. It has been held in England that where the return to an habeas corpus consists of a narrative of facts, it will be bad if the facts stated do not show a legal cause for the detention.*

It is not permissible for this Court to go into the correctness of the facts alleged by the detaining authority but it is equally clear that accepting the facts at their face value, the Court can say that the satisfaction of the detaining authority is not a real satisfaction or a satisfaction in accordance with law. In Liversidge's case Lord Wright said: “Satisfied” must mean reasonably satisfied. It cannot import an arbitrary or irrational state of being satisfied.” Suppose a person convicted of cheating, forgery, or murder, served his sentence ten years ago and is detained under S. 2 (1) (a) of Act I of 1947 on the ground of his previous conviction and his consequent undesirable antecedents. This Court is entitled to say that the detention is bad either because the detaining authority had not exercised its mind at all on the relevant considerations or because that the satisfaction of the detaining authority which is required by S. 2 (1) did not exist. Similarly, if a person is detained merely on the ground of his religious, political or economic beliefs and opinions or because he is addicted to some personal vice, without anything relating to the maintenance of public safety or order appearing from the grounds, then also the detention would be held to be bad for the same reasons. Even if a person had been convicted of an offence involving a breach of the public peace, still, if the event happened in the remote past and the satisfaction of the detaining authority does not relate to conduct persisted in after the coming into force of Act I of 1947, the detention would be bad. I do not mean to suggest that antecedent conduct would not furnish reasonable grounds for finding out the present attitude of a person and for coming to a conclusion that he is acting or likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the public safety or maintenance of public order. All that I mean is that acts done in the proximate and immediate past and not in the remote past, should alone be relied upon to obtain the satisfaction that is required under S. 2 (1).

If the grounds and particulars furnished under S. 3 (1) are within the ambit and scope of and relevant to S. 2 (1), then this court is not entitled to say that the materials were too slender or too untrustworthy to furnish satisfaction to the detaining authority. Sufficiency of the relevant material or the reasonableness of the inference to be drawn from such relevant material is not for this court to enquire into. Supposing a man attempts forcibly to enter upon another's property and threatens to assault persons who prevent his unlawful entry, and an order for detention is passed against him under S. 2 (1) on the ground that he is likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order in the locality, this court cannot question the propriety of the order, merely because, in its opinion, the incident which led to the satisfaction of the detaining authority is an isolated, trivial or easily avertible threat to public peace or the maintenance of public order. The material is relevant and admissible and the quantum of the evidence as well as the propriety of the inference drawn therefrom are not matters left for the consideration of the court but of the executive which has latitude of choice.

Take a case where the grounds and particulars furnished under S. 3 (1) are such that some of them are within the scope and ambit of S. 2 and some are wholly outside it and the satisfaction of the detaining authority is derived from both of them. It is impossible to say whether relevant and admissible or wholly irrelevant and inadmissible considerations gave the requisite satisfaction to the detaining authority. In such a case detention would be bad. Sir Maurice Gwyer C, J. in delivering the judgment of the Federal Court in Keshav Talpade's case [1944] M.W.N 28 (overruled on another point by the Judicial Committee) dealt with such a situation in this way:

If a detaining authority gives four reasons for detaining a man without distinguishing between them, and if two or three of the reasons are held to be bad, it (the court) can never be certain to what extent the bad reasons operated on the mind of the authority or whether the detention order would have been made at all if only one or two good reasons had been before them.”

Chagla C. J. in In Re Raj Dhar Kalu Patil10 dealt with the matter in this way:

If a reason is given for the detention of a person which is not within the scope and ambit of the Act conferring the power upon the Government to detain, then the whole order is vitiated notwithstanding the fact that the other reasons given are good, because something may have operated upon the mind of the detaining authority which is foreign and extraneous to the purpose of the Act …. But if some of the grounds given are not outside the scope and ambit of the Act but are merely vague and indefinite, it cannot be said that some extraneous consideration has weighed with the detaining authority in making the order it has made. Therefore, we must draw a sharp distinction between a ground which is outside the purview of the statute and a ground which is bad because it lacks precision and accuracy. In the latter case the ground has to be completely ignored as if no ground was furnished at all.”

With these opinions I respectfully agree. I have referred to this aspect of the case at some length because in some of the cases that have come before us, grounds not within the scope and ambit of S. 2 (1) of Act I of 1947 but dealing only with the political affiliations and economic creeds of a detenu and his activities in those fields are stated as grounds for detection. Membership of a party or association which has not been declared an illegal body is prominently mentioned in the grounds communicated to the detenus in some of these casts without any allegation of any acts or facts suggesting that the detenus in question, apart from the party in general, were themselves acting or about to act in a manner prejudicial to public safety or maintenance of public order. In such cases the satisfaction of the detaining authority is not a satisfaction about matters relevant to or falling within S. 2 so far as the particular individuals are concerned and that is not a satisfaction which is immune from scrutiny in this court when the legality of the detention is impugned.

I do not consider that the decision of the Full Bench in G. Narayanaswami Naidu v. Inspector Of Police, Mayavaram precludes us from holding that the detention is illegal because the detaining authority on its own showing, had obtained its satisfaction on a consideration of material irrelevant to and inadmissible under S. 2 (1) of the Act and outside its scope and ambit. It is no doubt true that on an application under S. 491, Cr. P. C., the court cannot enquire into the sufficiency of the materials or the reasonableness of the inference drawn by the detaining authority. The detenu cannot litigate facts and must accept the facts disclosed by the executive authority. But if the reasons which influenced the detaining authority in making the order of detention are disclosed and put on the record by the Government, this court can scrutinise them to find out the condition of the mind of the detaining authority when it made the order. In view, however, of the presumption of regularity and validity attaching to an official order, regular on the face of it, in view of the rule that it is only the satisfaction or state of mind of the detaining authority without reference to any external standard that matters and in view of the power vested in the Provincial Government under S. 3 (1) of refusing to disclose facts which it considers would be against the public interest to disclose it will be difficult for the person challenging an order of detention on the ground above-stated to substantiate his plea.

An order of detention may be bad on the face of it if it does not disclose to the satisfaction of the detaining authority that the person ordered to be detained has acted or is about to act or is likely to act in a manner prejudicial to public safety or the maintenance of public order See A. K. Gopalan's case. In some of the cases which have come before our notice we find the language of S. 2 (1) copied mechanically in the orders of detention without specifying whether the detaining authority is satisfied that the person sought to be detained is actually acting in a manner prejudicial to public safety or the maintenance of public order or is about to act or likely to act in such a manner. The cyclostyle forms which incorporate all these three reasons found in the section are not even corrected before the orders are issued so as to indicate which of the three grounds apply to the particular case. One would expect that if more than one of the three enumerated grounds are relied upon in any particular case, the word “or” would be scored out and the word “and” substituted: but even this has not been done. This mechanical reproduction of the language of S. 2 (1) in the cyclostyle orders of detention gives the impression that the empowered authority does not exercise its mind upon the materials placed before it in each individual case, but issues the orders of detention as a matter of course or as a matter of routine without itself being sure about the reason for the detention. In a recent case decided by us Cr. M. P. No. 2633 of 194810a we held on an examination of the terms of the order and the attendant circumstances, that the detaining authority might have satisfied itself that the case came within one or other of the two categories specified in the order without pledging itself exactly to any one of them. We also relied on the observations of Spens C. J. in Sibnath Banerji's Case11 in the Federal Court affirmed on appeal by the Judicial Committee in Sibnath Banerji's Case and upheld the validity of the order for detention. It must, however, be confessed that orders framed in the terms above indicated leave a suspicion as to whether the mind of the detaining authority followed the act of signing the detention order. If, however, the grounds and particulars served on the detenu under S. 3 (1) specify the actual grounds on which he has been detained, there is no prejudice to him and the order of detention cannot be questioned on the ground above referred to, see Greene's case.

There are also other matters into which the Court can and will enquire under S. 491, Cr.P.C if occasion arises, e.g, the bona fides of the detaining authority, the authenticity and genuineness of the order of detention itself, the existence of a delegated authority in case the order of detention is passed by a delegate, and the identity of the applicant with the person referred to in the order. So much is clear from the unanimous opinion of the Full Bench in G. Narayanaswami Naidu v. Inspector Of Police, Mayavaram.

It is agreed on all hands that lack of bond fides or absence of good faith on the part of the detaining authority vitiates an order of detention. The power of preventive detention must be exercised honestly and for the purposes for which it is intended by law and entrusted to the detaining authority. The order should not be a fraudulent or colourable exercise or abuse of the powers conferred by the statute. See Rex v. Halliday, Liversidge's Case, Green's Case and G. Narayanaswami Naidu v. Inspector Of Police, Mayavaram. It is far easier to formulate this doctrine in the abstract than to apply it to the facts and circumstances of particular cases. If, for instance, it can be demonstrated in a particular case that the order of detention was actuated by personal malice or hostility or political animosity or that its subject or design was merely to prevent a person or body of persons from the pursuit of a lawful activity for fear that it might be prejudicial to the pecuniary or political interests of other persons or groups, the order would be illegal as being a mala fide exercise of the power of preventive detention. If an order for detention is made, not in the interests of public safety or the maintenance of public order, but for the purpose of securing the detention in prison of a person who cannot be successfully prosecuted for an offence of which he is merely suspected, then it would be a mala fide exercise of the power. If a person who has been serving a sentence of imprisonment in jail for a pretty long period, say two years, is served on the day of his release with an order of detention under S. 2 (1) (a) the order for detention is in effect an illegal extension of the term of his sentence of imprisonment and would be a mala fide exercise of the power. In such a case it could not be said that he was acting or was likely to act in a manner prejudicial to public safety at the moment of his release. Similarly, if a person gets an order for his release on bail from a competent court and just when he is actually released, an order of detention is made so as to nullify the order granting bail and for the purpose of confining him in jail during his trial for offences with which he is charged, it would be a mala fide exercise of the power conferred by Act I of 1947. If the primary purpose and avowed intention of the order of detention is only to circumvent the orders of bail issued by Criminal Courts, then it would be a mala fide exercise of the power under S. 2 (1). See In Re. Srinivasan, Cr.M.P No. 43 of 194912.

In this connection I must notice a point that is raised in some of the applications questioning the validity of an order for the detention of a person already arrested under S. 151, Cr. P. C. for a cognizable offence and remanded to custody. It is argued that the action of the detaining authority in resorting to Act I of 1947 and passing an order under S. 2 (1) (a) when it has evidently realised that there is no case against the applicant under the penal law of the land, is by itself proof of mala fides. We have already repelled this contention in our judgment in Cr. M. P. No. 2633 of 1948 and held that merely because the order for detention is made where the person concerned has already been arrested under S. 151 Cr. P. C. the order cannot be said to be mala fide. We must not however be understood as laying down that in no case could an order of detention passed against a person already in custody be said to be mala fide. We have an instance of a man who was detained in jail for over three months under S. 117, Cr. P. C. for refusing to execute an interim security bond. Instead of pursuing the proceedings initiated against him under S. 107 Cr. P. C. and giving him an opportunity to substantiate his defence under S. 118 of the Code, the Police dropped those proceedings and moved the District Magistrate for an order under S. 2 (1) (a) of Act I of 1947. The order for detention was passed on the ground that because the applicant (who stoutly protested his innocence all along) refused to execute an interim bond for keeping the peace he was likely to act in a manner prejudicial to public safety. His refusal to execute an interim bond did not mean or even imply that he was acting or was about to act or likely to act in a manner prejudicial to public safety or the maintenance of public order and an order for his detection passed under S. 2 (1) (a) of Act I of 1947 based on a refusal, of the applicant to execute an interim security bond would be a mala fide exercise of the power.

Where there is a limited statutory power of interference with the liberty of a person, the power must be exercised bona fide for the end specified in the statute. Otherwise, it will constitute a fraudulent exercise of the power and an order based on such a fraudulent exercise of power would be bad. “Fraud” in this connection does not involve or imply moral turpitude but is used to denote the exercise of a statutory power for purposes foreign to or outside the intendment of the statute, however laudable otherwise the intention of the person exercising the power may be. The fraud or mala fides consists in exercising the power for purposes foreign to those prescribed by the statute. The further question that arises is, whether, assuming the initial detention to be legal, non-compliance with the other requirements of Ss. 2 and 3 of Act I of 1947 renders the continuance of the detention illegal.

The powers conferred upon the Provincial Legislature under the Government of India Act, 1935, (Schedule VII, list 2 entry No. 1) as well as the preamble to Act I of 1947 and Ss. 2 and 3 of the Act, make it clear that it is only preventive detention for a specified period and not an arbitrary detention or imprisonment for an indefinite time at the pleasure of the executive that has been authorised by Act I of 1947. In an ordinary criminal trial, the accused is given detailed information and particulars about the alleged offence, the prosecution adduces evidence, the accused is given a right to rebut it, and conviction and sentence follow if the offence is found to be proved. Section 2 of Act I of 1947 abrogates trial by a Court and empowers the Provincial Government or its delegate, straightaway to imprison a man if it is satisfied that he is acting or is about to act or likely to act in a manner prejudicial to public safety or maintenance of public order. It will be observed that no time limit is prescribed for the communication of the grounds and particulars under S. 2 (2), for the communication of the grounds and particulars to the detenu under S. 3 (1), for the despatch of the representation of the detenu to the Advisory Council along with other materials under S. 3 (2), for the submission of the report' of the Advisory Council under S. 3 (4) or for the passing of the final orders of the Government under S. 3 (5). It is a distressing feature of some of the cases that have come under our notice and a circumstance that has caused us considerable uneasiness, that the applicants have been in jail for periods ranging from four months to one year pursuant to an initial order of detention without final orders having been passed by the Provincial Government. In other words, the applicants have had to endure imprisonment for a much longer period than the period of six months they would have to undergo, even if the initial order for detention had been confirmed by the Provincial Government under S. 3 (5).

Another ground of complain has been that the grounds communicated to the applicants are vague and general and lacking in precision. One of the paragraphs common to all the grounds is that the communist party to which the applicants belonged was indulging in violence and subversive activities and that most of the members of the party had gone underground and were committing various crimes like arson, looting, murder, etc. The grounds have been expressed in such a form as to be universally applicable to all people who profess to belong to the party without reference to the acts and conduct of the particular individual detained. I shall revert to this aspect of the matter later in the course of this judgment.

The question that arises for consideration is whether it is open to this court to order the release of a detenu under S. 491, Cr. P. C. for the reason that there has been a non-compliance with the provisions of S. 2 (2) or S. 3 (1), (2) and (5) of the Act either by reason of an inordinate and unreasonable delay in taking the requisite steps or otherwise. It is argued that non-compliance with the formalities directed to be carried out by Ss. 2 and 3 of the Act after the exercise of the statutory power of detention under S. 2 (1) (a), will not have the effect of invalidating the exercise of the power and the order of detention. In other words, it is said that the subsequent formalities prescribed in the various provisions following S. 2 (1) (a) of Act I of 1947 are not essential to the validity of the order of detention and their non-observance would not in any way render the detention illegal. Support for this contention is to be found in the observations of Subba Rao, J. who delivered the judgment of the Court in Venkataraman v. Commissioner of Police, Madras [1949] M.W.N 9. In that case an order for detention of the applicant was made under S. 2 (1) (a) by the Commissioner of Police on 1-4-1948 and communicated to the Government under S. 2 (2) on 9-6-1948. The applicant was arrested only on 17-8-1948 as he could not be found till then and was subsequently served with the grounds for his detention. The applicant relied on the inordinate delay in communicating the order of the Commissioner of Police to the Government under S. 2 (2) as invalidating his detention. The Court held that inasmuch as the initial order and the grounds thereof had been communicated to the Government and the applicant had been given a copy of the grounds and the necessary particulars and had also submitted his explanation at the time when the application under S. 491 came on for hearing before the Court, the inordinate delay of more than two months in the communication of the order by the Commissioner of Police to the Government was a mere irregularity which did not render his detention illegal. A detenu who had made himself scarce for more than two months after the order for his detention was made and who could not therefore be arrested, could not reasonably be heard to complain of the interim delay in the communication of the order. The judgment however contained the following observations of a general nature: —

If the order was valid at its inception we cannot see how it would become invalid by the subsequent non-compliance with the other provisions of the Act …. Assuming that in view of this enormous delay, it must be held that the provisions of the section have not been strictly complied with, would it have the effect of invalidating an order that had been validly passed? We think not. Once an order has been passed in strict compliance with the provisions of S. 2 (1) it was validly passed. Ss. 2 (2) and 3 (1) were designed to provide a machinery for the person against whom an order has been passed to seek redress as early as possible. If a statutory authority did not comply with the provisions of S. 2 or 3, there may be other remedies open to the aggrieved party; but in our view, the non-compliance with the provisions prescribing a procedure to get redress by the aggrieved party against whom an order has been passed under S. 2 (1) cannot in law invalidate an order validly passed under S. 2 (1) …. The argument of Mr. Pillai (Counsel for the detenu) was that assuming the order passed under S. 2 (1) was valid at its inception and continued to be so, the further detention after the violation of the provisions of S. 2 (2) was illegal. This argument ignores the distinction between an order of detention and the procedure prescribed for enabling an aggrieved party to seek redress…. If the authority concerned did not carry out his statutory duty, the petitioner could have taken the appropriate remedy to compel him to perform his duty. He may have other remedies if he was prejudiced by the breach of a statutory duty by the authority concerned. But in our view, the non-compliance with the provisions of sub-sec. (2) to S. 2, could not make thee detention illegal.”

In another case, In re Venkatachala Thevar14, a copy of the grounds of detention under S. 3 (1) was served after a delay of 22 days after the detention and after the filing, but before the hearing of an application under S. 491, Cr.P.C in this court. This court characterised the delay as unconscionable but held that the irregularity had been cured by the time the application was heard. The relevant portion of the judgment is as follows:

However, even if in the absence of an order furnishing the reasons under S. 3 (1) within a reasonable time, we might have held that the detenu had been unlawfully detained, we would not order his release after the reasons had been furnished and the detention became lawful.”

This decision seems to assume that the continuance of the detention might become unlawful if there is unreasonable delay in serving the grounds under S. 3 (1).

Though the learned Judges who decided Venkataraman's case do not cite any authority, they were perhaps relying upon the observations of Goddard L. J. in the Court of Appeal and of Lord Macmillan in the House of Lords in Green's case couched in similar language. I shall examine Green's case presently but before doing so, I may point out some of the consequences of the view taken by the learned Judges. S. 2 of Act I of 1947 does not require that the order of detention should be served on the person ordered to be detained before he is arrested and indeed it does not even require a written order, though in practice such an order is made. According to the Full Bench decision in Narayanaswami Naidu's case an order of detention based on the personal satisfaction of the detaining authority that the person detained is acting or about to act or likely to act in a manner prejudicial to public safety or the maintenance of public order is all that is required to make the contention legal ab initio. The only grounds on which the legality of the initial detention can be challenged are (1) that the order was not duly authenticated, (2) that there has been a mistaken identity, (3) that there has been an absence of good faith, and (4) that there was not on the facts stated or disclosed by the Government, any such satisfaction in the mind of she detaining authority as is required by S. 2 (1). The learned judges in Venkaatraman's case held that a deten- tion legal ab initio does not become illegal even though the formalities prescribed by S. 3 are not complied with and therefore the remedy under S. 491, Cr. P. C. does not lie, whatever other remedies may be open to the prisoner in respect of such non-compliance. Goddard L. J. in the Court of Appeal in Greene's case14a made similar observations citing the remedy by way of mandamus. But the writ of mandamus does not lie in India against the Provincial Government or mofussil authorities. Nor is the remedy by way of damages for false imprisonment available, assuming that money can compensate a man adequately for the unjust deprivation of his freedom. The remedy by Habeas Corpus and the claim for damages for false imprisonment are both founded on the illegality of the restraint or imprisonment and if according to the learned Judges in Venkataraman's case, a detention ab initio legal does not become illegal by reason of non-compliance with the terms of S. 3, I am unable to visualise any remedy except by way of appealing to the sense of justice and fair play of the Government. But the absence of an effective remedy, though a relevant consideration, is not a conclusive argument if the interpretation of the Act is clear or if the decision in Greene's case has authoritatively laid down the law in the sense in which it has been declared by the learned Judges.

To turn to the facts of Greene's case and [3] Mr. Green was arrested under an order of the Home Secretary under Reg. 18 (B) of the Defence Regulations. The order served upon him stated that he was a person of “hostile associations” within the meaning of Cl. (1 A) of the Regulation and that by reason thereof, it was necessary to exercise control over him. By clause (3) of the Regulation the detenu was given a right of appeal to an advisory committee constituted under the Regulation on the lines of the advisory Council under Madras Act I of 1947. Clause 5 of the Regulation casts on the Chairman of the Committee the duty of informing the objector, of the grounds on which the order had been made against him, with such particulars as were, in the opinion of the Chairman, relevant and sufficient. The notice from the Chairman instead of specifying “hostile associations” under clause (1A) as the ground of detention, referred to “acts prejudicial to public safety, defence of the realm etc.” coming under clause (5) of the Regulation as the ground of detention. The particulars furnished to the detenu, however, related mostly to “hostile associations”. The detenu appeared before the Advisory Committee and put forward his case without complaining about the discrepancy in the notice issued by the Chairman of the Advisory Committee. The Advisory Committee and the Home Secretary confirmed the initial order of detention. An application for a writ of Habeas Corpus was made. The argument on behalf of the detenu, relevant to the present purpose, was that the discrepancy between the order for his detention and the subsequent notice issued by the Chairman of the Advisory Committee made the detention illegal ab initio or alternatively, from the date of notice. This contention was repelled both in the Court of Appeal and in the House of Lords on the ground that the defect complained was a defect in procedure and a mere irregularity which did not prejudice the applicant. The following observations of the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords taken together and in their context, show, in my opinion, that their Lordships contemplated not only the possibility of the detention being illegal ab initio but its continuance becoming illegal, for proper and sufficient reasons.

Scott, L. J.: “As a matter of law I cannot see anything in the Regulation which would justify the conclusion that such a mistake by the Advisory Committee either invalidates an originally good order or confers a right to release” (page. 106).

GODDARD, L. J.: “Moreover a mistake in the document served on him after he was in custody cannot, in my opinion, invalidate the original detention or render its continuance invalid. It is the actual order signed by the Secretary of State that is the governing document and it is this document that the return should disclose” (page 117).

VISCOUNT MAUGHAM. “I also agree with their view (the Court of Appeal) that a mistake in that document could not, in any event, invalidate the original detention or render its continuance invalid” (p. 296).

LORD MACMILLAN “The mistake, the occurrence of which your Lordships deplore, does not in any way affect the validity of the detention order which is the answer to the appellant's application. It affects the due observance of the procedure prescribed for the further consideration of the case of a person who is ex hypothesi under lawful detention”. (p. 298).

LORD WRIGHT. “I see no reason to differ from the opinion of the court below that this irregularity does not vitiate the order made and continued”. (p. 300).

LORD ROMER. “This mistake cannot affect the validity of the order that had been made by the Home Secretary nearly two months before. Had the appellant been prejudiced by the mistake, the court might nevertheless have afforded him some relief. But the matter was carefully considered both by the divisional Court and the Court of Appeal”. (PP. 309-310)

I do not consider that the above decision taken as a whole, supported the general proposition laid down by the learned Judges in Venkataraman's case. There is no question here of nullifying the effect of a prior judicial order. S. 2 (1) (a) of Act I of 1947 merely provides for physical detention by a summary order and it is only at a later stage that the grounds and reasons for the order have to be formulated and canvassed and a final order passed. Neither the language of the section nor any binding authority compels me to hold that once the preliminary order for detention is made under S. 2 (1) (a) everything that follows the order is a mere matter of procedure and non-compliance with it is a mere irregularity not affecting the substantive rights of the detenu.

It is as well that I further consider the matter on principle and authority. In so doing I may draw attention to the observations of Brett L.J in Dales case [1181] L.R 6 Q.B.D 376 461 & 463. It was a case of a person who was arrested without due compliance with the technical formalities prescribed by statute. An application was made for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that his arrest and detention were illegal. Brett L.J stated the law in these terms: —

It is a general rule, which has always been acted upon by the Courts of England, that if any person procures the imprisonment of another, he must take care to do so by steps, all of which are entirely regular, and that if he fails to follow every step in the process with extreme regularity, the Court will not allow the imprisonment to continue. The question here, therefore, is whether the promoters after the matter had been properly signified to the Court of Chancery have proceeded regularly. In my opinion they have not”. (Italics are mine).

Later in the course of his judgment the learned Lord Justice observed:

I desire to state that although in this case I consider that irregularity a matter of substance, I should be of the same opinion if it were only a matter of form, because, as I said before, I take it to be a general rule that the courts at Westminister will not allow any individual in this kingdom to procure the imprisonment of another unless he takes care to follow with extreme precision every form and every step in the process just to procure that imprisonment. I consider this to be a wholesome and good rule, and to be in accordance with the great desire which English Courts have always had to protect the liberty of every one of Her Majesty's subjects.”

Cotton L.J agreed with the above observations in these terms: —

I quite agree with Brett L.J that when persons take upon themselves to cause another to be imprisoned, they must strictly follow the powers under which they are assuming to act, and if they do not, the person imprisoned may be discharged, although the particulars in which they have failed to follow those powers may be matters of mere form”. [469].

To the same effect is the decision of the Judicial Committee in Ezhugbayi Eleko v. Government of Nigeria15a. In dealing with a question relating to the regularity of forfeiture of a man's property where some of the steps regulating the exercise of the power of forfeiture had not been duly complied with, James L.J observed as follows:

“It was the established rule of the Court of Chancery and of the Courts of Common Law that no forfeiture of property could be made unless every condition precedent had been strictly and literally complied with. A very little inaccuracy is as fatal as the greatest. Here the nonce is inaccurate. It is therefore bad and the forfeiture is invalid”. Mellish L.J stated as follows: —

I think that if the notice departs in any respect from the statutory form, it is impossible for us to go into the question how much it departs. It is a bad notice and the subsequent resolution, which is founded upon it, is invalid”. Johnson v. Lyttle's Iron Agency [1877] 5 Ch. D. 687.

Forfeiture of a man's property or personal freedom can result from the exercise of a power conferred by statute on executive authority and without the intervention of a Court, but to have that effect, the power must be exercised in strict compliance with the formalities and requirements prescribed by the statute. It is open to the person aggrieved by the exercise of the power to question the legality of the forfeiture or arrest and imprisonment on every available ground of non-compliance with the provisions of the statute. In Pramela Devi's Case17, the Judicial Committee observed that in the matter of forfeiture of shares in a limited company the formalities prescribed by the articles regarding the issue of notices must be strictly observed. Imprisonment except under a sentence or order of a court is prima facie unlawful and the person or authority directing such imprisonment must justify the act in law.

It is true that the legislature in view of the emergency that it was providing against, has authorised detention under S. 2 (1) (a) even before informing the person sought to be detained of the grounds for his detention and hearing his explanation. If the statute had authorised detention after service of the grounds of detention and after consideration of the explanation, if any, of the person affected, it could hardly be contended that the provisions as to the service of grounds and the giving of an opportunity for explanation are not conditions precedent to the exercise of the statutory power of detention. The provisions would than be considered to be mandatory in character. Do they cease to be such merely because by reason of the urgency of the situation, these formalities are directed to be complied with subsequent to the initial order of detention? Is the initial order of detention of greater effect than an interim order passed in a pending judicial proceeding which requires confirmation after notice to the opposite party and hearing his objection? To take another analogy furnished by the Civil Law, does not a condition subsequent have as great an efficacy as a condition precedent in connection with the vesting and divesting of rights in property and is not non-performance or non-compliance with either the one or the other condition, equally fatal? In view of the emergent situations that were in its contemplation and in view of the fact that there might not be enough time to serve a person with notice and hear his objections before detaining him so as effectively to prevent an apprehended breach of public peace or order, the legislature authorised an immediate detention under S. 2 (1) (a). But in my judgment substantial compliance with the formalities prescribed by S. 2 (2) and S. 3 (1) to (5) is quite essential to sustain the legality of the continuance of the detention. They are not merely directory provisions whose non-observance would constitutes mere irregularity in procedure. If the non-compliance with the provisions of S. 2 (2) and S. 3 is substantial and serious, it would render the continuance of the detention illegal even though it might have been legal ab initio. It is not uncommon to find in other fields of law provisions for interim suspension, without previous notice, even of persons holding a freehold or hereditary office pending enquiry into their misconduct. The nature of the office may be such that instant suspension from the functions of the office without notice and without giving time for explanation would be necessary in public interest. This interim suspension is different from a punitive suspension and is merely incidental to the power of removal or dismissal. If the interim suspension is allowed to continue indefinitely without any enquiry into the alleged misconduct, then it would be a fraud on the power or a mala fide exercise of the power. The position would be the same if an order for dismissal is passed without giving an opportunity to the persons affected to explain charges of misconduct that might be made against them. In such cases, the aggrieved person would have his remedy in the Civil Courts. The fact that an interim or initial detention is legal does not secure for it immunity from attack if the subsequent formalities prescribed by S. 2 (2) and S. 3 of Act I of 1947 are not substantially complied with and the continuance of the detention would become illegal by reason of such non-compliance. Any other construction would result in conferring upon the executive a power of arbitrary detention for an indefinite period which certainly was not the object or intention of the legislature in enacting Act I of 1947. That the continuance of a detention ab initio legal, might become illegal by reason of a non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of S. 3 (1) was, in substance, the view taken by Horwill and Govinda Menon, JJ. in Cr.M.P No. 2128 of 1948 and by my learned brother and Rajagopalan J. in Cr.M.P No. 200 of 1949 and 91 of 1948. The same view has been taken by Full Bench decisions of other High Courts (See Mural Patwa v. Province of Behar [1949] A.I.R Pat 135; Nek Muhammad v. Province of Behar [1949] A.I.R Pat I.F.B; Durga Das v. Rex [1949] A.I.R All 48, Inder Pra- kash v. Emperor [1949] A.I.R All 37 and In Re Raj Dhar. The Full Bench decision in G. Narayanaswami Naidu v. Inspector Of Police, Mayavaram dealt only with the challenge against the validity of the initial order of detention and did not consider the question whether the continuance of the detention which was legal at its inception could become illegal or improper in view of what happened subsequently or by reason of what the Government subsequently did or failed to do. (See the observations of Govindarajachari, J. at page 31 of the report).

The statutory formalities whose non-compliance renders the continuance or the detention illegal may now be briefly noticed so far as they are relevant to the cases heard by us. An order made by an empowered authority under S. 2 (1) (a) has to be reported forthwith to the Provincial Government together with the grounds of detention and necessary particulars. Under S. 3 (1) the Provincial Government has to communicate to the detenu the grounds on which the order for his detention has been made together with relevant particulars. S. 3 (2) requires the Provincial Government to place the grounds and the order of detention, the report, if any, received under S. 2 (2) and the representation of the detenu before the Advisory council. S. 3 (4) requires the Advisory Council to submit their report to the Provincial Government after a consideration of the materials placed before it. The Provincial Government, after considering the report of the advisory Council is required to pass an order, confirming, modifying or cancelling the order of detention under S. 3 (5). As I have already stated, there have been instances of inordinate delay at every one of the stages enumerated above, in the applications that we have heard. I have no reason to doubt that these delays were due to inadvertance, administrative difficulties and also perhaps, to a lack of appreciation of the heavy responsibility taken by the Provincial Government in constituting itself both an accuser and a Judge. It is true that there is no time limit fixed by the Act for the performance of the duties above enumerated but the result in law is that these steps have to be taken expeditiously and within a reasonable time, Murat Patwa v. Province of Behar. What is a reasonable time must, to some extent, depend upon the circumstances of each case. The general principle regulating the time factor in these cases is thus stated by Horwill J. in In re Venkatachala Thevar:

It is sufficient to point out that the very magnitude of the powers given to the Government under this Act adds to their responsibility to see that no man is incarcerated a day longer than is necessary without giving good reasons for it.”

To the same effect are the observations of Subba Rao J. in A.K. Gopalan v. District Magistrate, Malabar. Where the delay in communicating the grounds under S. 3 (1) or in submit ting the case to the Advisory Council under S. 3 (2) or in passing final orders under S. 3 (5) is unreasonable and unexplained to the satisfaction of the Court, it must be held that the continuance of the detention becomes illegal on that ground. (See Murat Patwa v. Province of Behar, Durga Das v. Rex Cr. M.P No. 2128 of 1948 and Cr.M.P Nos. 91 of 1948 and 200 of 1949.

Another ground of non-compliance with statutory formalities urged before us in some of these applications is that the grounds communicated to the applicants are so vague and so devoid of particulars that it is not possible for them or any one in their position to make any effective representation against the order of detention. It cannot be said that, if this allegation were true, there is merely a breach of a directory provision contained in S. 3 (1) and a mere irregularity not affecting the legality of the detention. S. 3 (1) casts a peremptory duty upon the Provincial Government to furnish the detenu with all the grounds of detention together with the necessary particulars so as to enable him to make a representation against the legality or the propriety of the order of detention. This object would be frustrated if the grounds are vague and general without any particulars and without attempt at precision or accuracy. This provision is meant as a safeguard for the subject against arbitrary detention by the executive and it is our duty to see that this safeguard is not whittled away in practice. The grounds and particulars must not be vague, indefinite or incomplete but must convey sufficient information to the detenu to enable him to make an effective representation, supported by facts and figures, if necessary, that the detaining authority was wrong in its belief that his detention was necessary in the interests of public safety or the maintenance of public order. The grounds must contain sufficient details to show that the detention was within the scope and object of the Act. If in the opinion of the court, the grounds furnished are so vague, indefinite and insufficient, that the detenu could not fairly be expected to make an effective representation against the legality or propriety of the order for detention then, it must be held that his further detention is illegal or improper. The word “grounds” in S. 3 (1) do not merely mean the conclusions of the Government or abstract reasons for their action. They must by themselves or along with particulars which are required to be furnished, include facts and circumstances on which the conclusions or reasons are based. If activities which are normally unobjectionable are considered to be objectionable and therefore relied upon as a ground for detention, then, the circumstances in which or the reasons why those activities are looked upon as objectionable must be indicated to the detenu. The grounds and particulars together form a sort of substitute for a charge. General, vague and indefinite grounds are no grounds at all and the detenu should not be left to his own introspection or guess work to find out what is being alleged against him.

It is true that facts, grounds and particulars may and often do overlap and that under S. 3, the Government is not bound to disclose facts which it considers against the public interest to disclose. The Government is also given the discretion to furnish only such particulars as are, in its opinion, sufficient to enable the detenu to make a representation to the Government. The section draws some but not a clear distinction between grounds and particulars and requires the authority to communicate all the grounds and such particulars as are, in its opinion, sufficient to enable the detenu to make a representation against the order of detention. While facts can be withheld by the Provincial Government on the ground that their disclosure would be prejudicial to the public interest, grounds and particulars cannot be withheld for that reason. It must be remembered that the only opportunity the detenu has of vindicating his character and defending his liberty is to make a representation to the Government under S. 3 (1) and it is but fair and reasonable that the grounds and particulars furnished to him should be clear, precise and accurate. Otherwise they would fail to serve the purpose for which they were required to be communicated to him. The detenu must know what he is charged with and what reasons or considerations have persuaded the Government to deprive him of his liberty. There is no doubt a discretion given to the Government in the matter of furnishing particulars but if the particulars are given in such a way as to make it impossible for the detenu to make an effective representation against the order for detention, then we must hold that there has been a failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of S. 3 (1) and the detention becomes illegal thereafter. Having regard to the nature of the grounds that have been alleged against the applicants in many of the applications before us, it is necessary to point out that mere membership of a political party or association would not mean that any particular member was acting in such a manner as to necessitate his detention. The grounds and particulars referred to in S. 3 (1) must relate to the particular individual who is detained and must disclose the facts which led to the belief that he was acting or about to act or likely to act in a manner prejudicial to public safety or the maintenance of public order. The question is one of substance on the facts and the circumstances of each case and the applicant will have to satisfy the court that the grounds and particulars communicated to him are so vague and indefinite that there has been no compliance in substance and in effect with the requirements of S. 3 (1) of the Act. There is a considerable body of authority in the High Courts of Allahabad, Patna and Bombay for the views above stated. (See Durgadas v. Rex, In Re. Raji Dhar and Nek Muhammad v. Province of Behar In re Krishnaji Gopal [1948] A.I.R Bom. 360.

With reference to the individual cases that have been argued before us, I agree with the conclusions of my learned brother. In view of the importance and frequent recurrence of the questions that I have discussed above, I have added my own observations.

SATYANARAYANA RAO, J: (Cr. M. P. 190 of 1940.) This and the connected petitions under S. 401 of the Criminal Procedure Code were heard together as they raise common questions of law under the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, I of 1947.

The facts and the contentions peculiar to the other petitions will be dealt with separately. Under S. 2 (1) (a) of the Act the District Magistrate, Madura passed an order of detention dated 1st April 1948 and the applicant was arrested on the same day. He was kept in police custody at Madura till the 3rd April when he was removed to the Central Jail, Vellore. The grounds of detention were communicated to the applicant on 24-4-1948, and he submitted his explanation on the 10th May 1948. The Government referred the matter to the advi- sory council on the 14th February 1949 and the matter is still pending with it. This application was filed on 18-1-1949 and till now no final order was passed by the Government under S. 3 (5) of the Act.

Mr. N. S. Mani, the learned counsel for the applicant, raised two contentions: firstly that the order of detention was void ab initio and not bona fide as the grounds now communicated to the detenu would not justify the order; secondly it was argued that as Government had failed to comply with the mandatory provisions required to be carried out after the order of detention under S. 2 (1) was passed the continuance of the detention of the applicant is, in any event, illegal.

The first of these contentions may be disposed of shortly, the order of detention passed by the District Magistrate who was empowered under S. 15 of the Act to take action under the Act states that he was satisfied that the applicant was acting in a manner prejudicial to the public safety and that with a view to prevent him from so doing, it is necessary to detain him. The satisfaction of the detaining authority is a condition precedent for the order of detention. An order which is legal on the face of it is presumed to have been legally made and the jurisdiction of this court to go into the validity of such an order was considered by the Full Bench in G. Narayanaswami Naidu v. Inspector Of Police, Mayavaram. The Full Bench judgment was based upon an elaborate consideration of the decisions of the courts in England and in India bearing upon the question, particularly the decisions of the House of Lords in Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson and Greene v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs. The learned Chief Justice after examining the authorities formulated under four heads the limitations within which this court could interfere in the exercise of its jurisdiction under S. 491, Cr. P. C. with orders made under S. 2 of the Act. They are: —

(1) When the order is not duly authenticated, as for example, when it is passed by an officer or authority not empowered under S. 15 of the Act;

(2) When the person detained in pursuance of the order is not the person intended to be detained, that is to say, when there is a mistake of identity:

(3) When there is lack of bona fides; and

(4) When it is established that the essential requirement of S. 2, namely the satisfaction of the Provincial Government or an officer or authority empowered under S. 15 with respect to the particular person that he is acting or about to act in any manner prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of public order and with a view to preventing him it is necessary to direct him to be detained or otherwise dealt with under S. 2 (1) of the Act, is not present. If it is established that neither the Provincial Government nor the officer or other authority empowered under S. 15 has exercised its or his mind on the material placed before it or him, then an order of detention though purporting to be passed under S. 2 (1) must be deemed to be not an order under S. 2”.

The other learned judges also agreed with this view. Under S. 2 of the Act, the satisfaction of the detaining authority is a subjective state of mind and not an objective fact. It is not open to the Court to go into the question whether the detaining authority could or could not be so satisfied on the grounds subsequently disclosed to the detenu, nor is it open to the Court to compel the Government or the detaining authority to disclose the facts or the material or the grounds on the basis of which the order was made. There is, however, a duty cast upon the Executive Government under S. 3 of the Act to disclose the grounds. But so far as the satisfaction is concerned, it is the satisfaction of the Provincial Government or of the empowered authority, as the case may be, and not that of the Court. In the words of the learned Chief Justice in the Full Bench :—

If these grounds do not exist, it is well established on the highest authority that this Court cannot investigate the sufficiency of the material or the reasonableness of the grounds upon which the Government or the empowered officer or authority had been satisfied. It is not competent for this Court to call upon the Government or the detaining authority to disclose the information and material on which it or he was satisfied as to the necessity for the detention of the person concerned. The satisfaction required by the section is the satisfaction of the Government or the empowered authority and not the satisfaction of this court. There is no question of fact which can be submitted to this Court in this matter. This position was fairly conceded by learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners.”

Govindarajachari J., the other learned Judge, expressed the same view at page 36 as follows:

Negatively it can be said that the sufficiency of the available material or information to justify the order of detention and the question whether the officer concerned could be said to have reasonable grounds for the issue of the order in question are not matters which are within the cognisance of the Court. The satisfaction is the satisfaction of the officer. He is the sole judge and once the conclusion is reached that he was satisfied the detenu cannot invite the Court to go behind it and dissect the reasons which weighed with the officer and find out for itself whether the order should have been issued. While the satisfaction of a properly constituted authority is a condition precedent to the issue of an order of detention, whether the circumstances called for the issue of such an order is a matter entirely for its consideration and nobody else's”.

Govinda Menon, J. also was of the same opinion. The learned judge states at page 49:

It is not open to the Court to find out whether the grounds on which the Provincial Government is satisfied are sufficient. Different standards of satisfaction are likely to exist in the case of different individuals even if the society were ideal. In the society as it is constituted today, we cannot expect the same standard in every individual, so that if the executive authority states bona fide that it is satisfied, this court cannot say that it is not a proper or valid satisfaction.”

The same view was also taken by the other High Courts construing similar provisions in the Public Safety Acts in the respective provinces.

It was argued that if the grounds disclosed are such as would not justify in the opinion of the Court, the conclusion that the detenu was acting or was about to act in a manner prejudicial to public safety or the maintenance of public order, then, the inference should be drawn that the order was not bona fide and that this court would have the jurisdiction to interfere in such a case under category (3) referred to by the learned Chief Justice in the judgment of the Full Bench. Even if the grounds do not warrant the making of an order under S. 2 of the Act, and the decision of the authority concerned that it was so satisfied is erroneous, it cannot be inferred that either the Provincial Government or the detaining authority were actuated by malice in making the order and that therefore it is mala fide. A judgment, however, erroneous it may be cannot be held to be a mala fide judgment. The discretion under the section of passing an order of detention if the condition is satisfied is vested in the authority concerned and it cannot be questioned.

It was contended on behalf of the applicant that the Full Bench while laying down that the satisfaction cannot be questioned and canvassed in a proceeding under S. 491, Cr.P.C placed no limit on the grounds open for consideration by the detaining authority and that to take an extreme case, if a man was detained under S. 2 (1) of the Act on the ground that his nose was long, it would not be open to this court to consider the legality of the order of detention. This contention, no doubt, has considerable force, but in my opinion there is a limit and a clear line of demarcation regarding the grounds which are open for consideration by the detaining authority and the Full Bench was not called upon to consider and lay down the limits of that demarcation. It must be remembered that the power of the Provincial Legislature to enact a law of the kind now under consideration is derived under item 1, list ii, (Provincial Legislative List) of the Government of India Act, 1935, which is as follows:

Public Order (but not excluding the use of His Majesty's naval, military or air forces in aid of the civil power): the administration of justice; constitution and organisation of all Courts, except the Federal Court, and fees taken therein; preventive detention for reasons connected with the maintenance of public order; persons subject to such detention”. (The italics are mine).

The power to legislate is for preventive detention for reasons connected with the maintenance of public order and the preamble of the Act (Madras Act I of 1947) states: —

Whereas for the maintenance of public safety and to prevent and put down disorders involving menace to the peace and tranquillity of the Province, it is necessary to provide for preventive detention, imposition of collective fines, etc., etc., it is hereby enacted as follows.”

The power conferred on the legislature and the preamble to the Act make it clear that the object of the legislature is preventive detention and the basis on which the order for detention is made is that a particular person in acting or about to act and after the amendment of 1948, or is likely to act, in a manner prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of public order and that therefore with a view to prevent him from so acting, it is necessary to make an order of detention. The acts which justify an order of detention under the Act are acts which are prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of public order. The person sought to be detained must be one who is either acting in such a manner or is about to act in such a manner or is likely to act in such a manner. The limitations, therefore, on the grounds that are open to the detaining authority for consideration and are permissible are the acts which are prejudicial to public safety and the maintenance of public order. The grounds, therefore, must be grounds which lead to the inference that the person concerned is acting or is about to act or is likely to act in a manner prejudicial to public safety or the maintenance of public order. If the grounds, therefore, are not within the ambit of the Act, the order cannot be justified. The Full Bench had not to consider and was not called upon to consider to what extent the acts of a person are permissible and can be taken into consideration under S. 2 of the Act by the authority concerned. The illustration that is given in the course of the argument by the learned advocate of a person having a long nose and detained on that account under S. 2 (1) of the Act would be an instance of a ground which is entirely outside the purview of the Act and an order of detention based upon material which is not within the ambit of the Act would be wholly illegal. Of course, as pointed out by the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in In re Rajdher, if the grounds disclosed contain grounds, some within the ambit of the Act and some outside it, the order of detention would be vitiated, wholly as in that event, it would be impossible to say which of the grounds and to what extent the detaining authority was influenced by acts outside the Act in making the order of detention. If, however, some of the grounds are good and some are vague and indefinite and uncertain, the grounds which are uncertain and vague may be ignored and may be treated as non-existing, and the order of detention can be justified on the grounds which are definite and, certain. This is also the view expressed by Chagla O. C. J. in the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court. In my opinion, that decision affords a clear line of demarcation between grounds which are permissible under the Act and ground which are pot permissible under it in making an order of detention under S. 2 of the Act. In dealing with the several petitions now before us, we have to bear these principles in mind in arriving at a correct decision.

It was also argued on behalf of the applicant that it will be open to us to go behind the Full Bench judgment and reconsider the position whether there is justification for the view expressed by the Full Bench that the satisfaction of the detaining authority cannot be canvassed in a proceeding under S. 491, Cr. P. C. No reasons are given in support of this extreme contention except inviting us to reconsider the authorities relied on in the judgment of the Full Bench and I see no reason to accede to this request. The decision of the Full Bench is clear and was based, if I may say so with respect, upon a careful consideration of all the authorities bearing on the question and it will be, in my opinion, an unnecessary waste of time to reconsider it.

The effect of non-compliance of the executive Government with the various steps laid down under the Act, after the order of detention under S. 2 was passed till the stage of a final order under S. 3 (5) on the legality of the continuance of the detention is a more difficult question. The Full Bench was concerned only with the original order of detention under S. 2. This was made clear in the judgment of Govindarajachari, J. at page 31 of the Madras Law Journal Report. The learned judge observed:

The challenge in every one of the cases involved in the batch of applications before us is a challenge against the order of detention itself and not that even if the order was valid at its inception the continuance of the detention has become illegal or improper in view of what happened subsequently or by reason of what the Government subsequently did or failed to do. I say this merely to guard myself against being understood as having decided anything more than what is strictly required by the applications under consideration.”

The Full Bench judgment, therefore, does not help us in deciding this difficult question.

The object of the Act, as stated already, is preventive detention and not punishment. The preliminary step under the Act is an order of detention under S. 2 (1) which is conditional on the satisfaction of the detaining authority. The final step contemplated by the Act in the passing of the order by the Provincial Government under S. 3 (5) of the Act. While the order under S. 2 may be passed either by the Provincial Government or by an officer or authority to whom the power was delegated under S. 15 of the Act, the subsequent steps should be taken and the final order itself should be passed by the Provincial Government. The officer or authority empowered under S. 15 after making an order of detention under S. 2 (1) has forthwith to report the fact to the Provincial Government together with the grounds on which the order was made, along with such other particulars as will have a bearing on the order under S. 2 (2). After this, the officer or authority empowered under S. 15 has no statutory function to discharge. The next step after the order of detention was made is provided by S. 3 (1). Under it, the Provincial Government has to communicate to the person affected by the order “so far as such communication can be made without disclosing the facts which they consider it would be against the public interest to disclose, grounds on which the order has been made against him and such other particulars as are in their opinion sufficient to enable him to make, if he wishes a representation against the order.” There is no time limit fixed under the Act for the Provincial Government to communicate this information. After the receipts of the grounds, the person detained has got the right to make a representation to the Government and that the very section enjoins upon the Provincial Government to inform the person of his right to make such a representation and also to afford him an opportunity of doing so. After the representation is received, the next step is, the Provincial Government has to place the matter before the Advisory Council constituted under the Act. The Advisory Council, thereafter after considering the material placed before it and after calling for such further information from the Provincial Government or from the person concerned has to submit a report to the Provincial Government, and after the receipt of that report, the final step is the Provincial Government has to pass an order under S. 3 (5) either confirming or modifying or cancelling the order made under sub-section (1) of S. 2. Under S. 4, the order of detention continues in force for a period of six months from the date on which the final order under S. 3 (5) was passed by the Provincial Government. But, of course, it is open to the Provincial Government to release the detenu even before the expiry of the period of six months. For taking the various steps above described, no time limit is fixed under the Act. It must be remembered that the Act interferes with the liberty of the subject without any trial and without any other remedy by way of appeal or otherwise to any other authority except the restricted and limited right of making a representation to the Government and through it to the Advisory Council whose opinion, however, is not binding on the Government. This restricted right of representation therefore, should not be still further curtailed by non-observance of any of the steps laid down by the Act. We have instances in which a final order under S. 3 (5) was not passed by the Provincial Government even though the detention has continued in force for more than several months, in some cases nearly a year. The result of this is: if ultimately the Government were to decide after considering the representations made by the detenu that the person should be set at liberty, such person would have unjustly been deprived of his liberty for no fault of his. Even if the Government were to decide that the original order of detention should be confirmed under S. 3 (5), the result even in such a case would be that while the Government would be entitled to keep him in custody for a period of six months only from the date of the final order, by reason of the delay on the part of the Provincial Government in taking the steps contemplated by the Act, his detention would be unnecessarily and perhaps unjustly, prolonged which is contrary to the spirit of the Act.

It is therefore necessary to consider to what extent the provisions of the Act enjoining the Provincial Government to take certain steps are mandatory and whether if those provisions were not observed properly by the Provincial Government the continuance of the detention would become illegal or improper within the meaning of S. 491, Cr. P. C. There is no time limit fixed by the Act for either communicating the particulars and grounds under S. 3 (1) or for referring the matter to the Advisory Council after the representation of the detenu is received, or even to pass a final order under S. 3 (5) after the report of the Advisory Council is received. The absence of the time limit is probably responsible for the inordinate delay we have noticed in some of these petitions on the part of the Government in taking the steps. It is an accepted rule of const ruction of a statute, that where no time limit is fixed for the doing of an act enjoined by it, the act should be performed within a reasonable time and it is unnecessary to consider the authorities in support of this rule of construction and it would be sufficient to refer to the Full Bench decision of Patna High Court in Murat Patwa v. Province of Bihar. In the petitions before us, there is no complaint of unreasonable delay in furnishing the grounds under S. 3 (1). We may however observe that the question was considered by Subba Rao and Mack, JJ, in Venkataraman v. Commissioner of Police, Madras in which the question that arose for consideration was the effect of the delay caused by the detaining authority in communicating to the Provincial Government the grounds of detention under S. 2 (2) of the Act. The learned judges held that the subsequent non-compliance with the provisions of the Act after an order of detention under S. 2 (1) was made, would not affect the legality of the original order of detention and would not make it ab initio void. They were also of opinion that the delay in communicating the grounds under S. 2 (2) would not even affect the further detention. In dealing with the contention that by reason of the non-observance of the subsequent provisions of S. 2 (2), the continuance of detention became illegal, Subba Rao, J. observed at page 92: —

This argument ignores the distinction between the order of detention and the procedure prescribed for enabling the aggrieved party to seek redress. The petitioner, as we found, was legally detained under S. 2 (1) of Madras Act I of 1947. Under S. 4 of the Act this order of detention shall be in force for six months from the date on which it is confirmed or modified under sub-sec. 5 of S. 3. If the authority concerned did not carry out his statutory duties, the petitioner would have taken the appropriate remedy to compel him to perform his duty. We may have other remedies if he was prejudiced by the breach of a statutory duty by the authority concerned. But in our view the non-compliance with the provision of sub-sec. (2) to S. 2 could not make the detention illegal. In any view as the order was communicated to the Government and the grounds for detention were duly served on the petitioner it would be impossible to hold that the detention of the petitioner at present is invalid”.

The question of the effect of the delay in communicating the grounds to the Provincial Government under S. 2 (2) by the detaining authority does not directly arise for consideration before us. We are, however, unable to see what remedy a person would have to compel the detaining authority to perform the statutory duty of communicating the grounds under S. 2 (2). If the authority concerned is outside the original jurisdiction of the High Court, even a mandamus would not lie. It is difficult to see that other remedies a person in such a situation would have if there was a clear breach of a statutory duty by the authority concerned. The man was deprived of his liberty, was in jail and there is no means of enforcing the statutory obligation to communicate the grounds under S. 2 (2) to the Provincial Government. The question came up for consideration before a Full Bench of the Patna High Court in which the delay complained of was the delay in communicating the grounds under S. 4 of the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act corresponding to S. 3 of the Madras Act. If the grounds of detention were not communicated to the detenu within a reasonable time and there is no acceptable explanation for the delay, the further detention becomes illegal. If the complaint before us in the petitions now under consideration was one of delay in communicating the grounds under S. 2 (2) or in communicating the grounds under S. 3 (1), in the light of the decision of the Full Bench of the Patna High Court the decision in Venkataraman v. Commissioner of Police, Madras, in my view, would require reconsideration and would have necessitated a reference to a Full Bench for an authoritative decision on the point. But as the objection before us is of a different nature, it is unnecessary to follow such a course.

The main ground of complaint before us in the several petitions is that the Provincial Government failed to carry out the duty of communicating to the detenu the grounds on which the order has been made, and such other particulars as are, in their opinion, sufficient to enable the detenu to make an effective representation to the Government. The contention is that the grounds are vague, indefinite and uncertain and that no particulars were given in any of the cases. As the detenu was not placed by the executive Government in a position of making an effective representation to government, he was deprived of the usefulness of the only remedy that is open to him under the Act to prove to the satisfaction of the Government and the Advisory Council that he was not guilty of any of the activities attributed to him. The relevant provision of S. 3 (1) is: —

Where an order in respect of any person is made by the Provincial Government under sub-sec. (1) of S. 2 or where any such order is made by any officer or authority subordinate to them, after receipt of the reports specified in sub-sec. (2) of that section, the Provincial Government shall communicate to the person affected by the order, so far as such communication can be made without disclosing the facts which they con- sider it would be against the public interest to disclose, the grounds on which the order has been made against him and such other particulars as are in their opinion sufficient to enable him to make, if he wishes a representation against the order”.

This provision is mandatory and imposes on the Provincial Government a duty of communicating to the detenu the grounds on winch the order was made. So far as the grounds are concerned, there is no power under the Act to withhold any of the grounds, as the grounds to be communicated are the grounds on which the order has been made which implies that all the grounds could be communicated to the detenu. So far as the facts are concerned, it is no doubt left to the Provincial Government to consider whether all the facts should be disclosed to the detenu or only some of them. They are not bound to disclose all the facts if they consider that such a disclosure would be against public interest. The Act makes a distinction between facts, grounds and particulars. While all the grounds have to be communicated and such facts as would not endanger public interest alone could be disclosed, so far the particulars are concerned, the Government are to communicate to the detenu so much of the particulars as would be sufficient in their opinion to enable the detenu to make a representation against the order. The Provincial Government, therefore, has to decide whether the particulars given and disclosed would be sufficient to enable the detenu to make a representation against the order. If the grounds are vague and uncertain, it would be open to the Government to supplement them by giving particulars to enable the person concerned to make a proper representation. If the grounds communicated are vague and uncertain, and no particulars are given, does the non-observance of the rule make the further detention illegal or improper?

Under the Act the liberty of the subject is curtailed without trial by courts established by law and the only safeguard provided by the Act for the detenu is the right to make a representation to the Advisory Council through the Provincial Government. This right is a substitute for a trial under ordinary law. In order to enable the detenu to present his case properly he should know the grounds and the particulars of the grounds on the basis of which an order for detention is made under S. 2 (1). The duty of providing this information was laid by the Act on the Provincial Government. The power conferred upon the Provincial Government of curtailing the liberty of the subject by the Act should, in my opinion, be exercised subject to the conditions and limitations imposed by the Act. It is the function of the Court to see whether the conditions laid down by the statute are properly carried out or not. If they are not duly observed and fulfilled, the very foundation of the power to continue to detain the person comes to an end and the further detention becomes illegal. If the grounds furnished are no grounds at all in the sense that they convey no information to the person detained, or even if they are grounds outside the purview of the Act, the continuance of the detention cannot be justified. It may not be necessary that the Provincial Government should furnish legal evidence or proof of the accusations against the detenu, as in cases where be is charged with a crime, but the information furnished mutt be such which enables the detenu to present his case effectively.

In Dale's case dealing with an application for a writ of habeas corpus, the rule requiring the observance of the steps laid down by law and its effect upon the detained person is stated thus by Brett, L.J (page 461):

It is a general rule, which has always been acted upon by the Courts of England, that if any person procures the imprisonment of another he must take care to do so by steps, all of which are entirely regular, and that if he fails to follow every step in the process with extreme regularity the Court will not allow the imprisonment to continue.”

And again, at page 463:

I desire to state that although in this case I consider that irregularity a matter of substance, I should be of the same opinion if it were only a matter of form, because, as I said before, I take it to be a general rule that the Courts at Westminster will not allow any individual in this Kingdom to procure the imprisonment of another, unless he takes care to follow with extreme precision every form and every step in the process which is to procure that imprisonment. I consider this to be a wholesome and good rule, and to be in accordance with the great desire which English Courts have always had to protect the liberty of every one of her Majesty's subjects.”

Cotton, L. J., in the same case concurred with Brett, L. J. and stated the rule in his own words as follows: (at 469).

I quite agree with Brett, L. J. that when persons take upon themselves to cause another to be imprisoned, they must strictly follow the powers under which they are assuming to act, and if they do not, the person imprisoned may be discharged, although the particulars in which they have failed to follow those powers may be matters of mere form. Here, however, the departure from the correct procedure is not, in my opinion, a mere matter of form, but is a matter of substance.”

The other High Courts, which considered a similar question under the Public Safety Act, have unanimously held that where the particulars given are indefinite and vague and uncertain there is no compliance with the provisions of the Act and the continuance of the detention is illegal. Vide, Nek Muhammad v. Province of Bihar, In re Krishnaji Gopal Brahma and Durgadas v. Rex. I respectfully agree with the reasons given in those judgments for holding that where there is no substantial compliance with the provisions of S. 3 of the Act, the continuance of the detention becomes illegal. It is unnecessary to examine these decisions at length.

The Court of Appeal in Greene's case, considered the effect of an error in the grounds communicated to the detenu on the continuance of the detention. The detenu there was informed of the grounds on which the order of detention was made and was also furnished with the particulars to enable him to present his case to the Advisory Council. The grounds communicated stated that he was concerned in one kind of acts endangering public safety, while the order of detention was made in fact, on a totally different ground. The detenu, however, was served with a true copy of the actual order and the particulars clearly stated the correct ground of detention. He did not, however, draw the attention of the Advisory Council to the material discrepancy between the two. Goddard, L.J with whom the other Lord Justices agreed held “That a mistake in the document served on the detenu after he was in custody would not invalidate the original order of detention nor does it render its continuance invalid. There was nothing to show that the detenu was in any way prejudiced by the mistake”. This aspect of the case was referred to and dealt with by the House of Lords on appeal. The House of Lords agreed with the Court of appeal, that as no prejudice was caused to the appellant by the error in the document sent to him by the Advisory Committee, the detention or its continuance was not illegal. Lord Macmillan at page 298, observed:

The mistake, the occurrence of which your Lordships deplore, does not in any way affect the validity of the detention order which is the answer to the appellant's application. It affects the due observance of the procedure prescribed for the further consideration of the case of a person who is ex hypothesi under lawful detention. Consequently the mistake affords no ground for invalidating the detention order and does not help the appellant in his present application”.

The test applied by the House of Lords was whether by reason of the mistake, there was any prejudice to the detenu and if there was no prejudice no question of its effect on the detention arose for consideration particularly as in that case the mistake was one which could be remedied.

In cases where on the basis of vague, indefinite and uncertain grounds a representation was made by the detenu to the best of his ability and after the matter was considered by the Advisory Council, the Provincial Government passed a final order of detention, there was no further means of remedying the defect and it cannot be said that when a Provincial Government failed to discharge its duty the fact that the detenu did not complain at the time of making the representation of want of particulars he is precluded from agitating the question now. The grounds, therefore, in each of the petitions before us have to be examined in the light of these principles.

In some of the petitions we have noticed that there is considerable delay on the part of the Provincial Government in referring the matter to the Advisory Council even after the representation by the detenu was received. In other cases, there was also delay in passing final orders after the report of the Advisory Council was received. The Government, it must be mentioned, has to deal with a number of applications of this nature and actually time would be taken in examining the representations made in the light of the information available and in referring the matter to the Advisory Council. It may be that the Provincial Government requires in certain cases further information from the District Magistrates and that might occasion some delay. Making due allowance for all these considerations, a delay of several months, if not properly explained, cannot be altogether ignored. The question of the effect of the delay in referring to the Advisory Council was considered by me and Rajagopalan, J. in Cr. M. P. No. 200 of 1949, and we stated in the judgment in that case:

We should however be inclined to say that any period in excess of the statutory limit of six months made applicable to an order under S. 3 (5) would by itself be proof prima facie of unreasonableness. But whether delay in any given case is unreasonable or not has to be judged with reference to the circumstances of that case taking also into account that the period was far in excess of six months”.

Horwill and Govinda Menon, JJ. observed in Cr. M. P. No. 2128 of 1948 that any further delay beyond a fortnight after the date of the order passed by the learned Judges would be sufficient to show that further detention would be illegal. The delay, therefore, in the two stages, namely, in referring the matter to the Advisory Council and in passing a final order under S. 3 (5) after the report from the Advisory Council was received, if unreasonable and is not properly explained would have the effect of making the continuance of the detention illegal.

In the present application, excluding the activities in 1946 and before August 1947 when the applicant was released from detention, the only ground communicated to him would not, in my opinion, convey any information nor does it refer to any activities on his part showing that he is acting in a manner prejudicial to the public safety or its maintenance. The communists party was not declared illegal, in which case, it will be open to the Government to take action under S. 17 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, if the person continued thereafter to associate himself with that party. Even if a party is declared illegal, the mere association with that party would not justify the inference that the person was acting in a manner prejudicial to public safety. In the Allahabad and Patna cases already referred to, which dealt with teases of members of Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh, it was pointed out that the mere association as such with the party after it was declared illegal is not an activity which endangers public safety. We are not concerned with the objects of a particular political party, nor are we prepared to accept the argument advanced on behalf of the applicants that the proceedings under the Act are actuated by political animosity and that therefore, they are mala fide. We are concerned only with the question whether the grounds communicated are definite and are such as would enable the applicant to present his case properly to the Provincial Government. To take a sample of the grounds communicated to the present applicant, one of the grounds stated that the applicant ridiculed the proposals of the Government to award compensation to the zamindars and inamdars; that he was also actively engaged in the Madura Municipal election propaganda to get Communist candidates elected. These grounds besides being vague, are, in our opinion, entirely outside the purview of the Act. A political party is entitled to take part in municipal or other elections and for that reason alone it cannot be said that the activity of a person concerned is such as to endanger public safety, nor his criticism of the proposals of the Government to award compensation to the zamindars and inamdars under legislation now pending sanction before the Governor-General for the abolition of the zamindaries. No dates are given as to when and where the person concerned ridiculed the policy of the Government. And the only other ground that is added is that he spread alarmist ideas about the number of workers that would be retrenched it the recommendations of the Committee were given effect to. Nobody knows and there is nothing to indicate what this committee is and what the reference to the alarmist ideas about the number of workers to be retrenched is. The grounds are not only outside the purview of the Act but are indefinite and vague. With these grounds, if they can be called grounds, it is impossible for any person to make any representation to the Government, to show his innocence and to establish that he is not guilty of any of the conduct attributed to him. We are therefore satisfied that as the statutory requirements have not been satisfied and as even no particulars were given, the continuance of the detention of the applicant is not justified. We direct, therefore, that the applicant should be set at liberty forthwith.

Cr. M. P. No. 191 of 1949. The applicant in this case was arrested under S. 151, Cr. P. C. on the 27th March, 1948. The order of detention under S. 2 (1) of the Act was passed on 9-4-1948 by the District Magistrate Tanjore. The District Magistrate states in the order that the applicant is acting, — about to act in a manner prejudicial to public safety, and maintenance of public order. He was removed to Central Jail, Vellore on 12-3-1948. The grounds of detention were furnished to him on 21-4-1948. On 11-5-1948 the applicant sent a representation to the Provincial Government. The matter was referred to the Advisory Council on 22-6-1948. On 22-12-1948 the Advisory Council recommended that the applicant should be released. The Provincial Government, however, did not accept this recommendation but confirmed the original order of detention under S. 3 (5) of the Act.

In this case also the grounds alone were communicated and no particulars were given. The only substantial ground is that he advocated acts of violence and was engaged in intimidating local and imported workers. The ground does not say when and where he advocated acts of violence and the reference to intimidation of local and imported workers is wholly unintelligible and is indefinite in that it does not even give the approximate time and date. Some of the grounds are outside the purview of the Act. There is no compliance with the provisions of S. 3 (1) of the Act and we, therefore, direct that the petitioner should be set at liberty forthwith.

Crl. M. P. No. 192 of 1949. The applicant in this case was arrested under S. 131 Cr.P.C on 2-5-1948 and an order of detention was passed on 15-5-1948 and thereafter he was removed to the Vellore jail. The grounds were communicated on 9-6-1948. He submitted his representation on 29-6-1948 and the matter was referred to the advisory council on 14-7-1948. The Advisory Council recommended by its report dated 20-1-1949 that he should be released, but the Provincial Government passed a final order on 15-2-1949 confirming the original order of detention.

On an examination of the grounds, we are satisfied that the grounds contain sufficient particulars and are not vague and indefinite. The original order of detention was objected to on the ground that the authority of the District Magistrate passing an order under S. 2 (1) was not disclosed in the order of detention. It is not necessary to state the authority and if the petitioner had raised the objection and seriously contended that the District Magistrate was not empowered under S. 15 of the Act, the order would have been easily produced. We therefore think that there is no substance in this contention.

It was also argued that the order of detention was passed after he was arrested under S. 151, Cr. P. C. and this indicates that the order was not bona fide. S. 151, Cr.P.C authorises a police officer to arrest a person designing to commit a cognisable offence, and therefore, if there was material justifying the action under S. 2 (1) of the Act, there is no reason to hold that the order of detention is illegal. We think, therefore, that there is no case for interference made out in this application. The application is therefore dismissed.

N.T.R