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Kunda Chenchurama Reddi v. Chintalapalli Ademma.

Madras High Court
Feb 4, 1949
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Factual and Procedural Background

The suit underlying this second appeal concerned 40 cents (a portion of the southern 3 acres, 75 cents) of S. No. 240 in Pottempavdu village, claimed by the plaintiff to have been trespassed upon by the defendant around 1938. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant, the owner of the adjoining S. No. 241, was able to annex that 40 cents because the plaintiff had purportedly leased the property to him for seven years under Ex. D-2 and that Ex. D-2 falsely described the subject-matter of the demise (asserting 3 acres, 60 cents) on account of fraud by the defendant.

The defendant denied the alleged trespass and required the plaintiff to prove title and possession within 12 years prior to suit. The trial Court (District Munsiff of Nellore) dismissed the suit. On appeal the Subordinate Judge of Nellore decreed the suit except as to an extent of 15 cents previously decreed to the plaintiff in an earlier litigation (the 15-cent decree had become inexecutable by limitation and the defendant remained in possession). The Subordinate Judge therefore denied relief as to the 15 cents but granted it for the remaining extent on the basis of what he treated as admissions in Ex. D-2; he did not disturb the trial Court's finding against the plaintiff on the alleged 1938 trespass.

The defendant filed the present second appeal challenging (1) the Subordinate Judge's reliance on the recitals of Ex. D-2 as negativing the defendant's adverse possession, and (2) the view that the plaintiff was not barred by Article 142 of the Limitation Act from recovering the remaining 25 cents (i.e., that the plaintiff had to prove possession within 12 years prior to the suit).

Additional facts of record: in 1928 the plaintiff executed a deed of trust in respect of her entire 3 acres, 75 cents in S. No. 240 in favour of certain trustees who remained in possession. The trustees remained in possession until the plaintiff repudiated the trust and obtained a decree in O.S. No. 156 of 1940 against them, thereby eventually entitling the plaintiff to possession as against those trustees. Because the trustees were in possession at the time of Ex. D-2, the defendant did not in fact acquire possession from the plaintiff pursuant to Ex. D-2.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the recitals in Ex. D-2 (which purported to record the plaintiff's title and possession) could be given effect so as to negativate the defendant's adverse possession or to establish the plaintiff's possession within the statutory period.
  2. Whether Article 142 of the Limitation Act barred the plaintiff's claim (i.e., whether the plaintiff was required to prove possession within 12 years prior to suit even assuming the alleged trespass of 1938), and if so, whether any of the respondent's arguments or authorities could save the plaintiff's case from that bar.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The Subordinate Judge unduly relied upon the recitals of Ex. D-2 about the plaintiff's title and possession; those recitals should not be used to negativate the defendant's adverse possession.
  • Even if the plaintiff's allegation of trespass in 1938 is accepted, the plaintiff nonetheless failed to prove possession within 12 years prior to suit as required by Article 142 of the Limitation Act and thus the plaintiff's suit is barred.

Respondent's Arguments

  • Counsel for the respondent (Mr. Umamaheswaram) advanced multiple lines of argument to escape Article 142, including:
    • The contention that the trustees' possession should legally be treated as the plaintiff's possession (i.e., that the plaintiff must be taken to have proved possession within 12 years because the trustees were in possession).
    • The argument that where the true owner sues a first trespasser and obtains a decree, any subsequent dispossession of that first trespasser by a second trespasser during the pendency of the suit would be unavailing as against the decree-holder; the decree, it was argued, operates proprio vigore to give back possession in law to the true owner and could therefore save a later suit from the bar of limitation.
    • Reliance on authorities and commentary (Mitra's commentary, Ram Kishore Gangopadhya, Agency Co. v. Short, Janakinata Saha v. Baikunthanath Chattik, Vasudeo Atmaram Joshi v. Eknath Thite, and others) to support doctrines such as constructive restoration or the effect of decrees on running of limitation in cases of successive trespassers.
    • Arguments based on tacking principles (cases under Article 144) and other case-law distinctions suggesting limits to the application of the limitation bar.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Official Receiver, East Godavari v. Govindaraju (1940) 2 M.L.J. 190 : I.L.R. 1940 Mad. 953 (F.B.) Full Bench ruling that Article 142 applies to suits for ejectment and that a plaintiff cannot rest on title alone but must prove possession within 12 years of suit. The Court treated this Full Bench decision as binding and applied it to reject the respondent's arguments based on earlier single-judge authorities; it overruled Periaya Jeeyangarasami to the extent inconsistent.
Ramayya v. Kotamma (1921) 42 M.L.J. 319 : I.L.R. 45 Mad. 370 Authority that adverse enjoyment of immoveable property for over 12 years, whether by single or successive independent occupiers (continuous and without break), bars the true owner under Article 142. The Court held the present case governed by this ruling, accepted it as sound and binding, and concluded that the plaintiff was barred by Article 142 on the facts.
Vasudeo Atmaram Joshi v. Eknath Balkrishna Thite (1910) I.L.R. 35 Bom. 79 A statement by Heaton J. proposing that a decree establishing title can, in some cases, substitute for proof of possession within the statutory period. The Court stated that part of Heaton J.'s statement (limiting Article 142) cannot be regarded as good law after the Full Bench ruling in Official Receiver; thereby limiting the precedent's application.
Periaya Jeeyangarasami v. Esoof Sahib (1924) 21 L.W. 398 Single-Judge adoption of a part of Heaton J.'s statement (suggesting Article 142 may not apply to claims not in substance for possession). The Court noted that this decision has been overruled by the Full Bench in Official Receiver and thus cannot be treated as good law for the present purposes.
Singaravelu Mudaliar v. Chokkalinga Mudaliar (1922) 43 M.L.J. 737 : I.L.R. 46 Mad. 525 Decision that a declaratory decree alone cannot stop the running of time by adverse possession (Article 144 context cited). The Court invoked this decision, along with Subbaya Pandaram, to indicate that a decree (including one for possession not effectively executed) will not satisfy the proof-of-possession requirement of Article 142.
Subbaya Pandaram v. Muhammad Mustapha Maracayar (1923) 45 M.L.J. 588 : L.R. 50 I.A. 295 : I.L.R. 46 Mad. 751 (P.C.) Privy Council authority that a declaratory decree does not stop adverse possession from running. Used to support the Court's view that decrees cannot, by themselves, satisfy Article 142's requirement of proof of possession within 12 years.
Ram Kishore Gangopadhya v. Bandikaratan Tewari Ghowdhry (1886) I.L.R. 13 Cal. 203 Cited in support of the commentary position that decrees can operate to restore possession in some contexts (referenced by respondent's counsel). The Court recorded that the respondent relied on it, but found the line of argument based on it inapplicable on the facts before the Court.
Agency Co. v. Short (1888) 13 A.C. 793 Authority cited to show that limitation ceases to run against the lawful owner after an intruder has relinquished possession. The Court noted the respondent relied on this decision but held it inapplicable because there was no relinquishment by the first trespasser during the pendency of any suit in the present case.
Janakinata Saha v. Baikunthanath Chattik (1922) 70 I.C. 602 Observation that when possession passes from a first to a second trespasser there may be a constructive (even momentary) restoration of possession to the true owner. The Court observed the respondent relied on such observations but found no factual ground in the present case to infer relinquishment or constructive restoration.
Willis v. Earl Howe (1893) 2 Ch. 545 Kay, L.J.'s observation used to support the principle that allowing successive unrelated occupiers to interrupt limitation would produce absurd results. The Court cited Kay, L.J.'s observations (via commentary) as supportive of the Ramayya rule and to justify treating continuous adverse possession by successive occupiers as running against the true owner.
Ram Lakhan Bai v. Gajadhar Rai (1910) I.L.R. 33 All. 224; Ademma v. Penchulu Reddi (1946) 1 M.L.J. 87; Secretary of State for India in Council v. Debendra Lal Khan (1933) 66 M.L.J. 134 : L.R. 61 I.A. 78 : I.L.R. 61 Cal. 262 (P.C.) Cited to show converse principles about tacking of adverse possession (Article 144 context): in some cases tacking of successive trespassers in privity is allowed; in other cases successive independent trespassers cannot tack. The Court said these decisions concern Article 144 and tacking issues and are irrelevant to the present case governed by Article 142.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by analyzing the factual record and the legal submissions strictly in light of Article 142 and the authorities cited.

  1. The Court found that the recitals in Ex. D-2 describing the plaintiff's title and possession were false, because at the time of Ex. D-2 the trustees (from the 1928 trust deed) were in possession in their own right and adversely to the plaintiff. Consequently the defendant did not obtain possession from the plaintiff under Ex. D-2.

    As a legal consequence the Court held the recitals could not be used to negativate the defendant's adverse possession or to establish the plaintiff's possession within the statutory period.

  2. The Court addressed the multiple lines of argument advanced by the respondent's counsel to escape Article 142 and rejected them one by one on the facts:
    • The idea that the trustees' possession should be treated as the plaintiff's was rejected because the trustees were in possession in their own right and adversely to the plaintiff; the plaintiff had to sue them (O.S. No. 156 of 1940) to recover possession.
    • The argument that a decree against a first trespasser (operating proprio vigore to restore possession to the true owner) could save a later suit was found inapplicable because, in this case, the suit against the first trespasser was subsequent to the alleged 1938 trespass by the defendant rather than prior; there was therefore no dispossession of the first trespasser by the second during the pendency of a suit by the true owner.
    • Doctrines of constructive restoration or reliance on Heaton J.'s statement in Vasudeo Joshi were limited in operation; the Court observed that the part of Heaton J.'s statement relied upon had been overruled by the Full Bench in Official Receiver and could not be treated as good law to defeat Article 142.
    • Decisions and dicta indicating that a declaratory decree or an unexecuted decree restores possession for limitation purposes were found inapplicable; the Court invoked Singaravelu Mudaliar and Subbaya Pandaram to show that such decrees will not stop the running of limitation under Article 144 and that they cannot be treated as satisfying Article 142's proof-of-possession requirement.
    • Arguments based on tacking or on cases under Article 144 (Ram Lakhan Bai, Ademma, Secretary of State v. Debendra Lal Khan) were treated as irrelevant to the present case governed by Article 142.
  3. Having rejected each of the respondent's lines of argument as either factually inapplicable or legally unsupportable in view of binding authority, the Court concluded that the case was governed by Ramayya v. Kotamma: continuous adverse enjoyment of immoveable property for over 12 years by single or successive occupiers (even if not claiming from one another) operates to bar the true owner under Article 142.

    The Court expressly stated its agreement with the Ramayya ruling and treated it as binding on a single judge of the High Court.

  4. On that basis the Court held that none of the respondent's arguments could save the plaintiff and allowed the second appeal.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The second appeal was allowed. The decree of the learned Subordinate Judge was set aside and the decree of the learned District Munsiff (the trial Court) was restored with costs to the defendant throughout.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the defendant's possession (as recognized by the District Munsiff) stands and the plaintiff's claim to the disputed portion was barred under Article 142 as governed by the ruling in Ramayya v. Kotamma.
  • The Court applied existing precedents (notably the Full Bench decision in Official Receiver and the Ramayya ruling) rather than creating new law; no broader new precedent was laid down by this decision beyond the application of existing authorities to the facts of the case.
Show all summary ...

1. The subject-matter of the suit out of which this second appeal arises is an extent of 40 cents of the southern 3 acres, 75 cents, belonging to the plaintiff in S. No. 240 of the Pottempavdu village of the total extent of 4 acres, 75 cents. Alleging trespass on the 40 cents somewhere about 1938 on the part of the defendant, the owner of S. No. 241 lying to the south of S. No. 240, the plaintiff sued to recover possession of the 40 cents and mesne profits thereon. According to the plaintiff, it became possible for the defendant to trespass, because he happened to have become the lessee of the plaintiff's property under Ex. D-2 for a term of seven years and could abuse his possession as such lessee so as to annex a portion of the leasehold to his own property. The plaintiff alleged also that out of 3 acres, 75 cents, an extent of 3 acres, 60 cents, was mentioned in Ex. D-2 as the subject-matter of the demise on account of the fraud which the defendant played. In answer to the action the defendant put the plaintiff to proof of her title and of her possession within 12 years prior to suit and denied the trespass alleged. The learned District Munsiff of Nellore who tried the suit dismissed it, giving effect to the pleas raised by the defendant. On appeal the learned Subordinate Judge of Nellore decreed the suit except with reference to an extent of 15 cents. This extent of 15 cents had been decreed to this very plaintiff against this very defendant in an earlier litigation on 25th August, 1930. But the decree became inexecutable by time-bar, and the defendant remained in possession of that extent all along. The learned Subordinate Judge therefore held that the plaintiff was disentitled to relief in respect of that extent, and that in respect of the remainder there was a clear admission of the plaintiff's title and possession in Ex. D-2 entitling her to a decree. I may add that the learned Subordinate Judge did not displace the finding recorded by the learned District Munsiff against the case of trespass in 1938 pleaded by the plaintiff.

2. Against the decree of the learned Subordinate Judge the defendant has filed this second appeal. There is no question now with reference to the 15 cents. As regards the remaining 25 cents the appellant's grievance is, firstly, that undue effect has been given by the learned Subordinate Judge to the recitals of Ex. D-2 about the plaintiff's title and possession, and secondly, that irrespective of the defendant's proof or failure of proof of his own adverse possession the plaintiff was bound to fail for want of proof of her possession within 12 years prior to suit under Article 142 of the Limitation Act, even assuming the trespass of 1938 alleged by the plaintiff to be true.

3. The further admitted facts of the case which I need mention are these. The plaintiff executed a deed of trust in 1928 in favour of certain third parties in respect of her entire 3 acres, 75 cents in S. No. 240. Those parties remained in possession thereof after the plaintiff's execution of the trust deed till the plaintiff who repudiated the trust later became eventually entitled to possession as against them by virtue of the decree passed in her favour in O.S. No. 156 of 1940 on the file of the Court of the District Munsiff of Nellore. The result was that, notwithstanding the recitals of Ex. D-2 abovementioned, the parties in possession at the time of Ex. D-2 being the trustees there was no possession got by the defendant from the plaintiff pursuant thereto, because there was no possession with her to be given by her to the defendant.

4. The recitals of Ex. D-2 being therefore false, I am of opinion with reference to the first contention of the appellant that they were wrongly used by the learned Subordinate Judge against the defendant as negativing his adverse possession Being false, they cannot, I think, be used whether for negativing adverse possession of the defendant or for finding the plaintiff's possession within the statutory period. With reference to the second contention of the appellant, in order to escape the bar of Article 142 of the Indian Limitation Act which would prima facie cover a case like the present under the Full Bench ruling of this Court reported in Official Receiver, East Godavari v. Govindaraju (1940) 2 M.L.J. 190 : I.L.R. 1940 Mad. 953 (F.B.), Mr. Umamaheswaram, the learned advocate for the respondent, attempted many lines of argument before me. He contended in the first instance, rather boldly that the plaintiff must be taken to have proved her possession within 12 years prior to suit, because the possession of the trustees was in law hers. That, in my opinion, is absolutely and obviously impossible. The trustees were in possession in their own right and adversely to the plaintiff and not. on behalf of the plaintiff, so much so that in fact the plaintiff had to file her suit, O.S. No. 156 of 1940, in order to evict them from the property in question.

5. The learned advocate next contended that if during the wrongful possession of one trespasser the true owner filed a suit and obtained a decree against him, any dispossession of that trespasser by another trespasser during the pendency of the suit would be unavailing against the plaintiff suing the later trespasser within 12 years of the decree. The argument was that the decree obtained by the true owner against the first trespasser would operate proprio vigore to give back possession in the eye of law to the true owner which, if proved to be within 12 years prior to the suit against the later trespasser, would save such a suit from the bar of limitation under Article 142. In support of this contention the learned advocate relied principally on the statement of law to be found at page 1706 of the 6th edition of Mitra's Commentary on the Indian Limitation Act and the case in Ram Kishore Gangopadhya v. Bandikaratan Tewari Ghowdhry (1886) I.L.R. 13 Cal. 203, cited in the foot-note in support thereof. My attention was also drawn in this connection to the decision of the Privy Council reported in Agency Co. v. Short (1888) 13 A.C. 793, as showing that in cases of successive trespassers limitation ceases to run against the lawful owner of land after the intruder has relinquished his possession. Reference was also made to the observations of the learned Judges in Janakinata Saha v. Baikunthanath Chattik (1922) 70 I.C. 602 at 604, to the effect that, When the possession passes from the first to the second trespasser, there is a constructive restoration, even if a momentary restoration, of the true title to possession.

6. It is unnecessary for me to deal with this line of argument of counsel for the respondent any further than to say that it can have no application to the facts of the case before me. Here no dispossession of the first trespasser by the second, that is, by the defendant in the present suit, took place during the pendency of a suit by the true owner against the former. The suit against the first trespasser (O.S. No. 156 of 1940) was in the present casein fact only subsequent to the alleged trespass of 1938 by the second and not prior. Nor is there any room in the circumstances of the present case for the inference of a relinquishment of possession by the first intruder or for the application of any principle of constructive restoration of possession to the true owner.

7. The next argument submitted by the learned advocate was based upon Heaton J. 's statement of the law in the last paragraph of his judgment in Vasudeo Atmaram Joshi v. Eknath Balkrishna Thite (1910) I.L.R. 35 Bom. 79 at 92. But it must be pointed out, in regard to one part of that statement, viz., that Article 142 has no application to claims which neither in terms nor in substance are claims to possession, made necessary by reason of dispossession or discontinuance of possession, that although that part of the statement of the law has been adopted by Madhavan Nair, J., sitting as a single Judge in Periaya Jeeyangarasami v. Esoof Sahib,(1924) 21 L.W. 398 it cannot be regarded as good law after the Full Bench ruling of this Court in Official Receiver, East Godavari v. Govindaraju(1940) 2 M.L.J. 190 : I.L.R. 1940 Mad. 953 (F.B.). The decision of the Full Bench has in terms overruled Periya Jeeyangarasami v. Esoof Sahib (1924) 21 L.W. 398, and laid down clearly and categorically that in suits for ejectment, against a person in occupation of immoveable property, the plaintiff cannot rest his case on title alone, and that Article 142 applies to such suit so as to make it incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove that he has exercised acts of ownership by being in possession within 12 years of suit. Nor am I satisfied that the other part of Heaton, J.'s statement of the law is any the sounder. Says the learned Judge:

It was indeed urged that it is a general principle that anyone suing in ejectment must prove possession within 12 years and the authorities seem to bear out that contention but the reason for this is that possession is commonly the effective assertion of title which is relied on and the cases accordingly deal with that particular kind of assertion of title. But it is not the only one; there is. another which in some cases is equally good; and that is an assertion of title made in Court and established by a decree. That is good against those who are party defendants to the suit, and if the same title is re-asserted and made good, as here in a later suit against other opposing parties, it is good against them also, and entitles to possession whether the title-claimant has or has not been in possession within 13 years; unless the opponent can defeat the title by adverse possession. There is no such defect in this case.

That a declaratory decree pure and simpliciter cannot stop the running of time by adverse possession under Article 144 has been ruled by the decision of the High Court of Madras in Singaravelu Mudaliar v. Chokkalinga Mudaliar (1922) 43 M.L.J. 737 : I.L.R. 46 Mad. 525, and that of the Privy Council in Subbaya Pandaram v. Muhammad Mustapha Maracayar (1923) 45 M.L.J. 588 : L.R. 50 I.A. 295 : I.L.R. 46 Mad. 751 (P.C.). It is difficult, then, to see how on principle such a decree or even a decree for possession not effectively executed can satisfy the requirement of proof of possession within 12 years of suit which is laid down by Article 142.

8. The last line of argument advanced before me for the respondent is founded on decisions of the kind illustrated by Ram Lakhan Bai v. Gajadhar Rai (1910) I.L.R. 33 All. 224, and Ademma v. Penchulu Reddi (1946) 1 M.L.J. 87, on the one hand and Secretary of State for India in Council v. Debendra Lal Khan (1933) 66 M.L.J. 134 : L.R. 61 I.A. 78 : I.L.R. 61 Cal. 262 (P.C.), on the other, which are cases mutually converse and go to show that in cases under Article 144 there can be no tacking on of adverse possession on the part of successive independent trespassers while in the case of successive trespassers in privity with each other or one another there can be such tacking on. But these decisions, it need hardly be observed, are thoroughly irrelevant to a case like the present governed by Article 142.

9. None of the lines of argument submitted for the respondent is consequently of any avail to him. The case is, in my opinion, governed by the ruling in Ramayya v. Kotamma (1921) 42 M.L.J. 319 : I.L.R. 45 Mad. 370 that, Adverse enjoyment of immoveable property for over 12 years, whether by a single person or by several persons in succession, even though they do not claim from one another, provided it is continuous and without a break bars the true owner under Article 142 of the Limitation Act.

That ruling, with which I respectfully agree, notwithstanding the doubt expressed by a single Judge of this Court, Chandrasekhara Aiyar, J., in Ademma v. Penchulu Reddi (1946) 1 M.L.J. 87, is based on the sound and sensible observations of Kay, L.J., in Willis v. Earl Howe (1893) 2 Ch. 545 that if the contrary were the correct view of the law, the effect would be that if a series of occupiers, not claiming under one another, kept out the real owner, say, for 100 years, time would run against him only from the moment when the last of such occupiers entered into possession. In any case, that ruling is binding on me sitting as a single Judge and concludes the present case against the respondent. Reference may in this connection be made also to the statement of the law to be found in Chitale's Commentaries on the Indian Limitation Act, 2nd edition, page 2395, to which my attention has been drawn by Mr. Sivaprasada Rao for the appellant. In the result the second appeal succeeds and I allow it. The decree of the learned Subordinate Jude is set aside, and the decree of the learned District Munsiff is restored with costs to the defendant throughout. (No leave).