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The Public Prosecutor v. Illur Thippayya And Another.
Factual and Procedural Background
These appeals arise from the acquittal of accused persons charged under Ss. 7 and 8 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, for contravening various government orders. Initially, the accused were convicted by the trial court, but their convictions were set aside on appeal due to lack of proof regarding the existence or due publication of the relevant orders. The Public Prosecutor challenged the acquittals, asserting that proof of publication was unnecessary as the courts should take judicial notice of Indian laws and official orders under S. 57(1) of the Evidence Act.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the orders contravened by the accused qualify as "Indian laws" within the meaning of S. 3(27-a) of the General Clauses Act and thus attract judicial notice under S. 57(1) of the Evidence Act.
- Whether the lower court erred in refusing to take judicial notice of the government orders and their publication due to the absence of supporting documents.
Arguments of the Parties
Public Prosecutor's Arguments
- Proof of the government orders and their publication was not necessary as the court should take judicial notice of Indian laws under S. 57(1) of the Evidence Act.
- The orders contravened are official government orders and thus fall within the scope of Indian laws requiring judicial notice.
Accused's Arguments
- S. 57 of the Evidence Act does not apply to the facts to be proved in this case.
- The lower court correctly exercised its discretion in refusing to take judicial notice in the absence of production of the necessary documents evidencing the orders and their publication.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court analyzed the scope of S. 57 of the Evidence Act, which mandates judicial notice of Indian laws, defined under S. 3(27-a) of the General Clauses Act to include laws, ordinances, orders, by-laws, rules, or regulations made by competent authorities in British India. The government orders contravened by the accused were found to be duly issued and notified under the Essential Supplies Act and thus constitute Indian laws. Consequently, these orders attract judicial notice under S. 57(1) of the Evidence Act.
However, the court emphasized that judicial notice can only be taken if appropriate and unimpeachable books or documents are produced or otherwise accessible to the court. The discretion to refuse judicial notice is expressly granted where such documents are not produced. In this case, the lower court refused to take judicial notice due to the absence of such documentary evidence. The appellate court held that this exercise of discretion was neither perverse nor illegal, and therefore upheld the acquittals.
Holding and Implications
DISMISSED
The appeals by the Public Prosecutor against the acquittals were dismissed. The direct effect of this decision is that the acquittals of the accused stand affirmed. No broader precedent was established beyond affirming the discretionary power of courts to refuse judicial notice in the absence of supporting documents, even when the facts sought to be noticed are Indian laws or government orders.
These are appeals by the Public Prosecutor against the acquittal of the accused in all the cases. The accused in all the appeals were charged under Ss. 7 and 8 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, for having contravened the various orders passed by the Government. The following tabular statement shows the orders contravened by the accused in the various cases:
Accused in C.A No. 629 of 1947 G.O No. Ms. 1026 Food dated 19th November 1946. Accused in C.A No. 23 of 1948 do Accused in C.A No. 631 of 1947 B.P No. 626 dated 15th May 1946. Accused in C.A No. 632 of 1947 do Accused in C.A No. 663 of 1947 do Accused in C.A No. 22 of 1948 do Accused in C. A. No. 633 of 1947 Clause 4(1)of the Madras Cloth (Dealers) Control Order, 1946.
The first Court convicted all the accused but in appeal the convictions were set aside mainly on the ground that there was no proof of the orders or their due publication. The Public Prosecutor contended that the proof of the said fact was not necessary and the lower Court should have taken judicial notice of the said facts under S. 57(1) of the Evidence Act. The learned Counsel for the accused argued that that section of the Evidence Act has no application to the facts to be proved in this case and in any view the lower Court had rightly, in the exercise of its discretion, refused to take judicial notice of the facts without the production of the necessary documents.
The question to be decided in this case turns upon the construction of S. 57 of the Evidence Act. The relevant provisions of S. 57 read as follows:
“The Court shall take judicial notice of the following facts:—
(1) All Indian laws … in all these cases and also on all matters of public history, literature, science or art, the Court may resort for its aid to appropriate books or documents of reference.
If the Court is called upon by any person to take judicial notice of any fact, it may refuse to do so unless and until such person produces any such book or document as it may consider necessary to enable it to do so.”
The scheme of the Evidence Act is clear. Generally all the facts alleged have to be proved in the manner provided by the Act but there are three exceptions; facts admitted, facts presumed and facts of which the Court should take judicial notice need not be so proved. S. 57 enumerates the facts of which the Court should take judicial notice. Under S. 57(1) the Court should take judicial notice of all Indian Laws.
“Indian Laws” is defined by the General Clauses Act under S. 3(27-a). It includes any law, ordinance, order, by-law, rule or regulation passed or made at any time by any competent Legislature, authority or person in British India. The question for consideration is whether the orders contravened by the accused are orders within the meaning of this definition. If so, S. 57(1) of the Evidence Act would apply. Under S. 3(1) of Act XXIV of 1946, the Central Government so far as it appears to it to be necessary or expedient for maintaining or increasing supplies of any essential commodity, or for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices, may by notified order provide for regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution thereof, and trade and commerce therein. Under S. 4 of the same Act, the Central Government may by notified order direct that the power to make orders under S. 3 shall be exercisable by such officer, or authority subordinate to the Central Government or such Provincial Government or such officer or authority subordinate to a Provincial Government, as may be sepecified in the direction. S. 7(1) prescribes the penalties for contravention of the said orders.
The aforesaid orders in contravention whereof the accused acted in all the cases were issued in strict compliance with the provisions of this Act by the Government or by authority or persons duly authorised by the Government and they have also been duly notified in the manner provided by the Act. They are clearly orders made by a competent authority or person in British India within the meaning of S. 3(27-a) of the General Clauses Act and therefore they are part of Indian law. If the said orders come under the definition of Indian laws, the provisions of S. 57 are attracted and the Court should take judicial notice of the same.
But the question still remains whether this is a fit case for interference in these appeals. Though a Court should take judicial notice of the facts mentioned in S. 57, it could only take such notice if unimpeachable books or documents are put before it or otherwise accessible for its reference. Under the last paragraph of the section the Court is given the discretion to refuse to take judicial notice of any fact unless such person calling upon the Court to take any judicial notice of such fact produces any such book or document as it may be necessary to enable it to do so. In this case no such book or document was placed before the lower Court for its reference to enable it to satisfy it-self that such order or notification was in existence. In its discretion the lower Court refused to take judicial notice as neither the orders nor the documents showing the publication of such orders were placed before it. It is therefore impossible to say that the discretion exercised by the lower Court is either perverse or illegal.
In the result all the appeals are dismissed.
N.R.R
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