- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Yellapragada Gopalkrishnamurthi v. Pettu Poda Madireddi And Others
Structured Summary of the Legal Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from a suit by the plaintiff for recovery of possession of one acre of land (out of 2 acres and 46 cents) in Demarcation No. 612/1, Chandola, which was dismissed by the Courts below.
Key factual points in the opinion:
- In 1929, one Manthona Butchi Raju and others, co-owners of about 8 acres (Demarcation Nos. 604/2, 606/1 and 612/1), agreed to sell the land to P. Venkateswarlu for Rs. 3,700. An advance of Rs. 450 was paid on 18 March 1929 (contract Ex. D‑4).
- Defendant 3 claims title under that contract (through Venkateswarlu) and paid Rs. 960 to two co-owners on 2 July 1929 (receipt Ex. D‑5). Defendant 3 remained in possession through lessees (present defendants 1 and 2) and paid taxes (Ex. D‑7 series), and possessed the land continuously from 1929.
- On 2 March 1934 Butchi Raju sold to the present plaintiff one acre out of 2 acres 45 cents (sale deed Ex. P‑4).
- On 9 March 1936 the co‑sharers (sellers under Ex. D‑4) sued in the District Munsif's Court, Tenali, for recovery of possession against Venkateswarlu (defendant 3 in that suit). The present defendant 3, her lessees (present defendants 1 and 2), and the present plaintiff were impleaded as parties in that suit (present plaintiff as defendant 8). The prior suit referred to the sale in favour of the present plaintiff and prayed that Butchi Raju be ordered to secure possession for defendant 8.
- The prior suit was dismissed for default by the District Munsif on 20 September 1937; that order became final.
- The present plaintiff instituted the present suit on 15 March 1941 seeking possession on the basis of the 1934 sale deed (Ex. P‑4). Defendant 3 contested, claiming entitlement under the prior contract (Ex. D‑4), alleging the plaintiff's sale was fraudulent and raising a bar under Order IX, Rule 9 (O.9, R.9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC).
- The District Munsif (judgment dated 9 July 1943) found the plaintiff had no title because the sale to him was fraudulent; he did not rule on the O.9, R.9 objection and held defendant 3 could not invoke part‑performance doctrine because the contract predated the 1929 amendment to the Transfer of Property Act.
- On appeal the Subordinate Judge remanded for fresh disposal (27 March 1944). After remand the District Munsif again dismissed the suit, finding the plaintiff had notice of the prior contract and acquired no title. On further appeal the Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit on the ground it was barred under O.9, R.9, without finally deciding the genuineness of the sale deed.
- In this second appeal the plaintiff challenged the O.9, R.9 finding; defendant 3 argued the suit should not be disposed without a determination on the plaintiff's title.
- The appellate Court (on first hearing) concluded the Subordinate Judge was incorrect in holding O.9, R.9 barred the suit, and remanded for findings on issues 1 and 2. After the Subordinate Judge submitted those findings (both in favour of the plaintiff), the appellate Court considered objections and concluded the sale deed was a nominal document; the appeal was dismissed with costs.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the present suit is barred by the bar created by Order IX, Rule 9 of the CPC (i.e., whether a suit dismissed under O.9, R.8 by the earlier plaintiffs precludes a subsequent suit in respect of the same cause of action).
- Whether the plaintiff acquired title (and thus entitlement to possession) under the 1934 sale deed (Ex. P‑4) — specifically whether that sale deed was a genuine, operative transfer or a nominal transaction.
- Whether defendant 3 could invoke the doctrine of part‑performance given that the prior contract (Ex. D‑4) predated the 1929 amendment to the Transfer of Property Act (as raised and considered in the lower courts).
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff's Arguments
- The plaintiff relied on the sale deed dated 2 March 1934 (Ex. P‑4) executed by Butchi Raju and claimed entitlement to possession of one acre and related profits under that deed.
- In the second appeal the plaintiff principally contested the correctness of the Subordinate Judge's conclusion that the suit was barred under O.9, R.9 of the CPC.
Defendant 3's Arguments
- Defendant 3 claimed entitlement to continue in possession based on the prior contract of sale in favour of Venkateswarlu (Ex. D‑4) and contended that the plaintiff's sale (Ex. P‑4) was of no legal effect and was fraudulently executed to defeat her rights.
- Defendant 3 also asserted that the present suit was barred under O.9, R.9 CPC because of the prior suit in which the present plaintiff was a party (as defendant 8) and the earlier suit's dismissal.
- In the appeals process defendant 3 contended the matter could not be disposed of without a finding on the plaintiff's title to the property.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Chand Kour v. Partab Singh, 16 Cal. 98 (15 I.A. 156 P.C.) | The Privy Council decision that dismissal of a suit under the old Code provision corresponding to O.9, R.8 does not operate as res judicata; the disability imposed by such dismissal applies only to the plaintiff of that suit and requires identity of plaintiff and cause of action to operate as a bar. | The court relied on this authority to explain that two essentials are needed for the O.9, R.9 disability to operate: (a) the plaintiff must be the same person, and (b) the cause of action must be identical. The court accepted that the causes of action were identical here but held that because the present plaintiff had been a defendant (not the plaintiff) in the prior suit, O.9, R.9 did not bar his suit. |
| Venkatasubbier v. Krishnamurthi, 38 Mad. 442 (A.I.R. (2) 1915 Mad. 1204) | Under Section 146 of the CPC it was decided that a representative of a defendant (a person not on record) could apply to set aside an ex parte decree under O.9, R.13; the case is used to show Section 146 permits applications by persons deriving interest. | The court used this decision to reason that by virtue of Section 146 an assignee or person deriving interest from the plaintiff could apply under O.9, R.9 to set aside an order under R.8. The court observed the implication but stated it was unnecessary to express a final opinion on whether R.9 should be construed to include "plaintiff and his representatives" in all cases. |
| Gopiram Bhotica v. Thahur Jagarnath Singh, 9 Pat. 447 (A.I.R. (16) 1929 Pat. 686) | Holds that an assignee of the plaintiff who intervened in proceedings and took steps to stand in the shoes of the original plaintiff could be affected by the disability of the original plaintiff. | The court noted this decision but found it distinguishable: in that case the assignee intervened and took proceedings in the earlier appeal, and so it was rightly affected by the disability. The court held that decision did not assist much in the present case and that reliance upon it by the Subordinate Judge was misplaced. |
| Aiya Ramalinga Mudali v. Arumugha Mudali, 39 M.L.J. 471 (A.I.R. (5) 1918 Mad. 495) | Where a suit by one reversioner was dismissed for default or withdrawn without trial on the merits, a subsequent suit by another reversioner challenging an improper alienation was not barred (illustrates limits of bars where parties do not derive title from one another). | The court observed that this decision sheds little light on the construction of O.9, R.9 because a reversioner does not necessarily derive title through another reversioner; thus it was not decisive for the present question. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's reasoning proceeded in two main phases: (A) the question of the applicability of O.9, R.9; and (B) the substantive question whether the plaintiff's sale deed was a real transfer entitling him to possession.
(A) Applicability of Order IX, Rule 9 CPC
- The Court quoted the operative part of O.9, R.9: "Where a suit is wholly or partly dismissed under R.8, the plaintiff shall be precluded from bringing a fresh suit in respect of the same cause of action."
- The Court relied on Chand Kour v. Partab Singh to set out the essential conditions for the disability to operate: identity of the plaintiff and identity of the cause of action. The rule is a disability imposed on the plaintiff whose suit was dismissed; it does not automatically operate as res judicata against all others.
- The Court examined the prior plaint and the present plaint and agreed with the Subordinate Judge that the causes of action in both suits were identical.
- The more difficult question was whether persons deriving title through the plaintiff in the earlier suit (assignees or representatives) would also be affected by the disability. The Court discussed Section 146 of the CPC and the Venkatasubbier decision, which indicates that representatives may apply to set aside orders; the Court observed there is no reason, in principle, why the disability under R.9 should not extend to persons claiming through the original plaintiff, but it was unnecessary to decide the general rule in this case.
- Because in the present case the plaintiff had been a defendant (not the plaintiff) in the prior suit, the Court concluded the disability under O.9, R.9 did not apply to him even though the causes of action were identical. The Subordinate Judge's conclusion that the suit was barred under O.9, R.9 was therefore incorrect.
(B) Substantive Determination on the Sale Deed (Nominal Transaction)
- Because the Subordinate Judge had not recorded findings on issues 1 and 2, the Court remanded the matter for findings on those issues (evidence on record to be considered).
- After the Subordinate Judge submitted findings (both in favour of the plaintiff), the defendants objected and contended that the sale deed was nominal and not intended to pass title. The appellate Court examined the findings and evidence and accepted the defendants' contention.
- The Court identified and relied on several factual circumstances (as found or recorded by the Subordinate Judge and appearing on the record) that supported the conclusion that the deed was nominal:
- The only evidence of payment of consideration was the testimony of the plaintiff (P.W.2), whose evidence the Subordinate Judge found to be interested and thus unreliable.
- There was no proof that the plaintiff or his vendor obtained possession at the time of the 1934 sale, despite an express recital of immediate delivery of possession in the deed; the plaintiff did not in fact obtain possession.
- The sale deed contained false recitals: (a) it recited a prior partition and that the one acre formed part of the vendor's allotted share, yet subsequent conduct (the 1936 suit) proceeded on the footing that the property was undivided; and (b) the deed did not specify boundaries for the one acre sold.
- The plaintiff delayed prosecuting his rights: the suit for recovery of possession was filed when the twelve‑year limitation period was close to expiring, and the plaintiff offered no satisfactory explanation for the delay after 1937 (when the earlier suit was disposed of).
- Defendant 3 had been in possession since 1929 and had paid consideration under the prior contract; the plaintiff's enquiries (if made) would have revealed defendant 3's possession and the existence of a prior contract.
- The Court concluded that taken together these circumstances permitted only one reasonable inference: the 1934 sale deed (Ex. P‑4) was a nominal transaction not intended to pass any real title or vest the plaintiff with a right to possession of the suit property.
- Given that conclusion, even if some factual contentions favoured the plaintiff at a superficial level, the substantive relief sought (ejectment based solely on Ex. P‑4) could not be granted; at best, if the sale had been genuine, the plaintiff's remedy might have been a suit for partition (not ejectment), but that relief was not claimed in the plaint.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The second appeal is dismissed. The appellate Court held that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief because the 1934 sale deed in his favour was a nominal document and did not vest any enforceable title or right to possession in him. The dismissal of the plaintiff's suit by the Courts below was upheld.
Implications and direct consequences:
- The plaintiff's appeal fails; the dismissal of his suit by the lower courts is affirmed.
- Costs of the appeal were awarded in favour of defendant 3 (the defendant is awarded costs).
- No leave to appeal was granted (the opinion records "No leave").
- The Court did not purport to lay down a novel general rule of law; its decision rests on the particular findings of fact (nominality of the sale deed, lack of consideration, false recitals, absence of possession, and delay) and the legal application of Order IX, Rule 9 and related principles as described in the opinion. The Court explicitly declined to express a final general opinion on whether the disability under O.9, R.9 extends to all representatives of a plaintiff.
Note: This summary is strictly based on the contents of the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond those presented in the text.
1. This is an appeal by the plaintiff whose suit for recovery of possession of one acre of land out of 2 acres and 46 cents in Demarcation No. 612/1 in the village of Chandola was dismissed by the Courts below.
2. One Manthona Butchi Raju and others were co-owners of a plot of land of the extent of 8 acres comprised in Demarcation Nos. 604/2, 606/1 and 612/1. On 18th March, 1929 they agreed to sell the land for a sum of Rs. 3700 to one P. Venkateswarlu. An advance of Rs. 450 was paid that day under a contract of sale, Ex. D-4. Defendant 3 in the present suit who claims rights under that contract from P. Venkateswarlu paid on 2nd July, 1929 a sum of Rs. 960 to two of the co-owners and obtained a receipt, Ex. D5. She was in possession of the land ever since through her lessees, defendants 1 and 2 in the present suit. Exhibit D-6 series are leases in their favour and defendant 3 was also paying taxes on the land as is evidenced by Ex. D7 series. On 2nd March, 1934 one of the co-sharers, Butchi Raju, sold under Ex. P-4 to the present plaintiff an extent of one acre of land out of 2 acres 45 cents comprised in Demarcation No. 612/1 which is the subject-matter of the present suit. The co-sharers instituted on 9th March, 1936 a suit in the District Munsif's Court of Tenali for recovery of possession of the land which was the subject-matter of the contract of sale, Ex. D-4, from Venkateswarlu, who was impleaded as defendant 3 in that suit and the present defendant 3 was impleaded as defendant 6. The lessees of defendant 3, the present defendants 1 and 2, were also impleaded as parties in that suit as defendants 4 and 5. The present plaintiff was defendant 8. That suit was based on the allegation that Venkateswarlu committed default and that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover possession of the property. Reference was made in that plaint which is marked as Ex. D-1 to the sale in favour of the present plaintiff of the one acre of land and it was prayed that as one of the plaintiffs, Butchi Raju, in pursuance of the covenant to deliver possession, was bound to secure possession and deliver the same to defendant 8 in that suit, the present plaintiff, he should be put in possession of the said extent of one acre. That suit was contested by the present defendant 3 and the present plaintiff filed a written statement Ex. D-2. In that written statement he pleaded that he was entitled to possession of one acre of land sold to him under the sale deed of 1934 together wish the profits in respect of that land. An issue was raised in that suit, issue 4, which runs as follows:
“Whether the plaintiffs and defendants 1, 2 and 8 are entitled to recover possession of the suit properties?”
3. On 20th September, 1937 the suit was dismissed by the learned District Munsif as the plaintiffs did not appear and their vakils were absent. That order became final. The present suit was instituted by the plaintiff on 15th March, 1941. He sued to recover possession on the strength of the sale deed in his favour executed by Butchi Raju in 1934. The main contesting defendant was defendant 3. She claimed to be entitled to continue in possession of the property in pursuance of the contract of sale in favour of Venkateswarlu; and further pleaded that the sale in favour of the plaintiff was of no legal effect as it was brought into existence fraudulently with a view to defeat her rights. A further plea that the present suit was also barred under O. 9, R. 9 of the CPC, was also raised.
4. The learned District Munsif, who tried the suit in the first instance by a judgment dated 9th July, 1943 found that the plaintiff had no title as the sale in his favour was a fraudulent one and was not intended to be operative. He however did not record a finding on the objection of defendant 3 based on O. 9, R. 9 of the Code and as the contract of sale in favour of Venkateswarlu was prior to the amendment of the Transfer of Property Act in 1929, he also found that though the contract was true and valid and though defendant 3 was in possession of the property continuously from 1929, she was not entitled to invoke the doctrine of part performance. In the result the suit was dismissed there was an appeal to the Sub-Court by the plaintiff and the learned Subordinate Judge by an order dated 27th March, 1944, remanded the suit for fresh disposal on to ground that the District Munsif did not dispose of the case from a proper perspective. After the remand the District Munsif again found that the plaintiff acquired no title under the sale in his favour, and that he also had notice of the prior contract of Sale in favour of Venkateswarlu. Under issue 10, he found that there was no bar under O. 9, R. 9 of the Code to the maintainability of the suit. In the result the suit was dismissed. There was again an appeal by the plaintiff to the Subordinate Judge. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit on the ground that the suit was barred under O. 9, R. 9 of the CPC. Though he was inclined to agree with both the learned District Munsifs that the sale in favour of the plaintiff was not supported by consideration and also not genuine, he did not consider that question and record a finding. According to the learned Judge defendant 3 was not entitled to invoke the doctrine of part-performance as the contract was prior to the amendment of the Transfer of Property Act though he agreed with the finding of the learned District Munsif that defendant 3 was continuously in possession from 1929 of the entire land.
5. The plaintiff canvasses in this second appeal the correctness of the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge under O. 9, R. 9 of the Code. Defendant 3 contended that the suit in any event could not be disposed of without a finding on the title of the plaintiff.
6. The question raised under O. 9, R. 9 of the Code is not covered by any decision. The relevant portion of O. 9, R. 9 of the Code is:
“Where a suit is wholly or partly dismissed under R. 8, the plaintiff shall be precluded from bringing a fresh suit in respect of the same cause of action.”
7. In the prior suit, the present plaintiff was a defendant. No doubt the plaintiffs in that action prayed that by virtue of the sale in favour of the present plaintiff who was defendant 8 in that suit, defendant 8 should be put in possession of one acre of land sold to him by Butchi Raju under Ex. P. 4. The present plaintiff cannot be said to be a person deriving title through the plaintiffs in the earlier suit, O.S No. 93 of 1936 as the sale in his favour was prior to the date of that suit. It has been decided by the Privy Council in Chand Kour v. Partab Singh, 16 Cal. 98 : (15 I.A 156 P.C), that the dismissal of a suit under S. 102 of the old Code corresponding to O. 9, R. 8 of the CPC of the Code of 1908, does not operate as res judicata. The rule only imposes a disability on the plaintiff whose suit has been dismissed. For the rule to operate as a bar two things are essential. One is that the plaintiff must be the same; end the second is that the cause of action must be identical. As regards this latter requisite there is no difficulty in the present case. On an examination of the allegations in the prior plaint and the present plaint, the learned Subordinate Judge arrived at the conclusion that the cause of action in both the suits was identical and I agree with this conclusion. The more difficult question is whether the fact that the plaintiffs in the prior suit claimed that defendant 8 should be put in possession of the one acre of land sold to him, as they were under an obligation to carry out the covenant for possession, would make them representatives of defendant 8; and defendant 8 can hence be deemed to be a plaintiff in that suit. Whether the disability under R. 9 applies to persons deriving title through the plaintiff either as assignees from him or as his legal representatives is a more difficult question to answer and does not arise for consideration in the present case. Section 146 of the CPC, which was introduced for the first time in the Code of 1908 and was intended to resolve the conflict between the decisions of the various High Courts on the question whether a legal representative of a defendant could apply under O. 9, R. 13 to set aside an ex parte decree no doubt enables an assignee or any other person deriving interest from the plaintiff to apply under R. 9 to set aside an order under R. 8 as it equally enables a representative of a defendant to set aside an ex parte decree. Under O. 9, R. 13 it was decided that a person not brought on record as a party but was a representative of the defendant could apply to set aside an ex parte decree by virtue of Section 146 of the CPC: vide Venkatasubbier v. Krishnamurthi, 38 Mad. 442 : (A.I.R (2) 1915 Mad. 1204). The position, therefore, is that by virtue of S. 146 it is open to a person deriving title through the plaintiff to apply under O. 9, R. 9 to set aside an order under R. 8. Does it therefore imply that the word “plaintiff” in rule 9 should be construed as “plaintiff and his representatives” and does the disability apply also to the representative. I do not see any reason why the disability should not extend to persona claiming through a plaintiff against whom an order under R. 8 dismissing the suit was passed. If the disability does not extend to persons deriving title through the plaintiff it would enable the plaintiff to circumvent the provision of R. 9 by making an assignment after an order dismissing his suit was passed under R. 8. No doubt both Ss. 11 and 47 of the Code refer to not only parties but also representatives and the non-mention of representatives or persons deriving title through the plaintiff in O. 9, R. 9 of the CPC, may suggest that the bar under R. 9 does not extend to representatives. I do not see any reason for holding that the plaintiff in R. 9 does not include his heirs and representatives-in-interest on the general principle of law that an order by or against a person binds not only him but also heirs and representatives. The heirs and representatives cannot be in a better position than the person through whom they derive title. However, it is unnecessary in this case to express any final opinion on the question.
8. In the present case, the present plaintiff was only defendant in the earlier suit and therefore the disability under R. 9 does not apply to him though the cause of action is identical. The only case which construed O. 9, R. 9 of the CPC, is the decision of the Patna High Court in Gopiram Bhotica v. Thahur Jagarnath Singh, 9 Pat. 447 : (A.I.R (16) 1929 Pat. 686). In that case, however, the assignee of the plaintiff in the earlier suit intervened in the appeal against the order dismissing the suit for default as he took appropriate proceedings to entitle him to the rights and benefits, qua procedure of the original plaintiff, and it was held that he should also be affected with the disability of the original plaintiff. That decision, therefore, is not of very much assistance in deciding the question before me and in my opinion, the learned Subordinate Judge was not right in relying on that decision in support of his conclusion. Decisions under O. 23, R. 1 which imposes a bar against a second suit when the prior suit was withdrawn without obtaining permission to institute the suit have been cited. In Aiya Ramalinga Mudali v. Arumugha Mudali, 39 M.L.J 471 : (A.I.R (5) 1918 Mad. 495), it was held that where a suit by one reversioner was dismissed for default or withdrawn without trial on the merits, a sub-sequent suit, by another reversioner challenging an improper alienation was not barred. This decision, however, does not throw much light on the application of O. 9, R. 9 of the CPC, as one reversioner does not derive title through another.
9. I am, therefore, of opinion that the learned Subordinate Judge's conclusion that the present suit was barred under O. 9, R. 9, is not correct.
10. This, however, does not dispose of this second appeal. As the learned Subordinate Judge did not record a finding on issues 1 and 2, the second appeal cannot be disposed of without a finding on those issues. It is, therefore, necessary to call for a finding from the learned Subordinate Judge on those issues. The case will, therefore, go back to the learned Subordinate Judge for findings on issues 1 and 2, on the evidence already on record. Time for submission of the findings, one month, after the reopening of that Court after the summer recess. Seven days for objections.
(After the return of the finding the Court delivered the following judgment):
11. The learned Subordinate Judge has now submitted his findings on the two issues on which findings were called for by me by my order dated 12th April, 1948. On both the questions he found in favour of the plaintiff. The defendants filed objections to the findings and contended that on the facts as found by the learned Subordinate Judge the only conclusion that is possible is that the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff was nominal and was not intended to be acted upon. I think this contention of the defendants is well founded. The learned Subordinate Judge has found that the only evidence as regards the payment of consideration for the sale is that the plaintiff examined as P.W 2 and that as his evidence is interested it should not be accepted. The learned Judge, however, in his discussion in the course of the judgment seems to confuse the facts which are necessary to be established to support an inference that the document is nominal with the conclusion that a particular document is nominal. If the document is not supported by consideration, it would be a point for consideration in coming to a conclusion whether the document was nominal or not. The learned Judge is also clearly of opinion that the plaintiff never obtained possession of the property though the sale deed was as early as 1934 and contained a false recital to the effect that possession was delivered then and there. This is the second circumstance which supports the conclusion that the document was nominal. Thirdly, there is the fact that even in the sale deed Butchi Kaju, the vendor, did not give any boundaries for the area of one acre which he wanted to convey under this document to the plaintiff. It should be remembered that Butchi Raju was one of the co-sharers who owned 8 acres in which the suit one acre is included. There is a recital by Butchi Raju in the document that there was an earlier partition and that the property covered by the document was allotted to his share in that partition. This is quite inconsistent with the later conduct of Butchi Raju in the suit of 1936 in which the dispute proceeded on the footing that the property was undivided. This is the second false recital in the document and even if the plaintiff succeeds in establishing that the sale deed is a real transaction there is no possibility of granting a decree in his favour as his only right would be to sue for partition impleading all the obiter co-sharers as parties to the suit. This is not the relief which he asked for in the plaint and he framed his suit as if it were a suit in ejectment. On the strength of the sale deed he is not entitled to this relief. But this does not mean that I am holding that the document in favour of the plaintiff is a real transaction.
12. The next important circumstance found by the learned Subordinate Judge is the fact that the present suit for recovery of possession was filed when the period of twelve years was about to expire and the plaintiff has not attempted to give any explanation for the delay, at any rate, after 1937 when the earlier suit was disposed of. The learned Judge tries to find soma explanation for which there is no basis and which is not the explanation offered by the plaintiff in the witness box. There is also the important circumstance that even in 1929 defendant 3 was in possession of the property and the plaintiff says in the witness box that he made enquiries. If really he made enquiries he would have found that the possession was with defendant 3 and if he had pursued his enquiries further he would have discovered that defendant 3 was in possession of the property under a contract of sale for which she undoubtedly paid consideration.
13. It must, therefore, be taken to have been established that the document was not supported by consideration, that neither the plaintiff nor his vendor had possession on the date of the sale, that the document contains false recitals and the property is not specified by boundaries and the plaintiff did not take steps to enforce the rights, if any, under the document till about the expiry of the period of twelve years.
14. From these circumstances the only inference that is possible and which the learned Subordinate Judge should have drawn is that the document is a nominal transaction not intended to clothe the plaintiff with any vestige of title in the suit property.
15. In the result the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief in the suit and the dismissal of his suit by the Courts below is correct. The second appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs of defendant 3. No leave.
C.R.K/D.H
16. Appeal dismissed.
Alert