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Ramachandra Chettiar v. Kandasami Pillai .

Madras High Court
Nov 12, 1948
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Factual and Procedural Background

The trial Court, in a preliminary decree in a suit for partition, ordered that the plaintiff was entitled to a half share in certain scheduled items on payment into Court within six months of the decree an amount of Rs. 1102-5-0 with interest from the date of plaint (15th September 1943). The plaintiff did not pay within those six months. An appeal was taken against that decree and the appeal was finally disposed of on 28th June 1946. Within six months of the appellate decree the plaintiff deposited the amount into Court and applied by I.A. No. 886 of 1946 for permission to deposit the amount due under the preliminary decree (confirmed on appeal) into Court. The learned Subordinate Judge granted a week's time from the date of the order (8th January 1947). Defendant 1 (the petitioner) filed the present revision seeking to set that order aside.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Court had jurisdiction to extend the time fixed in the preliminary decree (six months from the date of the trial Court's decree) for payment into Court.
  2. Whether, as a corollary, the Court retains power while the suit is pending (including under Section 35(c) of the Specific Relief Act and/or O. 34, R. 8 CPC) to extend time for payment under such a decree.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The Court had no jurisdiction to extend the time specified in the preliminary decree (i.e., six months from the date of the trial Court's decree).
  • The learned advocate for the petitioner relied on the decisions in Mohideen Kuppai v. Ponnusami Pillai (1 M.L.W 882 : A.I.R (2) 1915 Mad. 69) and Gopala lyer v. Sannasi (3 M.L.W 29 : A.I.R (4) 1917 Mad. 838) in support of the contention that time fixed in the decree could not be extended by the Court.

The opinion does not set out detailed counter-arguments by the plaintiff or other parties in the revision; it records the plaintiff's application to deposit and the Subordinate Judge's grant of time.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mohideen Kuppai v. Ponnusami Pillai, 1 M.L.W 882 : A.I.R (2) 1915 Mad. 69 Cited as authority relied on by the petitioner to support the proposition that the time fixed in a decree could not be extended. The court noted this decision was relied upon by the petitioner and observed it had been considered in subsequent cases; it did not treat it as dispositive against the power to extend time where the court retained jurisdiction.
Gopala lyer v. Sannasi, 3 M.L.W 29 : A.I.R (4) 1917 Mad. 838 Cited by the petitioner to support the contention that the time fixed in the decree could not be extended. The court recorded that this decision was relied on and that it had been considered together with others in later authorities, but declined to accept it as preventing extension of time where the court retained power over the action.
Abdul Shaker Sahib v. Abdul Bahiman Sahib, 46 Mad. 148 : A.I.R (10) 1923 Mad. 284 Contains the observation (by Schwabe C.J.) that preliminary decrees are acceptable "as long as [they are] understood to be of a preliminary nature and the Court still retains full power over the action." The court treated this authority as foundational for the proposition that a court retaining power over the action may extend time under such preliminary decrees.
Mohamed Ali Sahib v. Abdul Khadir Sahib, 59 M.L.J 351 Jackson J.'s statement that Schwabe C.J.'s observation lays down a sensible rule of procedure and that there is no ruling to the contrary. The court cited this as endorsing Schwabe C.J.'s view and as support for the conclusion that the court has jurisdiction to extend time in the circumstances described.
Abdul Shaker Sahib v. Abdul Rahiman Sahib, 46 Mad. 148 : A.I.R (10) 1923 Mad. 284 Referred to for the same principle as above (note: same reported citation appears with this variant name in the opinion). The court relied on the principles from this reported authority (as cited in the opinion) to support jurisdiction to extend time while the suit remained pending.
Idurnbu Parayan v. Pethu Reddi, 43 Mad. 357 : A.I.R (7) 1920 Mad. 99 Holds that where a partition decree allowed recovery of property on payment by a certain date without provision as to non-payment, the decree was in effect one for redemption and the Court had jurisdiction to extend time (also citing O. 34, R. 8 CPC as an alternative basis). The court found this decision "directly in point" and applied its principle that the Court had jurisdiction to extend time for payment under such a decree.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court framed the petitioner's principal contention as being a lack of jurisdiction in the Court to extend the six-month period specified in the preliminary decree. It reviewed the authorities relied upon by the petitioner (including Mohideen Kuppai v. Ponnusami Pillai and Gopala lyer v. Sannasi) and the subsequent consideration of those decisions in Abdul Shaker Sahib v. Abdul Bahiman (and its variant citation).

The court identified the key underpinning in Abdul Shaker Sahib as Schwabe C.J.'s observation that preliminary decrees are acceptable "as long as this form of decree is understood to be of a preliminary nature and the Court still retains full power over the action." Relying on that observation and the endorsement given by Jackson J. in Mohamed Ali Sahib v. Abdul Khadir Sahib, the court concluded there was no ruling to the contrary that would prevent the Court from extending time while it retained jurisdiction.

The opinion further records Thiruvenkatachariar J.'s reference to Section 35 (specifically Section 35(c)) of the Specific Relief Act and his conclusion that so long as the Court retained power under that provision to rescind the contract, the Court had power to extend the originally granted time because the suit was still pending. The court also relied on Idurnbu Parayan v. Pethu Reddi, which treated a similar decree as effectively one for redemption and held the Court could extend time under O. 34, R. 8 CPC; the present Court treated that decision as directly applicable.

Finally, the court observed that whether the Subordinate Judge exercised the discretion rightly in granting the time did not properly arise for reconsideration in revision proceedings.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition (revision) is dismissed with costs; revision dismissed.

Implications:

  • The Subordinate Judge's order granting the week's time to the plaintiff stands (the revision to set aside that order failed).
  • The Court's reasoning affirms that where a preliminary decree is understood as such and the Court retains full power over the action, the Court has jurisdiction to extend the time for payment required by the decree (including support drawn from Section 35(c) of the Specific Relief Act and O. 34, R. 8 CPC as articulated in the cited authorities).
  • No broader or novel precedent beyond the application of existing authorities is announced by this opinion; the decision applies established principles to uphold the exercise of jurisdiction in the circumstances presented.

Show all summary ...

1. In a preliminary decree in a suit for partition the decree of the trial Court provided; “that the plaintiff be entitled to a half share in the plaint A Schedule, Items 1 to 5 desoribed hereunder on payment into Court within six months from this date Rs. 1102-5-0 with interest thereon at six per cent, per annum from the date of plaint, that is, 15th September 1943 till payment.”

The amount was not paid within the period of six months from the date of the decree of the trial Court. There was an appeal against that decree and that appeal was finally disposed of on 28th June 1946. Within six months of the date of the appellate decree, the plaintiff deposited the amount into Court, and applied in I.A no. 886 of 1946 for permission to deposit the amount due under the preliminary decree which was confirmed on appeal into Court and the learned Subordinate Judge granted a week's time from the date of the order 8th January 1947. That order, defendant 1, petitioner, seeks to set aside in revision.

2. The main contention of the petitioner was that the Court had no jurisdiction to extend the time filed in the decree, that is, six months from the date of the preliminary decree of the trial Court. The learned advocate for the petitioner relied on the decisions in Mohideen Kuppai v. Ponnusami Pillai, 1 M.L.W 882 : (A.I.R (2) 1915 Mad. 69) and Gopala lyer v. Sannasi, 3 M.L.W 29 : (A.I.R (4) 1917 Mad. 838). Both these decisions were considered in Abdul Shaker Sahib v. Abdul Bahiman Sahib, 46 Mad. 148 : (A.I.R (10) 1923 Mad. 284), by a Division Bench consisting of Schwabe C.J and Wallace J. All these decisions again were considered in Mohamed Ali Sahib v. Abdul Khadir Sahib, 59 M.L.J 351. It should be unnecessary to go at great length into the same question. The basis of the decision in Abdul Shaker Sahib v. Abdul Bahiman Sahib, 46 Mad. 148 : (A.I.R (10) 1923 Mad. 284), appears to me to be the observation of Schwabe C.J at p. 155:

“As long as this form of decree is understood to be of a preliminary nature and the Court still retains full power over the action, I do not see any particular harm in the continuance of its use.”

In Mahomed Ali Sahib v. Abdul Khadir Sahib, 59 M.L.J 351 Jackson J. said with reference to the observations of Schwabe C.J:

“This with all respects lays down an eminently sensible rule of prooedure…. and there is really no ruling really to the contrary.”

3. Thiruvenkatachariar J. referred to the scope of Section 35 of the Specific Relief Act. Even with reference to that, the conclusion finally reached by the learned Judge was that so long as the Court retained its power under Section 35(c) of the Specific Relief Act to rescind the contract the Court had power to extend the time originally granted by it, obviously because the suit was still pending before the Court. That brings it exactly within the scope of the principle laid down by Schwabe C.J Idurnbu Parayan v. Pethu Reddi, 43 Mad. 357 : (A.I.R (7) 1920 Mad. 99), is directly in point. There the learned Judge held that where a decree in a suit for partition provided inter alia that the plaintiffs could recover certain properties from the alienees on payment of a sum of money into Court by a certain date without any provision as to the effect of non-payment and the plaintiff paid the money on a subsequent date the Court had jurisdiction to extend time for payment. The learned Judges observed that the decree was in terms and in effect one for redemption and the Court had jurisdiction to extend the time under O. 34, R. 8 of the CPC. Should an alternative basis be needed for the jurisdiction of the Court to extend time for payment that should be found in O. 34, R. 8. But even without that, on the basis of the principles laid down in Abdul Shaker Sahib v. Abdul Rahiman Sahib, 46 Mad. 148 : (A.I.R (10) 1923 Mad. 284), the Court obviously had jurisdiction to extend time.

4. No question really arises whether the learned Subordinate Judge did exercise this discretion aright in granting time prayed for by the plaintiffs. Obviously such a question could not really arise in revision.

5. The petition is dismissed with costs.

C.R.K/R.G.D

6. Revision dismissed.