- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
A. Vedachala Mudaliar v. The Central Road Traffic Board, Madras And Another.
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This is an application for a writ of certiorari requiring the Central Road Traffic Board, Madras, to send records in its proceedings No. 9820-A 1/47 and to quash the Board's order dated 26th June 1947.
The petitioner is the proprietor of Sri Gandipan Bus Service, holding permits for three buses on the Madras–Mahabalipuram route. On 1 December 1946 the petitioner applied to the Regional Transport Officer, Vellore, to divert his buses at Yechur to Manamady (2½ miles from Yechur). Prior to the petition there was a petition from villagers of Manamady seeking such a diversion. The Regional Transport Authority published a notification on 25 March 1947 under Section 57(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 fixing dates for representation and consideration. No representations were apparently received, and on 28 April 1947 the Regional Transport Officer permitted the petitioner to run his buses via Manamady until further orders.
On 29 April 1947 Sri Thirupurasundari Bus Service (the second respondent) appealed to the Central Road Traffic Board. The second respondent had not been an objector before the Regional Transport Authority and, on the facts as recorded, was not entitled to appeal under Section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The Central Road Traffic Board purported to allow the appeal by order dated 25 June 1947, cancelling the diversion and restoring the original route. The petitioner sought quashing of that order on the ground that the appeal was incompetent and the Board acted without jurisdiction. The petitioner also petitioned the Provincial Government, which declined to interfere by order dated 17 December 1947. The petitioner then applied to this Court for certiorari.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether this Court has jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the Central Road Traffic Board, given the territorial and subject-matter considerations and the decision in Ryots of Gara-bandho v. Zamindar of Parlakimedi (the Parlakimedi case).
- Whether the Central Road Traffic Board's order of 25 June 1947 can be upheld as a valid exercise of power under Rule 149 of the rules framed under the Motor Vehicles Act (i.e., whether Rule 149 confers revisional or appellate power to set aside an order of the Regional Transport Authority).
- Whether the Provincial Government's refusal to interfere in the petition filed by the petitioner means that this Court cannot issue certiorari (i.e., whether the petitioner is effectively seeking certiorari against the Provincial Government and whether Rule 150 gives the Government revisional power over such orders).
Arguments of the Parties
Arguments advanced on behalf of the Central Road Traffic Board (Advocate-General)
- The Court lacks jurisdiction to issue certiorari because the Regional Transport Authority which made the original order had its office outside the limits of the original jurisdiction of the High Court, and the subject-matter and parties were likewise outside the said limits—relying on the Parlakimedi decision of the Judicial Committee.
- Even if jurisdiction existed, the Central Road Traffic Board's order could be sustained as an exercise of power under Rule 149 of the rules framed under the Motor Vehicles Act, which allows the Central Board to call for reports and pass such orders as it deems fit.
- The Provincial Government's order declining to interfere was relied on to argue that this Court had no power to issue certiorari in effect against the Government; Rule 150 was invoked to support the contention that the Government has authority to give orders and directions and thus supervise or revise.
Arguments advanced on behalf of the Petitioner
- The appeal lodged by the second respondent was incompetent because the second respondent had not opposed the grant of the permit before the Regional Transport Authority and was therefore not entitled to appeal under Section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act.
- The Central Road Traffic Board acted without jurisdiction in purporting to allow an appeal by an incompetent appellant and cancelling the permit already granted to the petitioner.
- The petitioner contended that there was no provision giving him a right to ask the Provincial Government to set aside the Central Board's order and that the Government's order declining to interfere was not one passed under a valid revisional power contained in rules lawfully framed under the Act.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ryots of Gara-bandho v. Zamindar of Parlakimedi (Privy Council) — cited as (1943) 2 M.L.J. 254; L.R. 70 I.A. 129; I.L.R. (1944) Mad. 457 (P.C.) | The limits of High Court jurisdiction by certiorari where parties and subject-matter lie outside original territorial jurisdiction; the principle that mere location of the adjudicating body within the town of the High Court does not by itself confer jurisdiction to issue certiorari. | The Court examined the ratio of Parlakimedi, distinguished it on the facts (transport business was carried on at least in part in Madras; rights under Motor Vehicles Act are statutory permissions rather than private disputes before a Court), and held that Parlakimedi did not preclude the High Court from issuing certiorari in the present case. |
| Unreported Division Bench decision, C.M.P. No. 4452 of 1946 (Sir Lionel Leach and Lakshmana Rao, JJ.) | Applied the Parlakimedi principle to hold that the High Court would not have jurisdiction to quash an order of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Board relating to a mofussil temple. | The Court noted this authority but distinguished it on the basis that the order sought to be quashed in the present case does not entirely arise outside the limits of the Court's original jurisdiction; the present case involves matters carried on in Madras. |
| The King v. Liston (cited alongside authorities on rule nisi returns) | The principle that, on a return to a rule nisi for certiorari, a court must look to the face of the record and cannot justify an order by reference to facts not appearing on the face of the record or order. | The Court applied this principle to reject the Advocate-General's contention that the Central Board's order could be justified on facts not appearing on the face of the order (for example, by reference to an alleged petition by villagers to the Central Board). |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeded in distinct steps, each based on materials appearing on the face of the record and on textual construction of the rules:
-
Jurisdiction (application of Parlakimedi):
The Court first considered the Advocate‑General's reliance on the Privy Council decision in Parlakimedi to argue that the High Court lacked power to issue certiorari. After setting out the ratio decidendi of Parlakimedi (which concerned a dispute of private rights in Ganjam before a Board of Revenue and the geographical limits of the High Court's original jurisdiction), the Court distinguished that case.
Key distinctions made were: (a) the present matter does not involve parties litigating private rights before a judicial or quasi‑judicial body in the same sense as Parlakimedi; (b) the right in question arises under statutory provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act (permits granted by statutory authorities), and is not a private contractual or customary right; and (c) the transport business affected by the order is carried on at least in part in Madras (Madras being a terminus on the route), meaning some part of the subject-matter falls within the Court's original jurisdiction. Applying the Privy Council's test, the Court concluded that it had jurisdiction to issue certiorari to quash the Central Board's order.
-
Substance of the Central Board's Order and Rule 149:
The Advocate‑General contended that the Central Board was exercising power under Rule 149 (which permits the Central Board to call for reports and records from any Road Traffic Board and to pass such orders as it may deem fit). The Court rejected this contention for two principal reasons:
- The order of the Central Board was, both in form and substance, an order allowing an appeal by the second respondent; it did not appear on the face of the record to be an exercise of any power under Rule 149.
- On the construction of Rule 149 itself, the Court held that its language is inappropriate to confer appellate or revisional powers to set aside quasi‑judicial orders conferring rights. The Court contrasted Rule 149's wording with the clear language normally used where revisional powers are conferred (citing examples from other statutes). Rule 149, read in context (and noting the absence of time limits or procedural safeguards), appears intended to permit the Central Board to pass original orders (possibly based on information from Road Traffic Boards), not to function as a general revisional appellate body for rights‑affecting decisions.
As the Central Board's order could not, on the face of the record, be supported as an exercise of Rule 149, the Court declined to uphold it on that basis. The Court also relied on the established principle (citing Halsbury and The King v. Liston) that a return to a rule nisi cannot be bolstered by facts not appearing on the face of the order.
-
Provincial Government and Rule 150:
The Advocate‑General further argued that because the petitioner had petitioned the Provincial Government and the Government declined to interfere, this Court effectively sought to quash an order of the Provincial Government and lacked power to do so. Rule 150 (stating that the Road Traffic Board and Central Board "shall in all matters be subject to the orders of the Government and shall give effect to all orders passed by the Government whether on appeal or otherwise") was relied upon to support the view that the Government had revisional authority.
The Court applied the same textual analysis to Rule 150 as it had to Rule 149. It held that Rule 150's language is inadequate and inappropriate to be read as conferring on the Provincial Government a power of revision over orders affecting rights where statutory appeals are otherwise provided. Rule 150, read with its marginal note, was characterised as declaring the Government's superintendence rather than conferring specific revisional jurisdiction in respect of rights‑affecting decisions.
-
Conclusion on jurisdiction and validity:
Because the Board's order was based on an appeal that, on the face of the record, was incompetent and because the order could not be sustained as a valid exercise of Rule 149 (nor was the Provincial Government shown to possess the revisional power claimed), the Court concluded that the Central Road Traffic Board's order of 25 June 1947 was passed without jurisdiction. The rule for certiorari was made absolute.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court held that the order of the Central Road Traffic Board dated 25th June 1947 was passed without jurisdiction and must be quashed. The rule for certiorari was made absolute. The petitioner was awarded costs and an advocate's fee of Rs. 200 from the first respondent.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: the Central Road Traffic Board's order cancelling the diversion was quashed; the petitioner was awarded costs (advocate's fee Rs. 200) payable by the first respondent. (The Court's formal disposition was to make the rule absolute and to award the stated costs.)
- Wider procedural/constitutional observation: the Court highlighted an anomaly arising from the Parlakimedi ruling — that persons within the High Court's original territorial limits may have a remedy by certiorari to quash illegal orders, while persons and matters outside those limits may be denied a similar remedy for substantively similar orders. The Court stated that this anomaly and the hardship it produces are matters for the Legislature to consider; the Court's function was limited to bringing the anomaly to the Legislature's notice.
No additional precedential holdings were expressly declared as new law; the Court primarily applied and distinguished earlier authority and construed the rules under the Motor Vehicles Act in the context of the facts before it.
1. This is an application for the issue of a writ of certiorari calling upon the Central Road Traffic Board, Madras, to send the records in its proceedings No. 9820-A 1/47 and to quash the order made by it on 26th June, 1947.
2. The petitioner is the proprietor of a bus transport service named Sri Gandipan Bus Service. He had been granted permits to run three buses on the route from Madras to Mahabalipuram. On the 1st of December, 1946, the petitioner applied to the Regional Transport Officer, Vellore, for permission to divert his buses on the route between Madras and Mahabalipuram at a village named Yechur to a village called Manamady, 2-1/2 miles from Yechur. Prior to this application there was a petition from the villagers of Manamady praying for a diversion of the buses plying from Madras to Mahabalipuram to their village. The Regional Transport Authority published a notification on the 25th March, 1947, under Section 57(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, intimating that an application had been received from the petitioner for diversion of his buses running between Madras and Mahabalipuram via Manamady, fixing the date for representation to the 10th April, 1947, and the date for consideration of the application to the 26th April, 1947. Apparently no representations were received and on the 28th April, 1947, the Regional Transport Officer, Vellore, passed an order permitting the petitioner to run his buses in the same route from Madras to Mahabalipuram via Manamady until further orders.
3. The second respondent to this application is Sri Thirupurasundari Bus Service, Tirukalikundram. On its behalf an appeal was preferred to the Central Road Traffic Board on the 29th April, 1947. It may be mentioned that the second respondent was not a person who had objected to the grant of the permission sought by the petitioner and he was not entitled to prefer an appeal under Section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Under that provision it is only a person providing trans-port facilities who, having opposed the grant of a permit, is aggrieved by the grant thereof that is entitled to prefer an appeal to the prescribed authority within the prescribed time and in the prescribed manner. This was not apparently realised by the appellate authority, the Central Road Traffic Board, which purported to allow the appeal by its order dated 25th June, 1947. It is this order that is sought to be quashed and it runs as follows:
The appeal is allowed. The diversion granted to the respondent Messrs. Gandipan Bus Service is cancelled restoring the original route as before, i.e., from Madras to Mahabalipuram.
Against this order, the petitioner preferred a petition to the Provincial Government but the Government by its order dated 17th December, 1947, declined to interfere with the order of the Central Road Traffic Board. The petitioner thereupon filed the application before us for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the order on the ground that the appeal by the second respondent was not competent and the Central Road Traffic Board, the first respondent, acted without jurisdiction in pur-porting to allow the appeal of the second respondent and in cancelling the permission already granted to him.
4. It was conceded on behalf of the Central Road Traffic Board, the first respondent, that the appeal by the second respondent was incompetent, vide paragraph 8 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the first respondent. Prima facie therefore the order of the first respondent was without jurisdiction. But the learned Advocate-General on its behalf raised two objections to the issue of a writ by this Court. The first was an objection as to the jurisdiction of this Court to issue the writ. This objection is based on the decision of the Judicial Committee in Ryots of Gara-bandho v. Zamindar of Parlakimedi (1943) 2 M.L.J. 254 : L.R. 70 I.A. 129 : I.L.R. (1944) Mad. 457 (P.C.), where it was held that the High Court at Madras had no power to issue a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the Board of Revenue passed in certain settlement proceedings relating to the estate of Parlakimedi in the Ganjam District. The learned Advocate-General contended that as the Regional Transport Authority which passed the original order had its office outside the limits of the original jurisdiction of this Court and as the subject-matter and the parties were both outside the said limits, this Court is not entitled to issue a writ of certiorari. The fact that the Central Road Traffic Board had its office in Madras was, he contended, of no importance just as the fact that the Board of Revenue was located in the town of Madras did not matter in the Parlakimedi case1. Before we decide whether the decision of the Judicial Committee in the Parlakimedi case1 has any application to the facts of the present case, it is necessary to examine the ratio decidendi of that decision. In that case there was a dispute between the Zamin-dar of Parlakimedi and the ryots of certain villages in his estate in respect of the settlement of rent of these villages. The Government of Madras had directed the Special Revenue Officer of the district to settle a fair and equitable rent in respect of lands in the said villages and the officer made an order doubling the previous rents. There was an appeal by the ryots to the Board of Revenue. A member of that Board sitting alone reversed the decision and allowed an increase of rent of only 12-1/2 per cent. considering himself bound by proviso (b) of Clause (1) of Section 30 of the Madras Estates Land Act. The Zamindar appealed by way of revision to the Collective Board of Revenue from the decision of the single member and the Collective Board of Revenue decided by a majority that the single member was wrong in his assumption that Section 30, Clause (1) proviso (b) applied to the case. The Collective Board however fixed the increase at 37-1/2 per cent. to be spread over a period of five years. The ryots applied for a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the Collective Board of Revenue. It is clear therefore that in that case there was a dispute between the parties in respect of rights governed by custom contract and statute and they were litigating their rights before Courts or judicial bodies appointed for the purpose by statute. As the Judicial Committee point out, the parties, viz, the Zamindar on the one side and the ryots on the other, were not subject to the original jurisdiction of the High Court and the estate of Parlakimedi lay in the north of the Province. The only ground on which the power of the High Court to issue the writ could be based was the fact that the Board of Revenue was located in Madras and the order was made within the town. But the position of the Board of Revenue was really that of a Court, though it is true that the Judicial Committee considered that it may not be proper to describe it as a Court in a hierarchy of Revenue Courts. It was, they point out, an official body especially entrusted with particular duties which include duties of a judicial character. In our opinion the rationale of the rule enunciated by their Lordships in the case is to be found in two passages, one at page 494 and the other at page 497. At page 494, their Lordships say as follows:
If that Sovereign, or the company, in exercise of the dewani right committed by him to them, chose to appoint an individual or an executive authority such as the Board of Revenue to give a decision between Indians in Ganjam upon particular matters of individual right, the Supreme Court by the terms of Clause 8 of this charter could have no more right to interfere by certiorari with such a decision than in the case of the decision of one of the company's Courts.
At page 497, their Lordships observe thus:
Their Lordships think that the question of jurisdiction must be regarded as one of substance and that it would not have been within the competence of the Supreme Court to claim jurisdiction over such a matter as the present by issuing certiorari to the Board of Revenue on the strength of its location in the town. Such a view would give jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, in the matter of the settlement of rents for ryoti holdings in Ganjam between parties not otherwise subject to its jurisdiction, which it would not have had over the Revenue Officer who dealt with the matter at first instance.
5. Now coming to the facts of the present case there are no parties here litigating their individual rights before a Court or a judicial body entrusted with power to adjudicate upon their individual rights. The right which the petitioner claims is a right which can only be granted by the authorities prescribed under the Motor Vehicles Act. There can be no dispute as to such a right between private parties. The dispute can only be between the party applying for, or objecting to, the grant of a permit. The position of the Regional Transport Authority and the Central Road Traffic Board in this behalf is not to any extent similar to the position of the Special Officer or the Board of Revenue in the Parlakimedi case1. It there-fore becomes a matter of importance that the body whose order is being challenged is located, and has passed the order, within the limits of the original jurisdiction of this Court. Moreover, it cannot be said that no part of the subject-matter in question falls within the limits of the original jurisdiction of this Court. Admittedly Madras is a terminus on the route. An order of injunction which may be passed by this Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction in a suit perperly constituted can certainly be enforced against the petitioner or the second respondent and their officers and servants here in charge of the buses plying to and from Madras. It must be held that the transport business is being carried on at least in part in Madras though it is also being carried on outside the limits of Madras. Applying the test laid down by their Lordships.of the Privy Council in the Parlakimedi case1, we fail to see how this Court has no jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the first respondent.
6. The learned Advocate-General drew our attention to the unreported decision of a Division Bench of this Court consisting of the late Chief Justice Sir Lionel Leach and Lakshmana Rao, J., in C.M.P. No. 4452 of 1946, in which the learned Judges observed that this Court would have no power to issue a writ to quash an order made by the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Board appointing one of its officers to exercise all the functions of a trustee of a temple situated in a village in the Cuddappah district pending the framing of a scheme.... The learned Judges. say:
The Hindu Religious Endowments Board functions in Madras, but the order which is now in question relates to a temple in the mofussil. The case falls completely within the judgment of the Privy Council.
As we have already said the order now sought to be quashed does not relate to a. matter which entirely arises outside the limits of this Court's original jurisdiction.
7. The learned Advocate-General next contended that though the order of the first respondent could not be justified as an order on a valid appeal presented by the second respondent, nevertheless it was a valid order passed in exercise of the powers conferred on the first respondent under rule 149 of the rules framed by the Local Government under the Motor Vehicles Act. We cannot accept this contention for two reasons. It does not 'appear on the face of the record that the Central Road Traffic Board was purporting to exercise a power conferred on it by Rule 149. The order was both in form and substance an order allowing an appeal by the second respondent. It is well established that it is not a good return to a rule nisi for the issue of a writ of certiorari to state that the order is justified on facts not contained in the order. this Court cannot take notice of any fact which does not appear upon the face of the order (vide Halsbury, Hailsham Edition, Volume IX, page 889 and The King v. Liston (1943) 2 M.L.J. 254 : L.R. 70 I.A. 129 : I.L.R. (1944) Mad. 457 (P.C.). This excludes also any reference to a petition alleged to have been sent by the villagers of Mahabalipuram to the Central Road Traffic Board protesting against the diversion permitted by the Regional Transport Authority.
8. But in our opinion there is a more formidable objection to the tenability of the contention of the learned Advocate-General. Rule 149 on which reliance has been placed runs thus:
The Central Board may call for su£h reports and records from any Road Traffic Board and pass such order as it may deem fit. The Road Traffic Board shall give effect to such orders.
According to the learned Advocate-General, this rule confers a power on the Central Board to interfere with and even set aside an order passed by the Regional Transport Authority though no appeal had been preferred, under Rule 147 read with Section 64 of the Act. In the first place the language of Rule 149 is, in our opinion, wholly inappropriate to confer appellate or revisional powers on the Central Board in respect of quasi judicial orders passed by the Road Traffic Board or the Regional Transport Authority conferring valuable rights on parties. When the Courts or quasi judicial administrative bodies have been given powers of revision, the language used by the Legislature has been quite different and has been unambi-guous. It is sufficient to refer to Section 191 of the Sea Customs Act, Section 57 of the Madras Co-operative Societies Act and Sections 435 to 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Rule 149 does not empower the Central Board to call for any order passed by the Road Traffic Board and to pass an order setting aside or modifying that order. Rule 149 to our mind appears to contemplate the passing of an original order by the Central Board though such an order might be based upon reports and records obtained from any Road Traffic Board. The absence of any time limit and of the procedure to be followed before final orders are passed also indicates that the power conferred under Rule 149 is not,a power to revise orders passed by the Road Traffic Board affecting rights of parties.
9. The order of the first respondent therefore cannot be supported as an order passed in exercise of the powers conferred by Rule 149. It is not necessary therefore to go into the question whether it will be open to the Provincial Government to make a rule conferring a power of revision on the Central Board apart from the right of appeal conferred by the statute itself.
10. The learned Advocate-General raised a further objection based upon the petition preferred by the petitioner to the Provincial Government, which had been dismissed. It was contended that this Court had no power to issue a writ of certiorari against the Provincial Government and in effect this is what the petitioner seeks in this application. Mr Viswanatha Sastri on behalf of the petitioner contends that though it is true that the petitioner approached the Government to set aside the order of the Central Road Traffic Board, there was no provision which gave him such a right and the order of the Provincial Government cannot be said to be an order passed under any of the provisions of the rules validly framed under the Act, The learned Advocate-General relied on Rule 150 as conferring a right on the Provincial Government to interfere in revision with any order passed by the Central Board. Rule 150 runs thus:
The Road Traffic Board and the Central Board shall in all matters be subject to the orders of the Government and shall give effect to all orders passed by the Government whether on appeal or otherwise.
Many of the remarks made by us as regards Rule 149 apply mutatis mutandis to this rule also. The rule in our opinion has no reference to orders passed either by the Road Traffic Board or by the Central Board under powers given to them by statute or by rules affecting the rights of parties and against which appeals are specifically provided to the prescribed authorities. The rule, as the marginal note indicates, only declares the power of the Provincial Government to have superintendence over the two Boards. There may be matters in which the rights of parties are not concerned and which may be dealt with by the Government and the Government might give directions, general or particular, as regards several matters dealt with by the provisions of the Act in an administrative capacity. The language of Rule 150 is both inadequate and inappropriate to confer a right on the Provincial Government to interfere in revision with orders of the Road Traffic Board and the Central Board in respect of which appeals are specifically provided. Here again we are not called upon to decide whether the Provincial Government can make a valid rule conferring on themselves a power of revision in respect to orders as to which there is nothing in the provisions of the Act to indicate that the Government have such a power.
11. It therefore follows that the order of the first respondent was passed without jurisdiction and must be quashed. The rule is made absolute. The petitioner will be entitled to his costs from the first respondent, advocate's fee Rs. 200.
12. The argument in this case has prominently brought out the anomaly created by the ruling of the Judicial Committee in the Parlakimedi case, particularly having regard to the recent tendency in this country as in other countries to invest quasi judicial and administrative bodies with large powers to pass orders affecting interests of parties. It is a matter for consideration that persons within the limits of the original juris-diction of this Court should have a remedy to approach this Court for the issue of a certiorari to quash illegal orders and orders made without jurisdiction, but that in respect of similar orders relating to subject matter outside the original jurisdiction of this Court such a remedy should be denied to parties outside its original jurisdiction. Whatever historical accidents might justify the ruling of the Judicial Committee in the Parlakimedi case, there is no reason why the anomaly resulting there from should be allowed to continue. This is a matter however for the Legilsature and our province is only to bring to their notice the anomaly and the hardship, caused to a great body of persons in the Province.
Alert