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Adivi Bapiraju v. Janupamula Vallayya.

Madras High Court
Feb 28, 1947
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Structured Summary of the Provided Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Three plaintiffs filed four suits against their tenants (O.S. Nos. 330, 336 and 346 of 1940) in the District Munsiff's Court, Bhimavaram, seeking eviction, and a separate suit (O.S. No. 25 of 1941) for recovery of rent. The tenants pleaded that they had occupancy rights in the lands and that the suits were therefore not maintainable in a Civil Court. The District Munsiff overruled those objections and decreed the suits as prayed for. The tenants appealed those decrees.

The Subordinate Judge allowed the tenants' appeals, finding that the village of Vakapalli (in which the suit lands are situated) was an estate within the meaning of Section 3(2) of the Madras Estates Land Act, and returned the plaints for presentation in a Revenue Court. The present proceedings concern the further appeal from that decision, the principal question being whether Vakapalli is an "estate" under Section 3(2) (with particular focus on Section 3(2)(e)) and related questions about the nature of the mokhasa and the tenure.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the village of Vakapalli is an "estate" within the meaning of Section 3(2) of the Madras Estates Land Act.
  2. Whether Vakapalli is an estate specifically within the meaning of Section 3(2)(e) (the argument before the Court was confined to this sub‑clause).
  3. Whether the mokhasa (of which the suit lands formed a part) was held on a permanent under‑tenure (i.e., whether it formed part of the assets of the zamindari), a necessary factual element if the grant is to be an "estate" under Section 3(2)(e).
  4. Whether the lands in question were "Home Farm" lands or private lands excluded from the scope of the Madras Estates Land Act (this issue existed in the lower court proceedings but was not argued in the appeals to the Subordinate Judge, and was not pressed in this Court).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants (Plaintiffs)

  • The plaintiffs originally sought eviction of the tenants and recovery of rent in Civil Court proceedings.
  • The plaintiffs did not press, in the appeals before the Subordinate Judge, a contention that the lands were private lands such that the plaintiffs would be entitled to a decree even if the village was held to be an estate; accordingly that point was not advanced in the appeals and was not included in the grounds of appeal to this Court.

Respondents (Tenants / Defendants)

  • The tenants pleaded occupancy rights in the lands and contended that the suits were not maintainable in Civil Court because Vakapalli was an estate within Section 3(2) of the Madras Estates Land Act, thereby ousting Civil Court jurisdiction.
  • The respondents' counsel confined argument in this Court to whether Vakapalli was an estate under Section 3(2)(e); if established under that sub‑clause, there was no need to argue Section 3(2)(d).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Narayanaswami Naidu v. Subramaniam (1915) 29 M.L.J. 478; I.L.R. 39 Mad. 683 Interpretation of the term "whole inam village" and that the definition in Sub‑section (2), Clause (d) was intended to exclude "minor inams" but not to exclude typical mokhasa/aghraram villages from being estates. The Court endorsed the remarks in this case, agreeing that the technical meaning of "whole inam village" should not be narrowly construed so as to exclude many traditional estate villages merely because minor inams existed within them.
Lakshmi Narasimham v. Veerabadrudu (1923) 19 L.W. 671 Applied Section 3(2)(e) to a village despite the existence of poromboke and minor inams; accepted that pre‑existing minor inams and porombokes not included in a grant did not necessarily preclude the village being an estate. The Court relied on this decision as supporting the view that exclusion of minor inams does not prevent the grant from being treated as of a whole village under Section 3(2)(e), and used it in concluding that Vakapalli could be an estate.
Ademma v. Satyadhyana Thirtha Swamivaru (1943) 2 M.L.J. 289 Addressed post‑1936 questions about when a grant is a grant of a village; in that case the grant was of a specific acreage and excluded certain lands, so was held not to be a grant of the whole village. The Court analyzed and distinguished Ademma on its facts, observing that in Ademma the grant was specifically for an identified acreage excluding particular lands; thus Ademma did not control the present case under Section 3(2)(e).
Suri Reddi v. Agnihotrudu (1943) 2 M.L.J. 528 Held no indication that the whole village was granted; referred to "kandrika" meaning a part of the village. The Court noted this decision as evidence‑specific and distinguished it from the present case rather than treating it as altering the law under Section 3(2)(e).
Venkanna v. Lakshmipathi Raju (1946) 1 M.L.J. 300 Found on evidence that there had been a later grant of part of the village, indicating the original grant could not have been of the whole village. The Court treated this decision as fact‑dependent and not altering the principle applicable to Section 3(2)(e) where evidence supports a grant of an estate.
Seshagiri Rao v. Ramayya (1945) 2 M.L.J. 214 Dealt with a mokhasa in the same zamindari; held the grant was of an estate because it included the whole village except for a few minor inams and porombokes. The Court relied on this case as supporting the proposition that a grant may be of an estate even if a few minor inams or porombokes are excluded; it buttressed the Court's conclusion regarding Vakapalli.
Sri Rajah Sobhanadri Apparao Bahadur v. Sri Rajah Venkatanarasimha Apparao Bahadur (1902) I.L.R. 26 Mad. 403 Authority for the historical understanding that "mokhasa" often denoted a tenure subject to service and that mokhasa grants could be service or personal grants. The Court cited this precedent (via S. Sundararaja Aiyangar's work) to support the definition and historical nature of a mokhasa, as relevant to whether the grant was a true mokhasa (and thus whether it formed part of zamindari assets).
Veeraswami v. Seetharama Kantayya (1926) 51 M.L.J. 394 Relied upon the Inam Commissioner (Mr. Taylor)'s report to conclude Mokhasas in the Masulipatam Sub‑Division of Kistna District were included within zamindari assets and held on permanent under‑tenure. The Court cited and relied on Veeraswami as supporting the view that Mokhasas in the relevant area (including Vakapalli) were historically treated as part of the zamindari assets and therefore held on permanent under‑tenure.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court limited the scope of its inquiry to the single question considered by the Subordinate Judge: whether the village of Vakapalli is an "estate" within the meaning of Section 3(2) of the Madras Estates Land Act. The respondent's arguments were confined to Section 3(2)(e), and the Court proceeded on that basis.

The Court set out the elements the defendants must prove to establish that the mokhasa of which the suit lands formed part was an estate under Section 3(2)(e):

  • That the mokhasa consisted of one or more villages of an estate (i.e., a grant to which the definition of "estate" applies); and
  • That the mokhasa was held on a permanent under‑tenure (which the parties agreed is shown if the mokhasa formed part of the assets of the zamindari).

On the first element (whether the grant was of a village/estate), the Court discussed the technical meaning of phrases such as "whole inam village", noting authorities which had emphasised that the existence of minor inams within a village does not necessarily prevent a grant being a grant of the whole village for the purposes of Section 3(2)(e). The Court reviewed authorities that had taken different factual approaches after the 1936 amendment to Section 3(2)(d), but concluded those later decisions were distinguishable and did not change the legal position under Section 3(2)(e). The Court expressly agreed with the reasoning in Narayanaswami Naidu and with the approach in Lakshmi Narasimham that pre‑existing minor inams or porombokes being excluded from a grant does not inevitably preclude that grant being of an estate under Section 3(2)(e).

On the second element (whether the mokhasa was held on a permanent under‑tenure), the Court considered the historical and documentary evidence bearing on whether mokhasas in the relevant area were treated as part of the zamindari assets. The Court examined the meaning of "mokhasa" (including citation to Wilson's definition and to the historical commentary in S. Sundararaja Aiyangar's work relying upon Sri Rajah Sobhanadri Apparao Bahadur v. Sri Rajah Venkatanarasimha Apparao Bahadur) and concluded a mokhasa may be either a service grant or a personal grant, but that in the Masulipatam division of the Kistna district the term had a recognised meaning as a grant for service and that this village was consistently described as a mokhasa village in documents from 1850 onwards.

The Court also accepted documentary evidence which was tendered (a Sanad of 1802 filed in another proceeding) showing Vakapalli as one of the mokhasas of the Nuzvid zamindar; the Court admitted that document and said it clearly showed the connection, though the Court stated it would have reached the same conclusion even without that specific document. The Court therefore concluded that the mokhasa in question formed part of the zamindari assets and was held on a permanent under‑tenure.

For these reasons — both that the grant could be an estate under Section 3(2)(e) even if certain minor inams or porombokes were excluded, and that the mokhasa was historically treated as part of the zamindari assets — the Court agreed with the Subordinate Judge's conclusion that Vakapalli Mokhasa is an estate and that Civil Court jurisdiction was ousted.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court concluded that the defendants succeeded in proving that the Vakapalli Mokhasa is an estate within the meaning of Section 3(2) (and specifically under Section 3(2)(e)) and that the mokhasa was held on a permanent under‑tenure. As a result, the suits should have been instituted in the Revenue Court.

Core Ruling: The appeals are dismissed.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The Civil Court decrees could not stand because Civil Courts lacked jurisdiction over the subjects shown to be part of an "estate"; the plaints were to be presented in the Revenue Court as directed by the Subordinate Judge.
  • Costs: The appeals were dismissed with costs (three sets).
  • Scope of precedent: The opinion analyses and relies on earlier decisions but does not assert the creation of a new broad principle beyond applying established authorities to the facts; the decision's direct legal consequence is the ouster of Civil Court jurisdiction in respect of the Vakapalli Mokhasa on the facts found. (The opinion contains a detailed engagement with prior case law rather than announcing a novel rule.)
Show all summary ...

1. Three plaintiffs filed four suits against their tenants, O.S. Nos. 330, 336 and 346 of 1940 on the file of the District Munsiff's Court of Bhimavaram for the eviction of their tenants from their lands, and O.S. No. 25 of 1941 for the recovery of rent. The tenants pleaded that they had occupancy rights in their lands, and that the suits were not therefore maintainable in a Civil Court. The District Munsiff overruled the objections and decreed the suits as prayed for. The tenants appealed against all these decrees. The only point agitated in these appeals is whether the village of Vakapalli, in which the suit lands are situated, is an estate within the meaning of Section 3(2) of the Madras Estates Land Act. The learned Subordinate Judge found that it was and that therefore the suits were not maintainable in Civil Courts. He allowed the appeals and returned the plaints for presentation in a Revenue Court.

2. A common issue to O.S. Nos. 330, 336 and 346 of 1940 was : " Whether the suit land is a Home Farm land as contended by plaintiff? " The learned District Munsiff found it unnecessary to decide that question in view of his finding that these lands did not form part of an estate. This question was not considered by the learned Subordinate Judge in appeal ; and it is argued that a finding should be given on that point, even if this Court is disposed to agree with the learned Subordinate Judge on the points decided by him, and that the appeal should be remanded for fresh disposal upon consideration of the question whether the lands were private lands and therefore excluded from the mischief of the Madras Estates Land Act. The learned Subordinate Judge has distinctly stated in paragraph 4 of his judgment that the only point urged before him in the appeals was that the village of Vakapalli was an estate within the meaning of Section 3(2) of the Madras Estates Land Act. It is therefore clear that the plaintiffs did not urge in appeal that, whatever the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge might be on the above question, the lands in question were private lands and that therefore the plaintiffs were entitled to a decree in any case. In view of the fact that this point was not argued by the plaintiffs in the Court below, we are not disposed to allow them to take it in second appeal. Incidentally, that point has not been raised in the grounds of appeal to this Court.

The only question we have to consider, therefore, is that discussed by the learned Subordinate Judge : " Whether the village of Vakapalli is an estate within the meaning of Section 3(2)." The learned advocate for the respondent has confined his arguments to the question whether it is an estate within the meaning of Section 3(2)(e). If we find that it is an estate within the meaning of that Sub-section, it would be unnecessary for him to argue whether it is an estate by virtue of the provisions of Section 3(2)(d).

3. In order to prove that the mokhasa of which the suit lands formed a part, is an estate within the meaning of Section 3(a)(e), it is necessary for the defendants to prove, (1) that it consisted of one or more villages of an estate, and (2) that the mokhasa was held on a permanent under-tenure.

4. In 1913, the Government enfranchised certain minor inams in the village of Vakapalli as being pre-settlement inams ; and it is argued that if they were pre-settlement inams they would have been excluded in the original grant of the village. It would however be unsafe to accept the order of the Government in 1913 as conclusive proof of the facts assumed by them. We are unable to say from an examination of the documents whether the minor inams within the village of Vakapalli were granted subsequent to the grant of the mokhasa by the zamindar or prior to it. We have therefore to assume, since the burden is on the defendants to show that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court has been ousted, that the grant of the mokhasa was subsequent to the creation of the minor inams. The terms " whole inam village ", " whole village " and "a village " have a recognised meaning as referring to the grant of a village in contradistinction to the grant of a minor inam. These words have therefore acquired a technical meaning and are not to be construed narrowly according to their strict etymological meaning. An argument for the narrower meaning was put forward in Narayanaswami Naidu v. Subramaniam (1915) 29 M.L.J. 478 : I.L.R. 39 Mad. 683, where the question was whether under Section 3(2)(d) before the section was amended by the Act of 1936, there could be a grant of a whole inam village if some minor inams had separately been granted. The learned Judges made the following remarks, with which we are in complete agreement:

The definition in Sub-section (2), Clause (d) was obviously intendedto exclude from the defini tion of 'estate' what are known as minor inams, namely, particular extents of land in a particular village as contrasted with the grant of the whole village by its boundaries. The latter are know as ' whole inam villages.' The existence of 'minor inams' in whole inam villages is very common and if these inam villages do not come within the definition of ' estate' almost all the agraharam, shrotriam and mokhasa villages will be excluded. This certainly cannot have been the intention of the Legislature.

In Lakshmi Narasimham v. Veerabadrudu (1923) 19 L.W. 671, which dealt with a village claimed to be an estate by virtue of Section 3(2)(e), the village consisted of 1781-85 acres, 542.54 acres being poromboke and 50.91 acres minor inams. The learned judges did not discuss the question whether the grant was nevertheless of a whole village ; but in their great experience they assumed that the fact that pre-existing minor inams and porombokes were not granted did not preclude the application of Section 3(2)(e) to the village in question and so held that the land granted formed an estate.

5. It is however argued that recent decisions after the amendment of 1936 of Section 3(2)(d) have changed the law on the subject. The present Sub-Section 3(2)(d) refers to an inam village. It was argued in Ademma v. Satyadhyana Thirthq Swamivaru (1943) 2 M.L.J. 289 that unless every bit of land in the village was included within the grant, the grant could not be of an inam and the land granted could not have formed an estate. In the judgment of the Court, Narayanaswami Naidu v. Subramaniam (1915) 29 M.L.J. 478 : I.L.R. 39 Mad. 683 and Lakshmi Narasimham v. Veerabadrudu (1923) 19 L.W. 671 were not referred to, and the decision was based on an analysis of the evidence and the admission of the learned advocate for the tenants that unless the grant was of the whole of the village it was not an estate. In the cases which followed this decision, there was equally no discussion of Narayana-swami Naidu v. Subramaniam (1915) 29 M.L.J. 478 : I.L.R. 39 Mad. 683 or of Lakshmi Narasimham v. Veerabadrudu (1923) 19 L.W. 671. Mr. Subba Rao, however, analysed Ademma v. Satyadhyana Thirtha Swamivaru (1943) 2 M.L.J. 289 and the cases which followed it and has satisfied us that they can be distinguished from the present case. In Ademma v. Satyadhyana Thirtha Swamivaru (1943) 2 M.L.J. 289, the grant purported to be of 128 acres, excluding 15.10 acres of private land and 5.4 acres of minor inams ; and the learned Judges held that the grant was specifically only of 128 acres and did not purport to be the grant of the village. In Suri Reddi v. Agnihotrudu (1943) 2 M.L.J. 528, the learned Judges held that there was no indication that the whole village was granted ; and they referred to the word "kandrika," which meant a part of the village. In Venkanna v. Lakshmipathi Raju (1946) 1 M.L.J. 300, the learned Judges found on examining the evidence that there was a subsequent grant of a part of the same village ; and they therefore held that the first grant could not have been of the whole village or it would not have been possible to make the subsequent grant. Even if these decisions had said much more expressly than they have that the grant of a village from which minor inams were excluded was not a grant of the whole village within the meaning of Section 3(2)(d) as amended in 1936, we should still be of opinion that as far as the interpretation of Section 3(2)(e) was concerned, there was no difference of judicial opinion. The distinction between a whole inam village and a minor inam had always been clearly borne in mind in the decisions under this sub-section ; and it has never been held that merely because the grant did not include minor inams it could not have been of the whole village. In the last of these cases, Seshagiri Rao v. Ramayya (1945) 2 M.L.J. 214, dealing with a mokhasa in the same zamindari of Nuzvid, Chandrasekhara Aiyar, J., held that the grant was of an estate, because it included the whole village except for a few minor inams and porombokes.

6. The defendants have also to prove, if they are to succeed in their contention that the grant was of an estate within the meaning of Section 3(2)(e) of the Estates Land Act, that the mokhasa was held on a permanent under-tenure. It is conceded by Mr. Satyanarayana Rao for the appellants that the test whether it is held on a permanent under-tenure or not is whether the mokhasa forms a part of the assets of the zamindari. If it does, then that is proof that the mokhasa is held on a permanent under-tenure. If, however, it does not form a part of the assets of the zamindari, then it is not held on a permanent under-tenure. This question largely depends upon another question ; whether the suit grant was of a mokhasa in the strict sense of that word. A mokhasa is defined by Wilson as:

A village or land assigned to an individual either rent free or at a low rent, on condition of service....

It is pointed out at page 237 of S. Sundararaja Aiyangar's " Land Tenures in the Madras Presidency " relying on Sri Rajah Sobhanadri Apparao Bahadur v. Sri Rajah Venkatanarasimha Apparao Bahadur (1902) I.L.R. 26 Mad. 403:

that mokhasa was a well-known term in the Northern Sircars and that the term itself implied that it was a tenure subject to service. It took this form when it was granted to servants and military chiefs in lieu of pay ; sometimes it was granted to men of high position and influence, whose tenure was of a honorary or almost nominal nature. In some cases, when it was granted to relations of zamindars, no service is specified in the grant, though it is expressed to be for service. In these latter cases they partake of the nature of personal grants.

It is therefore seen that a mokhasa may be either a service grant or a personal grant. It is argued that in the case with which we are dealing, there is no proof of the real reason why the village was granted, and so it is not safe to conclude that it was a real mokhasa grant. Since, however, the word "mokhasa" has a recognised meaning in the Masulipatam division of the Kistna district as a grant for service rendered and we have no reason for thinking that it was not a mokhasa in the ordinarily accepted sense in that part of the country, it is reasonable to assume that it was. In Lakshmi Narasimham v. Veerabadrudu (1923) 19 L.W. 671 the learned Judges, after careful consideration of the reports of Mr. Taylor, the Inam Commissioner in 1860, to the Board of Revenue and to the orders passed thereon, have extracted the 'following passage from this report:

It was necessary to devote the most careful scrutiny to the above references, as the original nature of those Mokhasas and the circumstance of their being included in the assets of the zamindaries had not been generally understood. The villages of the Zamindari estates are distinguished on the back of the permanent kaul as seri (i.e., under the direct management of the zamindar) Mokhasas and Agraharams. But this distinction affords no ground for classing the Mokhasas with the Lakhiraj lands excluded by the Sannad, whilst a different conclusion is fully established by the accounts upon which the permanent settlement was based and which ought to explain the terms of the kaul. Should the Government concur in the justice of these observations, I submit we possess no reversionary interest in the Mokhasas, nor can we claim to derive a quit rent by their enfranchisement.

The learned Judges went on to say:

It is now clear that these Mokhasas were not excluded from the Zamindari, at the time of the "Permanent Settlement and that they were treated as part of the Zamindari. They are therefore part of an 'estate ' within the meaning of the Estates Land Act and Civil Courts have no jurisdiction.

In Veeraswami v. Seetharama Kantayya (1926) 51 M.L.J. 394, the learned Judges also relied upon the report of My. Taylor, the Inam Commissioner, and held that the Mokhasas in the Masulipatam Sub-Division of Kistna District were included within the assets of the Zamindari and that therefore they were held on a permanent under-tenure. We are satisfied that the constant description of this village as a mokhasa village in all the documents from 1850 onwards is a sufficient proof that this village is a real Mokhasa and that it was treated by the Government in the same way as the other Mokhasas of Nuzvid. Mr. Subba Rao has filed a petition seeking permission to adduce as proof that this Mokhasa formed part of the estate of the Zamindari of Nuzvid, a Sanad of 1802 of the estate of the zamindari filed in another proceeding in this Court. For reasons given separately, we have admitted that document. It clearly shows--as we should have held even without it--that the village of Vakapalli is one of the Mokhasas of the Nuzvid zamindar.

7. For the above reasons, we agree with the learned Subordinate Judge that the defendants have succeeded in proving that the Vakapalli Mokhasa is an estate and that the suits should therefore have been filed in the Revenue Court.

8. The appeals are dismissed with costs, three sets.