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Kanagasabhai Pathar v. Poornathammal.

Madras High Court
Apr 16, 1947
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Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent obtained a decree in O.S. No. 382 of 1943 in the Court of the District Munsif of Chidambaram for delivery of possession of a portion of a house against one Apparasu Pathar. The original owner of the house, Saradambal Ammal, had died before the suit. The respondent claimed title as purchaser from Thaiyanayaki Ammal (the deceased's mother) and succeeded in the suit, obtaining possession in execution of the decree.

The petitioner filed an application under Order 21, Rule 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (C.P.C.) claiming that he had been in possession of the property in his own right and had been wrongly dispossessed during the execution proceedings. The petitioner claimed title under a sale deed dated 24th November 1943 from Marimuthu Ammal, who was alleged to be a legatee under a will of the deceased Saradambal. The District Munsif dismissed the application; the petitioner sought revision of that dismissal in this Court.

Relevant temporal facts found by the lower court include: the respondent's suit was instituted on 18th November 1943; the petitioner's sale deed is dated 24th November 1943 (i.e., after institution of the suit). The petitioner alleged that, after his purchase, he gave notice to the judgment-debtor to quit and the judgment-debtor handed over possession to him while the suit was pending.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an applicant dispossessed by a decree-holder is entitled to redelivery under Order 21, Rule 100 read with Rule 101 C.P.C., when the person dispossessed received possession from the judgment-debtor during the pendency of the suit (i.e., whether R.102 excludes such persons).
  2. Whether Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act (the lis pendens rule) is applicable to an application under Order 21, R.100 C.P.C., or whether its principle is confined to substantive title and only the scope of Order 21, R.102 is relevant.
  3. How the words "transferred the property" in Order 21, Rule 102 C.P.C. should be interpreted — whether they include surrender or transfer of possession (pendente lite) even without a formal conveyance of title.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as presented)

  • Mr. S. Ramachandra Aiyar (for the petitioner) contended that Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act has no application to an application under Order 21, R.100 C.P.C., which must be decided on the terms of Order 21, Rrs. 101 and 102 alone.
  • The petitioner also alleged that he had been dispossessed of the entire house, whereas the respondent's decree entitled him only to possession of the portion occupied by the judgment-debtor; this raised the issue of excessive execution and the petitioner's possible remedies for dispossession of portions not covered by the decree.
  • The petitioner complained there was no specific evidence that the judgment-debtor voluntarily relinquished possession in his favour.

Respondent's Arguments (as presented)

  • Mr. Viswanatha Sastri (for the respondent) did not seriously contest that Section 52 is a rule affecting title, but urged that the principle underlying Section 52 (lis pendens) would be applicable even to an application under Order 21, R.100 C.P.C.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Musamat Fatima Khana v. Raza Alikhan Illustrates that a transferee pendente lite who enters into possession (after discharging a prior interest) and resists a decree-holder should be treated, in respect of possession, as a transferee of possession (i.e., the transfer regarded as of possession rather than title). The Court regarded the decision as supportive of its interpretation that "transfer" in Order 21, R.102 may be understood to include transfer of possession pendente lite; it cited the case to reinforce treating the petitioner's possession as a transfer from the judgment-debtor for the purposes of R.102.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court commenced by identifying the relevant procedural provisions: Order 21, Rules 100, 101 and 102 C.P.C. It recognized that the petitioner qualifies as a person (other than the judgment-debtor) dispossessed of immovable property by a decree-holder and is therefore entitled to present an application under Order 21, R.100. Under R.101, if the Court is satisfied the applicant was in possession on his own account (and not on account of the judgment-debtor), the applicant shall be put back into possession.

However, Rule 102 excludes from the protection of Rules 99 and 101 a person "to whom the judgment-debtor has transferred the property after the institution of the suit." The decisive question was therefore whether the judgment-debtor "transferred" the property to the petitioner after the suit was instituted.

The Court then analyzed the relationship between Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act (which prevents transfer or dealing with property pendente lite so as to affect rights of parties) and the Code provisions. It held that Section 52 is a substantive rule of title and is not directly applicable to an application under Order 21, R.100, which concerns only the factum and nature of possession at the time of dispossession. The Court accepted the petitioner's submission to that effect but observed that the principle behind Section 52 is to a certain extent reflected in Order 21, R.102.

Turning to the application of R.102 to the facts, the Court noted there was no formal conveyance or assignment of title by the judgment-debtor to the petitioner — the only act was the judgment-debtor's quitting and delivering possession to the petitioner after a notice to quit. The Court interpreted the words "transferred the property" in R.102 broadly to include both transfer of title and transfer of possession, and stated that primarily the phrase refers to transfer of possession whether or not accompanied by pretended transfer of title.

Applying that interpretation, the Court concluded that the judgment-debtor's surrender of possession to the petitioner must be deemed a "transfer" of the property within the meaning of Order 21, R.102, thereby excluding the petitioner from the relief under R.101. The Court found supportive authority in Musamat Fatima Khana v. Raza Alikhan for treating a transferee pendente lite as having received possession which is ineffective to defeat a decree-holder.

The Court addressed the petitioner's complaint about lack of specific evidence of voluntary surrender: it noted there was no indication to the contrary in the affidavit filed by the petitioner and that the judgment-debtor's conduct in the suit suggested voluntary surrender, supporting the Court's conclusion that the petitioner had acquired possession pendente lite.

Finally, the Court considered the petitioner's contention about eviction from the entire house where the decree entitled the respondent only to a portion. The Court observed that excessive execution (delivery of more property than covered by the decree) could afford relief — usually under Section 47 C.P.C. for the judgment-debtor — but doubted that a stranger to the suit (the petitioner) could invoke Section 47; instead, the petitioner's remedy might lie in a separate suit for trespass under colour of a decree. In any event, the Court held that Order 21, R.100 C.P.C. was not available to him for portions not covered by the decree.

Holding and Implications

Final Holding: The civil revision petition is dismissed with costs. The Court affirmed the dismissal of the petitioner's application under Order 21, R.100 C.P.C.

Implications and Consequences:

  • The petitioner is not entitled to redelivery of possession under Order 21, R.101 C.P.C. because his possession was held to be a transfer of the property by the judgment-debtor after institution of the suit, and therefore falls within the exclusion of Order 21, R.102.
  • The Court treated the phrase "transferred the property" in Order 21, R.102 broadly to include transfer of possession pendente lite (even where there was no formal conveyance of title), thereby limiting the reach of Order 21, R.100–101 for such transferees.
  • The Court held that Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act is a substantive rule of title and is not directly applicable to deciding an Order 21, R.100 application; however, R.102 embodies the relevant principle for procedural disposition of possession claims pendente lite and thus must be applied rather than invoking Section 52 by analogy beyond R.102.
  • Where excess property has been delivered in execution (i.e., eviction beyond what the decree covers), the affected person may have remedies (the judgment-debtor may have remedy under Section 47 C.P.C.; a stranger's remedy is more likely to be a separate suit for trespass under colour of a decree), but Order 21, R.100 C.P.C. is not the correct remedy for a stranger dispossessed of parts not covered by the decree.
  • No new broad principle of substantive property law was laid down beyond the interpretation of "transferred" in R.102 and the application of that rule to transfers of possession pendente lite.

Disposition: Civil revision petition dismissed with costs. (Signed N.R.R.)

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JUDGMENT

The point of law which arises in this revision petition does not appear to be covered by authority and must be decided on the language of the relevant statutory provisions. The respondent to this petition obtained a decree against one Apparasu Pathar in O.S No. 382 of 1943 in the Court of the District Munsif of Chidambaram for delivery of possession of a portion of a house. It is common ground that the original owner of the house was one Saradambal Ammal who died sometime before the institution of the suit. The respondent claimed title to the property as the purchaser from one Thaiyanayaki Ammal, the mother of the said Saradambal Ammal. The suit was based on a rent deed executed by the defendant Apparasu and after contest was decreed in the respondent's favour. In execution of the decree, the respondent obtained possession. The petitioner in this Court thereupon filed an application under O. 21, R. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure for redelivery of possession alleging that he had been in possession of the property in his own right and had been wrongly dispossessed in the execution proceedings taken by the respondent. He claimed title from one Marimuthu Ammal who was alleged to be the legatee of the property under a will executed by the deceased Saradambal. The learned District Munsif of Chidambaram dismissed his application and the petitioner seeks to revise the order of dismissal.

The learned District Munsif held on a consideration of the evidence that the petitioner was in possession of the house at the time of the delivery to the respondent in execution of his decree. He however held that the petitioner's right was affected by the rule of lis pendens contained in S. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act and he was therefore not entitled to any relief. He arrived at this finding on the following facts:

The suit for recovery of possession was filed by the respondent on 18th November 1943. The sale deed under which the petitioner claims title to the property from Marimuthu Ammal is dated 24th November 1943, i.e, subsequent to the institution of the respondent's suit. The petitioner's case in the lower Court was that after his purchase he gave notice to the judgment-debtor in the respondent's suit to quit and deliver possession of the portion in his occupation and that the judgment-debtor thereupon quit the premises. The learned District Munsif held that as the judgment-debtor handed over possession in pursuance of the notice to quit issued by the petitioner when the suit was pending the petitioner's right was affected by the rule of lis pendens and would not avail against the respondent decree-holder.

The relevant provisions of the Code are contained in O. 21, Rr. 100, 101 and 102. The petitioner is certainly a person, other than the judgment-debtor, who has been dispossessed of immovable property by the holder of a decree for the possession of such property and was therefore entitled to present an application under O. 21, R. 100 of the Code. Under R. 101, where the Court is satisfied that the applicant was in possession of the property on his own account or on account of some person other than the judgment-debtor, it shall direct that the applicant be put into possession of the property. If this rule stood alone, there can be no doubt whatever that the applicant was entitled to be put back in possession of the property because he was certainly in possession of the property on his own account claiming, as he did, to be the owner of the property by virtue of the sale deed which he obtained from Marimuthu Ammal. He was certainly not in possession on account of the judgment-debtor. But R. 102 is to the following effect:

“Nothing in Rr. 99 and 101 shall apply to resistance or obstruction in execution of a decree for the possession of immoveable property by a person to whom the judgment-debtor has transferred the property after the institution of the suit in which the decree was passed or to the dispossession of any such person.”

The learned District Munsif held that by quitting the house and surrendering vacant possession to the petitioner, the judgment-debtor cannot strictly he said to have “transferred” the property within the meaning of this rule. But he thought that S. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act applied to the facts of the case. That section is in the following terms:

“During the pendency in any Court……of any suit or proceeding which is not collusive and in which any right to immoveable property is directly and specifically in question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under any decree or order which may be made therein, except under the authority of the Court and on such terms as it may impose.”

In his view though the judgment-bebtor could not be said to have “transferred” the property, he must certainly be held to have “dealt with” the property so as to affect the rights of the decree-holder.

Mr. S. Ramachandra Aiyar, learned Advocate for the petitioner, contends that S. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act has no application to his petition under O. 21, R. 100, C.P.C which has to be decided on the terms of O. 21, Rr. 101 and 102 of the Code of Civil Procedure. I agree with his contention. The Court in dealing with an application under O. 21, R. 100, C.P.C is not concerned with the determination of the title to the property which is the subject matter of the application. It is only concerned with the factum of possession at the time when the applicant is alleged to have been dispossessed and the nature of such possession, viz., whether it was on his own account or on account of a person other than the judgment-debtor. S. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act on the other hand lays down a rule of substantive law affecting title to property. S. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act in terms prohibit a transfer or otherwise dealing with the property in suit by any party to the suit. The result would be that any person claiming to derive title from a party to the suit under a transaction during the pendency of the suit cannot escape from the prohibition contained in that section. This position is not seriously contested by Mr. Viswanatha Sastri, learned Advocate for the respondent. All that he urged was that the principle underlying that section would be applicable even to an application under O. 21, R. 100, C.P.C In my opinion to a certain extent the principle underlying this section has been embodied in O. 21, R. 102, C.P.C and it is not permissible to travel beyond that provision and rely upon the analogy of S. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. In this view it is unnecessary for me to decide whether the act of the judgment-debtor surrendering possession of the property to the petitioner would fall within the scope of the words “otherwise dealt with”.

The only question therefore which remains is whether R. 102 applies to the facts of this case. Has the judgment-debtor “transferred” the property to the petitioner after the institution of the respondent's suit. He has certainly not executed any conveyance to the petitioner. Nor has he purported to transfer or assign any title to the property to the petitioner. The only act which he has done is to quit and deliver possession of the property to the petitioner, after receipt of a notice from him to quit. In my opinion, having regard to the scope of the groups of sections beginning with O. 21, R. 95 C.P.C, the words “transferred the property” in R. 102 should be understood in a wide sense as to include both “transfer of title” as well as “transfer of possession.” I would even go further and say that primarily it refers to transfer of possession whether accompanied by a purported transfer of title or not. In this view I do not agree with the lower Court in thinking that it cannot be said that the judgment-debtor has transferred the property within the meaning of R. 102. The judgment-debtor, in surrendering possession to the petitioner, must be deemed to have “transferred” the property to him within the meaning of this rule. The petitioner would therefore be not entitled to any relief under R. 101.

One of the decisions relied upon by the learned Advocate for the petitioner reported in Musamat Fatima Khana v. Raza Alikhan, (1) appears really to be in support of my view. It was there held that where a transferee pendente lite pays off a prior usufructuary mortgage and enters into possession of the property and resists the decree-holder in obtaining possession, he must be treated, in relation to his possession, as a purchaser from the possessory mortgage. The transfer in that case must be deemed to have been a transfer of possession from the mortgagee and not from the judgment-debtor, the mortgagor, though the transfer of title was from the judgment-debtor. The learned Advocate for the petitioner complained that there is no specific evidence that the judgment-debtor voluntarily relinquished possession in his favour. But there is no indication to the contrary even in the affidavit filed by the petitioner in reply to the additional counter affidavit of the respondent raising the plea of lis pendens. The judgment-debtor's attitude in the suit itself also suggests that he must have voluntarily surrendered possession to the petitioner. In this view the application of the petitioner under O. 21, R. 100, C.P.C must fail and was rightly dismissed by the lower Court.

Mr. Ramachandra Aiyar points out that the respondent was entitled under the decree only to possession of the portion of the house occupied by the judgment-debtor but the petitioner has been evicted from the entire house. If this be true, the petitioner is not without remedy but certainly the remedy under O. 21, R. 100, C.P.C will not be open to him in respect of the portion not covered by the decree. It would be a case of excessive execution i.e, delivery to the decree-holder of property in excess of that to which he was entitled under the decree. In such cases it has been held that the judgment-debtor can get relief under S. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But I doubt if a stranger to the suit like the petitioner could invoke the provisions of S. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure in his aid. His remedy might only be a suit based on a cause of action of trespass under colour of a decree. In no event can his remedy be under O. 21, R. 100. C.P.C because that rule applies only to redelivery of possession of property delivered to the decree-holder in execution of the decree.

In the result the civil revision petition is dismissed with costs.

N.R.R