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Rashid Leathers (P.) Ltd. v. Super Fine Skin Traders.

Madras High Court
Feb 19, 1988
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Judgment Summary — Srinivasan, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This matter arises from a company petition for winding up under section 433(e) of the Companies Act. The petitioner (who supplied skins of sheep and goats) sold goods to the respondent between January 1981 and July 1982 under 17 bills (exhibits P-2 to P-18). No time for payment or contractual interest was agreed. The petitioner asserted that Rs. 1,24,752.88 was due and issued a lawyer's notice dated December 8, 1982, which additionally claimed interest at 18% per annum. The respondent did not reply to that notice. Subsequent correspondence followed (including a telegram on November 1, 1985), and ultimately the petitioner presented a company petition for winding up when demands did not result in payment.

The respondent admitted liability for the principal amount but disputed liability to pay interest. During pendency of the petition, the respondent made a series of payments on specified dates and ultimately paid the balance on April 29, 1987. At the company court, the judge held that the question of interest fell within the scope of the winding-up proceedings, directed interest at 9% per annum on the principal, and granted three months' time to pay, listing the petition on July 29, 1987.

Two miscellaneous appeals followed: OSA No. 174 of 1987 (filed by the petitioner seeking interest at 18% as claimed in the December 8, 1982 notice) and OSA No. 116 of 1987 (filed by the respondent contending no liability to pay interest and that interest could not be gone into in winding-up proceedings).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a claim for interest on an admitted principal debt can be adjudicated in company winding-up proceedings under section 433 when the principal is not in dispute.
  2. Whether there was a bona fide dispute about liability to pay interest such that the interest claim fell outside the scope of section 433 proceedings.
  3. What rate of interest (if any) should be awarded, and from what date, in the circumstances of this case?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner (creditor)

  • The petitioner argued that interest was part of the claim and fell within the scope of section 433 because the liability to pay the principal was not disputed and the demand for interest had been made long before filing the petition (notice dated December 8, 1982).
  • The petitioner sought interest at the rate of 18% per annum as claimed in its lawyer's notice of December 8, 1982. Counsel also relied on the Interest Act, 1978 and the proviso to section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code to support an argument for a higher rate of interest where a commercial transaction is involved.
  • Petitioner relied on decisions (Punjab & Haryana and Delhi High Court authorities) holding that company courts can determine interest claims where principal is undisputed, and that creditors should not be permitted to bring separate civil suits solely for interest.

Respondent (company)

  • The respondent accepted that the principal was due but contended that liability to pay interest was disputed and therefore could not be determined in winding-up proceedings under section 433.
  • The respondent argued it was not liable to pay any interest; alternatively, that the court should not award more than 6% per annum, relying on Supreme Court authority (and other case law) to support a lower rate.
  • The respondent relied on a Karnataka High Court decision to suggest that disputes about interest rates can, in certain contexts, fall outside the scope of inquiry under section 433 — and that enforcement of agreements reached during pendency may not be permissible in winding-up proceedings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Stephen Chemical Ltd. v. Innosearch Ltd., [1986] 60 Comp Cas 702 (Punjab & Haryana High Court) Held that where the liability to pay principal is not disputed and the company judge is seized of the matter, the company court is the appropriate forum to determine entitlement to interest; avoids multiplicity of litigation. The learned company judge relied on this decision; the court accepted its proposition and applied it to hold that interest could be dealt with in the winding-up proceedings.
Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Stepan Chemicals Ltd., [1986] 60 Comp Cas 1046 Same proposition as Stephen Chemical: company court may determine interest where principal is not disputed; creditor should not be allowed a separate civil suit for interest alone. Cited by petitioner and treated as supporting the proposition that interest falls within the company court's purview.
Unisystems Pvt. Ltd. v. Stepan Chemical Ltd., [1985] 58 Comp Cas 875 (P & H), Order of Goyal J. Observation that where no agreement for payment of interest exists and the creditor merely claims interest, no winding-up order could be passed. The court noted this observation but declined to follow it for the facts of the present case, distinguishing cases where the principal itself is disputed or where claims relate to agreements entered into after filing of the petition.
Southern Industrial Polymers (P.) Ltd. v. Amar Formulators & Electronics (P.) Ltd., [1984] 56 Comp Cas 77 (Karnataka High Court) On its facts, the court held the scope of inquiry under section 433 cannot be extended to enforcement of a memorandum of agreement entered into during the proceedings; where the company is commercially solvent, a dispute about agreed interest rate should not by itself justify winding up. The present court distinguished this authority on its facts and held it did not establish the broad proposition that any dispute about interest falls outside section 433; hence it did not assist the respondent.
Union of India v. Watkins Mayor & Co. & Co., AIR 1966 SC 275 Held that interest prior to institution of suit may be awarded where there is an agreement for interest, trade usage, or substantive law prescribing interest (example: section 80 Negotiable Instruments Act at 6%). The court observed that the decision pre-dated the 1976 CPC amendment and did not absolve the respondent of liability; at best it could be used to argue for a 6% rate under earlier law, but law had since changed.
Hirachand Kothari v. State of Rajasthan, 1985 Supp SCC 17 : AIR 1985 SC 998 Considered court's power to award interest on equitable grounds for compensation (awarded 6% until trial-court judgment and 9% thereafter until realization). The court held this authority did not aid the respondent's position and did not establish a general rule limiting court-awarded interest to 6%.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by analysing statutory provisions, prior authorities, and the factual matrix:

  1. Statutory framework considered included:
    • Section 433 of the Companies Act (jurisdiction of company court on winding-up petitions).
    • Section 61 of the Sale of Goods Act (power to award interest on the price to the seller from the date of tender or date price was payable).
    • Provisions of the Interest Act, 1978 (including definitions in section 2(b) and section 3(1)(b) governing "current rate of interest" and award of interest where proceedings do not relate to a debt discharged by a written instrument).
    • The proviso to section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (permitting higher rates in commercial transactions up to contractual rate or bank lending rate where no contractual rate exists).
  2. On the factual question whether there was a bona fide dispute about liability to pay interest, the court observed:
    • The principal amount was admitted and the claim for interest was first made by lawyer's notice dated December 8, 1982; the respondent gave no reply to that notice.
    • Thereafter the petitioner repeatedly demanded both principal and interest; the respondent repeatedly assured settlement and never earlier demurred to liability to pay interest until it raised the contention for the first time before the company court.
    • Accordingly, the court concluded there was no bona fide dispute about liability to pay interest — the respondent's late contention appeared aimed at evading payment and delaying proceedings.
  3. On precedent, the court accepted the reasoning in Stephen Chemical and Delhi Cloth (that company courts can determine interest where principal is undisputed and the court is seized of the matter) and distinguished contrary observations in Unisystems and the Karnataka case where the facts involved enforcement of agreements entered into after filing or where the petitioner's purpose appeared to be to enforce post-petition arrangements.
  4. Rate of interest:
    • Petitioner asserted a higher bank-deposit rate (claimed 15% or 18% in the notice), but the court found no material to support that and noted to its knowledge the maximum did not exceed 12% per annum.
    • The court applied equitable considerations (it was exercising jurisdiction to avoid winding-up by directing payment) and statutory pointers (Interest Act and CPC proviso) to select 12% per annum as a just and equitable rate to be applied uniformly from December 8, 1982 (date of the lawyer's notice) until payment.
  5. Practical directions:
    • The court directed that amounts already paid by the respondent on specified earlier dates would be given credit on those dates and interest should be calculated on the balance remaining on each date.
    • Parties were directed to file a calculation memo before the company court. The respondent was granted four months from the date of the judgment to pay the amount so calculated in full; the company petition was to be called on June 13, 1988.

Holding and Implications

Holding:
The court's core rulings were as follows:

  • OSA No. 174 of 1987 is allowed to the extent indicated above. The petitioner is entitled to interest at the rate of 12% per annum from December 8, 1982 until payment.
  • OSA No. 116 of 1987 is dismissed.
  • The respondent must be credited for earlier payments on their respective dates and is directed to pay the balance within four months; the company petition will be called on June 13, 1988. There is no order as to costs.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the respondent-company was held liable to pay interest (12% p.a. from December 8, 1982) on the admitted principal and was given a limited time to discharge that liability with credit for prior payments; the petition was to be called at the company court on the stated date.
  • The court did not purport to establish a general new precedent beyond applying and distinguishing existing authorities on whether interest claims can be adjudicated in winding-up proceedings where the principal is admitted; the decision rests on statutory provisions, precedent it accepted, and the facts (absence of bona fide dispute about interest and admitted principal). The opinion does not state that it sets a novel binding rule beyond its application to these facts.

All information in this summary is taken exclusively from the provided opinion text and no additional facts or inferences have been introduced.

Show all summary ...

Srinivasan, J.:— These two appeals arise out of a petition for winding up filed under section 433(e) of the Companies Act. The appellant in OSA No. 116 of 1987 was the respondent in Company Petition No. 87 of 1985 and the appellant in OSA No. 174 of 1987 was the petitioner in the company petition. The parties will be referred to hereinafter by their rank in the company petition.

2. It is not a matter in dispute that the petitioner supplied skins of sheep and goats to the respondent from January, 1981, to July, 1982, under 17 bills marked as exhibits P-2 to P-18. There was no time limit fixed for payment of the price of the goods, nor was there any agreement to pay interest on delayed payments. It is admitted that a sum of Rs. 1,24,752.88 was due to the petitioner, and it was making demands on the respondent to pay the same. It issued a notice through a lawyer on December 8, 1982, and the notice is marked as exhibit P-45. In that notice, it had not only demanded the payment of the principal, but also the payment of interest at the rate of 18 per cent, per annum. There was no reply to the notice by the respondent. Thereafter, there was correspondence between the parties. On the one hand, the petitioner was demanding payment of money due to it; and on the other, the respondent was repeatedly assuring the petitioner that it will settle the accounts shortly. Ultimately, a telegram was sent by the petitioner on November 1, 1985, demanding payment of principal and interest. Finding that it did not produce the desired result, the petitioner filed the company petition as stated above for winding-up the respondent company. The respondent, while admitting that the principal amount was due, was raising a dispute with regard to its liability to pay interest thereon. During the pendency of the petition, the respondent made payments as follows:

Rs. 1.7-1-1986 10,000 2. 6-2-1986 10,000 3. 19-2-1986 30,000 4. 19-3-1986 20,000 5. 2-2-1987 20,000 6. 17-2-1987 20,000

3. Finally, it paid the balance due on April 29, 1987.

4. At the time when the petition was heard by the company court, the respondent contended that the liability to pay interest was in dispute and, therefore, it fell outside the purview of section 433 of the Companies Act. The contention on behalf of the petitioner was that the matter of interest was also covered by the provisions of section 433 of the Companies Act as the liability to pay the principal amount was not in dispute; and the demand for interest had been made long prior to the filing of the petition.

5. The learned judge accepted the contention of the petitioner and relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Stephen Chemical Ltd. v. Innosearch Ltd., [1986] 60 Comp Cas 702, held that the matter of interest fell within the scope of the company petition. With regard to the rate of interest, the learned judge directed the respondent to pay interest at the rate of 9 per cent, per annum on the principal amount and granted three months' time to the respondent to pay the same. The learned judge directed the petition to be called on July 29, 1987.

6. The petitioner has filed OSA No. 174 of 1987 contending that it will be entitled to interest at the rate of 18 per cent, per annum as claimed by it in the notice dated December 8, 1982. The respondent has filed OSA No. 116 of 1987 contending that it is not liable to pay any interest and, in any event, the question of liability to pay interest cannot be gone into in the proceedings for winding up.

7. Learned counsel for the petitioner referred to the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Stephen Chemical Ltd. v. Innosearch Ltd., [1986] 60 Comp Cas 702 and in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Stepan Chemicals Ltd., [1986] 60 Comp Cas 1046. The proposition laid down in both the cases is that the question of payment of interest is a matter to be considered by the company court in the winding up proceedings and the creditor cannot be permitted to file a civil suit with regard to payment of interest alone. It is useful to refer to the following passage in the judgment in Stephen Chemical Ltd. v. Innosearch Ltd., [1986] 60 Comp Cas 702, 704:

“In our opinion, where the company judge was seized of the matter, and when the liability to pay the principal debt had not been disputed by the company sought to be wound up and, in fact, paid up the debt in order to avoid winding up, the forum of the company judge is the appropriate forum for determining as to whether the creditor was entitled to interest on the amount in question or not. The basic policy of law is to avoid multiplicity of litigation.

8. Learned counsel for the appellant also referred us to the order of Goyal J. in Unisystems Private Limited v. Stepan Chemical Limited, [1985] 58 Comp Cas 875 (P & H), wherein Goyal J. had observed that where no agreement for the payment of interest existed, and the creditor had claimed interest, no winding-up order could be passed.

9. With respect, if the said observations are intended to cover cases of the present kind, we find ourselves unable to concur with that view. The said observations may be correctly applicable to a case where winding up initially is sought by a party on the ground that a certain amount by way of interest due to one from the other party which the other party had failed to pay up despite demand notice, and the other party raises a bona fide dispute as to the right of the creditor to claim interest in the absence of any agreement regarding payment of interest or any other plausible ground, but the position would be entirely different where the amount alleged to be due from the company sought to be wound up included the principal amount of debt and the liability to the principal amount has been accepted before the company judge; and the creditor is sought to be relegated to a civil remedy for getting the interest on the said principal amount.”

10. We are entirely in agreement with the proposition set out above.

11. Learned counsel draws our attention to the provisions of section 2(b) and section 3(1)(b) of the Interest Act, 1978. Section 2(b) of the Interest Act defines “current rate of interest” as the highest of the maximum rates at which interest may be paid on different classes of deposits (other than those maintained in savings account or those maintained by charitable or religious institutions) by different classes of scheduled banks in accordance with the directions given or issued to banking companies generally by the Reserve Bank of India under the Banking Regulation Act, 1949.

12. Section 3(1)(b) provides that if the proceedings in a court do not relate to any debt discharged by virtue of a written instrument, then interest is to be awarded from the date mentioned in this regard in a written notice given by the person entitled or the person making the claim to the person liable that interest will be claimed, to the date of institution of the proceedings.

13. It is argued by learned counsel for the petitioner that the rate of interest payable on deposits by scheduled banks is 15 per cent. We do not find any record in support of the submission made by learned counsel for the petitioner. To our knowledge, the maximum rate of interest payable on deposits by scheduled banks does not exceed 12 per cent, per annum. Learned counsel also relies on section 34, Civil Procedure Code. The relevant portion of section 34 is found in the proviso to the section which reads as follows:

“Provided that where the liability in relation to the sum so adjudged had arisen out of a commercial transaction, the rate of such further interest may exceed six per cent, per annum, but shall not exceed the contractual rate of interest or where there is no contractual rate, the rate at which moneys are lent or advanced by nationalised banks in relation to commercial transactions.”

14. It is, therefore, submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that interest could be awarded at the rate prescribed in the Interest Act up to the date of the filing of the petition and at the rate prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure after the date of the filing of the petition till the date of payment.

15. As against this, learned counsel for the respondent relies upon the decision of the Karnataka High Court in Southern Industrial Polymers (P.) Ltd. v. Amar Formulators and Electronics (P.) Ltd., [1984] 56 Comp Cas 77. In that case, the respondent therein had certain transactions with the petitioner-company; and in respect of those transactions, the respondent-company was due and payable to the petitioner a sum of Rs. 2,69,308.38 as on March 31, 1981. When the petition for winding-up was filed on September 10, 1981, the claim was raised to Rs. 2,96,736.62. After the presentation of the petition, there was an agreement between the parties in a meeting held on November 10, 1981, by which it was agreed that a sum of Rs. 3,16,072.37 should be paid by the respondent to the petitioner-company by instalments as mentioned in the joint memo of agreement. In terms of the joint memo, the petitioners had also agreed to withdraw the company petition. However, the memo of agreement was not acted upon strictly in terms thereof. On April 12, 1982, the respondent paid a sum of Rs. 40,000 in court and on June 2, 1982, it had paid Rs. 15,390.64 and a further sum of Rs. 17,064.75 was paid on June 18, 1982. With the last payment mentioned, it was submitted that the entire claim against the company had been satisfied except the interest claimed at 20% though interest has been worked out at 12% and paid. In that situation, the Karnataka High Court made the following observations Cat page 78):

“But all outstanding claims except the amount arising out of the difference in the rate of interest calculated is outstanding. In my view, the scope of an inquiry under section 433 cannot be extended to an enforcement of the memorandum of an agreement entered into during the pendency of the proceedings. The payment made by the respondent-company is clearly indicative that the respondent-company is commercially solvent. Therefore, an exercise of the jurisdiction under section 433 of the Act, admitting the petition merely because the rate of interest agreed to between the parties in regard to the transactions is disputed, would be unjust.”

16. The Karnataka High Court has not laid down any proposition of law that whenever a dispute is raised by the respondent as regards payment of interest, that would fall outside the scope of section 433. On the facts of that case, the court found that the petitioner in the company petition was trying to enforce a memorandum of agreement which was entered into after the filing of the petition. That could not be done.

17. The decision in the above case will not help the respondent herein to contend that the claim for interest cannot be made in these proceedings.

18. Learned counsel for the respondent relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Union Of India v. Watkins Mayor & Co. and Co., AIR 1966 SC 275. In that case, it was held that interest may be awarded for the period prior to the date of the institution of the suit when there is an agreement for the payment of interest at a fixed rate or when interest is payable by the usage of trade having the force of law, or under the provisions of any substantive law; as for instance, under section 80 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, when no rate of interest is specified in the promissory note or bill of exchange, and the court may award interest at the rate of 6 per cent, per annum.

19. The above decision was rendered long prior to the amendment of the Civil Procedure Code in 1976. That case does not help the respondent to contend that it has no liability to pay interest. If at all, it could rely on that decision only for the purpose of contending that the rate of interest should be fixed at 6 per cent. In view of the law as it then existed, the Supreme Court held that the rate of interest should be 6 per cent. The law has since changed.

20. Learned counsel for the respondent has cited another decision of the Supreme Court in Hirachand Kothari v. State of Rajasthan, 1985 Supp SCC 17 : AIR 1985 SC 998. In that case, the Supreme Court had to consider the powers of court to award interest on equitable grounds on the compensation awarded. The court held that interest should be awarded on the compensation granted from the date of dispossession till the date of judgment of the trial court at 6 per cent, and, thereafter, at 9 per cent, till realisation. We do not see how this decision will help the respondent.

21. In this case, admittedly, the amount due was out of the transactions of sale of goods. Goods were supplied to the respondent and price was due from the respondent under section 61 of the Sale of Goods Act, the court is empowered to award interest at such rate as it thinks fit on the amount of the price to the seller from the date of the tender of the goods or from the date on which the price was payable.

22. Apart from the provisions of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930, the Interest Act, 1978, and the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, provided for payment of interest in this case; it cannot be said that there is a bona fide dispute with regard to payment of interest. The liability to pay the principal was never in dispute. The claim for interest was made for the first time on December 8, 1982, by a lawyer's notice. Admittedly, the respondent did not send any reply to that notice. Thereafter, the petitioner has been repeatedly making demands for interest as well as the principal by several letters. In all the replies sent by the respondent, it had been assuring the petitioner that it would settle the claim. It had never demurred that it was not liable to pay interest on the amount due. For the first time, the respondent raised the contention in the proceedings before the company court that it was not liable to pay interest. If a dispute is raised just for the purpose of evading payment and delaying the proceedings, it cannot be considered to be a bona fide dispute. Unless there is a bona fide dispute with regard to the liability to pay the amount, the company court was entitled to consider the matter under section 433. In that view, we hold that the conclusion of the learned judge that the respondent is liable to pay interest and that that is a matter which has to be gone into in these proceedings, is correct.

23. With regard to the rate of interest, we think that it is just and equitable in this case to award 12 per cent, per annum. The petitioner will be entitled to interest at the uniform rate of 12 per cent, per annum from December 8, 1982, till the date of payment.

24. It is contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that the rate of interest should be fixed at 18 per cent, per annum; and it should be payable from the date which was mentioned in the notice dated December 8, 1982, issued by its lawyer to the respondent. As we have pointed out already, there is no material on record to show that the prevailing rate of interest payable on bank deposits is 18 per cent, per annum. While the Interest Act refers to the interest payable on deposits in scheduled banks, the Civil Procedure Code refers to the rate of interest charged by banks on loans advanced. This is not a proceeding for recovery of money as such. This is only a proceeding for winding up the company. In the exercise of our equitable jurisdiction, we are directing the respondent-company to pay to the petitioner the amount due with interest thereon in order to avoid winding-up of the company. Hence, we consider that the interests of justice require fixation of rate of interest at 12 per cent, per annum as stated above.

25. Learned counsel for the/respondent contended that the court should not fix more than 6 per cent. He relied, upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Hirachand Kothari v. State of Rajasthan, 1985 Supp SCC 17 : AIR 1985 SC 998, in support of that propostion. We have already referred to that decision and we find that that decision does not lay down any principle of law that interest granted by the court should not exceed 6 per cent, per annum. Hence, we reject this contention advanced on behalf of the respondent. The payments made by the respondent on the various dates will be giyen credit on the respective dates; and on the balance due on those dates, interest will be calculated. The parties are directed to file a calculation memo before the company court. The respondent will have four months' time from this date to pay the amount. It shall pay the entire amount on or before the expiry of four months. The company petition will be called before the company court on June 13, 1988.

26. OSA No. 174 of 1987 is allowed to the extent indicated above. OSA No. 116 of 1987 is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.