- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Sakkarathayammal And 3 Others. v. Shanmugavel Chettiar And 7 Others.
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Letters Patent Appeal)
Factual and Procedural Background
Defendants 4, 6 and 7 and the legal representative of the fifth defendant in Original Suit No. 85 of 1974 (Sub Court, Tuticorin) are the appellants before the Court; the plaintiff is the first respondent. The second defendant died and his legal representatives were impleaded as respondents 4 to 8. The third defendant is the wife of the deceased second defendant.
The plaintiff sued for declaration of title to the 1st Schedule property, for delivery of possession by defendants 4 to 7 and for mesne profits, or alternatively a monetary claim against defendants 2 and 3 as per the II Schedule.
Core factual allegations: a settlement deed dated 16-9-1968 (Ex. B1) was executed by Sankaralinga Mudaliar and his wife Nedungi Ammal in favour of defendants 2 and 3, creating life estates without power of alienation; later events include an alleged cancellation deed (Ex. B27 dated 15-10-1968), a gift deed (Ex. B28 dated 17-10-1968) to three daughters, a lawyer's notice (Ex. B26 dated 31-10-1968) asserting fraud, and a subsequent conveyance by defendants 2 and 3 of the property to the plaintiff (sale deed dated 23-9-1972).
Procedural history: The trial Court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff, awarding possession and damages. A Division Bench (learned Judge) of this Court in A.S. No. 541 of 1977 confirmed that decree, and the present Letters Patent Appeal was preferred against that confirmation. The appeal challenged the trial Court's and the appellate Judge's findings on the validity of Ex. B1 and related factual and legal conclusions.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Ex. B1, the settlement deed dated 16-9-1968, is a validly executed instrument or is void ab initio because of misrepresentation as to the nature/character of the document (as distinct from a misrepresentation as to contents), i.e., whether the doctrine of non est factum / voidness for misrepresentation as to character applies.
- Whether the attesting evidence (D.Ws.1 & 2 and D.W.3) satisfactorily proves execution of Ex. B1 in compliance with S.3 of the Transfer of Property Act and S.68 of the Evidence Act.
- Whether documents executed by Sankaralinga during his lifetime (Ex. B27 — cancellation deed, Ex. B26 — lawyer's notice, Ex. B28 — gift deed) are admissible and relevant evidence to establish fraud and to affect the validity of Ex. B1.
- Whether the plea of fraud/misrepresentation was sufficiently pleaded by the defendants so as to be entertained by the Court, having regard to authorities requiring particulars of fraud/undue influence in pleadings.
- Whether, if Ex. B1 were voidable rather than void, the absence of a suit for cancellation within limitation would bar impeaching Ex. B1 by later parties (i.e., interplay between void vs. voidable instruments and limitation principles such as Art. 91 and Art. 59).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants / Defendants (as reflected in the opinion)
- Contended that Ex. B1 was procured by misrepresentation as to the character of the document: Sankaralinga was told he was executing a Power of Attorney when in truth a settlement deed (and a power of attorney) were created; therefore Ex. B1 is void ab initio under the doctrine applied in Ningawwa v. Byrappa.
- Pointed to immediate steps taken by Sankaralinga on discovery of the alleged fraud — a registered cancellation deed (Ex. B27), cancellation of the Power of Attorney (24-10-1968), and a lawyer's notice (Ex. B26) — as evidence that fraud was practised and detected promptly.
- Relied on testimony of neighbours and an attestor (D.W.4) corroborating Sankaralinga's claim of fraud, and on the manner in which the parties later dealt with the properties (gifts by husband and wife to different daughters) to show that Ex. B1 did not reflect true intention.
- Argued that defects in attestation evidence (D.Ws.1 & 2) and failure to prove compliance with Transfer of Property Act S.3 and Evidence Act S.68 vitiate Ex. B1.
Plaintiff / Respondent (as reflected in the opinion)
- Maintained that no fraud or misrepresentation was practised on Sankaralinga or his wife and that Ex. B1 was validly executed.
- Argued that particulars of fraud/misrepresentation were not pleaded with sufficient detail in the written statement, referencing authorities that require specific pleading of fraud, undue influence or misrepresentation.
- Relied on attesting witnesses (D.Ws.1 & 2) and D.W.3's evidence that Ex. B1 was executed with Sankaralinga's knowledge; contended that at best Ex. B1 would be voidable and that no suit to set it aside was instituted within the period of limitation.
- Invoked precedents and principles that a party of full age and understanding is ordinarily bound by the signature to a document and cannot lightly claim non est factum unless misled as to the character of the document.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ningawwa v. Byrappa, 1968-2 S.C.R. 797 = A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 956 | Distinction between misrepresentation as to the character of a document (which makes the transaction void) and misrepresentation as to its contents (which makes it voidable). | The Court applied this principle to hold that if Ex. B1 was procured by misrepresentation as to its character (representing a Power of Attorney while obtaining a settlement deed), Ex. B1 would be void ab initio; this reasoning supports the Court's conclusion that Ex. B1 is void. |
| Appanna v. Venkalappadu, 66 L.W. 304 = 1952 M.W.N. 128 = A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 611 | When a deed of one character is executed on a representation that it was of a different character, it is void and inoperative; such a document need not be set aside under Art. 91 of the Limitation Act. | The Court relied on this authority to support the proposition that Ex. B1, if misrepresented as to its character, is void and need not have been the subject of a court action for cancellation; the decision was used to differentiate void from voidable transactions. |
| Afsar Shaikh v. Soleman Bibi, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 163 | That fraud must generally be specifically pleaded; plaintiffs may object to vague/unspecific pleas of fraud. | The Court considered the authority but found that the written statement and referenced documents (Ex. B27, Ex. B26) contained sufficient particulars of fraud in the present case, making the authority inapplicable to bar the defence. |
| Ladli Prashad v. Karnal Distillery Co., A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1279 | Burden of proving undue influence generally lies on the party setting up the plea; particulars must be present in the pleadings. | The Court used this principle to examine whether the defendants had provided sufficient particulars in their pleadings; it concluded that the pleadings (read with Ex. B27) were adequate here. |
| Madhavakrishnan v. Sami, 1980-II M.L.J. 398 | Doctrine of non est factum: a person misled into signing a document of a different class/character can plead non est factum and render the instrument void. | The Court applied the non est factum doctrine as articulated in this authority to hold that Sankaralinga could avoid Ex. B1 if he had been misled as to the character of the document. |
| Tila Bewa v. Mama Bewa (citation as cited in opinion) | Held that it is not open to a settlor to revoke a settlement at will; a settlor should get it set aside in Court. | The Court acknowledged the authority but treated Ex. B27 (cancellation deed) and related documents as relevant evidentiary material to show Sankaralinga's contemporaneous reaction to alleged fraud; the Court emphasized the distinction between void and voidable instruments when applying this precedent. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court identified the pivotal question as the validity of Ex. B1 (the settlement deed dated 16-9-1968). The analysis proceeded in the following steps, rooted in the record and cited authorities:
- Examination of the primary evidence offered to prove Ex. B1: The Court scrutinised the testimony of two attesting/identifying witnesses (D.W.1 and D.W.2) and the evidence of D.W.3 (second defendant). Although these witnesses claimed Sankaralinga dictated the recitals and affixed his thumb impression, they also admitted Sankaralinga lacked eyesight and made inconsistent statements (for instance, claiming Sankaralinga had seen witnesses sign). The Court found these parts of their evidence implausible and "utter falsehood," undermining the attestation.
- Formal requirements: Because the attesting witnesses' evidence was unreliable, the Court concluded that the attestation requirements contemplated by S.3 of the Transfer of Property Act had not been complied with for Ex. B1; similarly, Ex. B1 had not been properly proved as required under S.68 of the Evidence Act.
- Consideration of contemporaneous acts by Sankaralinga: The Court considered Ex. B27 (registered cancellation deed dated 15-10-1968), the cancellation of the Power of Attorney (24-10-1968), and the lawyer's notice (Ex. B26 dated 31-10-1968) as relevant pieces of evidence showing prompt reaction by Sankaralinga upon discovery of the alleged fraud. These documents were treated as admissible evidence of Sankaralinga's belief and conduct on coming to know of the misrepresentation.
- Corroboration: The Court observed that D.W.4, an attestor to the cancellation deed, corroborated Sankaralinga's account of events and denied suggestions that other daughters had forcibly obtained the cancellations; this reinforcement buttressed the probative value of Ex. B27 and the lawyer's notice.
- Legal characterisation of the misrepresentation: Applying the principle in Ningawwa v. Byrappa and Appanna v. Venkalappadu, the Court focused on whether the misrepresentation related to the character of the document (i.e., representing a Power of Attorney while procuring a settlement deed). The Court held that such a misrepresentation, if established, renders the document void ab initio (non est factum), as distinct from a mere misrepresentation as to contents, which would make a document voidable only.
- Evaluation of pleadings and authorities: The plaintiff relied on precedents requiring particular pleading of fraud; the Court examined the written statement alongside Ex. B27 and Ex. B26 and concluded that sufficient particulars of fraud were pleaded for the defence to be heard. The Court therefore declined to bar the plea on pleading grounds.
- Addressing arguments about cancellation only by husband or need for court proceedings: The Court distinguished between a void instrument (which need not be set aside by suit) and a voidable one (which requires action). It held that if Ex. B1 is void ab initio due to misrepresentation of character, there was no requirement that Sankaralinga or his wife must have obtained a court decree to avoid it; the registered cancellation and contemporaneous evidence were admissible to show the fraud and avoid Ex. B1.
- Assessment of trial court's and appellate judge's approach: The Court criticised the trial Court for relying overly on the attestors' testimony and for an unsatisfactory disposal of the vital fraud issue. It also found that the appellate Judge's reliance on alleged absence of specific particulars was misplaced because the written statement and the contemporaneous documents provided adequate particulars and corroboration.
- Final application to facts: Considering the unreliability of the attesting witnesses, the contemporaneous cancellation and notice, corroboration by neighbours, and applicable precedent, the Court concluded that Ex. B1 was void ab initio due to misrepresentation as to character. Consequently, properties included in Ex. B1 that belonged to Sankaralinga were not properly dealt with by Ex. B1 and were instead validly gifted (Ex. B28) to his three daughters; those daughters transferred the 1st Schedule property to first defendant (Ex. B31), and that title could not be assailed by the plaintiff who purchased from the son-in-law (Ex. A7).
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Letters Patent Appeal is ALLOWED, and the suit is DISMISSED with costs throughout.
Implications (direct effect on the parties):
- Ex. B1 (the settlement deed dated 16-9-1968) was held to be void ab initio for being procured by misrepresentation as to the character of the instrument; accordingly, the purported settlement under Ex. B1 does not give the plaintiff a valid title.
- Properties which belonged to Sankaralinga and were included in Ex. B1 were treated as having been validly gifted to his three daughters under Ex. B28; those daughters conveyed the 1st Schedule property to the first defendant, whose title (by Ex. B31) cannot be assailed by the plaintiff.
- The plaintiff's claim to declaration of title, possession and mesne profits was dismissed; the plaintiff's purchase from defendants 2 and 3 (the son-in-law) did not prevail because Ex. B1 was void.
Broader legal implications: The opinion applies and reiterates existing principles distinguishing void instruments (misrepresentation as to character) from voidable ones (misrepresentation as to contents), but the judgment itself does not purport to establish a new legal precedent beyond application of the cited authorities.
End of summary based exclusively on the provided opinion text.
1. Defendants 4, 6 and 7 and legal representative of fifth defendant in OS. No. 85 of 1974, Sub Court, Tuticorin are appellants herein. Plaintiff is the first respondent. Second defendant having died, his legal representatives are impleaded as respondents 4 to 8. Third defendant, the wife of the second defendant is the wife of the third respondent.
2. The suit was filed for declaration of plaintiff's title to the 1st Schedule property, and to direct defendants 4 to 7 to deliver possession and to pay mesne profits or in the alternative to direct defendants 2 and 3 to pay plaintiff the amounts specified in the II Schedule with costs.
3. In the plaint it is stated that third defendant is the wife of the second defendant. First Schedule property bearing door No. 323, North Car Street, Sankarankoil alongwith other properties were settled by one Sankaralinga Mudaliar and his wife Nedungi Ammal in favour of defendants 2 and 3 under settlement deed dated 16-9-1968. Four daughters were born to them. They being: Gomathiammal, Muthammal, Shanmugathammal and Ananji Ammal. The last two daughters were married to second defendant. Ananji Ammal lived away from him because of certain disputes. Under the terms of the settlement deed, the (sic) (donees?) were given a life estate without any power of alienation and power of cancellation, and that after their life time, the property should vest absolutely on defendants 2 and 3. First defendant was a tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 40. When rent was demanded from him, he claimed that there was a dispute with reference to the property, and therefore, he was depositing the rent in Court. Sankaralinga died on 24.12.1969,” and Nedungi on 30-11-1970. On 5-7-1970, defendants 2 and 3 and Nedungi entered into an agreement of sale to sell the property to one Arumugham Chettiar, the Plaintiff's undivided brother for Rs. 11,500. Pursuant to this agreement, defendants 2 and 3 conveyed the property to the plaintiff on 23-9-1972 for Rs. 11,500 out of which Rs. 3,000 had been paid, and for the balance amount of Rs. 8,500 a promissory note had been executed in favour of second defendant. It was agreed that defendants 2 and 3 should secure physical possession of the property before claiming the amount under the promissory note. Thereafter, reference is made to certain Rent Control Proceedings, and adjustment of amounts between the parties. Hence, it is claimed that the plaintiff is entitled to the reliefs as prayed for.
3A. First defendant, who was in occupation of the property as a tenant under Sankaralinga opposed this claim by stating that Sankaralinga had cancelled the settlement deed, dated 16-9-1968 by a cancellation deed, dated 15-10-1968, and executed a gift deed in favour of his three daughters viz., Gomathi, Muthammal and Ananchi Ammal on 17-10-1968 settling the 1st Schedule property. On 31-10-1968, Sankaralinga issued a lawyer's notice to second defendant informing him about the cancellation of the settlement deed dated 16-9-1968 and the execution of the gift deed, but no reply was received from him. The Power of Attorney brought about by second defendant was also cancelled by Sankaralinga on 24-10-1968 on knowing about the fraud played upon him in view of his old age and ill-health. The settlement deed, dated 15 -9-1968 was not accepted and acted upon. The donees had been in possession and enjoyment of the property covered by the gift deed, dated 17-10-1968 by paying taxes, etc., in their names. First dependent continued to be in possession of the property having been inducted as a tenant. The alleged sale deed in favour of the plaintiff is not a valid one,
4. Second defendant supported the plaintiff's claim, and his right to get possession of the property from first defendant.
5. Defendants 4 to 7 supported the claim of first defendant.
6. A reply statement was filed by plaintiff claiming that no fraud or misrepresentation had been played upon Sankaralinga and his wife.
7. Trial Court decreed the suit, and directed defendants 4 to 7 to put plaintiff in possession of the property, and pay past damages in a sum of Rs. 800 for use and occupation and future damages at Rs. 40 monthly from 1-6-1974 till recovery of possession On learned Judge of this Court in A.S No. 541 of 1977 confirming it, this Letters Patent Appeal is preferred.
8. The learned Judge proceeded on the basis that if the validity or otherwise of Ex. B1, the settlement deed dated 16-9-1968 is decided upon, then the subsequent deed of cancellation under Ex. B27 and the deed of gift under Ex. B28 dated 17-10-1968 have got to be ignored, and that first defendant and his legal representatives being defendants 4 to 7, cannot resist the title claimed by plaintiff. It is in this perspective, the learned Judge held that the evidence tendered by D Ws.1 and 2. the two of the four attestors to Ex. B1, and the evidence of second defendant, as D.W.3 would show that Ex B1 was not brought into existence by practising any fraud or misrepresentation upon Sankaralinga. The learned Judge also held that in the absence of any details furnished in the written statement about the nature of misrepresentation fraud and there being no cogency between the stand taken in Ex. B27, and the lawyer's notice (Ex. B26) dated 31-10-1968 at the instance of Sankaralinga relating to the fraud practised upon him and also taking note of the conduct of Nedungi Ammal in contrast to what her husband did it was held that Ex. B1 is not a valid document as claimed by first defendant and his legal heirs (hereinafter referred as defendants) (ranking of parties as in suit).
9. As rightly approached by the learned Judge, the pivotal point which determines the rights of parties is, whether Ex. B1 is a valid settlement deed or not. Mr. K. Alagiriswami, learned Counsel for defendants, submits that there being a misrepresentation made to Sankaralinga about the nature and character of the transaction, it is a void document. According to him, his son-in-law having represented that what is being executed was a Power of Attorney, and when ultimately he had brought into existence two documents viz, Ex. B1, settlement deed, and Power of Attorney, and soon thereafter re alising the fraud practised upon him, he having executed a registered cancellation deed pertaining to Ex. B1, and followed it by cancelling the power of Attorney by another deed dated: 24-10-1968, and not stopping with this, when he had taken the further step to issue a lawyer's notice (Ex. B26) to his son-in-law informing him of how he had been cheated, and when the representation made to Sankaralinga, who did not have admittedly proper eye sight, that he was executing a power of Attorney, when in fact, what had been got from him was a settle ment deed also and therefore, when such misrepresentation relates to the nature and character of document, as held in Ningawwa v. Byrappa 1968-2-S.C.R 797=A.I.R 1968 S.C 956., Ex. B1 is a void document.
10. Mr. T.S Subramaniam, learned coun sel for the plaintiff, submits that in the absence of particulars of fraud and misre presentation in the written statement, and when Sankaralinga himself could not decide relating to the validity of Ex B-1, and there being lack of cogency between the stand taken in Ex. B-27 and Ex. B-26, and when two of the four attestors had spoken as to how and in what manner, Ex. B-1 came to be executed by Sankaralinga fully know ing of its contents, and when both husband and wife executed Ex. B-1 but cancellation having been attempted only by Sankaralinga in spite of a recital in Ex. B-1 that they have no power of alienation, and when the three of his daughters have fraudulently brought into existence Ex. B-27 and B-28. and when the averments relate to contents of Ex. B-1; it could at best be construed as a voidable document and not a void document; And when Sankaralinga had never gone to Court to set aside Ex. B-1 within the period of limitation, nor any of his sucees-son-in-law interest: the validity of Ex. B-1 cannot be impeached at this distance of time.
11. Ex. B-1 bears the signatures of both Sankaralinga and his wife Nedungi Ammal. Several properties were covered by this document of which, learned Counsel for the plaintiff would state that 32 items belong to Sankaralinga, and 7 items to his wife. It is attested by four witnesses apart from the scribe. Plaintiff has not chosen to examine any of these attestors, but it is the second defendant, who besides examining himself as D.W.3, had examined two of the attestors, who are also identifying witnesses, as D.Ws.1 and 2. D.W.1 says that Sakara-linga by reference to earlier documents, dictated the recitals contained in Ex. B-1, and after writing, the scribe read it over to him and thereafter along with his wife, he affixed his thumb impressions, and this was followed up by all the attestors affixing their signatures, which was known to the executants. In cross-examination, he admits”
Then he would state that it was only Nedungi, who came and requested him to be an attestor to Ex. B-1, and after 1½ weeks of the execution of Exhibit B-1, it was registered, and that he was an identifying witness before the Sub-Registrar. He also speaks about the execution of the Power of Attorney at that time.
12. D.W.2, the other attesting witness states that he witnessed both the executants affixing their thumb impressions, and that they saw the attestors signing the document.
In cross-examination, he too admitted that Sankaralinga did not have eye sight. He too stated that Nedungi requested him to come, and that it was Sankaralinga who dictated the recitals, and the scribe Nataraja wrote the document and read over the same to them, and he too was an identifying witness. It is their evidence which had impressed both the trial Court and the learned Judge to hold that they having attested the document, and also being identifying witnesses, their version is entitled to acceptance. Both of them admit that Sankaralinga did not have eye-sight, but yet, they had gone to the extent of claiming that he along with his wife had seen the attestors affixing their signatures in Ex B-1. This part of the evidence is not only unworthy of acceptance, but also makes their attestation invalid. When both the attestating witnesses claimed that by reference to earlier documents, Sankaralinga had dictated the recitals, they have uttered blatant falsehood, and certainly he had not seen the witnesses attesting Ex. B-1. Hence, the requirements of S. 3 of Transfer of Property Act had not been complied with, in that, Ex. B-1 has not been proved to be a validly executed document. Even if for any reason it is to be held that the attestation as contemplated in S. 3 had been made even then their evidence cannot be accepted and acted upon, because of the utter falsehood which is self-evident on what had been already referred to. Hence, when both of them having been examined, and as their evidence cannot be aceepted and acted upon; on this ground as well, “it is held that Exhibit B-1 had not been properly proved, as required under S. 68 of Evidence Act.
12-A. It is the second defendant; against whom Sankaralinga had even in a registered document, claimed that he had practised fraud upon him; who had come forward to get them examined. Both these witnesses had not given any reason as to why it took nearly ten days to register the document. D.W.3 would state that, because at the time the seeds were being sowed in the field, the document was registered on 11th day. This is alt the evidence available to claim that Ex. B1 had been validly executed by Sankaralinga and his wife, being fully aware of he nature and contents of the document executed by them.
13. To counter this claim, first defendant who had been a tenant under Sankara-linga, and who had since become a purchaser of the property from the donees under Ex. B28, has relied upon what all San-karalinga did immediately on realising about the fraud practised upon him by his son-in-law. Under Ex. B27, dt. 15-10-1968, San-karalinga had executed a registered cancellation deed. According to him, he had asked his son-in-law to get a Power of Attorney for management of the properties, and on that he had represented to him that he had brought a document to that effect, and obtained the thumb impressions of himself and his wife thereon. He had got it registered in Karivalam Vandanallur Sub-Registrar's Office. Later on, Sankaralinga came to know that his son-in-law had obtained also a settlement deed from them. They never intended to settle all the properties in favour of their son-in-law and his wife Shanmughathammal. They wanted the properties to be taken by all the four daughters, and therefore, the settlement deed that had been brought into existence is not valid, and hence, he is cancelling the document in respect of the properties belonging to him. His wife would be executing a separate document relating to her properties. He stated in Ex. B27 to the following effect:
Not stopping with this, immediately on realising that in practising fraud upon him, the son-in-law had taken two documents viz., the settlement deed and power of Attorney, he had got that power of attorney also cancelled on 24-10 1968. Not stopping with all these which he thought would be the proper way of getting over the fraud practised upon him by his son-in-law, he sent a Lawyer's notice to him under Ex B26 on 31-10-1968. He has claimed therein as follows:—
“My client is an old man, and not in sound health. His wife is also aged He directed you to get a general power of attorney written in your name to collect rents, to manage the properties and attend to Court work of theirs and his wife. On 27-9-1968 you took my client and his wife to Karivalara Vandanallur and had the power registered. On the even date it transpired you had a deed of settlement registered as if my client and his wife settled in favour of you, and your wife Shanmughathammal, all their properties. The said document is a deliberate creation of you and your wife both. My client never desired to bequeath his properties to you born to the exclusion of his other daughters. As my client was being helped by you and your wife, by undue influence you have brought about the deed of settlement.
2. On coming to know the true facts, my client had the settlement and power of attorney executed by him in favour of you, cancelled on 15-10-1968 and 24-10-1968 respectively. As my client's wife was taking steps to cancel the said deeds by separate doouments, she did not join my client in the said instruments. In any event, the cancellations by my client would operate as regards his properties.
3. As you and your wife are trying to collect rent and draw monies from Court, it has become imperative to intimate to you the cancellation of general power of attorney and settlement deed in your favour by this notice.
4. My client has gifted his properties to bis three daughters on 17-10-1968. You are hereby directed that you shall not in “any way deal with my client's properties, collect rents, or draw monies from Court or in any way act as my client's agent.”
Sankaralinga died on 24-12-t969. Therefore, what all he could think of doing regarding Ex. B1 and the power of attorney, he had done to his best of knowledge and ability. He had taken legal advice, and the lawyer had not advised him to file a suit then and there. That would not mean that what all he had done in this manner, and that too by bringing into existence registered documents, cannot be treated as irrelevant. What is contended by plaintiff is that it is not for Sankaralinga to decide whether fraud had been practised upon him or not, and whatever he says cannot be the conclusive evidence, and that by executing a cancellation deed, cannot take away the validity of Ex. B1, unless in a proceeding instituted by him it is declared to be invalid and inoperative, and that his version in the document could not be acted upon unless corroborated; and in the written statement, the particulars of fraud having not been pleaded, whatever he had, done, could not unsettle Ex. B1. These extreme contentions are least impressive, because Sankaralinga himself had taken certain positive steps to expose the fraud practised upon him. It would be improper for a Court if it cannot appreciate the circumstances in which a person like him is placed, and what all he could do when faced with misrepresentation and fraud being practised upon him by his close relations and associates around this layman without eye sight. It is too much to claim that he should have then and there instituted a suit and also obtained a decree setting aside the document before he died, falling which, it is a fraud that should prevail with flying colours. In these days, fraud is having better chance than truth. Cannot a party faced with misrepresentation and fraud, do any other act or thing, other than 61ing a suit to show that fraud had been practised upon him? It is for the Court to decide whether the follow up actions taken by Sankaralinga after the execution of Ex. B1 would constitute evidence or not. Therefore, the aforesaid documents which had come into existence during his life time, are taken into account as relevant piece of evidence. It must be remembered that to the lawyer's notice (Ex. B26), secood defendant had not chosen to send any reply. As claimed by plaintiff's Counsel, is there any corroborative evidence of what Sankaralinga has claimed? D.W.4, an attestor to Ex. B27 has stated in cross-examination by counsel for defendants 2 and 3 as follows:
He was also a neighbour to Sankaralinga, and he had denied the suggestion that the other three daughters, who were also living in the same village, had forcibly taken sankaralinga and got ExS. 827 and B28 executed by him. Therefore, when the claims made by Sankaralinga about fraud is corroborated by the evidence of D.W.4, and his claim having not been dislodged in any manner in cross-examination, the much wanted claim of plaintiff about corroboration is fully satisfied. It must also be remembered that Sankaralinge had also executed a gift deed under Ex. B28 dated 17-10 1968 in favour of three of his daughters, in respect of properties belonging to him, after cancellation effected by him under Ex B27. Therefore, these facts and circumstances would show that it is with reference to the nature of the document, his son-in-law had practised fraud upon Sankaralinga by making a representation that the papers in which the thumb impressions were being taken were for the purpose of a power of attorney, but factually he had brought into existence two documents; one being Ex. B1 and the other, the power of attorney. Though they are differently dated, he got both of them registered on 27-9-1968. Hence, as held in Ningamma v. Byrappa, Ex. B1 is a void document. It was held therein:
“The legal position will be different if there is a fraudulent mis-representation not merely as to the contents of the document but as to its character. The parties make a clear distinction between the fraudulent representation as to the charcter of the document and fraudulent misrepresentation as to the contents thereof…”
Hence if the representation is with reference to the nature of document then it has been held that the transaction is void, while in the case of the other i.e, about contents then it is only voidable.
14. A Division Bench of this Court in Appanna v. Venkalappadu 66 L.W 304=1952 M.W.N 128=A.I.R 1953 Mad. 611., held that when a deed of one charcter is executed on a representation that it was of a different chararter, then it is void and inoperative. Such a document need not be set aside under Art. 91 of the Limitation Act. In the light of these autho ritative pronouncements, when the facts and circumstances clearly show that there was a misrepresentation relating to the char acter of the document (Ex. B1), none of the decisions referred to by Mr. T.S Subramaniam, learned Counsel for plaintiff as to what are voidable documents, and if Ex. B1 is voidable, what steps and within what time, the affected party should seek for re medies need be referred to. In the intial part of his submissions, considerable time was consumed in referring to decisions as to what remedies will be available, if it is a voidable document.
15. As far as trial Court is concerned, in paragraph 13 of its judgment, it has chosen to rely upon the evidence of D.Ws 1 to 3, and then confined its finding to the point taken about the documents being registered at Karivalam Vandanallur Sub-Registrar's Office instead of nearby office at Sankaran kovil. No other aspect the trial Judge would deal with as proper or relevant to be ref erred to, in holding that Ex. B1 is not viti ated by fraud or mis-representation. Undoubtedly, this is an unsatisfactory manner of disposing of a vital point taken in the suit.
16. As for the judgment under appeal is concerned, the first aspect taken into account is that no details of misrepresentation or fraud are found in the written statement of first defendant. In para. 2, he had referred to what Sankaralinga did on coming to know about the fraud practised upon him, and about sending of lawyer's notice, which had not been refuted, etc. He was a tenant under Sankaralinga. It was not the first defendant against whom any fraud had been practised. He had chosen to rely upoa the contents in the cancellation deed. Furthermore, he is no better placed than Sankaralinga to speak about the fraud experienced by him. It is not known as to what more is required to be stated in a written statement under such circumstances. On the nature of fraud, he had put the plaintiff on notice that reliance will be placed on what Sankaralinga has stated in his documents. Hence, it cannot be said that there is absence of pleadings relating to fraud and misrepresentation in the written Statement of first defendant.
16A. Learned Counsel for plaintiff relies upon Afsar Shaikh v. Soleman Bibi A.I.R 1976 S.C 163., and states that unless fraud is specifically pleaded, such a plea cannot be entertained. In the instant case, on paragraphs 2 and 3 of the written statement read wi'h the contents of Ex. B27 to which plaintiff's attention had been drawn in para. 3 of the written statement; it cannot still be claimed that there is lack of pleading in this regard. It was held in Ladli Prashad v. Karnal Distillery Co. A.I.R 1963 S.C 1279., that the burden of proving undue influence primarily lay upon the defendant who was setting up the plea, and that particuiars regarding the nature of undue influence must be found in the pleadings. In Madhavakrishnan v. Sami 1980-II-M.L.J 398., it was pointed out that it is settled law that a vague and general plea of undue influence would not be sufficient when the plaintiff comes forward with an action to set aside a contract on that ground, and that it is the duty of the Court to scrutinise the pleadings to find out that a plea has been made, and full particulars thereof have been given before considering whether uudue influence has been made out or not.
17A. As stated in para. 15 above, the required facts and circumstances relating to fraud are found in written statement. Hence, sufficient particulars had been made avilable in the pleadings, and the plaintiff has not shown as to in what manner and in regard to what particulars he had been at a handicap in knowing the defence put forth by defendants.
17. The next aspect is about reliance placed on the evidence of D.Ws.1 and 2, the attestors Already it has been pointed out that they have come forward with a false claim, and as to how they cannot be treated as attestors when Sankaralinga had not seen them affixing their signatures, when admittedly he had no eye sight.
18. The other point which had impressed the learned Judge is that, there is no cogency between the stand taken in Exs. B26 and B27. The contents of the lawyer's notice (Ex. B26) had been already extracted. The lawyer used the word “undue influence”, and therefore, it was considered that there being difference between fraud, misrepresentation and undue influence, Sankaralinga had not come forward with a consistent plea. Except for the last sentence in para, 1, in all the earlier sentences the plea that fraud has been practised upon him had been spelt out, and which is in consonance with the recitals in Ex. B27. It has been claimed that it was a deliberate creation by the son-in-law and his wife, and that the recitals found therein are contrary to their intention. An inept expression used by a lawyer, who cannot be termed, as a seasoned lawyer, ought not to have been highlighted to this extent, particularly when every piece of evidence available goes to show that fraud was practised on Sankaralinga, who had reacted to it at the shortest possible time by taking such steps which he could do to the best of his knowledge and ability. Hence there is practically no lack of cogency between the contents of Exs. B26 and B27.
19. The only other aspect taken into ac count by the learned Judge was about lack of eye-sight, and it has been construed as not a factor which would support the plea of fraud, because Sankaralinga had execu ted three documents later on in spite of lack of eye sight. If he had come with the only plea that because of his lack of eye sight, it has been taken undue advantage of, then execution of later documents go to show that, in spite of this deficiency, he could take certain steps to safeguard his valuable rights. It is because he had to depend on others, he reposed confidence in his son-in-law, and therefore, requested him to man age his properties by taking up a power of attorney in bis favour. But the avaricious son-in-law had taken two documents from him. Therefore, he had to necessarily take the assistance of others and the neighbour (D.W.4) had acted as an attestor to the cancellation deed. Hence, as none of the aspects taken into account by the learned Judge being relevant in the context of what had been done to Sankaralinga, it is held that Ex. B1, is a void document. Once it is held that 32 items of properties included therein and which belonged to him, had not been dealt with therein he being the ab solute owner of the properties, had validly gifted those properties to his three daugh ters, Gomathi, Muthammal and Ananchi Animal under Ex. B28. No suit bad been filed to challenge the validity of this gift deed. They having conveyed the plaint 1st schedule property to first defendant, who was a tenant under Sankaralinga under Ex. B31, dated: 18-10-1972 his title to property cannot be assailed by the plaintiff, who claims to have purchased the suit pro perty from the son-in-law under Ex. A7.
20. There are certain other aspects on which Mr. T.S Subramaniam, learned Counsel had advanced his submissions. He claims that it is only a Court which could say that a particular document is vitiated by fraud, and that it cannot be done by executing a registered document, as done in respect of Ex. B27. He relies upon Appanna v. Venkatappadu, and Tila Bewa v. Mama Bewa. In the later decision, it was held:
“It is not open to a settlor to revoke a set” tlement at his will and pleasure, and he has to get it set aside in a Court of law by putting forward such pleas as bear on the validity of gift deed.
21. As already pointed out, Ex. B27 has been taken into accout only as a relevant piece of evidence to the plea of fraud. Therefore, if the transaction is a voidable transaction, there would be need to set it aside, but if it is a void transaction, there is no need to institute a proceeding to declare it as void, but he can simply avoid it.
22. He would then rely upon S. 31 of Specific Relief Act and claim that, even in respect of a void transaction, it is obligatory on the part of the party, who wants to avoid, the document to institute proceedings. The section itself states that if anyone who is faced with a void or voidable instrument, apprehends that it may cause him serious injury, he may sue to have it adjudged as void or voidable. Art. 91 of the Limitation Act of 1908, prescribed a period of three years for cancellation of a document which is voidable, and it did not apply where the document was ab initio void, because such documents do not require to be set aside in law. Art. 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 prescribes a period of three (years from the time When the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument cancelled first become known to him. Therefore, this section cannot be relied upon to claim that, unless a suit is filed to declare a document as void, the executant cannot avoid it, when it is ab inito void as had happended to Ex. B1.
23. The other plea is that, the general rule of law is that, a party of full age and understanding is normally bound by his signature to a document whether he reads it or understands it or not. Mr. T.S Subramaniam states that, such a party cannot plead non est factum. In support of this plea, he relies upon the ruling of a Divir sion Bench of this Court in Madhavakrishnan v. Sami, wherein it was held as follows:
“..But, if however, a party has been misled in executing a deed or signing a document essentially different from that which he intended to execute or sign, he can plead non est factum in an action against him and the deed of writing is completely void in whomsoever hands it may come. As Byles, J., said in Foster v. Mackinnon.
“It is invalid not merely on the ground of fraud, where fraud exists, but on the ground that the mind of the signor did not accompany the signature; in other words; that he never intended to sign, and therefore in contemplation of law never did sign, the contract to which his name is appended.”
“The doctrine of non est factum does not apply unless there is a misrepresentation inducing a mistaken belief as to the class or Character of the supposed document and not a misrepresentation simply as to its contents. . .”
Hence on the finding already rendered tha Sankaralinga had been induced into a mistaken belief as to the nature and character of Ex. B1, such a plea could be taken by defendants in the instant case.
24. Yet another plea put forth is that, when Ex. B1 had been executed by Sankaralinga and his wife Nedungi relating to 39 items of properties, it could not have been cancelled only by Sankaralinga under Ex. B27 relating to 32 items of properties belonging to him. If fraud had been practised upon him, it was equally upon Nedungi, and she having not come forward to execute any cancellation deed in spite of Sankaralinga claiming that she will do it by separate document; Ex. B1 cannot be declared as a void document: If a transaction is an ab initio void transaction, as held in the decisions above referred to, the party involved in the transaction can simply avoid it. There is no need to execute a cancellation deed. There is no need to institute any suit to declare that such a transaction is a void transaction, failing which, it would be a valid one. Sankaralinga was thoughtless in executing Ex. B27. He could have avoided it. As for Nedungi, what Sankaralinga did by executing Ex. B27 was only to bring into existence a piece of evidence, to show that at the relevant point of time he had felt that fraud had been practised upon him and accordingly reacted. Trial Court relied upon Exs. B20 and B23, sale deeds. Ex. B24, the patta, and Exs B6 to B9. the kist receipts to show that Nedungi had acted as per Ex. B1. She had dealt with the items of properties belonging to her in the manner in which she had desired. It is in evidence that she had not chosen to go along with Sankaralinga, who on realising that fraud had been practised upon him, had chosen to live with the other three daughters. Both husband and wife had dealt with their properties in the manner in which they have desired. Hence, transactions entered into by Nedungi in respect of her properties subsequent to Ex. B1 would only show that she had avoided Ex. B1 and over those properties. Under Ex. B1, only life interest had been created in her favour, and in spite of it, she had chosen to be a party in selling the properties. Reference made to Ex. B1 therein would not make Ex. B1 a valid document. Hence, there could be no legal impediment in treating Ex. B1 as a void document, because only one of them had chosen to execute a cancellation deed. Once again it is made clear that it is not Ex. B27 which made Ex. B1 a void document. It is the fraud which was practised upon Sankaralinga by his son-in-law (D.W.2) which had made Ex. B1 ab initio a void document and that was why each of the executants therein had started dealing with the properties as they liked. Hence, even in so far as Nedungi is concerned, Ex. B1 is an abinitio void document, and there was no need for her either to go to Sub-Registrar's Office for cancellation or to Court and put forward pleas in the manner done by her husband. She could simply ignore the document.
25. One more aspect touched upon is that, if really both of them had thought of benefitting their daughters as claimed in Ex. B27, then under Ex. B28, the gift would not have been made only to three daughters. D.W.3 married not only one of the daughters Shanmaghathammal but also married ano ther daughter by name Ananchi Ammal. Ac cording to him, the latter had not lived with him for nearly 15 years. There is no evi dence available as to how and in what man ner, the first two and the last daughter had been provided. Thirty nine very valaable items have been dealt with under Ex. B1. All of them are purported to be settled only upon one daughter, and the son in-law; who had taken two daughters in marriage. It cannot be said that the intention to provide for four daughters as found in Ex. B27 had not been more or less accomplished, because the father gave all his 32 items to his three daughters, and the mother gifted her 7 items of properties to the other daughter.
26. Therefore, for all the reasons sta ted above, there being a total failure on the part of the trial Court to take into account several relevant factors relating to the plea of fraud practised upon Sankaralinga, and as none of the conclusions of the learned Judge are based on relevant evidence on record, this Letters Patent Appeal is allowed, resul ting in the Suit being dismissed with costs throughout.
VCS/RR
Alert