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V. Rajagopal Naidu v. Srimathi Muthulakshmi Ammal And Others.

Madras High Court
Oct 20, 1967
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Structured Summary of the Opinion — Judgment by T. Ramaprasada Rao, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner (judgment-debtor) sought revision of orders of the lower Court which refused to set aside the sale of his property in execution of a money decree. The property comprised two items: (i) garden land of 74 cents and (ii) cultivable land of 58 cents with a well. According to the petitioner, at the stage of attachment before judgment he valued the property at Rs. 6,500 (paragraph 1). A later passage in the opinion records that in the attachment before judgment proceedings the judgment-debtor had valued the property at Rs. 6,000 (paragraph 16).

In Execution Petition No. 632 of 1962 the Village Munsif valued the two items at Rs. 800 and Rs. 1,000 respectively. The second item was subject to an encumbrance in favour of a Co-operative Society relating to a loan taken by the judgment-debtor to widen the well. After an earlier attachment had been raised on compromise of the suit, the decree-holder re-attached the property in execution and a sale took place on 3 April 1963. The property was knocked down to the husband of the decree-holder for Rs. 801 (first item) and Rs. 1,001 (second item).

The lower Court and the lower appellate Court refused to set aside the sale; this civil revision in the High Court challenges those refusals.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether service of notice under Order 21, Rule 66, Civil Procedure Code (by affixture after alleged refusal) was sufficient to constitute proper notice to the judgment-debtor and whether the concurrent findings of fact on this issue could be disturbed.
  2. Whether the sale proclamation was defective because it omitted the valuation furnished by the judgment-debtor (and the encumbrance), and if so whether such defect vitiated the sale.
  3. Whether the unusually low upset price (as stated by the decree-holder) and the absence of the judgment-debtor's valuation in the proclamation amounted to material irregularity or a nullity.
  4. Whether any alleged defect in the proclamation was waived by the judgment-debtor (or he was estopped from objecting) by reason of his conduct (including his application for postponement of the sale).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The property had been valued by him at the stage of attachment before judgment at Rs. 6,500 (see para. 1) or alternatively at Rs. 6,000 according to another passage (para. 16), much higher than the values used in the proclamation.
  • No valid notice under Order 21, Rule 66, CPC was served when the sale was directed — service was by affixture after an alleged refusal and the attesting witnesses were not ordinary residents of the village.
  • The proclamation of sale (Exhibit C-2) omitted his valuation and the encumbrance; therefore it was defective.
  • The sale was knocked down at ridiculously low prices (Rs. 801 and Rs. 1,001), showing the decree-holder's valuation was grossly inadequate and calculated to mislead bidders; consequently the sale suffers from material irregularities and has prejudiced the judgment-debtor.

Decree-holder / Respondents' Arguments

  • The service by affixture (after alleged refusal) was sufficient service under Order 21, Rule 66, and both Courts below correctly found service to be sufficient.
  • Even if the judgment-debtor's valuation was not inserted, the sale is not vitiated because (i) the judgment-debtor did not give his price at the appropriate time to be mentioned in the proclamation, and (ii) in any event there was a waiver of the irregularity by the judgment-debtor (respondents relied on authorities on waiver/estoppel).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ramalingam v. Sankara (1964) 2 M.L.J. 229 : I.L.R. (1964) 2 Mad. 370 Proclamation based on inchoate/illegal material or incorrect information can make resultant sale a nullity rather than a mere irregularity. The Court considered this ratio. It accepted the principle but distinguished the facts and proceeded to apply the broader rule that mandatory/statutory requirements in a sale proclamation must be complied with; if absent, the proclamation may render the sale invalid.
Karunakaran Nayar v. Chathu I.L.R. (1957) Mad. 187 : (1956) 1 M.L.J. 47 Authority referenced in support of the principle stated in Ramalingam regarding defective proclamations. Referred to as part of the reasoning in Ramalingam; the Court noted agreement with the view that defective/inchoate material can vitiate a sale.
Nagendra v. Varadaraja I.L.R. (1964) 2 Mad. 28 Under Order 21, Rule 66(e), the proclamation must state values as given by both the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor; if upset price reflects only the decree-holder's grossly inadequate value intended to conceal true value, the sale is vitiated. The Court relied on this Division Bench view to support the proposition that omission of the judgment-debtor's valuation is a material defect and that a proclamation which gives only the decree-holder's low valuation may be set aside as vitiated.
Saadatmand Khan v. Phul Kuar (1898) I.L.R. 20 All. 412, 417 : L.R. 25 I.A. 146 (P.C.) Misstatement of value that is glaring and not in good faith is calculated to mislead bidders and prevent adequate offers. The Court quoted this Privy Council observation to show that a deliberately misleading low valuation can prejudice potential bidders and thereby vitiate the sale.
Marudanayagam v. Manickavasagam I.L.R. (1945) Mad. 601, 607 : L.R. 72 I.A. 104 : (1945) 1 M.L.J. 229 (P.C.) Efficacy of plea of waiver depends on proof that the party knew the true facts from which an intention to waive can be inferred; waiver cannot be presumed without such proof. The Court applied this principle to hold that waiver by the judgment-debtor was not established because there was no proof he knew the omission of his valuation in the proclamation or other material facts.
Girdhari Singh v. Hurdeo Narain Singh (1876) L.R. 3 I.A. 230 (P.C.) Authority relied upon by respondents in support of waiver/estoppel arguments. The Court noted that the respondents relied on this case for waiver but treated the respondents' reliance on it as part of the waiver argument; the Court required proof of knowledge of true facts which was not shown.
Arunachallam v. Arunachallam (1888) I.L.R. 12 Mad. 19 : L.R. 15 I.A. 171 Authority relied upon by respondents regarding waiver/estoppel. Referred to as relied upon by respondents; the Court emphasized that waiver requires knowledge of the true facts, which was absent here.
Raja Shyam Sunder Singh v. Kaluram Agarwala (1939) 1 M.L.J. 147 (P.C.) Privilege/waiver principle: waiver can only be sustained if the party had full knowledge of the material facts. Referred to for the proposition that waiver requires full knowledge; the Court relied on this to reject respondents' plea of waiver because such knowledge was not proved.
Vaidyalingam v. Chidambaram (1966) 1 M.L.J. 441 : I.L.R. (1967) 2 Mad. 140 Where the judgment-debtor stood by and allowed the sale to go on, he cannot set up a plea of misdescription in the sale proclamation. The Court held this authority inapplicable to the present facts because here the judgment-debtor did not have effective or personal service and did not knowingly stand by to allow the sale.
Potta Reddi v. Karuppa (1935) 68 M.L.J. 48 : AIR 1935 Mad. 150 Case where judgment-debtor, despite notice, took no part in settling the proclamation and later applied for adjournment; held estopped from setting aside sale. The Court distinguished this case from the present facts, observing that in Potta Reddi the judgment-debtor had notice and took no part; that circumstance is not present here.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the matter in stages:

  1. On service under Order 21, Rule 66: Both Courts below had found, as a fact, that service by affixture (after alleged refusal by the judgment-debtor) constituted sufficient service and imputed constructive notice. The High Court accepted the concurrent factual finding that service had been made and observed that this factual finding could not be successfully challenged in revision (para. 2). The Court noted, however, that the attesting witnesses being non-residents and other suspicious circumstances left room for doubt but not for overturning the concurrent finding.
  2. On the omission of the judgment-debtor's valuation in the proclamation: The Court treated this omission as a material defect. It emphasised that Order 21, Rule 66(2)(e) (a Madras State amendment) is a mandatory provision which requires strict enforcement: the proclamation must disclose both the decree-holder's and the judgment-debtor's values (paras. 3–4). The Court referred to earlier decisions (including a Division Bench in Nagendra v. Varadaraja) to support the proposition that where the proclamation gives only the decree-holder's grossly inadequate value—designed to conceal the true value—the sale is vitiated (para. 5).
  3. On the adequacy of price and availability of evidence: The petitioner had earlier valued the property vastly higher (paras. 1 and 16). The Village Munsif's valuations used in the execution (Rs. 800 and Rs. 1,000) were, on the face of it, "ridiculously low." The Court criticised the lower appellate Court's refusal to admit additional evidence from the judgment-debtor to rebut the decree-holder's low valuation, calling the lower court's conclusion that additional documents would not rebut the record "a conclusion without any consideration" (para. 8). The Court accepted that the low proclamation price could prejudice bidders and quoted Privy Council authority to show such misstatements are likely to mislead and prevent adequate bidding (paras. 9–11).
  4. On waiver/estoppel: The respondents argued waiver because the judgment-debtor applied for postponement after learning about the sale. The Court examined waiver jurisprudence and concluded waiver can only be sustained if there is proof that the party waived its right with full knowledge of the true facts. Because the judgment-debtor was not personally served and there was no convincing evidence he knew of the omission of his valuation, the Court held that waiver had not been proved (paras. 12–17). The Court relied on Privy Council authorities (e.g., Marudanayagam and Raja Shyam Sunder Singh) to state that waiver requires knowledge of the material facts; absent such proof, estoppel cannot be invoked.
  5. On the Court's duty: The Court noted a judicial duty to prepare a completed sale proclamation by availing itself of all material information on the record. The judgment-debtor's earlier valuation (in attachment proceedings) was available on the Court record but was not used to complete the proclamation; thus the Court failed to discharge a statutory duty and failed to exercise its jurisdiction properly (para. 10).
  6. Conclusion of analysis: Given (a) the omission of the judgment-debtor's valuation in the proclamation, (b) the manifest disparity between the decree-holder's low valuation and the judgment-debtor's valuation on record, (c) the lack of proof of waiver and (d) the Court's failure to use available information, the High Court concluded the sale was vitiated by a serious irregularity going to the root of the sale (paras. 11–13).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court ordered that the sale was set aside. More precisely: The civil revision petition is allowed; the sale is set aside and the order of the lower Court is set aside. There will be no order as to costs (para. 13).

Implications:

  • The direct effect is to nullify the execution sale held on 3 April 1963 (knocked down for Rs. 801 and Rs. 1,001) and to set aside the lower court's order refusing to disturb that sale.
  • The Court emphasised strict enforcement of the mandatory requirement in Order 21, Rule 66(2)(e) (Madras amendment) that a sale proclamation must disclose the valuation given by both the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor; omission of the judgment-debtor's valuation is a material defect capable of vitiating a sale, particularly where the decree-holder's valuation is grossly inadequate and is capable of misleading bidders (paras. 3–6, 10–13).
  • No costs were awarded; the decision focused on correcting a defective execution sale and enforcing procedural/substantive requirements for sale proclamations rather than imposing broader sanctions.

Note: This summary is prepared exclusively from the text of the provided opinion. No facts, arguments, or implications have been added beyond what is contained in that opinion.

Show all summary ...

JUDGMENT T. Ramaprasada Rao, J.

1. The judgment-debtor-petitioner, aggrieved by the orders of the lower Court which refused to set aside a sale of his property in execution of a money decree, canvasses the legality of the same, as petitioner in this Court. The petitioner's case is that the property has been valued by him even at the stage when it was attached before judgment at Rs. 6,500. After the suit ended in a compromise decree, the attachment having been raised, the 1st respondent-decree-holder re-attached the property in execution. The property consists of two items (i) garden land of an extent of 74 cents, and (ii) cultivable land of an extent of 58 cents with a well in it. In Execution Petition No. 632 of 1962, the property was valued by the Village Munsif item-war at Rs. 800 and Rs. 1,000 each. Incidentally the second item of the property was subject to an encumbrance in favour of the Co-operative Society from whom the judgment-debtor secured a loan to widen the well. After the property was attached in execution, the petitioner's Case is that no notice was validly served on him under Order 21, Rule 66, Civil Procedure Code, when the sale was directed. Even in the proclamation of sale Exhibit C-2 only the decree-holder's valuation and the Court's valuation have been mentioned and his valuation and the encumbrance were not included therein. It appears after knowing the sale date, he sought for an adjournment of the sale and was asked to deposit some money towards the decree. The sale was finally held on 3rd April, 1963 and was knocked out in favour of the husband of the decree-holder for Rs. 801 in respect of the first item and for Rs. 1,001 in respect of the second item. The petitioner contends that as (i) there was no notice under Order 21, Rule 66, Civil Procedure Code, (ii) there was no proper torn torn of such sale, (iii) there was no insertion in Exhibit C-2 of his valuation and (iv) the property was knocked down for a ridiculously low price, and the sale suffers from material irregularities and the petitioner is. adversely affected by such a sale.

2. As regards the first objection that no notice under Order 21, Rule 66, Civil' Procedure Code, was served on the petitioner, it has to be noted that the service in. the instant case was effected by affixture consequent upon the refusal by the judgment-debtor. Both the Courts below found, as a matter of fact, that such service was sufficient service. It must, however, be noted that due to the alleged refusal and consequential affixture, the Courts below imputed the judgment-debtor with constructive notice under Order 21, Rule 66, and this conclusion was arrived at on a detailed examination of the oral evidence in the case. The main contention, of the petitioner is that the attesting witnesses are not those ordinarily residing in the village in which the property is situate. Though at first sight this argument appears to be well with force but in revision the matter cannot be successfully canvassed by the petitioner because the factum of service is clearly a fact found concurrently by the Court-below. The conspicuous event in this case is that if the judgment-debtor did not have such effective notice of sale it was well within his rights to apply for setting aside the ex parte order which accepted such service as good service. The judgment-debtor, however, did not file any such application to set aside the ex parte order. As regards the other contention that no proper tom tom can be said to have been effected by the decree-holder at or near the place of auction, it does not appear to me that the reasons given by the petitioner in this Court are in. any way convincing to disturb the concurrent findings of fact of both the Courts below.

3. But the contention of the judgment-debtor that the sale proclamation was defective in that the valuation of the judgment-debtor was not incorporated therein and such an inchoate and irregular sale proclamation cannot be the foundation of a legal and valid Court or public sale, has considerable force. The trial Court does not appear to have adverted to this material circumstance. The lower appellate Court, however held that there is nothing on record to show that the judgment-debtor gave any value for being mentioned in the sale proclamation and, therefore, it held that the sale is not vitiated and not liable to be set aside. I shall presently advert to the other main contention of the petitioner that by reason of the irregular proclamation resulting in an illegal sale, he has been considerably prejudiced in that the real market value of the property was not incorporated in the document which has to be circulated to the public to enable them to come and bid at the sale. What is the impact of Order 21, Rule 66 (2) (e) over a sale proclamation which is admittedly defective, in that there is a lacuna therein which relates to the absence of valuation of the judgment-debtor?

4. Before the above question is answered directly, it would be necessary to find. out as to what is the purpose and intendment of the Civil Procedure Code in prescribing certain requirements which have to be found and publicly exhibited in a sale proclamation before any public sale is attempted. This aspect was considered in a different light by Veeraswami, J., in Ramalingam v. Sankara (1964) 2 M.L.J. 229 : I.L.R. (1964)2 Mad. 370. That was a case which arose under circumstances wherein the complaint was that the notice under Order 21, Rule 66, Civil Procedure Code was not served. There the learned Judge, agreeing with Panchapakesa Ayyar, J., in Karunakaran Nayar v. Chathu I.L.R. (1957) Mad. 187 : (1956) 1 M.L.J. 47 held that if a proclamation is drawn up on inchoate and illegal material, and in any event on the basis of information which was either incorrect or untrue, then the resultant sale would be a nullity and it will not be a case of mere irregularity. No doubt, this was the ratio in the above case. But applying the same test to the particular facts of the case before me, it appears to me that if a sale proclamation. does not contain a mandatory and a statutory requirement, the mere fact that constructive 'notice of sale and notice under Order 21, Rule 66, Civil Procedure Code is imputed to the judgment-debtor by an a priori consideration of the facts, it would nevertheless be a sale held on a proclamation which was not drawn up in accordance with law. Learned Counsel for the petitioner rightly contends 'that : Order 21, Rule 66 (2) (e), which is a particular and peculiar amendment introduced in Madras State, has to be strictly enforced and if as a fact there is any defect in the sale proclamation in that it does not disclose the two valuations, that is, both of the decree-holders and that of the judgment-debtor, which are obligatorily to be described, then the proclamation suffers from an irregularity which cannot be cured even by acquiescence.

5. A Division Bench of this Court in Nagendra v. Varadaraja I.L.R. (1964) 2 Mad. 28, was of the view that the Court has to give, under Order 21, Rule 66 (e), Civil Procedure Code, the value of the property as stated by the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor, and added:

Where this rule is not complied with and the upset price given in the proclamation is the one given by the decree-holder, which on the evidence is found to be grossly inadequate, and it reveals a clear intention on the part of the decree-holder to conceal from the intending bidders the true value of the property and thereby, dissuade a good many of them from taking part in the sale, in such circumstances the sale is clearly vitiated and liable to be set aside.

6. In this case the judgment-debtor originally valued the property at Rs. 6,000. When he attempted to substantiate before the lower appellate Court that the value as stated by the decree-holder is inadequate and considerably low, he was not allowed to do so. His application for reception of additional evidence was summarily rejected by the lower appellate Court. The lower appellate Court, while refusing to receive additional evidence, observed:

Further, even if the documents are received, they are not sufficient to rebut the evidence already on record.

This appears to me to be a conclusion without any consideration. The value as evaluated by the judgment-debtor at the time of the attachment before judgment proceeding was nearly six times the value as stated by the decree-holder. Thus, the value put in the proclamation is ridiculously low. At any rate, no opportunity was given to the judgment-debtor to establish that the decree-holder's valuation was designedly low. The insistence of the decree-holder to hold on to such a value, which is obviously self-serving and to his ultimate advantage, savours of lack of bona fides. Honesty is a duty of universal obligation. The fact that the value of both the items of property is depicted as so low, might prejudice the minds of buyers about the quality of the land. In the words of the Privy Council in Saadatmand Khan v. Phul Kuar (1898) I.L.R. 20 All. 412, 417 : L.R. 25 I.A. 146 (P.C.).

...it is a mis-statement of the value of the property which is so glaring in amount that it can hardly have been made in good faith, and which, however, it came to be made, was calculated to mislead possible bidders and to prevent them from offering adequate prices or from bidding at all.

Thus, therefore, the value as given by the decree-holder is misleading and has caused?considerable prejudice to the judgment-debtor, and without hesitation we can conclude that the sale is thus vitiated.

7. Mr. K. Raman appearing for the decree-holder, however, contends that even though the sale proclamation did not include the price of the judgment-debtor, the sale is not vitiated for two reasons, (i) the judgment-debtor did not make any attempt to give his price at the appropriate time for the same to be mentioned in the proclamation of sale, (ii) there is a waiver of such an irregularity, even if it is one.

8. Regarding the first objection, the instant case is one in which the judgment-debtor was deemed to have been served. Therefore, he had no real or effective opportunity to state the valuation of the property. The inclusion of the judgment-debtor's valuation in the proclamation is not a rule of mere procedure, but one of substance. This is a mandatory requirement. There is, therefore, no force in the first contention. The second contention which closely follows the first requires a serious consideration. This is mainly rested on the ground that the judgment-debtor applied for postponement of the sale after he came to know of it. In this case, notice under Order 21, Rule 66 was affixed and the evidence is that the judgment-debtor refused. But the case of the judgment-debtor is that he was not present in the house on that day and the note made by the process-server that he refused summons is incorrect and he even states that it is false. But sitting in revision I am constrained to accept the finding of fact that notice was served under Order 21, Rule 66 on the judgment-debtor. But, in my view, the circumstances are suspicious and not beyond reasonable doubt. It cannot with certainty be presumed that the affixture which was made by the process-server in the instant case, which was attested by non-residents of the village, could have been done, or even if it was done, whether the version given by the decree-holder through his witnesses can be true. Suffice it, however, to say without further probing into the details of the evidence regarding such service, that though it has been held that the judgment-debtor should be deemed to have had notice or constructive notice of such service, yet, for all just and equitable purposes it cannot be presumed that the judgment-debtor, at that point of time, had all the information about the defective proclamation of sale which propelled the public sale. In the words of the Privy Council in Marudanayagam v. Manickavasagam I.L.R. (1945) Mad. 601, 607 : L.R. 72 I.A. 104 : (1945) 1 M.L.J. 229 (P.C.).

The efficacy of a plea of waiver by the appellant depends on the ability of the respondent to prove that the appellant knew the true facts from which an intention on his part to waive his right to object to a mis-statement in the proclamation can be inferred.

9. No such proof has been let in this case by the respondents.

10. There is also a duty cast on the Court to send out a completed sale proclamation containing details as required in law. It has also the duty to avail itself of all information from the records in Court. In the attachment before judgment proceedings, the judgment-debtor has valued the property at Rs. 6,000. This material was thus available. But the Court has not adverted to such material information on its records and failed to discharge one of its statutory duties and thus failed to exercise its jurisdiction vested in it by law.

11. Learned Counsel for the respondents strenuously stressed the plea of waiver by the judgment-debtor to contend that the sale cannot be set aside. As already stated, the application for postponement of sale is pressed into service in support of this contention. No doubt, certain observations of the Privy Council in Girdhari Singh v. Hurdeo Narain Singh (1876) L.R. 3 I.A. 230 (P.C.), and in Arunachallam v. Arunachallam (1888) I.L.R. 12 Mad. 19 : L.R. 15 I.A. 171, were relied upon. Mr. K. Mohan appearing for the petitioner equally relied upon two other Privy Council decisions reported in Raja Shyam Sunder Singh v. Kaluram Agarwala (1939) 1 M.L.J. 147 (P.C.), and Marudanayagam v. Manickavasagam I.L.R. (1945) Mad. 601, 607 : L.R. 72 I.A. 104 : (1945) 1 M.L.J. 229 (P.C.). In this case the two other decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the respondents are referred to but yet the learned Law Lords laid down in no uncertain terms the rule that waiver can only be sustained, if the party against whom it is projected did have full knowledge of all the material facts put against him. This is not so in this case as the judgment-debtor was not personally served with the notice under Order 21, Rule 66. There is no clinching evidence to show that the petitioner knew the true facts, to wit the absence of his valuation in the proclamation, from which a deliberate intention on his part to waive his right to object to a mis-statement in the proclamation can be fairly, legitimately and properly inferred. It is only such a state of affairs that could constitute waiver, as estoppel must be certain to every intent and not to be taken by argument or inference. . To the same effect are the observations of the Privy Council in Raja Shyam Sunder Singh v. Kaluram Agarwala (1939) 1 M.L.J. 147 (P.C.).

There is a distinction in law between waiver and admission; in the case of waiver a person is not to be held to have waived a right of which he was reasonably ignorant, but in the case of a representation or admission which is acted on the party making it cannot plead ignorance unless it is induced by the other party, for, if he does not choose to enquire beforehand, he takes the risk of error.

The case cited by Mr. K. Raman, Vaidyalingam v. Chidambaram (1966) 1 M.L.J. 441 : I.L.R. (1967) 2 Mad. 140, has no application to the facts of this case. There the judgment-debtor stood by and allowed the sale to go on and Kailasam, J., held that he cannot be heard to set up a plea of misdescription in the sale proclamation. The other case cited by the learned Counsel for the respondents, Potta Reddi v. Karuppa (1935) 68 M.L.J. 48 : AIR. 1935 Mad. 150, is yet again one in which the judgment-debtor in spite of notice took no part in the settling of the proclamation and thereafter applied for adjournment of sale. In those circumstances, Walsh, J., held that he is estopped from filing an application for setting aside such a sale.

12. In the instant case, the notice was not directly served. The Court did not perform its duty to avail itself of the available material on record to complete the proclamation in all aspects. The judgment-debtor cannot be said to have had all information regarding the defective sale proclamation when he applied for adjournment. The application for adjournment is obviously made in an emergency to avert a sale and highly involuntary rather than a free act in exercise of one's volition being conscious of all the defects with which the proclamation was suffering.

13. I am satisfied that in this case the petitioner is not estopped from raising the plea that the proclamation is defective and thus there was a serious irregularity which goes to the root of the Court sale. I have already found that the conduct of the decree-holder coupled with the fact that the judgment-debtor was not given a fair opportunity to prove the market value raises a considerable doubt whether the price paid is adequate. In fact, by reason of the low and inadequate price the judgment-debtor has been damnified considerably. This is a fit case in which the sale has to be set aside and accordingly it is set aside. The order of the lower Court is consequently set aside and this civil revision petition is allowed. There will be no order as to costs.