- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
S. Thangavelu Pillai v. E.M Mani (Decd.). And Others.
Factual and Procedural Background
The dispute arises from an alleged motor accident that occurred on 6 October 1960. The appellant instituted a suit for payment of compensation on 6 October 1961. The plaint was returned on 20 November 1961 for presentation to the proper forum, after which the appellant presented it to the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal.
Section 110-A(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act prescribes a limitation period of sixty days for an application for compensation and contains a proviso empowering the Tribunal to excuse delay if satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time. Pursuant to that proviso, the appellant filed an application asking the Tribunal to excuse the delay.
Both sides agreed that the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal was constituted for the first time by rules promulgated on 12 July 1961; prior to that, claims were to be adjudicated by the civil court, where the limitation period was one year. The appellant's case was that he was unaware of the promulgation constituting the Tribunal and, under the impression that he could approach the civil court within one year, presented the plaint on 6 October 1961 and therefore sought excusal of delay.
The Tribunal dismissed the application for excusing the delay by order dated 11 July 1962. The appellant appealed against that order to the High Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the appeal against the Tribunal's order dismissing the application to excuse delay is maintainable under S. 110-D(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act (i.e., whether such an order amounts to an "award" or otherwise falls within the scope of S. 110-D).
- Whether the Tribunal ought to have exercised the proviso to S. 110-A(3) to excuse the delay, given the circumstances that the Tribunal was constituted after the accident and the appellant's belief that the civil court's one-year limitation still governed his remedy.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The appellant was unaware of the rules promulgated on 12 July 1961 constituting the Tribunal and therefore believed he could still approach the civil court within one year; he presented the plaint on 6 October 1961 on that basis.
- Relying on the proviso to S. 110-A(3), he applied to the Tribunal to excuse the delay in making the application for compensation.
Respondent's Arguments
- A preliminary contention that the appeal is not maintainable: S. 110-D provides for appeals only from an "award" of a Claims Tribunal, and the order dismissing the application for excusing delay is not an award within S. 110-D(1).
- The respondent further contended that the main application for payment of compensation had not been dismissed because it had not been entertained, implying there was nothing appealable under S. 110-D(1).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Gopalaswami v. Navalgaria (1) | Support for the proposition that the present appeal is competent under S. 110-D(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act. | The court relied on this decision to overrule the respondent's preliminary objection and held that the appeal against the Tribunal's order dismissing the application to excuse delay was maintainable under S. 110-D(1). |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
On the preliminary question of maintainability, the court rejected the respondent's contention that the order dismissing the application for excusing the delay was not an "award" and thus not appealable under S. 110-D(1). The court reasoned that the practical effect of dismissing the application to excuse delay is the rejection of the application for compensation itself; therefore, for practical purposes the application for compensation could be taken as having been rejected. The court concluded that the appeal was competent under S. 110-D(1) and relied on the decision in Gopalaswami v. Navalgaria (1) to support that conclusion.
On the merits, the court noted that the Tribunal was constituted only on 12 July 1961 and that the sixty-day period prescribed by S. 110-A(3) would commence from that date. The court accepted that it was conceivable the appellant believed his remedy in the civil court (with a one-year limitation) remained available for accidents occurring before the Tribunal's constitution. The Tribunal had taken the view that ignorance of law cannot constitute sufficient cause to excuse delay. The court held that, in the particular circumstances where a new forum was introduced after the accident, rejecting the application on the sole ground of ignorance of law was an unduly narrow and technical approach.
The court emphasized that the "peculiar circumstances" arising from the introduction of a new forum after the occurrence of the accident — and the consequent belief a person might reasonably entertain that the old remedy remained available — should have been taken into account. Because the Tribunal failed to consider these aspects, the court considered this a proper case in which the Tribunal ought to have exercised its jurisdiction under the proviso to S. 110-A(3) and excused the delay, allowing the application for compensation to be dealt with on its merits.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL ALLOWED.
The court allowed the appeal, set aside the Tribunal's order dated 11 July 1962 dismissing the application to excuse delay, and directed the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal to deal with the application for payment of compensation on the merits. The court ordered that there would be no order as to costs in the appeal.
Direct effect on the parties: the appellant's application for compensation is to be entertained and decided on merits by the Tribunal; the Tribunal is directed to consider whether the delay should be excused in light of the circumstances explained by the court. The opinion does not discuss broader implications or purport to lay down a new precedent beyond the decision in this case.
This is an appeal against the order dated 11th July, 1962 of the District Judge and Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, West Thanjavur, Thanjavur, dismissing the application filed by the petitioner appellant herein for excusing the delay in filing an application for payment of compensation. With reference to an alleged accident that took place on 6th October, 1960, on 6tb October, 1961, the appellant therein instituted a suit for payment of compensation. That plaint was returned on 20th November, 1961 for presentation to the proper forum and the appellant herein presented the same to the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. Under S. 110-A(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, the period of limitation prescribed for an application for compensation is sixty days and the proviso to that subsection confers a power on the Tribunal to excuse the delay if it was satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from the making the application in time. The appellant herein, pursuant to this proviso, filed an application for excusing the delay. It is the common case of both sides that the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal was constituted for the first time by the rules promulgated on 12th July, 1961 and prior to that the forum for adjudication of any claim for compensation was the civil Court and the period of limitation available in this behalf was one year. According to the appellants, he was not aware of the promulgation of the rules of the 12th July, 1961 constituting the Tribunal and therefore under the impression that he could approach the civil court within a period of one year, he presented the plaint on 6th October, 1961. It is on that ground he applied to the Tribunal for excusing the delay. The Tribunal took the view that ignorance of law cannot constitute sufficient cause to enable it to excuse the delay. Hence the present appeal.
Learned Counsel for the respondent took up a preliminary point to the effect that his appeal is not maintainable. It is S. 110-D of the Act which provides for an appeal and that section statgs that any person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal may prefer an appeal to the High Court. The contention of the learned Counsel is, the order dismissing the application for excusing the delay is not an award so as to attract the scope of S. 110-D (1). As a matter of fact, the learned Cousel went to the extent of contending that the main application for payment of compensation has not yet been dismissed because it has not been entertained at all. I am unable to agree with this contention. That effect of the dismissal of the application filed by the appellant to excuse the delay is the rejection of the application for compensation itself. Consequently for all practical purposes, it can be taken that the application for compensation itself has been rejected. Therefore, I am of the of the view that the present appeal is competent under S. 110 D(1) of the Act. As a matter of fact, this conclusion is supported by a decision of this court in Gopalaswami v. Navalgaria(1). Therefore I overrule the preliminary objection of the learned counsel for the respondent and hold that the present appeal is maintainable.
Coming to the merits, admittedly, the Tribunal was constituted only on 12th July 1961, and the period of sixty days provided for under Sec. 110 A (3) will commence only from that date. It is quite possible that the appellant thought that relation to an accident that took place prior to the constitution of the Tribunal, his remedy in the civil court remained unaffected by the constitution of the Tribunal and the period of limitation prescribed for the purpose of making an application to such a Tribunal. Under such circumstances, to reject the application of the appel: lant to excuse the delay on the ground that ignorance of law cannot constitutes sufficient cause is to take an unduly narrow and technical view in this behalf. The peculiar circumstances relating to a new forum being introduced after the occurrence of the accident and the consequential belief that might be entertained by a person that in relation to an accident occuring earlier the old remedy is still available should be taken note of. This is what the Tribunal in this case fail to do. I consider that this is a proper case in which, the Tribunal ought to have exercised its jurisdiction and excused the delay and should have dealt with the application for compensation on merits. Accordingly I allow this appeal and set aside the order dated 11th July 1962 and direct the tribunal to deal with the application for payment of compensation on merits. There will be no order as to cost in this appeal.
v.c.s
Alert