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G. Ramanujam v. Zonal Manager, Life Insurance Corporation, Madras And Another
Structured Summary of the Court's Opinion (Delivered by P.S. Kailasam, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner was an Assistant Branch Manager (Development) absorbed into the Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC) after earlier service in New India Assurance. He was promoted as a Class I officer in September 1962. On November 20, 1964, the petitioner was served with a charge memo containing two charges; he filed a written statement on December 3, 1964 denying the charges. An Enquiry Officer (Sri S.T.V. Chari) was appointed on December (date in text: "id"), 1964. An additional charge was framed by the Divisional Manager on January 12, 1965 and an enquiry was conducted between January 18 and 24, 1965.
A show-cause notice was issued on April 5, 1965; the petitioner replied on April 15, 1965. By order dated April 29, 1965 the Zonal Manager dismissed the petitioner from service; an appeal to the Chairman was rejected by an order dated December 3, 1965. The petitioner filed a writ petition (certiorari) in the High Court seeking to quash the dismissal order and related records.
The factual controversy concerned allegedly incorrect “lapsed” policy figures submitted to the Zonal Office. The Divisional Manager had called for confidential reports; contrary to instructions, the Divisional Office forwarded the proforma to the petitioner, who collected figures from the branch and returned them. It was later found that some figures were incorrect. Three charges were ultimately framed (set out in full in the opinion). The Enquiry Officer acquitted the petitioner of the first charge but found him guilty of charges 2 and 3. The enquiry procedure adopted and reliance on certain documents and confessional statements are the principal subjects of challenge in the writ petition.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the domestic enquiry conducted by the Life Insurance Corporation observed the principles of natural justice, particularly the right to cross-examine witnesses and to have material adverse to the accused put to him with an opportunity to explain.
- Whether the Enquiry Officer could properly rely upon (a) a confessional statement made by steno R. Natarajan in a separate enquiry and (b) a denial by accounts Natarajan obtained after the enquiry, without giving the petitioner an opportunity to test or explain those materials.
- Whether an order of dismissal by a statutory/public body such as the Life Insurance Corporation of India is amenable to judicial review by way of writ petition (certiorari) in the High Court.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments (as advanced by Mr. Mohan Kumaramangalam)
- The Enquiry Officer's proceedings were vitiated because the principles of natural justice were not observed.
- The Corporation relied on a letter from Accounts Officer Natarajan as substantive evidence without affording the petitioner an opportunity to question or explain that letter.
- The Enquiry Officer relied on a confessional statement made by steno R. Natarajan in a separate enquiry without giving the petitioner an opportunity to cross-examine the steno on that confession.
Respondent's Arguments (as advanced by Mr. V.K. Thiruvenkatachari for LIC)
- A preliminary objection was raised to the maintainability of the writ petition: an order of dismissal by the Life Insurance Corporation is not liable to be interfered with by writ proceedings (contention that dismissal of a servant effectively terminates the contract and the proper remedy may be damages or limited relief).
- Factual position presented by the Corporation: the petitioner came to Madurai, collected data without seeing the officer who had written the proforma, and the steno Natarajan manipulated figures to the petitioner’s advantage; steno Natarajan later made a confession in an enquiry against him which implicated the petitioner, and the Enquiry Officer inferred that the petitioner must have been aware of the alterations.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| State of Mysore v. Shivabasappa | Domestic tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions are not courts bound by strict rules of evidence, but they should not act on information against a party unless it is put to him and he is given a fair opportunity to explain; general standards for natural justice in domestic enquiries. | The Court applied this case as the primary standard to assess whether the enquiry observed natural justice — concluding that the enquiry must permit the accused to explain, adduce evidence, and cross-examine witnesses, and that on the facts a fair opportunity was not given. |
| Kesoram Cotton Mills v. Gangadhar | Reaffirmation of the State of Mysore standard; procedural expectations in industrial enquiries (noted by the Supreme Court). | The Court noted that Kesoram Cotton Mills reaffirmed State of Mysore and cited it to support the proposition that when witnesses are not examined in the presence of the charged person, the latter should be given statements in advance and an opportunity to cross-examine. |
| Khardah and Co. v. Its Workmen | Desirability that witnesses on whose testimony the management relies be examined in the presence of the charged person; procedural standards in Industrial Disputes Act cases. | The Court observed that Khardah established desirable procedures in industrial disputes and contrasted that these principles inform the minimum standards expected in domestic enquiries like the present one. |
| Francis v. Municipal Councillors | English authority: courts generally will not declare that a contract of service continues and will not ordinarily order specific performance of service contracts; remedy issues on termination. | The decision was cited by respondents to argue limits on remedies for wrongful dismissal. The Court considered it but distinguished the English decisions against the body of Indian authority permitting writs against breach of statutory provisions by public bodies. |
| Vidyodaya University of Ceylon v. Silva | Privy Council authority that writ of certiorari may not be available for ordinary master-and-servant contract terminations. | The Court recorded this authority as relied upon by respondents but treated it as not controlling in view of subsequent Indian Supreme Court and High Court authorities which permit writs where statutory obligations or public functions are involved. |
| Vine v. National Dock Labour Board | English authority (special circumstances): a dismissal without proper authority may justify a declaration that employment continues in special cases. | The Court noted Vine was distinguished in Francis on the basis of special facts; the opinion cited Vine to show limited English authority recognizing exceptional relief in specific circumstances but did not rely on it to deny writ jurisdiction. |
| Ram Babu v. Divisional Manager, L.I.C. | Indian High Court decision holding an LIC employee could not maintain a writ of certiorari (relationship treated as master and servant). | The Court observed this decision exists but held it could not stand in view of later Supreme Court authority (State of Uttar Pradesh v. Babu Ram) and other precedents recognizing writ availability against public bodies; thus Ram Babu was not treated as good law here. |
| State of Uttar Pradesh v. Babu Ram | Rules made under a statute must be treated as if they were in the Act for purposes of construction and obligation. | The Court relied on this principle to support the proposition that statutory rules and obligations attract writ jurisdiction; it used this to distinguish Ram Babu and support writ availability against LIC actions where statutory or rule-based obligations have been breached. |
| Life Insurance Corporation v. Sunil Kumar Mukherjee | Where employees' services were terminated without enquiry or opportunity to be heard, such orders must be held invalid. | The Court cited this Supreme Court decision as directly supporting the proposition that LIC dismissals without fair enquiry/opportunity are susceptible to writ intervention; it informed the Court's rejection of the preliminary objection. |
| T.C.M. Pillay v. Indian Institute of Technology | Dismissal without observing mandatory procedure under statute is a nullity and amenable to writ under Article 226. | The Court used this Madras High Court decision to reinforce that where statutory or mandatory procedures exist, failure to follow them invites writ relief; it supported the conclusion that LIC action could be reviewed. |
| V. Ramiah v. State Bank of India | Order of dismissal by State Bank is liable to be interfered with in writ proceedings. | The Court cited this decision as precedent for interference in writ proceedings against a statutory or public financial institution, supporting writ availability against LIC dismissal. |
| Narayanaswamy Naidu v. Krishnamurthy | This High Court decision held a writ is available against acts of the Life Insurance Corporation. | The Court relied on this domestic precedent to support writ jurisdiction over LIC decisions and to reject the respondent's preliminary objection. |
| Mafatlal Barot v. Divisional Controller, State Transport, Mehsana | Supreme Court authority that courts can interfere with orders of dismissal by a Road Transport Corporation. | The Court cited this Supreme Court decision to illustrate that courts have interfered with dismissals by statutory/public transport bodies, analogously supporting review of LIC dismissals. |
| D.L. Board, Calcutta v. Jaffar Inam | Supreme Court authority supporting interference with dismissals by a public transport statutory board. | The Court cited this as further Supreme Court authority showing writ jurisdiction extends to dismissals by public/statutory bodies. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in two main strands: (A) the procedural fairness of the domestic enquiry and (B) the preliminary objection on writ jurisdiction.
A. Analysis of the Enquiry Procedure (Natural Justice)
- The Court set out the applicable law: State of Mysore v. Shivabasappa and subsequent reaffirmations require that while domestic tribunals are not bound by strict rules of evidence, they must not act upon information adverse to a party unless it is put to the party and a fair opportunity to explain is given. The minimum expected includes opportunity to adduce relevant evidence, to hear evidence of the opponent in the presence of the charged person, and to cross-examine opposing witnesses.
- The Court examined the actual conduct of the enquiry. It noted that the Enquiry Officer did not follow the "normal procedure" of (i) examining prosecution witnesses in the presence of the charged person, (ii) allowing cross-examination by the charged person, and (iii) then affording an opportunity for the charged to explain and call defence witnesses. Instead, the Enquiry Officer and the Corporation’s representative (Mr. S.R. Iyer) questioned the petitioner and others directly and recorded responses; most pages of the proceeding were signed by the parties.
- The material relied upon to find guilt consisted principally of (i) a confessional statement made by steno R. Natarajan in an enquiry against him, and (ii) a denial by accounts Natarajan (in a letter dated February 15, 1965) of an assertion by the petitioner. The Court observed: (a) the confessional statement was put to the petitioner but was not tested by cross-examination of steno Natarajan; (b) steno Natarajan was present during the enquiry, yet the petitioner was not told or invited to cross-examine him; and (c) the denial by accounts Natarajan was obtained after the enquiry against the petitioner had closed and was relied on without giving the petitioner an opportunity to explain.
- Applying the principles from State of Mysore and the subsequent authorities, the Court concluded that, on the facts, the petitioner was not given a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine crucial witnesses or to explain material that was used against him. Although the Enquiry Officer was found to have been sincere and anxious to give a fair opportunity, the procedure actually followed resulted in an unwitting denial of a fair opportunity to defend.
B. Analysis of the Preliminary Objection (Writ Jurisdiction)
- The respondent argued that dismissal by the LIC is an employer-employee contractual matter not amenable to certiorari. The Court reviewed English authorities (Francis, Vidyodaya) relied upon by the respondent and noted distinctions and limitations in those authorities — particularly that English cases often protect the general rule that courts do not order continuance of personal service except in special circumstances.
- The Court placed greater reliance on Indian authority: the Supreme Court and Madras High Court decisions (including State of Uttar Pradesh v. Babu Ram; Life Insurance Corporation v. Sunil Kumar Mukherjee; T.C.M. Pillay; V. Ramiah; Narayanaswamy Naidu; and others). These authorities hold that writ relief is available where a public or statutory body breaches statutory rules or fails to accord mandated procedure or natural justice, and that rules made under statute are to be treated as if incorporated in the statute for purposes of obligation.
- Accordingly, the Court rejected the preliminary objection and held that in the face of the cited Indian authorities a writ petition is maintainable to challenge the merits or the statutory/mandatory procedural defects in disciplinary dismissals by public/statutory bodies such as the LIC.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The writ petition was allowed. The Court set aside the order of dismissal.
Core Ruling: The order of dismissal was quashed because the domestic enquiry did not afford the petitioner a reasonable and fair opportunity to cross-examine material witnesses (notably steno Natarajan) and to explain materials (notably the accounts Natarajan's denial) relied upon against him.
Immediate implications and consequences:
- The Life Insurance Corporation of India is at liberty to frame fresh charges and conduct a fresh enquiry against the petitioner, observing the procedures and standards of natural justice outlined by the Court.
- The preliminary objection that writ relief is unavailable against dismissal by the LIC was rejected on the basis of Indian authorities; the Court reaffirmed that writ jurisdiction lies to correct breaches of statutory obligations or failure to observe mandatory procedures by public/statutory bodies.
- The Court made no order as to costs.
The opinion does not state that a new legal precedent was created; it applies and relies on existing Supreme Court and High Court authorities to resolve the issues in this case. The direct effect is the quashing of the dismissal and permission for a fresh, properly conducted enquiry.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
P.S Kailasam, J.:— The petition is filed by the Assistant Branch Manager of the Life Insurance Corporation of India, for the issue of a writ of certiorari calling for the records connected with the order of the Zonal Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India, Madras, dated April 29, 1965, dismissing the petitioner from service as confirmed by the order of the Chairman, Life Insurance Corporation of India, Bombay, dated December 3, 1965.
2. The petitioner joined the New India Assurance as organiser in the year 1955 and was absorbed in the said Corporation as a Development Officer when the Corporation was established in 1956. He was promoted as Class I officer in September, 1962. The petitioner was served with a charge memo containing two charges on November 20, 1964. He filed a written statement to the charge memo on December 3, 1964, denying the charges. On December id, 1964, Sri S.T.V Chari, was appointed as Enquiry Officer. On January 12, 1965, the Divisional Manager framed an additional charge and an enquiry was conducted between January 18 to 24, 1965. On April 5, 1965, a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner to which the petitioner sent his reply on April 15, 1965. The Zonal Manager dismissed the petitioner by his order dated April 29, 1965, and an appeal to the Chairman was also rejected on December 3, 1965. Mr. Mohan Kumaramangalam, learned Counsel lor the petitioner, submitted that the proceedings of the Corporation are vitiated by the fact the principles of natural justice were not observed in the enquiry conducted against the petitioner. Secondly, he submitted that the authorities relied on a letter written by the Accounts Officer Natarajan as substantive evidence, without affording an opportunity to the petitioner to question about the letter relied on. Thirdly he submitted that the Enquiry Officer relied on a confessional statement made by steno Natarajan in an enquiry conducted against him without giving an opportunity to the petitioner to cross-examine the steno Natarajan. Mr. V.K Tniruvenkatachari, learned Counsel for the Life Insurance Corporation of India, took a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that an order of dismissal by the Life Insurance Corporation 01 India, is not liable to be interfered with in writ proceedings.
3. In order to appreciate the contentions of the Counsel, the mate rial facts may be set out. The Zonal Officer wrote a confidential letter to the Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India, Mathurai, enclosing C.R 7 and C.R 8 forms and also the proforma, for lapsed details. The Divisional Manager was asked to submit the particulars for deciding the question of confirmation of the petitioner as an Assistant Manager. The Divisional Manager was asked to send the report in a cover marked “Secret to be opened by the addressee only.” This letter was received at the office of the Divisional Manager. Contrary to the instructions, a letter was sent from the divisional office to the petitioner requiring the petitioner to furnish the details called for by the Zonal Officer. The petitioner came to Mathurai and collected the information from the branch office and sent the data sheets to the Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India, Mathurai. It was subsequently found that the figures furnished regarding the number of policies that lapsed, were not correct. By a letter dated June 30, 1964, the petitioner was asked to explain the difference in figures given by him and the figures that were reported by the branch office. The petitioner replied on July 5, 1964. He stated that on receipt of the letter from the divisional office on July 19, 1963, he went to the office of the Divisional Manager, Mathurai on July 25, 1963, and collected the information and furnished the figures that were given to him by the branch office to the Divisional Office and returned to Tirunelveli.
4. Three charges were framed against the petitioner which may be extracted in full:
1. That while you functioning as Assistant Branch Manager (Development), Tirunelveli called at Madurai Branch Unit No. 1 on July 25, 1963, to collect some information regarding your lapses and not finding the Branch Manager requested the Assistant in the Development section of the Branch to give the figures required and in doing this you have done so deliberately with a view to influence the Assistant of the Branch Office not to give the correct figures with regard to lapses but such figures which would be favourable to you and which will not be an impediment for securing your confirmation as Assistant Branch Manager (Development).
2. And you are also charged for acting in a high handed manner ignoring the usual procedure in regard to collection of data from the office through proper channel. ‘And thereby committed an act detrimental to the interests of the Corporation’.
3. That while you functioning as Assistant Branch Manager in 1963 connived with others to see that wrong information with regard to the lapses is given in the data sheet sent to the Zonal Office for considering your confirmation as Assistant Branch Manager (Development), and in doing so, you have committed a serious misconduct and acted in a way detrimental to the interests of the Corporation.
The Enquiry Officer acquitted the petitioner of the first charge, but found him guilty of charges 2 and 3. It is unnecessary to discuss the merits regarding charges 2 and 3, as the submission on behalf of the petitioner is that the principles of natural justice had not been observed by the Enquiry Officer. The procedure adopted in the enquiry is stated by the Enquiry Officer in his report. The Divisional Manager framed charges against Sri R. Natarajan, G. Ramanujam, the petitioner and one P.R Rajagopalan of Tirunelveli. An additional charge was also framed against them and the Divisional Manager was directed to enquire into the additional charge also. At the enquiry, the Corporation was represented by Sri S.R Iyer, Assistant Zonal Officer. Mr. Iyer, presented the case in respect of each charge-sheeted persons by reading a prepared statement. Copies of Written Statement were read out by Mr. Iyer. Exhibits were filed by him. The proceedings of the Enquiry Officer disclosed that the petitioner as well as the three other persons charged and Mr. S.R Iyer had signed every page of the evidence. The Enquiry Officer did not follow the normal procedure of examining the prosecution witnesses and allowing the petitioner or other persons to cross-examine those witnesses, followed by an opportunity to the petitioner to explain his case and examine defence witnesses. The Enquiry Officer Mr. M.R Iyer, questioned the petitioner and the other persons charged regarding the various allegations and recorded their answer. The enquiry was conducted on August 18 and 19, 1965, and is recorded in pages from 125 to 229 of the typed sets of documents filed by the Counsel, for the respondent.
5. The case for the Life Insurance Corporation of India against the petitioner is briefly as follows:
The petitioner came to Madurai and without seeing the officer, who wrote to him the demi official letter calling for the completed forms contacted the assistant, Thirumalai and collected the data and took them to the divisional office where the proforma figures were manipulated by the steno Natarajan for the purpose of giving lapsed figures to the advantage of the petitioner. It is admitted that the lapsed figures, which were subsequently found to be not correct, are in the handwriting of the steno Natarajan. The statement of the steno Natarajan in the enquiry conducted against him was that he erased totally all the entries in the columns (d)(i) and (d)(ii) of the proforma. Steno Natarajan also admitted that he did manipulate the lapsed figures. The Enquiry Officer was of the view that the Steno Natarajan would not have altered the figures except with a view to oblige the petitioner and that the petitioner could have been definitely aware of the revision of the figures by steno Natarajan. The steno Natarajan was not examined as a prosecution witness in the enquiry against the petitioner. The statement, which is relied on by the Enquiry Officer against the petitioner was made by steno Natarajan in the enquiry against steno Natarajan in which he made the confession. After the confession was made by steno Natarajan when the enquiry against the petitioner was recommended on January 24, 1965, the Enquiry Officer has recorded as follows:—
“Mr. Ramanujam, after your examination, which lasted till day before yesterday, I have been conducting an enquiry into the charges framed by the Divisional Manager against Mr. Natarajan and in the course of the enquiry yesterday, Shri Natarajan made a certain deposition. In the light of that deposition, I felt I should recall you for further examination in connection with the charges against you and it was for this reason that I telephoned to you yesterday, asking you to attend the enquiry today.”
6. A portion of steno Natarajan's confession in the enquiry against him was read out to the petitioner. After the statement was read out, the steno Natarajan was asked whether the petitioner was with him throughout. The steno Natarajan answered that the petitioner was with him when the incident of July 25, 1963, took place. Steno Natarajan further stated that the Assistant Divisional Manager, Subbiah, was also present till the end of this process which ended at 5 p.m on July 5, 1963. Then the Enquiry Officer, put the confessional statement of steno Natarajan to the petitioner and asked for his explanation. The Enquiry Officer stated to the petitioner that according to the steno Natarajan, the petitioner discussed the matter with the Assistant Divisional Manager, Subbiah, in his room and that steno Natarajan was sent for by the Assistant Divisional Manager, Subbiah, and the petitioner found that the lapsed figures were unfavourable to the petitioner and all these matters were discussed and at the instigation of Subbiah in the petitioner's presence, steno Natarajan was asked to correct the figures which he did. In reply, the petitioner, stated that he had deposed in detail previously and he did not want to add anything further. He reiterated that he came to the Branch Office and showed the letter and the proforma and the assistant furnished figures and he took the forms to the Divisional Office at about 4.00 p.m and met the Assistant Divisional Manager and according to his instructions, he handed over the proforma to steno Natarajan. The procedure in accepting the confessional statement of R. Natarajan made in the enquiry against him as substantive evidence in the enquiry against the petitioner is questioned. Further it is submitted that the petitioner was not given an opportunity to cross-examine the steno Natarajan. It is clear from the proceedings that steno Natarajan was present during the enquiry. But the petitioner was not asked whether he would like to cross-examine steno Natarajan. As already stated, the procedure of examining the prosecution witnesses, cross-examining them and giving an opportunity to the petitioner to adduce defence evidence was not followed. But the whole proceedings were conducted by the Enquiry Officer and Mr. Iyer putting questions to the various persons including the petitioner. It may be noted that according to the confession of steno Natarajan, Subbiah, Assistant Divisional Manager was present, and that it was decided that the figures should be altered to suit the requirements of the petitioner. In the enquiry report relating to the petitioner the presence of Subbiah is not mentioned at all. But in the report relating to steno Natarajan, the presence of Subbiah is not accepted.
7. Another circumstance, which is submitted as violative of the principles of natural justice, is the reliance by the Enquiry Officer on the statement of R. Natarajan, the Assistant Divisional Manager, Accountant in his letter dated February 15, 1965, that the statement of the petitioner that the Accountant asked him to see steno-Natarajan and hand over the forms to him for further attention is not correct. This denial was made by Natarajan or the accounts branch by his letter dated February 15, 1965, after the enquiry against the petitioner was closed. The petitioner had no opportunity to explain this circumstance against him.
8. The Supreme Court has laid down in State of Mysore v. Shivabasappa (1), that the Domestic Tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions are not Courts and therefore, they are not bound to follow the procedure prescribed for trial of actions in Court, nor are they bound by strict rules of evidence. They are at liberty to obtain all information material for the points from all sources, but should not act on any information which they may receive unless they put it to the party against whom it is to be used and give him a fair opportunity to explain it. What is the fair opportunity must depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. Generally the procedure followed is that the petitioner would have an opportunity to adduce all relevant evidence on which he relies, that the evidence of the opponent should be taken in his presence and that he should be given an opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses examined by that party, and that no materials should be relied on against him without his being given an opportunity of explaining them. The Supreme Court held that though normally the examination of the witness will in its entirety take place before the party charged who will have full opportunity of cross-examining him, the enquiry will not be vitiated if the statement given by the witness previously behind the back of the party is put to him and admitted in evidence and a copy thereof is given to the party and he is given an opportunity to cross-examine him. It was held that it was unnecessary that the witness should be made to repeat word by word, and sentence by sentence what all he stated previously. The requirement of natural justice would be fulfilled, if the petitioner is given an opportunity to explain the case against him, to adduce evidence in support of his case and to cross-examine the witness deposing against him. The view expressed by the Supreme Court cited supra has been reaffirmed in Kesoram Cotton Mills v. Gangadhar (2), and in Khardah and Co. v. Its Workmen (3), in dealing with an enquiry before the Industrial Tribunal. The Supreme Court after stating that the enquiry should be conducted in the manner stated in State of Mysore v. Shivabasappa (1), observed that the minimum that is expected where witnesses are not examined from the very beginning at the inquiry in the presence of the person charged is that the person charged should be given a copy of the statements made by the witnesses which are to be used at the inquiry well in advance before the inquiry begins. In Khardah and Co. v. Its Workmen (3), the Supreme Court dealing with the case of workmen under the Industrial Disputes Act expressed its opinion that it is desirable that all witnesses on whose testimony the management relies in support of its charge against the workmen should be examined in his presence. The decisions in Kesoram Cotton Mills v. Gangadhar (2), and Khardah and Co. v. Its Workmen (3), were rendered with regard to the disputes under the Industrial Disputes Act. In the case of domestic enquiry by an institution like the Life Insurance Corporation of India, the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Mysore v. Shivabasappa (1), would be applicable and the principles of natural justice could be said to have been observed, if the petitioner was given an opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses examined by the opposite side and an opportunity to examine his own witnesses and to explain the case against him.
9. It has to be determined whether on the facts of the case, a fair opportunity was given to the petitioner. The material on which the petitioner is found guilty, is the confessional statement made by the steno-Natarajan and the denial by the accounts Natarajan. So far as the confessional statement of steno-Natarajan is concerned, though the confessional statement made by the steno-Natarajan was put to the petitioner, it is not tested by cross-examination. The entire proceedings were conducted by the Enquiry Officer and the petitioner as well as others were only answering the questions put to them and the petitioner was not made aware that he would be entitled to cross-examine steno-Natarajan on the confession he had made and on which the Life Insurance Corporation of India wants to rely for proving the charges. It may also be noted that steno-Natarajan has mentioned about the presence of Subbiah during the transaction and no reference is made about the presence of accounts Natarajan in the Enquiry Officer's report. In the circumstances I am not satisfied that a reasonable opportunity was given to the petitioner to cross-examine the steno-Natarajan on the material on which reliance is placed upon by the Corporation. Further, the Corporation has undoubtedly relied on the denial of the accounts Natarajan that he did not tell the petitioner to see steno-Natarajan and hand over the forms to him for further attention. On the basis of this denial, the statement of the petitioner is rejected. This denial was obtained only after the enquiry was completed and reliance should not have been placed on this denial without giving an opportunity to the petitioner to explain it. On a consideration of the facts of the case, I am not satisfied that the petitioner was given a reasonable opportunity to defend all the charges framed against him. I must also record that the Enquiry Officer conducted the enquiry without any prejudice and was anxious to give a fair opportunity to the petitioner to explain the case against him. But by observing the procedure which he did, he had unwittingly denied the petitioner a fair opportunity to defend himself.
10. The order of dismissal is therefore, set aside. The Life Insurance Corporation is at liberty to frame fresh charges and conduct a fresh enquiry against the petitioner.
11. The preliminary objection raised by Mr. V.K Thiruvenkatachari that a proceeding by way of writ petition is not available against an order of dismissal passed by a body like the Life Insurance Corporation of India may also be considered. He referred to Halsbury's Laws of England, Third Edition, Vol. 25, page 519, para. 991 and submitted that the dismissal of a servent even if it is otherwise than in accordance with the procedure in his contract of service is in effect termination of contract and the servant cannot claim that the contract had not been validly terminated and his remedy is only by way of damages. He also referred to two English decisions reported in Francis v. Municipal Councillors (4), and Vidyodaya University of Ceylon v. Silva (5). In Francis v. Municipal Councillors (), the Privy Council held that a declaration to the effect that the contract of service still subsisted would rarely be made and would not be made in the absence of special circumstance because of the principle that the Courts would not grant specific performance of contracts of service. The Court distinguished the case of a Vine v. National Dock Labour Board (6), on the ground that the circumstance in Vine's case () was very special where the dismissal was shown to have been without proper authority and the labourer should have the benefit of the declaration that he was still in the employment of the National Dock Board. In Vidyodaya University of Ceylon v. Silva (), the Privy Council held that the contract of employment made by the University with the teachers did not involve more than ordinary contract between the master and the servant and that the procedure by a writ of certiorari was not available. The English decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for the respondents would not advance his contention for the Supreme Court as well as the Madras High Court have uniformly held that a writ would be available against breach of any of the statutory provisions by a public body. The only case of Indian High Courts, which is in favour of the respondents, is Ram Babu v. Divisional Manager, L.I.C (7). The Court held that an employee of the Life Insurance Corporation could not maintain a writ of certiorari, a relationship between the employee and the Corporation was one of master and servant and the general law of master and servant applies to the case. This decision cannot be held to be good law in view of the subsequent pronouncement of the Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Babu Ram (8). It has been held that the rules made under a statute must be treated for all purposes of construction or obligation exactly as if they were in the Act, and are to be judicially noticed for all purposes of construction or obligation. In Life Insurance Corporation v. Sunil Kumar Mukherjee (9), the Supreme Court dealing with the case of Life Insurance Corporation of India held that where the services of such employees were terminated on the ground that their performance was found poor by the committee specially appointed for the purpose without any enquiry or without giving any opportunity to the concerned employee, the orders must be held invalid.
12. The Madras High Court in T.C.M Pillay v. Indian Institute of Technology (10), has held that the dismissal of an Assistant Professor of Metallurgy in the Indian Institute of Technology without observing the mandatory procedure prescribed under the statute would be a nullity and liable to be interfered with in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In V. Ramiah v. State Bank Of India (11), the Court has held that an order of dismissal by the State Bank is liable to be interfered in writ proceedings. This Court has held that a writ is available against the Acts of Life Insurance Corporation in Narayanaswamy Naidu v. Krishnamurthy (12) in Writ Petition No. 53 of 1959. Recently the Supreme Court has laid down that the Courts can interfere with the orders of dismissal by the Road Transport Corporation in Mafatlal Barot v. Divisional Controller, State Transport, Mehsana (13), and in D.L Board, Calcutta v. Jaffar Inam (14). In the face of the over-whelming authorities the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondent that the dismissal of the petitioner by the Life Insurance Corporation is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court, will have to be rejected.
13. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. The Life Insurance Corporation of India is at liberty to frame fresh charges and conduct an enquiry and proceed according to law. There will be no order as to costs.
14. Writ Petition allowed.
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