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A. Arpudaswami Chettiar v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Nagapattinam

Madras High Court
Jul 27, 1967
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Summary of Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

These writ petitions were heard together because they involved a common question. They challenge re-assessments made on the petitioner under the Central Sales Tax Act in respect of turnovers for several years (the opinion lists the years for which assessments are in dispute). Initially, for four of the years in question the assessing authority (the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer at Nagapattinam) assessed the disputed turnovers as local sales under the Madras General Sales Tax Act by assessment orders dated 15 January 1961, 15 July 1961, 19 December 1962 and 3 December 1963.

The petitioner is a candle merchant who supplied candles to customers both inside Madras State and outside. The turnovers in dispute represented sales to purchasers outside Madras State; the petitioner himself dispatched goods by lorries and trains, with the railway/lorry receipts showing the petitioner as consignor and the buyer as consignee. For the year 1963-64, the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer concluded that sales of the same description amounted to inter-State sales within the meaning of Section 3 of the Central Sales Tax Act and assessed the turnover under the Central Sales Tax Act.

Subsequently, relying upon Rule 5(7) of the Central Sales Tax (Madras) Rules (which allows the assessing authority, within five years, to determine and assess turnover that has escaped assessment "if for any reason" it has escaped), the officer issued a notice on 9 June 1964 and after hearing representations re-assessed the earlier corresponding turnovers (previously assessed under the Madras General Sales Tax Act) to Central Sales Tax by an assessment dated 23 November 1964. The petitioner filed these writ petitions challenging those re-assessments.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the assessing authority had jurisdiction under Rule 5(7) of the Central Sales Tax (Madras) Rules to re-open and re-assess turnovers previously assessed as local sales under the Madras General Sales Tax Act.
  2. Whether a reassessment under Rule 5(7) can be made where the earlier assessment reflected a concluded view (i.e., whether a mere change of opinion by a later officer can justify re-opening under the "escape" concept).
  3. Whether Rule 5(7) is ultra vires (invalid as beyond the rule-making power) and, if so, whether re-assessment can nevertheless be sustained under other statutory provisions (notably Section 9(3) of the Central Sales Tax Act read with powers under the Madras General Sales Tax Act).
  4. Whether the petitioner was required to pursue remedies before the statutory appellate tribunals instead of invoking the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (Sri Parasaran)

  • The Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, in making the re-assessments, was effectively sitting in appeal over the earlier assessments, altering a prior assessing officer's view rather than correcting an instance of turnover having genuinely "escaped" assessment.
  • The earlier Deputy Commercial Tax Officer who assessed under the Madras Act must be presumed to have been aware of the Central Sales Tax provisions, and the turnovers were before the earlier officer; thus the situation is one of a change of opinion not a case of escaped turnover.
  • Analogy was drawn to Section 34(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act (which requires "information in his possession" for reassessment in certain cases) to argue that reassessment should be limited and should not permit mere correction of an earlier erroneous view by reassessment powers.
  • Reliance was placed on authorities (including the Full Bench decision in State of Madras v. Louis Dreyfus & Co. Ltd. and income-tax cases) which, it was argued, demonstrate that re-opening is available where turnover was not noticed due to inadvertence, omission, concealment or lack of care — not simply because a later officer thinks the earlier decision wrong.
  • It was contended that, because the petitioner would have been unable properly to argue the vires of Rule 5(7) or jurisdiction issues before the statutory tribunals, he was entitled to invoke the High Court's writ jurisdiction under Article 226.

Respondent's Arguments (Assessing Authority / State)

  • Rule 5(7) uses the wide words "if for any reason" and so is broader in scope than provisions like Section 34(1) of the Income-tax Act; it permits reassessment where the assessing authority concludes, for any reason, that turnover escaped assessment.
  • Subsequent authoritative decisions (notably the Supreme Court in Maharajadhiraj Sir Kameshwar Singh v. State of Bihar) interpreted a comparable statutory clause ("any reason") to allow reassessment even where an earlier officer had taken a different view, and this supports jurisdiction under Rule 5(7).
  • Even where Rule 5(7) might be struck down as ultra vires, prior decisions (including Haji J. A. Kareem Sait) held that reassessments could still be sustained on the basis of Section 9(3) of the Central Sales Tax Act read with the Madras Act's powers (e.g., Section 16(1)).
  • The State argued that the petitioner should have pursued statutory appeals, but the Court was invited to accept that the petitioner could raise jurisdictional and vires questions before the High Court by way of writ petition.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in this Opinion
State of Madras v. Louis Dreyfus & Company Limited (1955) 6 S.T.C. 318 Defined "escape" under Rule 17(1) of the Madras General Sales Tax Rules: 'escape' refers to turnover not noticed by the officer because of inadvertence, omission, deliberate concealment or want of care. The Court cited the Full Bench's definition to explain the narrower meaning of "escape" in that context and to contrast it with the wider expression "for any reason" in Rule 5(7); but did not treat Louis Dreyfus as preventing reassessment under the broader Rule 5(7).
N. Naganatha Iyer v. Commissioner of Income Tax ((1965) 2 I.T.J. 326; (1965) 2 M.L.J. 242; 60 I.T.R. 647) Under Section 34 of the Income-tax Act, when a return had been filed but no assessment made, it could not be held that income had escaped assessment so as to justify action under Section 34. Cited to show limits on reassessment under Section 34 and by analogy to illustrate the narrower footing of Section 34 compared with Rule 5(7); used to distinguish reassessment under the Sales Tax provision.
Sankaralinga Nadar v. Commissioner of Income-tax (I.L.R. (1963) Mad. 214; 48 I.T.R. 314) Held that reassessment under Section 34 cannot be based on a mere change of opinion by the reassessing officer; however, reassessment is permissible where there was lack of vigilance, inadvertence or negligence by the Income-tax Officer, provided requirements of Section 34(1)(b) are satisfied. Relied upon to emphasize that mere change of opinion is not enough under Section 34; the Court used this to distinguish the Income-tax regime from the sales tax provision and to frame the petitioner's argument.
Maharaj Kumar Kamal Singh v. Commissioner of Income Tax (Supreme Court) Held (inter alia) that "information" in Section 34(1)(b) includes information as to the true state of law (including judicial decisions), and that "escape" is not confined to lack of a return; a subsequent authoritative decision can be "information" justifying reassessment. Discussed as an important landmark under Section 34; petitioner relied on limitations in Section 34 (arguing no new information or change of law occurred), while the Court considered the case in contrasting the narrower Section 34 approach with the broader language of Rule 5(7).
Maharajadhiraj Sir Kameshwar Singh v. State of Bihar (Supreme Court) Interpreted a statutory clause using "if for any reason" (in Section 26 of the Bihar Agricultural Income-tax Act) as of wide import, dispensing with the narrower conditions applicable under Section 34 of the Income-tax Act; held reassessment competent even where earlier assessment thought income exempt. The Court relied on this Supreme Court decision as directly in point and as authoritative support for the wide scope of a provision framed "for any reason", concluding that a comparable attitude should apply to Rule 5(7) (and thus that reassessment was within power).
The Deputy Commissioner (C.T.), Coimbatore v. V.D. Srinivasa Iyer (T.C. N.35 of 1962) (unreported; Bench of this Court) Applied Maharajadhiraj and held that the Joint Commercial Tax Officer had jurisdiction under the Madras General Sales Tax Act to revise his own order and re-fix turnover at an enhanced amount under Section 16(1), which is in pari materia with Rule 5(7). Used as a supporting local authority showing that revisional/reassessing power exists under the Madras Act and is comparable to the power asserted under Rule 5(7); supported the conclusion that the Deputy had jurisdiction to reassess.
Haji J. A. Kareem Sait v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer (1966) 18 S.T.C. 370 Held that Rule 5(7) of the Central Sales Tax (Madras) Rules was ultra vires; however, the re-assessment complained of could be sustained on the basis of Section 9(3) of the Central Sales Tax Act read with Section 16(1) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act. The Court relied on the reasoning in Kareem Sait to observe that, even if Rule 5(7) were invalid, reassessment could still be maintained under Section 9(3) read with Madras Act powers; this reinforced the conclusion that re-assessment stood on statutory powers beyond Rule 5(7).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by distinguishing the differing statutory formulations and prior case-law governing reassessment. It emphasised a key textual distinction between Section 34(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act and Rule 5(7) of the Central Sales Tax (Madras) Rules: Section 34(1) is conditioned on the assessing officer having "information" in his possession leading to the belief that income escaped assessment and thus is relatively narrow, whereas Rule 5(7) uses the wider phrase "if for any reason", and therefore permits reassessment whenever the assessing authority, for any reason, concludes turnover escaped assessment within the five-year period.

The Court reviewed authorities relied upon by both sides. It acknowledged the Full Bench of this Court in State of Madras v. Louis Dreyfus, which defined "escape" in the Madras Rule 17(1) context as turnover not noticed due to inadvertence, omission, concealment or want of care. That decision was used to demonstrate that some reassessment provisions have a narrower meaning of "escape". But the Court observed that the language of Rule 5(7) (and closely similar statutory provisions) is materially broader.

The Court placed particular weight on the Supreme Court's decision in Maharajadhiraj Sir Kameshwar Singh v. State of Bihar, which construed a statutory clause framed "for any reason" (in the Bihar Agricultural Income-tax Act) to be of wide import and to permit reassessment even though an earlier assessment had treated the item as exempt. The judgment of Hidayatullah, J., was cited as directly dispelling the narrower limitations that apply under Section 34 of the Income-tax Act.

The Court also noted an unreported Bench decision of this Court (Deputy Commissioner (C.T.), Coimbatore v. V.D. Srinivasa Iyer) which, relying on Maharajadhiraj, held that the Joint Commercial Tax Officer could revise his earlier order under the Madras General Sales Tax Act (Section 16(1)). The opinion further observed that in Haji J. A. Kareem Sait Rule 5(7) was struck down as ultra vires, but the reassessment in that case could nevertheless be sustained under Section 9(3) of the Central Sales Tax Act read with powers under the Madras Act (including Section 16(1)).

Applying these authorities, the Court concluded that the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer in the present cases did have jurisdiction to re-assess turnovers earlier assessed under the Madras General Sales Tax Act on the ground that, on a correct view of the relevant provisions, they were assessable under the Central Sales Tax Act. The Court also accepted the petitioner's submission that he was entitled to approach the High Court under Article 226 to challenge jurisdictional and vires points rather than being confined to statutory appeals, but nonetheless found that the cited decisions supported the validity of the reassessments and therefore no relief could be granted.

Finally, recognising a practical hardship, the Court remarked on the petitioner's apprehension that amounts already collected under the Madras General Sales Tax Act (at a lower rate) might not be appropriately credited against the new demand under the Central Sales Tax Act (at a higher rate). The Court considered the Department's assurance about "suitable revision" to be vague and recommended that assessing authorities should give credit for amounts already collected (or otherwise adjust/credit double payments) so the assessee is not compelled to pay twice.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petitions are DISMISSED. The Court held that the assessing authority had jurisdiction to re-assess the previously assessed turnovers under the Central Sales Tax Act (relying on the wide language "for any reason" as interpreted in the cited authorities and on related statutory provisions such as Section 9(3) read with Section 16(1) of the Madras Act).

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the reassessments made by the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer (the assessment dated 23 November 1964 and the notice of 9 June 1964) stand and the petitioner is not entitled to have those re-assessments quashed in these writ petitions.
  • The Court accepted that the petitioner could properly invoke Article 226 to raise jurisdictional and vires grounds, but on the merits the existing precedents were held to support the assessing authority's power to reassess.
  • The Court expressed procedural guidance (not a formal order) urging assessing authorities to give credit for any amounts already collected under the Madras General Sales Tax Act when demanding additional amounts under the Central Sales Tax Act, or otherwise to make suitable adjustment so that the assessee is not compelled to pay twice; the Court observed the Department's affidavit assurance was vague and that practical adjustment/credit should be made.

No order as to costs was made.

Show all summary ...

1. These Writ Petitions involve a common question for consideration and therefore they are heard together. They relate to assessments made on the Petitioner under the Central Sales Tax Act respectively for 1959-60, 1960-61 1961-62 and 1962 62 and 1062-63 It is not necessary to mention the figures of turnover for the purpose of these writ petitions. What is important to be noticed is that for the several years mentioned above and in respect of the items of turnover now in dispute, the assessing authority made assessments on the footing that they were local sales assessable under the Madras General Sales Tax Act. The relevant assessment orders for four years mentioned under the Madras Sales Tax Act were passed on 15th January 1961 15th July, 1961, 19th December, 1962 and 3rd December, 1963. The assessee is a candle merchant and he supplies candles to churches and other institutions both in Madras State and outside. Regarding the turnovers in dispute the factual position was that they represented sales of candles to purchasers outside the Madras State and despatched by the petitioner himself through lorries and trains. In the railway receipt or the lorry receipt the assessee noted his name as the consignor and the buyer's name as consignee. The Sales Tax Department in the orders mentioned above concluded that the transactions were sales 'completed in Madras State and assessed them under the Madras General Sales Tax Act of 1959. The officer who made these assessments was the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer at Nagapattinam. But when it came to the corresponding turnover in 1963-64, the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer was of the opinion that sales of the same description should have been really assessed under the Central Sales Tax Act because the transactions occasioned the movement of the goods from one State to another thereby attracting the definition of sales in the course of inter-State trade or commerce given in Section 3 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. Not merely did he make the assessment thus under the Central Sales Tax Act on the corresponding turnover for 1963-64 but he also felt called upon to re-assess the corresponding turnovers already assessed as stated above under the Madras General Sales Tax Act for the four years above-mentioned and issued on 9th June, 1964, a notice to the assessee relying upon Rule 5 (7) of the Central Sales Tax (Madras) Rules, which is in the following terms:

If for any reason, the whole or any part of the turnover of business of a dealer has escaped assessment to tax in any year, the assessing authority may, at any time within five years next succeeding that to which the tax relates, determine to the best of his judgment the turnover which has escaped assessment and assess the tax payable on such turnover after issuing a notice to the dealer and after making such enquiries as he considers necessary.

After hearing the representations of the assessee, he decided that in so far as the turnovers above mentioned were not assessed to Central Sales Tax, but only to the local sales tax of the Madras State, there was an escape of assessment within the meaning of the above rule and therefore he re-assessed them to Central Sales Tax by assessment made on 23rd November, 1964. The petitioner has filed these Writ Petitions challenging the above mentioned re-assessments.

2. The argument initially urged by Sri Parasaran, who appears for the petitioner, is that the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer in making the re-assessments was really sitting in appeal over the assessments made earlier by the then Deputy Commercial Tax Officer. The Deputy Commercial Tax Officer who made the assessment on the earlier occasion under the Madras General Sales Tax Act must be presumed to have been fully aware of the relevant provisions of the Central Sales Tax Act which were in force at the time also. In fact it is urged that in the year that preceded the present set of four years, viz., 1958-59, with regard to the return of the corresponding turnover representing sales outside the Madras State, the assessment officer held that they were local sales and completed the assessment accordingly and that assessment became final. It is urged by the learned Counsel, that the jurisdiction under Rule 5 (7) to make an assessment of escaped turnover does not involve the exercise of what is plainly an appellate jurisdiction, involving the correction of erroneous decisions by assessing authorities on prior occasions, which should be properly the function of the higher appellate authorities who have been provided by the Act itself for that purpose. He referred in this connection to decisions under the provision of Section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act of 1922. Section 34 (1) is in the following terms:

3. Section 34 (1):

If-

(a) the Income-tax Officer has reason to believe that by reason of the omission or failure on the part of an assessee to make a return of his income under Section 22 for any year or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year, income, profits or gains chargeable to income-tax have escaped assessment for that year, or have been under-assessed or assessed at too low a rate , or have been made the subject of excessive relief under the Act, or excessive loss or depreciation allowance has been computed, or

(b) notwithstanding that there has been no omission or failure as mentioned in Clause (a) on the part of the assessee, the Income-tax Officer has in consequence of information in his possession reason to believe that income, profits or gains chargeable to income-tax have escaped assessment for any year, or have been under-assessed, or assessed at too low a rate, or have been made the subject of excessive relief under this Act, or that excessive loss or depreciation allowance has been computed, he may in cases falling under Clause (a) at any time and in cases falling under Clause (b) any time within four years of the end of that year, serve on the assessee, or if the assessee is a company, on the principal officer thereof, a notice containing all or any of the requirements which may be included in a notice under Sub-section (2) of Section 22 and may proceed to assess or reassess such income, profits or gains or recompute the loss or depreciation allowance; and the provisions of this Act shall, so far as may be, apply accordingly as if the notice were a notice issued under that sub-section.

But one crucial point of distinction between Section 34 (1) of the Indian Income-tax Act and Rule 5 (7) of the Central Sales Tax Rules extracted above may be straightaway mentioned at this stage. Section 34 (1) refers to definite information which has come into possession of the Income-tax Officer leading to a discovery of escape of assessment; but Rule 5 (7) is wider in scope and uses the words " if for any reason ". A provision similar to that found in Rule 5 (7) was also found in Rule 17 of the Rules framed under the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939, and this rule was later on incorporated in the body of the Act itself as Section 16 when the Madras General Sales Tax Act was amended in 1959. Therefore it is clear that the Sales Tax Act deals with a situation where the authority empowered to assess escaped turnover can exercise that power " for any reason " which leads him to the conclusion of turnover having escaped assessment, whereas Section 34 (1) narrows down the situation to the extent that it refers to information reaching possession of the Income-tax Officer after the earlier assessment and leading to the discovery of escaped assessment. I will briefly refer to the decisions cited in this connection at the Bar.

4. The decision of a Full Bench of this Court in State of Madras v. Louis Dreyfus & Company Limited (1955)6 S.T.C. 318 held the field for a long time. That decision was given in connection with Rule 17 of the Madras General Sales Tax Rules, 1939, and it defined " escape " for the purpose of this rule, in the following terms:

The ' escape ' that serves as the foundation of the jurisdiction to re-open an assessment is that of' turnover ' and not be it noted, an assessment. ' Turnover ' escapes when it is not noticed by the officer either because it is not before him by reason of an inadvertence, omission or deliberate concealment on the part of the assessee, or because of want of care on the part of the officer, the turnover though in the books has not been taken notice of. This would be the natural and normal meaning of the expression ' turnover ' 'which has escaped ' in Rule 17 (1).

There is no real analogy between Rule 17 (1) of the Madras General Sale's Tax Rules, 1939, and the provisions of Section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.

Relying upon these observations learned Counsel contended that the turnover now assessed was before the assessing officer on the earlier occasion, that he took it into account, but decided according to the best of his reasoning, that it should be assessed only under the Madras Act; but what we have here is an alteration of opinion by a subsequent Deputy Commercial Tax Officer leading to a re-assessment and not any of the situations mentioned in the Full Bench decision, such as failure to notice the turn over in question by reason of inadvertence, deliberate concealment, or want of care, etc.

5. In N. Naganatha Iyer v. Commissioner of Income tax (1965) 2 I.T.J. 326; (1965) 2 M.L.J. 242 : 60 I.T.R. 647, a Bench of this Court dealing with assessment to income-tax under Section 34 observed that when a return had been filed but no assessment had been made, it could not be said that income escaped assessment so as to justify action under Section 34.

6. In Sankaralinga Nadar v. Commissioner of Income-tax I.L.R. (1963) Mad. 214 : 48 I.T.R. 314, again a case which arose under Section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act, a Bench of this Court held that an action under Section 34 of the Act cannot be justified on the ground of a mere change of opinion regarding the chargeability of income on the part of the reassessing officer different from his own previous opinion or from that of his predecessor-in office. But the Court qualified the remark by saying that income which escapes assessment as a result of the lack of vigilance of the Income-tax Officer or due to inadvertence or negligence or to the perfunctory performance of his duties without due care and caution can well be within the ambit of Section 34 (1) (b) provided the requirements of that section are satisfied.

7. The decision in Maharaj Kumar Kamal Singh v. Commissioner of Income tax is an important land-mark in the case law under Section 34, wherein the Judges of the Supreme Court laid down certain important principles for applying Section 34. They held:

(i) that the word ' information ' in Section 34 (1) (b) included information as to the true and correct state of the law, and so would cover information as to the relevant judicial decisions;

(ii) that ' escape' in Section 34 (1) (b) was not confined to cases where no return had been submitted by the assessee or where income had not been assessed owing to inadvertence or oversight or other lucuna attributable to the assessing ¦authorities; even in a case where a return had been submitted, if the Income-tax Officer had erroneously failed to tax a part of the assessable income, it was a case where that part of the income had escaped assessment;

(iii) that, therefore, the decision of the Privy Council was ' information ' within the meaning of Section 34 (1) (b) and that the decision justified the belief of the Income-tax Officer that part of the appellant's income had escaped assessment for the relevant year.

In that case at the time of the original assessment an item of income was excluded from the scope of income-tax assessment because the law laid down by the Patna High Court treated such income as agricultural income, but subsequently the Privy Council reversed that decision holding that such an income was not agricultural income. Thereupon the Income-tax Officer initiated re-assessment proceedings and the Supreme Court held that the correct view of the law as laid down subsequently by the Privy Council should be treated as ' information ' giving jurisdiction to re-assess under Section 34 (1) (b). It was urged by the learned Counsel Sri Parasaran that the present is not a case where the law had altered, and one earlier authoritative view of the law had been replaced by another view. What has happened is that the subsequent assessment officer considered that the view taken by his predecessors-in-office was wrong without any fresh information or without any fresh authoritative decision of a Court of law about the correct position of the law. He contended that this point was left open by the Supreme Court in the concluding portion of their judgment in the repot above mentioned. He therefore urged that, in this state of the law, it cannot be held that the assessing officer in the present case acted properly within the jurisdiction conferred under Rule 5 (7) to assess the escaped turnover.

8. But the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent-assessing authority urges that whatever may be the view in regard to Section 34 (1) of the Income-tax Act, there cannot be any more doubt at the present moment, in regard to the interpretation of a provision like the one found in Rule 5 (7), in view of a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court as well as a decision of this Court. In Maharajadhiraj Sir Kameshwar Singh v. State of Bihar the Supreme Court had to consider Section 26 of the Bihar Agricultural Income-tax Act which contains a clause " if for any reason any agricultural income....has escaped assessment for any financial year or " etc., etc., and therefore in pan materia with the clause in Rule 5 (7) . In that case an earlier assessment under the Agricultural Income-tax Act had been made and confirmed. Later on the same Agricultural Income-tax Officer re-interpreted the terms of a lease deed relied upon on the earlier occasion and came to the conclusion that the rent under that lease deed ought to have been assessed as income of the assessee and to that extent it had escaped assessment on the earlier occasion and reassessed it under Section 26. When the attention of Hidayatullah, J., who delivered the judgment of the Supreme Court, was drawn to the issue which was left open in the earlier Supreme Court decision cited above, he observed at page 394:

The use of the words ' any reason ' which are of wide import dispenses with those conditions by which Section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act is circumscribed. The point which was thus left over by Gajendragadkar, J., cannot arise in the context of the Act we are dealing with.

9. The Supreme Court concluded that

" the Agricultural Income-tax Officer was competent under Section 25 of the Act to assess as item of income which he had omitted to tax earlier, even though in the return that income was included and the Agricultural Income-tax Officer then thought that it was exempt."

10. In an unreported decision of a Bench of this Court in The Deputy Commissioner (C.T.), Coimbatore V.D. Srinivasa Iyer T.C. N . 35 of 1962, Venkatadri, J., who delivered the judgment of the Bench relied upon Maharajadhiraj Sir Kameshwar Singh v. State of Bihar and held that Joint Commercial Tax Officer had jurisdiction under the Madras General Sales Tax Act, to revise his own original order and by a subsequent order refix the turnover at an enhanced amount and assess the tax on the revised turnover, relying for that purpose on Section 16(1) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959, which, as observed earlier, is in pari materia, with Rule 5 (7) of the Central Sales Tax Rules. In view of these authoritative statements on the interpretation to be given to the terms of Rule 5 (7) of the Central Sales Tax Rules as well as Section 16 (1) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959, it will not be proper to hold that the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer in this case had no jurisdiction to re-assess the earlier assessment which had been made under the Madras General Sales Tax Act, on the ground that the earlier assessment did not properly interpret the provisions of the General Sales Tax Act the inter-State sales, and that on the correct view of the relevant provisions, the turnover should have been assessed only under the Central Sales Tax Act and not under the Madras General Sales Tax Act. I may incidentally observe that there was no attack at the time of the hearing about the correctness of the legal position about the accessibility of the turnover in question under the Central Sales Tax Act.

11. The next argument that was urged by Sri Parasaran was that Veeraswami, J., delivering the judgment of a Bench of this Court in Haji J. A. Kareem Salt v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer (1966) 18 S.T.C. 370 struck down Rule 5 (7) of the Central Sales Tax (Madras) Rules as being ultra vires the rule making authority and that will be a ground for quashing the assessment in the present case also. But it has to be borne in mind that in Haji J.A. Kareem Sait v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer (1966) 18 S.T.C. 370 what was attacked was the Validity of the assessment under Rule 5 (7) made by the assessing authority, just as the petitioner had done in the present case, by means of a writ petition. However, the Bench held that even though the re-assessment could not be sustained under Rule 5 (7) as that rule was ultra vires, the Revenue could maintain and support the re-assessment on the ground that Section 9 (3) of the Central Sales Tax Act would confer on the assessing authority power to assess turnovers under the Central Sales Tax Act and for that purpose he could exercise all the powers under the Madras General Sales Tax Act. Such powers would include the power under Section 16 (1) to re-assess escaped turnovers. Therefore the Bench held that even after Rule 5 (7) is struck down as ultra vires, there will be no room to quash the re-assessment, because in any event Section 9 (3) of the Central Sales Tax Act, read with Section 16 (1) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act would confer jurisdiction to re-assess, the turnover which had escaped.

12. There was an argument by the learned Counsel for the respondent. State that the petitioner ought not to have approached this Court for remedy by way of writ proceedings when he had before him, the remedy by way of appeal to the hierarchy of Tribunals under the General Sale Tax Act. As against this, the petitioner's Counsel urged that he had an argument to put forward regarding the jurisdiction of the authority to assess the turnovers as escaped turnovers, that in any event he had an argument to put forward about the vires of Rule 5 (7), that these contentions he could not urge before the Tribunals constituted under the Act itself, and that this circumstance would give him a right to invoke the powers of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. I am inclined to accept this argument and hold that, on the pleas put forward, the petitioner was entitled to approach this Court, for remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution. But, in view of the considerations set out earlier, no relief can be afforded in these writ petitions because the decisions above cited clearly give jurisdiction to the assessing authority for re-assessing the escaped turnovers in this case.

13. The petitions are dismissed.

14. Before parting with the cases, I will refer to a representation made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner with, in my opinion, a great deal of justification, that this is an unfortunate case where the assessee who had been made to pay assessment on the concerned turnover under the Madras General Sales Tax Act at a lower rate, is being re-assessed on the same turnover under the Central Sales Tax Act at a higher rate, but without any assurance being given to him of the necessary refund where there had been excess realisations, or adjustment as the case may be. In counter affidavit of the Department in these writ petitions, there is an averment for the purpose of meeting this complaint, that the assessment under the Madras General Sales Tax Act in respect of the turnover involved in these years will be " revised " by the appropriate authority suitably after the present assessment proceedings are finalised. It is not clear to me what is meant by the statement about ' suitable revision '. It is a vague statement, and the petitioner feels apprehension about his relief. It will be much better for the assessing authorities to give credit to the amounts collected from the assessee under the assessment made under the Madras General Sales Tax Act when making a demand for the assessment at the higher rate levied under the Central Sales Tax Act so that the assessee is not compelled to pay over any part of the sum twice. But if he had already paid any amount twice over the simplest way is to give credit to what has already been paid twice over and collect only the balance and make the necessary adjustment between the amounts due to be collected under the Central Sales Tax Act and the Madras General Sales Tax Act under the appropriate heads of account.

No order as to costs.