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Alok Nigam v. Union Of India & Ors.
Structured Summary of the Full Bench Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This Full Bench reference arose because there was a difference of opinion between the then Chief Justice and Hon'ble Shri Justice Dilip Raosaheb Deshmukh concerning the maintainability of three writ petitions filed as public interest litigation (PIL). The specific question referred for the Full Bench's consideration was whether, in view of the Supreme Court's order in T.N. Godavarman Thirimulpad v. Union of India dated 10th April 2006 (AIR 2006 SC 1774), the writ petitions should be dismissed in limine without going into their merits.
Background facts (in nutshell) that led to the petitions: Maruti Clean Coal and Power Ltd. applied for and obtained an allocation/lease of approximately 37.91 acres of land in Korba, Chhattisgarh, for a coal washery (lease deed dated 7-12-2002). Multiple writ petitions were filed as PILs challenging the allotment/lease primarily on the ground that the land was forest land and that the State lacked competence to lease it without Central Government permission; other grounds included alleged procedural impropriety and that the land belonged to South Eastern Coal Fields Limited (S.E.C.L.). The writ petitions relevant to this reference include W.P. No. 1264/2003 (filed by Dr. B.L. Wadehra), W.P. No. 1382/2003 (filed by Sanjay Srivastava and Surendra Sahu), and W.P. No. 4147/2003 (filed by five organizations including Bhartiya Koyal Khadan Mazdoor Sangh).
An intervening application by Deepak Agarwal in the Supreme Court matter Writ Petition (C) No. 202 of 1995 (the Godavarman forest matter) was disposed of by the Supreme Court on 10th April 2006, the Court holding inter alia that "even on facts we find no substance in the plea that the land allotted to Maruti is forest land" and strongly criticizing Deepak Agarwal's I.A. as being mala fide and a name-lender.
A Division Bench of the High Court (then Chief Justice and Justice D.R. Deshmukh) heard final arguments and delivered separate orders on 19th December 2006: Justice D.R. Deshmukh declined to go into merits, treating petitioners' bona fides as doubtful in light of the Supreme Court order; the then Chief Justice reached the opposite conclusion and allowed the petitions, quashing the state's allotment with costs. Because of this difference of opinion the reference to the Full Bench was made.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, in view of the Supreme Court's order in T.N. Godavarman Thirimulpad v. Union of India dated 10th April 2006 (AIR 2006 SC 1774), the three writ petitions before the High Court are liable to be dismissed in limine without going into the merits of the cases.
Arguments of the Parties
Arguments for limiting the Full Bench to the reference (counsel for petitioners raising scope issues)
- Shri M.L. Verma and Shri A.K. Sinha argued that the Full Bench was required to answer only the specific question of maintainability in light of the Apex Court judgment dated 10th April 2006 and could not go into the merits of the cases.
- They contended that when a reference is particular and specific, the Full Bench must confine itself to that issue. The Court recorded agreement with this procedural point and relied on a Supreme Court authority to that effect.
Arguments challenging factual statements and contending Supreme Court did not discredit these petitioners
- Shri Vivek Tankha, Shri M.L. Verma and Shri A.K. Sinha argued that the Division Bench's order of 19-12-2006 contained factual inaccuracies regarding intervention/applications in the Godavarman case (for example, that several petitioners were recorded as having sought intervention when they had not).
- They submitted that the Supreme Court's 10-4-2006 order only decided whether the land was forest land and had commented upon the conduct and bona fides of Deepak Agarwal alone; it had not adjudicated that the petitioners in the three writ petitions before the High Court were not bona fide or lacked credentials.
- They drew attention to the fact that some petitioners had not even moved for impleadment in the Supreme Court matter and that the Supreme Court's refusal to allow impleadment did not equate to a finding that the petitioners lacked bona fides.
Arguments that the writ petitions are not maintainable (opposing counsel)
- Shri Kailash Vasudev, Senior Counsel, contended that in view of the Supreme Court judgment dated 10th April 2006 these petitions are not maintainable because the primary question (whether the land is forest land) had already been decided by the Supreme Court and related title disputes were before a civil court. He argued the High Court could not go beyond the Apex Court's decision.
- He also maintained that these petitions were filed at the instance of a business rival and noted that the Apex Court had rejected interventions by labour union and others (which he relied on to suggest the petitions were camouflaged).
- Shri Kailash Vasudev relied upon Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation (1995) 4 SCC 96 : AIR 1995 SC 1480.
Arguments in support of maintainability despite rival business status
- Shri M.L. Verma relied on Mehsana District Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. State of Gujarat (2004) 2 SCC 463 : AIR 2004 SC 1576 to submit that a PIL can be filed by a business rival where statutory violations are alleged.
- The Full Bench noted this submission but recorded that it could not entertain that wider maintainability-on-merits question because it was confined to answering the reference.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India (reported inter alia as AIR 2006 SC 1774; also cited AIR 1997 SC 1228 in the opinion) | Dealt with the question whether the land in question was forest land; the Supreme Court held the land was not forest land and commented strongly on the I.A. filed by Deepak Agarwal as mala fide and a name-lender. | The Full Bench carefully read the 10-4-2006 judgment and concluded that the Apex Court decided only that the land was not forest land and commented upon Deepak Agarwal's conduct; it did not adjudicate upon or express any opinion regarding the bona fides and credentials of the petitioners in the three writ petitions before the High Court. Therefore, the Full Bench held these writ petitions were not liable to be dismissed in limine on the basis of that Supreme Court order. |
| Kerala State Science & Technology Museum v. Rambal Co. (2006) 6 SCC 258 : 2006 AIR SCW 408 | Principle that when reference is made on a specific issue to a larger Bench, the larger Bench cannot adjudicate upon issues not referred to it. | The Full Bench relied on this authority to limit its scope to the precise issue referred (i.e., maintainability in light of Godavarman) and refused to go into the merits of the writ petitions or decide unrelated applications. |
| Kesho Nath Khurana v. Union of India (1981 SCC (Cri) 674 : AIR 1982 SC 1177) | Authority used to support the proposition that a larger Bench cannot decide issues beyond the specific reference. | Cited as one of the supporting authorities in the paragraph of the Kerala State Science & Technology Museum judgment relied upon to constrain the Full Bench's scope. |
| Samaresh Chandra Bose v. District Magistrate, Burdwan (1972) 2 SCC 476 : AIR 1972 SC 2481 | Authority supporting the limitation on issues a larger Bench can decide beyond the reference made. | Cited in the Kerala State Science & Technology Museum passage relied upon by the Full Bench to confirm that it must confine itself to the referred question. |
| K.C.P. Ltd. v. State Trading Corporation of India (1995 Supp (3) SCC 466) | Authority cited alongside others to show that a larger Bench cannot adjudicate on matters not referred to it. | Referenced as part of the jurisprudence sustaining the procedural limitation on the Full Bench's adjudicatory scope. |
| Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation (1995) 4 SCC 96 : AIR 1995 SC 1480 | Relied upon by Shri Kailash Vasudev to support non-maintainability where prior Supreme Court decisions had decided related issues. | The Full Bench considered the judgment but found it distinguishable on facts and held it had no bearing on the merits of the present writ petitions for purposes of answering the specific reference. |
| Municipal Corporation v. Ratnaprabha (1976) 4 SCC 622 : AIR 1977 SC 308 | Cited in the context of the Indian Oil line of authorities concerning adherence to earlier Supreme Court decisions on points of law. | Referenced by the Full Bench when explaining why the Indian Oil line of authority was not directly applicable to the facts before the High Court. |
| Mehsana District Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. State of Gujarat (2004) 2 SCC 463 : AIR 2004 SC 1576 | Authority for the proposition that a PIL may be filed by a business rival where a statutory violation is alleged (paras quoted by counsel). | The Full Bench noted the argument based on this case but recorded that it could not consider the wider maintainability-on-merits question because the Bench was confined to answering the specific reference on the impact of the Godavarman order. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Full Bench followed a methodical approach:
- The Bench first determined the scope of the reference: it was limited and specific — namely, whether in light of the Supreme Court's 10th April 2006 order in the Godavarman matter the pending writ petitions were liable to be dismissed in limine without inquiry into their merits. The Bench accepted the submission that it could not go beyond the referred question and relied on the Supreme Court's jurisprudence to that effect (Kerala State Science & Technology Museum v. Rambal Co. and authorities cited therein).
- Because the reference required examining the effect of the Supreme Court's order, the Bench summarized the background facts (the lease to Maruti Clean Coal & Power Ltd., the writ petitions challenging it, and the Supreme Court's disposal of Deepak Agarwal's I.A. in the Godavarman matter).
-
The Bench then read the Supreme Court's 10th April 2006 judgment in full and analyzed what the Apex Court had actually decided. It observed that the Supreme Court:
- decided the specific question that the land in question was not forest land;
- expressly deprecated and characterized Deepak Agarwal's I.A. as far from bona fide, misconceived and mala fide, describing him as a name-lender; and
- stated that the dispute as to title was not before it.
- The Bench examined the Division Bench's earlier divergent conclusions and identified factual inaccuracies recorded in the dissenting order (such as assertions that certain petitioners had sought intervention in the Godavarman matter when, according to the Full Bench, they had not). The Bench relied on the documentary record and submissions by counsel to clarify who had in fact filed intervention applications before the Supreme Court.
- The Full Bench concluded that nothing in the Supreme Court's 10th April 2006 order adjudicated upon or expressed any opinion on the bona fides and credentials of the petitioners in the three writ petitions before the High Court (other than the commentary directed to Deepak Agarwal). The Bench held that to treat the Supreme Court's observations about Deepak Agarwal as a finding against all of these petitioners would be an impermissible stretching of the Apex Court's decision beyond what it actually decided.
- Because the reference was narrowly framed and because the Supreme Court had not adjudicated that the present petitioners were not bona fide, the Full Bench held it could not dismiss the writ petitions in limine solely on the basis of the Supreme Court's April 2006 order.
- The Bench further noted procedural consequences: it would not decide a number of interlocutory applications (I.A. Nos. 1712/2007, 1713/2007, 1747/2007, 1746/2007) because those matters were beyond the referred question.
- Finally, the Bench took into account the Supreme Court's subsequent direction (Transfer Petition (Civil) No.54/2007) that the High Court dispose of the matters within six weeks; it noted that the six-week period had already expired on 16-3-2007 and directed registry action accordingly.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The reference is answered in the negative. In other words, the Full Bench held that, in view of the Supreme Court's order dated 10th April 2006 in the Godavarman matter, the three writ petitions are not liable to be dismissed in limine without going into their merits.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The writ petitions will not be summarily dismissed on the ground of the Supreme Court's 10th April 2006 order; they remain pending for further adjudication on the merits before the appropriate Bench of the High Court.
- Procedural direction: The registry is directed to place the matters before the Hon'ble Chief Justice in view of the Supreme Court's subsequent order indicating the High Court should dispose of the matters within six weeks (the opinion records that the six-week period had already expired).
- On precedent: The Full Bench did not purport to lay down any new substantive precedent beyond answering the narrow reference; the Bench expressly confined itself to the referred question and did not decide the broader maintainability or merits issues which were left open for adjudication by the appropriate forum.
Ordered accordingly.
This summary faithfully reflects the content and conclusions set out in the provided Full Bench opinion. No information has been added that is not explicitly contained in the opinion.
L.C Bhadoo, J.:— As there was difference of opinion in the order dated 19th December, 2006 between Hon'ble the then Chief Justice and Hon'ble Shri Justice Dilip Raosaheb Deshmukh on the question of maintainability of these P.I.L (s), therefore, in the light of above difference of opinion, this reference has been made for consideration and decision on the fallowing issue by the Full Bench constituted by Hon'ble the Chief Justice:—
“Since we differ on the question whether in view of the Order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the Case of T.N Godavarman Thirimulpad v. Union of India dated 10th April 2006, reported in (AIR 2006 SC 1774), the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed in limine without going into the merits of the cases.”
2. Shri M.L Verma, and Shri A.K Sinha, learned counsel, argued that this Full Bench is required to answer the reference to the extent of maintainability of these writ petitions as PIL in the light of the judgment of the Apex Court dated 10th April 2006. This Full Bench cannot go beyond that i.e this Full Bench cannot enter into the merits of the cases. We have perused the reference and we find substance in the argument advanced by learned counsel. The scope of reference made to the Full Bench is to the extent that whether in view of the order of the Apex Court in the case of T.N Godavarman dated 10th April 2006 these writ petitions are liable to be dismissed in limine without going into the merits of the cases or not. When the scope of reference is particular and specific, then the Full Bench has to answer the reference only. The Full Bench cannot go beyond that. In this respect, we are fortified in our view by the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Kerala State Science and Technology Museum v. Rambal Co. reported in (2006) 6 Supreme Court Cases 258 : (2006 AIR SCW 408). In para-8 of this judgment, the Apex Court held that:—
“It is fairly well settled that when reference is made on a specific issue either by a learned single Judge or Division Bench to a larger Bench i.e Division Bench or Full Bench or Constitution Bench, as the case may be, the larger Bench cannot adjudicate upon an issue which is not the question referred to. (See Kesho Nath Khurana v. Union of India (1981 SCC (Cri) 674) : (AIR 1982 SC 1177), Samaresh Chandra Bose v. District Magistrate, Burdwan (1972) 2 SCC 476) : (AIR 1972 SC 2481) and K.C.P Ltd. v. State Trading Corpn. of India (1995 Supp (3) SCC 466)”.
The above legal position was made known to learned counsel for the respective parties and everybody agreed to it, therefore, arguments were heard limited to the reference made.
3. In order to answer the reference, we consider it necessary to narrate background facts in nutshell which led to making of the reference to the Full Bench. Maruti Clean Coal and Power Ltd., made an application to the Chief Minister of the Chhattisgarh State on 1-7-2002 for allotment of about 60 acres of land in village Nawagaon Khurd for setting up of a coal washery. Ultimately, allocation of 37.91 acres land, situated in village Ratiza, District Korba, Chhattisgarh, on 99 years lease, was made by the State Government of Chhattisgarh and lease deed dated 7-12-2002 was executed between the Chhattisgarh State Industrial Development Corporation and Maruti Clean Coal and Power Ltd. Questioning the validity of above allotment/lease, one Dr. B.L Wadehra filed writ petition bearing No. 1264/2003 on 10-4-2003 as Public interest Litigation primarily questioning the said allotment/lease on the ground that the land in question is a forest land, therefore, without seeking prior permission of the Central Government, the State Government was not competent to give land on 99 years lease. Second ground was that the said land belongs, to South Eastern Coal Fields Limited (for short S.E.C.L, therefore, the State was not entitled to give the land on lease, as the said land was already allotted to the S.E.C.L
4. Another Writ Petition No. 1382/2003 was filed on 22-4-2003, as Public Interest Litigation, by Sanjay Srivastava and Surendra Sahu questioning the allotment/lease of the said land in favour of Maruti Clean Coal and Power Ltd., on the ground that the said land is a forest land. Without seeking prior permission of the Central Government, the State was not entitled to allot/grant lease as also the entire process will have an adverse impact on the environment of the whole area. The residents of that area including the petitioner will be subjected to more and more pollution and suffer an action of environment imbalance. Another ground was raised that the entire process of allotment of land to respondent No. 13 i.e Maruti Clean Coal and Power Ltd. is in utter disregard to the rules and procedure.
5. Third Writ Petition No. 4147/2003 was filed on 9-12-2003 by five organizations viz. Rastriya Koyal Khadan Mazdoor Sangh, Central Industrial Trade Union etc. in public interest questioning the said allotment/lease on the ground that the land in question is a forest land and the State Government has no jurisdiction to allot the said land without prior permission of the Central Government, and also that the land belongs to the S.E.C.L They have also challenged the lease on the ground of procedural impropriety adopted in grant of lease of said land in favour of Maruti Clean Coal & Power Ltd.
6. In the meantime, one Deepak Agarwal filed I.A before the Supreme Court in Writ Petition (C) No. 202 of 1995, reported in AIR 1997 SC 1228 (T.N Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India ((2006) 6 Supreme Court Cases 28 : (AIR 2006 SC 1774) (known as forest matter). The said I.A was disposed of by the Hon'ble Apex Court vide order dated 10th April 2006 holding in para-40 of the judgment that “even on facts we find no substance in the plea that the land allotted to Maruti is forest land”. In para-31 of the judgment, the Apex Court held that (Para 30 of AIR):—
“On perusal of the record, we have no doubt that the application filed by Deepak Agarwal is far from being bona fide. He has been set up by others. We strongly deprecate the filing of an entirely misconceived and mala fide application in the garb of public interest litigation by Deepak Agarwal. He is nothing but a name-lender.”
The Apex Court in para-40 of the said judgment also said that ‘the dispute in respect of the title is not a matter in issue before us.’
7. Arguments for final disposal of these writ petitions were heard by a Division Bench consisting of Hon'ble the then Chief Justice and Hon'ble Shri Justice Dilip Raosaheb Deshmukh. On 19th December, 2006, they passed separate orders. Hon'ble Justice D.R Deshmukh held that “to conclude, in the light of Hon'ble Apex Court's judgment in Godavarman's case (AIR 1997 SC 1228) and the bona fides of the petitioners in Writ Petitions No. 1264/2003, 1382/2003 and 4147/2003 being in doubt, I decline to examine the question of procedural irregularity in the allotment of land in area 37.91 acres by the State Government of Chhattisgarh to Maruti Clean Coal and Power Limited at the behest of the petitioners, who are not public interest litigants and whose bona fides and credentials are in doubt”, whereas, Hon'ble the then Chief Justice held that I do not find any finding recorded by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its order to hold that all the petitioners herein are not pro bona publico or that the bona fides and credentials of all the petitioners are in doubt, Hon'ble the then Chief Justice also held that “I am of the considered opinion that the contention of the petitioners that the lease of subject land in favour of Maruti Clean Coal & Power Limited is vitiated on account of infraction of mandatory provisions of the Code and that it suffers from serious procedural impropriety, is wholly justified and consequently, the impugned grant cannot be sustained”. Ultimately, Hon'ble the then Chief Justice allowed the writ petitions and quashed the orders of the State of Chhattisgarh dated 5-12-2002 as well as agreement dated 7-12-2002 allotting the subject land in favour of Maruti Clean Coal & Power Limited with costs quantified at Rs. 10,000/-.
8. Shri Tankha, learned Senior Counsel submitted that it is an admitted position that regarding title of the land, a suit is already pending in the Civil Court at Katghora between S.E.C.L and Maruti Clean Coal & Power Limited and it is in this background, on 19th December, 2006, a dissenting order in respect of the maintainability of the above three writ petitions was passed by the Division Bench considering of Hon'ble the then Chief Justice and Hon'ble Shri Justice D.R Deshmukh. He submitted that at page-9, in para-6, Hon'ble Justice Deshmukh mentioned that “in that petition (petition before the Supreme Court), Bhartiya Koyala Khadan Mazdoor Sangh, petitioner herein in W.P No. 4147 of 2003, late Dr. B.L Wadehra, the petitioner herein in W.P No. 1264 of 2003 and Sanjay Srivastava, the petitioner herein in W.P No. 1382 of 2003 sought intervention. The Apex Court vide its judgment dated 10th April 2006 rejected the prayer for impleadment by the aforesaid petitioners”. Shri Tankha contended that late Dr. B.L Wadehra, Sanjay Srivastava and Surendra Sahu never filed any application for intervention. Shri M.L Verma, learned Senior Counsel submitted that in Writ Petition No. 4147/2003 there are five petitioners, out of the five petitioners, only Bhartiya Koyla Khadan Mazdoor Sangh filed an intervention application whose name is mentioned at Item No. 12 in the list which was prepared by the Central Empowered Committee (CEC) regarding matters pending in connection with land before the High Courts and the Supreme Court. Therefore, first four petitioners never filed any intervention application. This factual position was not disputed by learned counsel for the opposite side.
9. They submitted that the above factual inaccuracy has been crept-in in the order of Hon'ble Judge dated 19-12-2006. Of-course, Dr. B.L Wadehra filed an S.L.P against the order dated 9-5-2003 and the said S.L.P was dismissed on 10th April 2006. They further submitted that in para 11, it has again been mentioned that petitioner Sanjay Srivastava in W.P No. 138/2003 was one of the interveners in Godavarman's case. But, he never filed any intervention application. It has again been mentioned that the Apex Court refused the impleadment of Sanjay Srivastava in Godavarman's case (AIR 1997 SC 1228), which is factually incorrect. Again in para 12 factual inaccuracy has been crept in that B.L Wadehra moved an application for impleadment and same was refused in Godavarman's case. In the said para, it has further been mentioned that W.P No. 4147/2003 also substantially raises the main issue that the allotted lands are forest lands while also raising the question of procedural irregularity as by way of additional submission and the observations made in Godavarman's case by the Hon'ble Apex Court leave no room for any doubt that the bona fides and credentials of the petitioners in all these writ petitions are in doubt, and therefore, as the Hon'ble Apex Court had refused intervention by these writ petitioners, these petitions deserve to be dismissed in limine being clearly and demonstratively camouflaged since the real persons behind these petitioners is a competitor of Maruti Clean Coal and Power Limited who was operating in the area and having monopoly.
10. They also drew the attention of the Court towards para 17 in which it has been mentioned that “To conclude, in the light of Hon'ble Apex Court's judgment in Godavarman's case (AIR 1997 SC 1228) and the bona fides of the petitioners in Writ Petitions No. 1264/23, 1382/2003 and 4147/2003 being in doubt, I decline to examine the question of procedural irregularity in the allotment of land in area 37.91 acres by the State Government of Chhattisgarh to Maruti Clean Coal & Power Limited at the behest of the petitioners, who are not public interest litigants and whose bona fides and credentials are in doubt.”
11. Showing above backgrounds of factual inaccuracy. Shri Vivek Tankha, learned senior Counsel, Shri M.L Verma, learned Senior Counsel as also Shri A.K Sinha, learned Counsel argued that in the above judgment of the Apex Court dated 10th April 2006, the Apex Court has nowhere expressed or given finding in respect of the petitioners in these writ petitions that they are not bona fide litigants. They further argued that it is evident from the bare perusal of the Supreme Court judgment that the only question before the Supreme Court was whether land in question is a forest land or not. The Supreme Court has decided that question only, nothing beyond that and for remaining issue regarding propriety of the allotment made in favour of Maruti Clean Coal & Power Limited, the Supreme Court has not said anything. They vehemently argued that reading of the whole judgment makes it clear that the Supreme Court has commented upon conduct of Deepak Agarwal who filed I.A in the forest matter before the Supreme Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the application filed by the Deepak Agarwal was far from being bona fide and strongly deprecated the filing of an entirely misconceived and mala fide application in the garb of public interest litigation by Deepak Agarwal saying that he is nothing but a name-lender.
12. On the other hand, Shri Kailash Vasudev, learned Senior Counsel argued that in view of the Apex Court judgment dated 10th April 2006 these petitions are not maintainable. He argued that primarily in these writ petitions the only question raised by the petitioners is that the land is a forest land which has already been decided by the Apex Court and for the claim that the land belongs to the S.E.C.L, a suit is already pending before the Civil Court at Katghora. Now, this Court has no jurisdiction to go beyond the decision of the Apex Court, as the main issue raised in these writ petitions has already been decided by the Hon'ble Apex Court. Moreover, these three petitions have been filed at the instance of business rival group that is why the Apex Court rejected the interventions made by Labour Union and others. He placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation reported in (1995) 4 Supreme Court Cases 96 : (AIR 1995 SC 1480). Shri Thakur Vijay Singh adopted the arguments of Advocate Shri A.K Sinha for S.E.C.L whereas, Senior Advocate and Additional Advocate General Shri Prashant Mishra adopted the arguments advanced by Senior Advocate Shri Kailash Vasudev.
13. In order to appreciate arguments advanced by learned counsel for the parties, we have carefully read the whole judgment of the Apex Court dated 10th April 2006. Reading of the whole judgment, no doubt, makes it clear that the Apex Court has only commented upon conduct and bona fide of Deepak Agarwal. The Apex Court held that the application filed by Deepak Agarwal is far from being bona Fide, same is entirely misconceived and mala fide in the garb of PIL. It is clear from reading of paras-1, 21 and 40 of the Judgment in which it has been mentioned that the Court is required to decide whether the land in question is a part of forest land or not. The Apex Court has only decided the question that the land in question is not forest land, nothing beyond that. As far as these writ petitioners are concerned, in para 23 the Apex Court held that “Some unions have also tried to jump into the fray by filing applications seeking impleadment in these proceedings so as to contend that the allotment is of a forest land. We see no reason to allow the impleadment of parties in these proceedings”. Except that nothing has been mentioned about credentials and bona fides of the petitioners herein in these three petitions. Of Course, it has been mentioned in the said judgment that one K.K Srivastava is the representative of Aryan and many times he appeared on behalf of Deepak Agarwal to assist the advocate as also before CEC. In the third report of the CEC, CEC noted numbers of cases that were filed in respect of giving the land on lease to Maruti Clean Coal & Power Limited and those matters have been referred in para 18 in the said order. In that, item No. 2 mentions about filing of matter by Sanjay Srivastava (relation of K.K Srivastava) in the High Court. Except that the Supreme Court has not said anything about Sanjay Srivastava's conduct or anything else. Therefore, in the first instance, as has been mentioned earlier, Dr. Wadehra, Sanjay Srivastava, Surendra Sahu and first four petitioners in Writ Petition No. 4147/2003 have never moved any application for impleadment. Of Course, the petitioner No. 5 in W.P No. 4147/2003 had moved an application for intervention before the Supreme Court, same has been rejected. In the second place, the Supreme Court held that we see no reason to allow the impleadment of parties in these proceedings. The Supreme Court has not commented upon conduct and bona fide of petitioner No. 5 in Writ Petition No. 4147/2003 about filing of this writ petition. If above portion commenting upon the credentials of Deepak Agarwal is read against the petitioner No. 5 in W.P No. 4147/2003, it will amount to stretching the issue beyond the decision and observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court dated 10-4-2006. Therefore, observation made in para-12 of the order that the observations Apex Court has not said anything about bona fides and credentials of the petitioners of these writ petitions.
14. Had it been so, the Hon'ble Apex Court may have transferred all the three writ petitions to the Supreme Court under Article 139-A of the Constitution of India and have dismissed them along with I.A filed by Deepak Agarwal.
15. Moreover, in para 18 the Apex Court has simply mentioned that in the third report of the CEC, CEC further noted number of cases that were filed in respect of allotment of land to Maruti Clean Coal & Power Limited. The Apex Court simply mentioned about the notes made in the 3rd report about filing of various petitions regarding land, beyond that the Apex Court has not observed or said anything about maintainability of those writ petitions as also bona fides and credentials of the petitioners herein.
16. As far as judgment cited by Shri Kailash Vasudev, Sr. Advocate, is concerned, the said judgment of the Apex Court is distinguishable on facts and has no bearing on the merits of the present writ petitions. The question before the Apex Court in that matter was that Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court did not follow judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of Municipal Corporation v. Ratnaprabha reported in (1976) 4 SCC 622 : (AIR 1977 SC 308). The Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court overruled the decision of the Division Bench. Then the matter went before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that:—
“In the High Court the matter was not res integra being concluded by the authority of the direct decision by a three Judge Bench of this Court in Municipal Corpn. v. Ratnaprabha on the correct construction of Section 138(b) of the M.P Act. No other direct decision of this Court is to the contrary. However, the Division Bench of the High Court in a later case between the very same parties took a different view on the construction of the same provision placing reliance on some other decisions of this Court wherein the question arose for decision in the context of a similar provision in some other statutes applicable in the other States wherein there was no non obstante clause as in the M.P Act.”
Therefore, judgment relied upon by the Shri Kailash Vasudev was in a different context and has no application on facts in the present cases.
17. Shri M.L Verma, learned Senior Counsel placing reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of Mehsana District Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. State of Gujarat reported in (2004) 2 SCC 463 : (AIR 2004 SC 1576), (Para 16), argued that public interest petition can be filed even by a business rival where violation of the Act or Rule has been raised. He argued that in the above matter, the Apex Court held that PIL preferred by a person no other than business rival of the appellants due to clash of interest was rightly entertained. The Court further held that:—
“The High Court by the impugned order issued a writ of mandamus, directing Respondents 4 and 5 to take appropriate action against the appellants in accordance with the provisions contained in the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act and the Rules framed thereunder. We do not see any infirmity in the impugned order. The Acts and Rules are made to be followed and not to be violated. When the statute prescribes the norms to be followed, it has to be in that fashion. Converse would be contrary to law. If there is any allegation of violation of statutory rules which have been brought to the notice of the authorities and if the authorities concerned do not perform their statutory obligation, as in the present case, any aggrieved citizen can always bring to the notice of the High Court the inaction of the statutory authorities and in such event it would always be open to the High Court to pass an appropriate order as deemed fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.”
We are of the considered opinion that at this stage above judgment cannot be considered because we have to answer reference made to us and we cannot discuss about the maintainability of the writ petitions on their merits.
18. We have to simply answer the reference, therefore, we are not required to decide applications I.A Nos. 1712/2007 & 1713/2007 filed by Shri Amrito Das, Advocate, on behalf of Aryan Coal Beneficiation Private Limited, application I.A No. 1747/2007 for proper orders filed by Shri Abhishek Sinha, Advocate, on behalf of Arun Singh and the application I.A No. 1746/2007 filed, by Shri B.P Sharma, Advocate to ask Mr. Alok Nigam to file Income Tax return.
19. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the considered opinion that the Apex Court in its order dated 10th April 2006 passed on I.A moved by Deepak Agarwal has not adjudicated or expressed any opinion on any other aspects of these three writ petitions except that the land in question is not a forest land nor the Apex Court has observed anything about the bona fides and credentials of the petitioners herein, therefore, in view of the order of the Supreme Court dated 10th April 2006 passed in Godavarman's case (AIR 2006 SC 1774), these writ petitions are not liable to be dismissed in limine without going into the merits of the cases.
20. In the result, reference is answered in negative. Registry is directed to place the matters before Hon'ble the Chief Justice in view of the Apex Court's order dated 2-2-2007 passed on Transfer Petition (Civil) No(s). 54/2007 in which it has been directed that the interest of justice would be served if the High Court disposes of the matters within six weeks from today and the period of six weeks already expired on 16-3-2007.
Ordered accordingly.
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