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State Of Madhya Pradesh (Now Chhattisgarh) v. Vijay Kumar.
Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The State obtained leave under Section 378(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to appeal against a judgment of acquittal dated 8 June 1989, delivered by the Special Judge, Rajnandgaon (M.P.) in Special Case No. 7/87. The prosecution's case was that in 1986 the respondent, posted as Food Inspector at Dongargarh, was a public servant within the meaning of Sections 5(1)(d) and 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The complainant, Bhuwanlal (PW-1), alleged that the respondent had called him repeatedly and demanded Rs. 300, threatening to collect a milk sample if payment was not made. A trap was organized by officers of the Special Police Establishment; Bhuwanlal gave currency notes treated with phenolphthalein to the respondent during the trap. The trap party later searched the respondent's house and found the treated notes on top of an almirah. After investigation and obtaining government sanction under Section 6(1)(c) of the Act, a charge-sheet was filed and charges were framed under Section 5(1)(d) read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. At trial, the respondent denied the charges; prosecution witnesses testified, and the Special Court ultimately acquitted the respondent.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the prosecution proved that the respondent, a public servant, obtained illegal gratification of Rs. 300 by corrupt or illegal means in contravention of Section 5(1)(d) read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
- Whether the appellate court should interfere with the Special Court's judgment of acquittal—i.e., whether the trial court's view was perverse or otherwise unsustainable such that interference is warranted under principles applicable to appeals against acquittal.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Budh Singh v. State of U.P. (2006) 9 SCC 731 | That ordinarily a High Court will not set aside an acquittal where two views are possible; however, an appellate court can review the entire evidence to determine whether the trial court's view was perverse or unsustainable, or whether admissible evidence was ignored or inadmissible evidence considered, including incorrect allocation of burden of proof. | The court relied on these principles to frame the standard for interference on appeal: it assessed whether the Special Court's acquittal was one of two possible views or whether it was perverse or had ignored admissible evidence—finding no basis for interference under these standards. |
| V.N. Ratheesh v. State of Kerala (2006) 10 SCC 617 : AIR 2006 SC 2667 | Confirms that appellate courts may review evidence upon which an acquittal is based; reiterates that where two views are possible the view favorable to the accused should be adopted; interference is warranted only for compelling and substantial reasons—e.g., when admissible evidence is ignored or the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable and relevant/convincing materials have been unjustifiably eliminated. | The court used these principles as guidance to examine whether the trial court's conclusions were reasonable or whether there were compelling reasons to interfere. The court concluded there were no such compelling reasons in this case. |
| Bhagwan Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (referred) | Referred by the Apex Court in the bundle of authorities on appellate interference with acquittal; the specific principle as applied in this opinion is not separately detailed. | Referred as part of authoritative support for the general appellate principles; not separately analyzed in the opinion. |
| Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra (1973) 2 SCC 793 : AIR 1973 SC 2622 | One of the decisions cited on the point of interference with acquittal; the opinion does not extract a distinct rule beyond its inclusion among authorities on the subject. | Referred to support the general principles governing appellate review of acquittals; no separate application or analysis in this judgment beyond citation. |
| Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat (1996) | Cited among authorities bearing on the scope of appellate review of acquittals. | Referred to as part of the judicial line of authority; the court did not separately elaborate its holding beyond citing it for the broader point. |
| Jaswant Singh v. State of Haryana (2000) | Cited as an authority on appellate interference in acquittal cases. | Referred in support of the principles articulated from higher judicial decisions; not further analyzed in the opinion. |
| Raj Kishore Jha v. State of Bihar (2003) | Cited among decisions on interference with acquittals. | Referred to as part of the judicial authorities confirming when appellate interference is appropriate; no distinct application in the opinion. |
| State of Punjab v. Karnail Singh (2003) | Cited as an authority relevant to appellate review of acquittals. | Referred to support the general propositions; the opinion does not articulate a separate holding from this case. |
| State of Punjab v. Pohla Singh (2003) | Another decision cited in the context of appellate interference with acquittal judgments. | Referred among other decisions to buttress the legal standards governing appeals against acquittal; no discrete application in this judgment. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by reciting the prosecution's case and the trial court's reasons for acquittal. The Special Court's principal basis for acquittal was that the prosecution failed to establish that the respondent obtained illegal gratification by corrupt or illegal means. The Special Court specifically disbelieved the testimony of Bhuwanlal (PW-1) on multiple grounds set out in the impugned judgment:
- Material contradictions in PW-1's testimony: inconsistencies between his complaint and his trial evidence (e.g., whether he was selling milk at the relevant time) and between his trial testimony and entries in his police case diary about when the accused first met him.
- Inconsistencies as to timing and conduct on the date of the trap: the Special Court found PW-1's account of entering the respondent's house, remaining briefly, and placing money on top of an almirah implausible within the short time he claimed; additional inconsistencies included absence in the case diary of statements that the respondent met PW-1 outside his house or asked him to sit on a bench.
- Suspicious circumstances surrounding the conduct of the trap and the placement of the currency notes (why the respondent would place treated notes on top of the almirah rather than pocket them), which raised doubts about the prosecution's version of handing over the money.
The appellate court then considered authoritative principles from the Apex Court (notably Budh Singh and V.N. Ratheesh) regarding the scope of appellate review of acquittals: while the High Court or appellate court should not ordinarily overturn an acquittal where two views are possible, it may review the entire evidence to determine whether the trial court's conclusion was perverse, ignored admissible evidence, took into account inadmissible evidence, or misallocated the burden of proof. Interference is warranted only when there are compelling and substantial reasons—such as when the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable or when relevant and convincing materials have been unjustifiably overlooked.
Applying these principles to the present record, the court found that the Special Court's distrust of PW-1's testimony and consequent acquittal constituted a view that was within the range of possible and reasonable conclusions a court could reach on the facts presented. The appellate court concluded that there was no demonstration that admissible evidence had been ignored, nor that the trial court's judgment was so unreasonable as to deserve interference. Therefore, there were no compelling or substantial reasons to set aside the acquittal.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal filed by the State is dismissed and the judgment of acquittal passed by the Special Court is confirmed. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
Implications:
- The direct effect is that the respondent's acquittal for the alleged offence (charged under Section 5(1)(d) read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act) stands confirmed and the State's appeal fails.
- The court applied established appellate principles regarding interference with acquittals and did not find this case to present compelling or substantial reasons to disturb the trial court's view; the opinion does not purport to set any new legal precedent beyond applying existing authorities to the facts.
1. On a leave being granted under Section 378(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the State has filed this appeal against the judgment of acquittal dated 8th of June, 1989 passed in Special Case No. 7/87 by the Special Judge, Rajnandgaon (M.P).
2. The case of the prosecution is that in the year 1986, the respondent was posted as Food Inspector, Dongargarh, and was a public servant for the purposes of Sections 5(1)(d) and 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (for short “the Act”). The complainant namely Bhuwanlal (PW-1) was a milk vendor. On 20-6-1986, he made a complaint to the Superintendent of Police (Special Police Establishment), Raipur alleging that the respondent had called him 2-3 times in his house at Dongargarh and he demanded Rs. 300/- from him making a threat that if the amount is not paid to him, he would collect the sample of milk. On the said report, a trap was organized and the trap party, consisting of inspector-G.P Tripathi (PW-9), Naib Tehsildar-J.M Shukla (PW-2), Superintendent Land Record-A.K Khan and Con-stable-B. Laxmaiya (PW-6), made a trap while giving Rs. 300/- as the illegal gratification to the respondent by Bhuwanlal (PW-1). It is stated that the currency notes for Rs. 300/- were treated with phenolphthalein powder and were handed over to the complainant for giving it to the respondent, which, according to the prosecution, was handed over to him by Bhuwanlal and when a search of the house, after such giving and taking, was made by the trap party, the currency notes were found on the top of the Almirah inside the house of the respondent. After completion of the formalities of phe-nolphthalein test etc., the investigation was completed and then after obtaining a sanction from the Government under Section 6(1)(c) of the Act. for prosecution of the respondent/accused, charge sheet was filed against him. At the trial, as stated above, charges were framed under Section 5(1)(d) read with Section 5(2) of the Act to which the respondent denied, therefore, the evidence of prosecution witnesses were recorded and after completion of the trial, the respondent was acquitted.
3. The Special Court acquitted the respondent mainly on the ground that the prosecution could not establish that the respondent by use of corrupt and illegal means or by abusing his position as a public servant, obtained illegal gratification of Rs. 300/- from the complainant. The Special Court disbelieved the testimony of Bhuwanlal (PW 1) on various grounds. The first ground for disbeliving his testimony was the material contradictions in his evidence as indicated vide para 15 of the impugned judgment. The two contradictions are (i) though in his complaint this witness has stated that he was selling milk at the relevant time, but in his evidence he denied that he was selling milk during that period; (if) in his evidence, he had stated that the accused first met with him on 18-6-86 when the demand of money was made, but in his police case diary statement, he had stated that accused had met him 2 or 3 months before the date of trap. The Special Court took the view that if the accused had really met with him 2 or 3 months before the date’ of trap, he would have not kept silence all this time and would have reported the matter earlier, therefore, the version of Bhuwanlal (PW-1) that the accused had met with him and demanded money becomes doubtful. The Special Court further held that on the evidence of this witness, it appears that on the date of trap, he had reached the house of the respondent, entered straight in the house and came out from the house immediately within a few seconds, however, in para 73 of the deposition of this witness, it comes that in the room, he sal on a bench lying in the room and accordingly it was held that in 2 seconds, it was not possible for a man to go and come back from the house after giving bribe to a person. The Special Court further held that in para 60 of the deposition of this witness, he had stated that the respondent met him outside his house, whereas, this fact was not incorporated in his case diary statement nor the fact that respondent had asked him to sit on the bench was incorporated therein. The Special Court also observed that Bhuwanlal (PW-1) had contended that at the time of trap, the respondent was present in his drawing room all alone and he gave money to him, which he kept on the top of the Almirah, where a register was also lying and in the said situation, it appears more suspicious as to what made the accused to put the currency notes on the top of the almirah and not to keep It in his pocket or inside the almirah. Taking all this circumstances about the conduct of this witness, Bhuwanlal (PW-1), the Special Court held that all these circumstances raise a suspicion about his claim that the accused after receiving the currency notes from him kept them on the top of the Almirah.
4. The version of Bhuwanlal (PW-1) has also been tested in light of the evidence of other witnesses of trap party and ultimately, after giving reasons for disbelieving the testimony of this witness, it has been held by the Special Court that firstly the circumstances, which led to trap are suspicious and the factum of handing over the money to the accused is also suspicious and finally, it was held, while concluding point No. 1, that it has not been proved that accused/respondent obtained Rs. 300/- or any other amount from Bhuwanlal (PW-1) as illegal gratification.
5. The Apex Court held in the matter of Budh Singh v. State of U.P, (2006) 9 SCC 731 : (2006 Cri LJ 2886), vide para 9, that in a matter of appeal against acquittal, the High Court does not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, although the view of the Appellate Court is a more probable one. However, while dealing with a judgment of acquittal, it is free to consider the entire evidence on record so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial Court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. It is also entitled to consider as to whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial Court has failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and has taken into consideration evidence brought on record contrary to law. Similarly, wrong placing of burden of proof may also be a subject-matter of the scrutiny of the Appellate Court.
6. It was further held by the Apex Court in the matter of V.N Ratheesh v. State Of Kerala, (2006) 10 SCC 617 : AIR 2006 SC 2667 : (2006 Cri LJ 3634) that there is no embargo on the Appellate Court reviewing the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based. Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The Apex Court said that the golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The Apex Court further said that the paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented, A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilt is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the Appellate Court to re-appreciate the evidence where the accused has been acquitted, for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused really committed any offence or not. The Apex Court referred to the decisions rendered in the matter of Bhagwan Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2002 (2) Supreme 567) : (2002 Cri LJ 2024). It was further held that the principle to be followed by Appellate Court considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons lor doing so. If the impugned judg ment is clearly unreasonable and relevant and convincing materials have been unjustifiably eliminated in the process, it is a compelling reason for interference. The Apex Court also referred to many decisions on this point, which are Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra ((1973) 2 SCC 793 : AIR 1973 SC 2622) : (1973 Cri LJ 1783); Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State Of Gujarat (1996 (4) Supreme 167) : (1996 Cri LJ 2867), Jaswant Singh v. State Of Haryana. (2000 (3) Supreme 320) : (2000 Cri LJ 2212), Raj Kishore Jha v. State of Bihar (2003 (7) Supreme 152) : (2003 Cri LJ 5040), State Of Punjab v. Karnail Singh (2003 (5) Supreme 508) : (2003 Cri LJ 3892) and State of Punjab v. Pohla Singh (2003 (7) Supreme 17) : (2003 Cri LJ 5010).
7. If we examine the facts and circumstances of this case in light of the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the cases referred to above, firstly, it would appear that the view taken by the Special Court that the testimony of Bhuwanlal (PW-1) appears to be untrustworthy does not appear to be completely unreasonable, hence, the same can be said to a probable view which may be one of the possible views, which, the Special Court has adapted. Moreover,’ it also does not appear to me a case, in which-, either admissible evidence is ignored or a case where interference is required to prevent the miscarriage of justice. There are also no compelling and substantial reasons to interfere with such a finding recorded by the trial Court, when it does not appear to be clearly unreasonable particularly when no relevant and convincing materials have been unjustifiably eliminated in the process of appreciation for arriving at a just and proper decision.
8. In the opinion of this Court, the Special Court has taken a view and has recorded a finding, which appears to be one of the possible views which could have been taken by a Court of law in the facts and circumstances of this case and I do not find any reason to interfere with such a finding recorded by the trial Court in a Judgment which was delivered by it as back as in the year 1989 for the alleged offence said to have been committed in the year 1986.
9. There is no merit in the appeal filed by the State.
10. The same deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. The judgment of acquittal passed by the Special Court is confirmed.
11. Appeal dismissed.
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