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Abdul Razzaq Sunesra v. Municipal Corporation Of Greater Mumbai And Others

Bombay High Court
Jul 17, 2013
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Factual and Procedural Background

The writ petition challenges section 515-A of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, as introduced by Maharashtra Act No. II of 2012. The dispute concerns an unauthorized structure constructed on a plot of land at S.V Road, Borivali (W), Mumbai. The Municipal Corporation issued a notice on 28 May 2013 under section 351 of the Act, followed by an order on 17 June 2013 requiring the removal of the structure. The Designated Officer passed this order after providing the petitioner an opportunity to show cause. The petitioner filed a suit before the City Civil Court, which declined ad-interim relief on 26 June 2013, holding that notices under sections 351 and 354-A could not be challenged in Civil Courts due to the bar created by section 515-A and that a grievance redressal mechanism existed under a Municipal Corporation circular.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether section 515-A of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, which bars jurisdiction of Civil Courts over notices, orders, or directions issued under sections 351 and 354-A, is constitutionally valid.
  2. Whether the absence of a mandated personal hearing under sub-section (1A) of section 351 and section 354-A violates principles of natural justice.
  3. Whether the bar on civil suits introduced by section 515-A arbitrarily denies access to civil courts, violating Article 14 of the Constitution.
  4. Whether the statutory provisions provide adequate safeguards and remedy mechanisms for persons affected by notices or orders under sections 351 and 354-A.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • No requirement of a hearing is stipulated in sub-section (1A) of section 351 and section 354-A, violating natural justice.
  • The designated officer must be satisfied that the structure is unauthorized before initiating demolition.
  • Prior to section 515-A, civil courts had jurisdiction; the new bar denies access to civil remedies.
  • The statute does not mandate demolition even if a structure is unauthorized, and no adequate adjudicatory machinery is provided, making the bar of jurisdiction arbitrary and violative of Article 14.

State's Arguments

  • Compliance with principles of natural justice does not require a personal hearing; notice and opportunity to show cause suffice.
  • Sections 351 and 354-A provide safeguards including notice, opportunity to present defense, and objective consideration by the designated officer.
  • Jurisdiction of Civil Courts under section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure can be barred by statute, and such a bar is valid even if the adequacy of remedy is not decisive.
  • An adequate remedy exists through writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution against orders passed under sections 351 and 354-A.
  • Absence of an appellate remedy does not render the provision unconstitutional.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Muni Suvrat-Swami Jain S.M.P Sangh v. Arun Nathuram Gaikwad, (2006) 8 SCC 590 Confers enabling power and discretion on Commissioner to demolish unauthorized construction based on sufficient cause. Used to explain the discretionary power of the Designated Officer under section 351 to remove unauthorized structures after due process.
Dhulabhai etc. v. State of M.P, AIR 1969 SC 78 Principles governing interpretation of finality clauses and statutory bars on Civil Court jurisdiction. Established that express bar of jurisdiction by statute is valid and examination of remedy adequacy is relevant but not decisive.
Organo Chemical Industries v. Union of India, (1979) 4 SCC 573 Absence of appellate remedy does not render statutory provision unconstitutional if other safeguards exist. Supported the view that the absence of appeal against Designated Officer's order does not invalidate section 515-A.
Babubhai and Co. v. State of Gujarat, (1985) 2 SCC 732 Factors to consider in determining reasonableness of power and necessity of corrective machinery. Clarified that absence of appeal is one factor among many, and powers exercised objectively with safeguards and judicial review are valid.
Pratibha Co-operative Housing Society Limited v. State of Maharashtra, (1991) 3 SCC 341 Need for firm action against unlawful constructions in public interest. Emphasized the public interest in controlling unauthorized constructions, supporting legislative intent behind section 515-A.
Dipak Kumar Mukherjee v. Kolkata Municipal Corporation, (2013) 5 SCC 336 Dangers of illegal constructions and the necessity of prompt State action. Supported the legislative objective to prevent delays caused by litigation in unauthorized construction cases.
Esha Ekta Apartments Co-operative Housing Society v. Municipal Corporation of Mumbai, (2013) 5 SCC 357 Provisions for punishment and restoration for unauthorized development without permission. Reinforced that unauthorized constructions are not to be regularized and must be dealt with firmly.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the constitutional validity of section 515-A, which bars Civil Court jurisdiction over notices and orders under sections 351 and 354-A of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act. The Court noted that the legislature introduced section 515-A to prevent delays caused by litigation in unauthorized construction cases and to allow expeditious action.

The Court examined the procedural safeguards in sections 351 and 354-A, including the requirement of notice, opportunity to show cause (either in writing or in person), and the necessity for the Designated Officer to apply objective mind and record reasons before ordering demolition. These safeguards ensure compliance with principles of natural justice.

The Court referred to precedents establishing that express statutory bars on Civil Court jurisdiction are valid even if alternative remedies may not be fully adequate, provided there are sufficient procedural safeguards and availability of writ jurisdiction under Article 226.

The absence of an appellate remedy was held not to render the provision unconstitutional, as the power is to be exercised objectively with judicial review available. The Court further emphasized the public interest in prompt action against unauthorized constructions to prevent hazards and maintain planned development.

The Court also acknowledged the existence of a grievance redressal mechanism established by the Municipal Corporation to address complaints regarding unauthorized constructions, reinforcing the availability of remedies outside Civil Courts.

On these bases, the Court concluded that section 515-A is not arbitrary or violative of Article 14 and upheld its constitutional validity.

Holding and Implications

The petition challenging the constitutional validity of section 515-A of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, is dismissed.

The Court held that section 515-A validly bars Civil Court jurisdiction over notices, orders, or directions issued under sections 351 and 354-A, given the procedural safeguards and availability of writ jurisdiction. The decision prevents misuse of civil suits to delay action against unauthorized constructions and promotes expeditious enforcement of municipal regulations. No new precedent altering existing principles was set; the ruling affirms the legislature's authority to bar Civil Court jurisdiction when appropriate procedural protections exist.

Additionally, the Court granted a two-week interim period before implementation of the demolition order dated 17 June 2013, allowing the petitioner to seek remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Show all summary ...

Dr. D.Y Chandrachud, J.:— Rule. Learned counsel for the Respondents waive service. By consent, the Rule is made returnable forthwith. The writ petition is taken up for hearing and final disposal, by consent and on the request of learned counsel.

2. The challenge in these proceedings is to section 515-A of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 which is brought on the statute by Maharashtra Act No. II of 2012. The Act received the assent of the President and was published in the gazette on 13 March, 2012.

3. The dispute in the present case relates to a structure constructed on a plot of land bearing CTS No. 50.A at S.V Road, Borivali (W), Mumbai-400 092. A notice was issued by the Municipal Corporation on 28 May, 2013 under section 351 of the Act on the ground that the structure is unauthorized. An order was passed on 17 June, 2013 requiring the removal of the structure on the ground that it is unauthorized. This order was passed by the Designated Officer after furnishing to the Petitioner an opportunity of showing cause. The Petitioner filed a suit before the City Civil Court. Ad-interim relief was declined by an order dated 26 June, 2013 both on the ground that in view of the amendment brought about to insert section 515-A, notices issued under sections 351 and 354-A could not be questioned in a Civil Court and on the ground that a grievance redressal machinery has been provided under a circular issued by the Municipal Corporation.

4. Section 515-A provides as follows:

“515-A. Bar of jurisdiction.— Save as otherwise provided in this Act, any notice issued, order passed or direction issued by the Designated Officer, under section 351 or 354-a shall not be questioned in any suit or other legal proceedings.”

5. The challenge to the constitutional validity of section 515-A is on the following grounds which have been urged at the hearing:

(i) No requirement of a hearing has been stipulated in sub-section (1A) of section 351 and in section 354-A;

(ii) Before initiation of an action under sections 351 and 354-A, a designated officer must be satisfied that the structure is unauthorized and he may pass an order of demolition;

(iii) Prior to the insertion of section 515-A, access to the Civil Courts was not barred, whereas, as a result of the bar of jurisdiction contained in the newly added provision, no civil suit can lie for the purposes of questioning an order, notice or direction issued under section 351 or section 354-A of the Act;

(iv) Even though a structure is unauthorized, the statute does not mandate that it shall be demolished since under sub-section (2) of section 351, the designated officer may require the removal of the structure. An adequate machinery has not been provided in the statute for adjudication of all issues that may arise in the context of an action initiated against an unauthorized construction and consequently the bar of jurisdiction under section 515-A is arbitrary, and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

6. When the petition came up for hearing, it appeared to the Court that in the interests of justice it would be necessary to resolve the issue of the constitutional validity of section 515-A in order to set at rest the uncertainty arising out of the maintainability of civil suits across the State and in particular in the city of Mumbai in regard to notices, directions or orders under section 351 and section 354-A. The amending Act, it must be noted, has brought about similar amendments to Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 and the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949. In that view of the matter, we issue notice to the learned Advocate General. The learned Advocate General has appeared before the Court and has accepted the notice. We have accordingly heard the learned Advocate General in defence to the challenge to the constitutional validity of the provisions.

7. On behalf of the State it has been submitted by the learned Advocate General that:

(i) The requirement of compliance with the principles of natural justice does not necessitate a personal hearing. The principles of natural justice require an opportunity to a person who is affected by the proposed action of the State or its authority to put forth a defense and a due and adequate consideration of the defence. In the present case, both sections 351 and 354-A contain safeguards for the issuance of a notice, an opportunity to show cause and require a judicious application of mind by the designated officer to the cause which is shown;

(ii) It is well settled that the jurisdiction of a Court under section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to entertain and try an action of a civil nature can be barred by statute. Where the statutory provision enacts an express bar, as in this case, an analysis of the adequacy of the remedy is not decisive in itself;

(iii) In any event, an adequate remedy is provided in section 351 and section 354-A and recourse to the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution would be available against an order passed under those provisions; and

(iv) Absence of an appellate remedy does not render a provision unconstitutional. Hence, it has been urged that section 515-A is constitutional.

8. Sub-sections (1) and (1A) of section 351 provide as follows:

“351. Proceedings to be taken in respect of buildings or work commenced contrary to section 347.— (1) The Commissioner shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, designate an officer of the Corporation to be the Designated Officer for the purposes of this section and of sections 352, 352-a and 354-a. The Designated Officer shall have jurisdiction over such local area as may be specified in the notification and different officers may be designated for different local areas.

(1A). If the erection of any building or the execution of any such work as is described in section 342, is commenced contrary to the provisions of section 342 or 347, the Designated Officer, unless he deems it necessary to take proceedings in respect of such building or work under section 354, shall:

(a) by written notice, require the person who is erecting such building or executing such work, or has erected such building or executed such work, or who is the owner for the time being of such building or work, within seven days from the date of service of such notice, by a statement in writing subscribed by him or by an agent duly authorized by him in that behalf and addressed to the Designated Officer, to show sufficient cause why such building or work shall not be removed, altered or pulled down; or

(b) shall require the said person on such day and at such time and place as shall be specified in such notice to attend personally, or by an agent duly authorized by him in that behalf, and show sufficient cause why such building or work shall not be removed, altered or pulled down.

Explanation: “To show sufficient cause” in this sub-section shall mean to prove that the work mentioned in the said notice is carried out in accordance with the provisions of section 337 or 342 and section 347 of the Act.”

Under sub-section (1A) of section 351, the designated officer is empowered to act in a situation where the erection of a building or the execution of any work of the nature referred to in section 342 is commenced contrary to the provisions of section 342 or section 347. Section 342, inter alia, applies where additions, alterations or repairs are sought to be carried out to a building in which event a notice of intent has to be furnished to the Commissioner of the nature and the extent of the intended work, among other things. Section 347, inter alia, provides that no person shall commence such work without furnishing a notice of intent and without the approval of the Commissioner (or if the Commissioner has failed to intimate his disapproval within the period prescribed). Before the designated officer initiates steps under section 351, he is required to issue a written notice calling upon the person who is erecting a building or executing the work or to the person who has erected a building or executed the work to show sufficient cause why the building or the work should not be removed, altered or pulled down. Under clause (b) of sub-section (1A) of section 351, an enabling provision has been made by which the designated officer may call upon a person to whom a notice is addressed, to attend personally to show cause. The explanation stipulates that the expression ‘to show sufficient cause’ shall mean to prove that the work mentioned in the notice has been carried out in accordance with sections 337, 342 or 347. If the person fails to show sufficient cause to the satisfaction of the designated officer, the officer may remove, alter or pull down the work.

9. This provision, as noted in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Muni Suvrat-Swami Jain S.M.P Sangh v. Arun Nathuram Gaikwad, 2007 (2) Mh.L.J (S.C) 8 : (2006) 8 SCC 590 Paragraph 57 on pages 611 and 612 confers an enabling power on the Commissioner and a discretion if sufficient cause is not shown, whether or not to demolish the unauthorized construction. Similarly under section 354-A, if the designated officer is satisfied that the erection of a building or execution of a work has been unlawfully commenced or is being unlawfully carried on, he may issue a notice to stop such erection of work forthwith. Sub-section (2) of section 354-A provides as follows:

“354-A. Power of Designated Officer to stop erection of building or work commenced or carried on unlawfully.— (2) If the erection of the building or execution of the work is not stopped as required by the Designated Officer or permission approved by the competent authority in favour of the erection of the building or execution of the work is not produced within twenty-four hours from the service of notice referred to in sub-section (1), the Designated Officer may, without further notice, remove or pull down the building or work and the expenses thereof shall be paid by the said person or owner of the building or work. The Designated Officer may also direct that any person directing or carrying out such erection or work shall be removed by any police officer from the place where the building is being erected or the work is being executed.”

10. Sub-section (2) of section 354-A deals with a situation where the erection of a building or execution of a work is not stopped upon receipt of a notice or where the person to whom the notice is addressed does not produce the approval of the competent authority within 24 hours. In such a case, the designated officer is authorized, without further notice, to remove or pull down the building or the work. Section 354-A evidently applies to emergent situations where the designated officer considers it necessary to stop work which has been unlawfully commenced or work which has been unlawfully carried out despite issuance of a stop work notice.

11. Ordinarily a Civil Court under the provisions of section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall have the jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. The conferment of jurisdiction on Civil Courts to try suits of a civil nature is, therefore, subject to a law which may be enacted by the competent legislature either expressly barring the jurisdiction or impliedly taking away the jurisdiction of the Court. There is nothing uncommon, as a first principle of law, in a competent legislature barring the jurisdiction of a Civil Court to entertain a civil suit of a specified nature. The legislature in the State of Maharashtra has introduced section 515-A to exclude the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in matters involving demolition of unauthorized constructions in order to obviate the inordinately long delays that were occasioned in the taking of steps against illegal structures and constructions due to the pendency of suits before the Civil Courts. The legislature was entitled to take cognizance of these delays and to enact a suitable statutory provision. In the judgment in Dhulabhai etc. v. State of M.P, 1969 Mh.L.J (S.C) 1 : AIR 1969 SC 78, the Supreme Court summarized the principles of law governing the interpretation of finality clauses and statutory provisions ousting the jurisdiction of Civil Courts. In regard to the express bar of jurisdiction, the principle enunciated in the judgment of the Supreme Court is as follows:

“35(2). Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the Court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the Civil Court.

Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the Tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in Civil Courts are prescribed by the said statute or not.”

12. In the present case, there is an express bar on the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in section 515 A to entertain a suit calling into question any notice, order or direction issued under sections 351 and 354-A. Hence, in view of the law laid down in Dhulabhai (supra), an examination of the scheme of the Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is strictly speaking, not decisive. Be that as it may, under section 351, sufficient safeguards have been provided by the legislature to ensure that the determination by the authority is subject to the observance of statutory parameters. The statute incorporates requirements to ensure that the procedure is fair and that the outcome of the inquiry is based on objective considerations. The conditions which are imposed by the statute ensure firstly that before action is taken, a written notice must be issued to the person who is erecting a building or executing a work. Following the issuance of a notice, the statute secondly mandates that an opportunity to show sufficient cause must be granted in the form of a statement in writing. Thirdly the designated officer is empowered in an appropriate case to allow the person to whom the notice is issued, to show cause in person or through an agent. Fourthly, the designated officer is required to apply his mind whether the person to whom a notice was issued, has or has not failed to show sufficient cause to his satisfaction. The satisfaction of the designated officer is not a subjective satisfaction but is a satisfaction which has to be arrived at objectively after appreciating the contents of the defence and the cause which has been shown. The officer must, in particular, apply his mind whether work of the description which is mentioned in section 342 has been commenced contrary to the provisions of section 342 or section 347. The officer is thereupon vested with the discretion on whether or not to demolish the structure. This discretion is again a discretion which has to be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily. Reasons must be recorded in the order of the designated officer. Reasons provide an assurance against an arbitrary exercise of power and allow the decision to be challenged and scrutinized under Article 226 of the Constitution.

13. The absence of an appellate remedy against the decision of an administrative officer does not render a statutory provision unconstitutional. This was settled by the judgment of the Supreme Court in Organo Chemical Industries v. Union of India, (1979) 4 SCC 573. In the concurring judgment of Justice Krishna Iyer, the principle was set out as follows:

“34.……………An appeal is a desirable corrective but not an indispensable imperative and while its presence is an extra check on wayward orders its absence is not a sure index of arbitrary potential. It depends on the nature of the subject-matter, other available correctives, possible harm flowing from wrong orders and a wealth of other factors.”

14. In a subsequent judgment in Babubhai and Co. v. State of Gujarat, (1985) 2 SCC 732, the same principle was elucidated in the following observations:

“6. It cannot be disputed that the absence of a provision for a corrective machinery by way of appeal or revision to a superior authority to rectify an adverse order passed by an authority or body on whom the power is conferred may indicate that the power so conferred is unreasonable or arbitrary but it is obvious that providing such corrective machinery is only one of the several ways in which the power could be checked or controlled and its absence will be one of the factors to be considered along with several others before coming to the conclusion that the power so conferred is unreasonable or arbitrary; in other words mere absence of a corrective machinery by way of appeal or revision by itself would not make the power unreasonable or arbitrary, much less would render the provision invalid. Regard will have to be had to several factors, such as, on whom the power is conferred-whether on a high official or a petty officer, what is the nature of the power-whether the exercise thereof depends upon the subjective satisfaction of the authority or body on whom it is conferred or is it to be exercised objectively by reference to some existing facts or tests, whether or not it is a quasi-judicial power requiring that authority or body to observe principles of natural justice and make a speaking order etc; the last mentioned factor particularly ensures application of mind on the part of the authority or body only to pertinent or germane material on the record excluding the extraneous and irrelevant and also subjects the order of the authority or body to a judicial review under the writ jurisdiction of the Court on grounds of perversity, extraneous influence, mala fides and other blatant infirmities. Moreover all these factors will have to be considered in the light of the scheme of the enactment and the purpose intended to be achieved by the concerned provision. If on an examination of the scheme of the enactment as also the purpose of the concerned provision it is found that the power to decide or do a particular thing is conferred on a very minor or petty officer, that the exercise thereof by him depends on his subjective satisfaction, that he is expected to exercise the power administratively without any obligation to make a speaking order then, of course, the absence of a corrective machinery will render the provision conferring such absolute and unfettered power invalid. But it is the cumulative effect of all these factors that will render the provision unreasonable or arbitrary and liable to be struck down.……”

15. The Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned against the dangers of unauthorized construction and encroachments. In Pratibha Co-operative Housing Society Limited v. State of Maharashtra, (1991) 3 SCC 341, the Supreme Court observed as follows:

“6. ………the tendency of raising unlawful constructions and unauthorized encroachments is increasing in the entire country and such activities are required to be dealt with by firm hands. Such unlawful constructions are against public interest and hazardous to the safety of occupiers and residents of multistoreyed buildings.………”

16. In Dipak Kumar Mukherjee v. Kolkata Municipal Corporation, (2013) 5 SCC 336, the Supreme Court has cautioned of the danger posed by illegal and unauthorised constructions to planned development. The failure of the State machinery to take prompt action is liable to give rise to the belief among common citizens that planning law is enforced against the poor and violations by those in the corridors of power are ignored. Hon'ble Mr. Justice G.S Singhvi delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court observed as follows:

“8. What needs to be emphasised is that illegal and unauthorised constructions of buildings and other structures not only violate the municipal laws and the concept of planned development of the particular area but also affect various fundamental and constitutional rights of other persons. The common man feels cheated when he finds that those making illegal and unauthorised constructions are supported by the people entrusted with the duty of preparing and executing master plan/development plan/zonal plan. The reports of demotion of hutments and jhugii jhopris belonging to the poor and disadvantaged section of the society frequently appear in the print media but one seldom gets to read about demolition of illegally/unauthorisedly constructed multi-storeyed structures raised by economically affluent people. The failure of the State apparatus to take prompt action to demolish such illegal constructions has convinced the citizens that planning laws are enforced only against poor and all compromises are made by the State machinery when it is required to deal with those who have money power or unholy nexus with the power corridors.”

Taking note of the earlier precedents on the subject, the Supreme Court held that there should be no judicial tolerance of illegal and unauthorised constructions. The same principle has been laid down in another judgment of the Supreme Court in Esha Ekta Apartments Co-operative Housing Society v. Municipal Corporation of Mumbai, 2013 (5) Mh.L.J (S.C) 30 : (2013) 5 SCC 357. The Supreme Court considered the provisions specifically of sections 44 and 45 and sections 52 and 57 of the Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act, 1966 and observed as follows:

“46. An analysis of the above reproduced provisions makes it clear that any person who undertakes or carries out development or changes the use of land without permission of the Planning Authority is liable to be punished with imprisonment. At the same time, the Planning Authority is empowered to require the owner to restore the land to its original condition as it existed before the development work was undertaken. The scheme of these provisions does not mandate regularisation of construction made without obtaining the required permission or in violation thereof.”

17. The State of Maharashtra and more particularly its urban areas are plagued by a menace of unauthorized constructions. The object of introducing section 515-A was to ensure that recourse to civil remedies is not utilized with a view to abuse the process as would generally result when those responsible for unauthorized constructions use every possible means to ensure that a delay takes place in the disposal of proceedings, once a stay is obtained. In this background, the legislative provision cannot be regarded as being arbitrary.

18. In Organo Chemical Industries (supra), the Supreme Court dealt with the provisions of section 14-B of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, which empowered the Provident Fund Commissioner to impose damages. The Supreme Court noted that in that case a hearing was given to the affected party; reasons had to be recorded in awarding damages and the writ jurisdiction was available to review the order of the Commissioner. These were amongst other circumstances which weighed in the upholding of the provision. Similarly, in Babubhai (supra), the provisions of section 54 of the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954 were upheld, inter alia, on the ground that the power of summary eviction was conferred on a responsible body and was required to be exercised in a objective manner. Besides the quasi judicial power required observance of the principles of natural justice and the passing of a speaking order accompanied by the reasons. This, according to the Supreme Court, would ensure an application of mind to germane or relevant material. The order was subject to the writ jurisdiction.

19. Having regard to these well settled principles, it is not possible to accede to the submission that the bar of jurisdiction which has been enacted by section 515-A of Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, as amended, is arbitrary or unconstitutional. The provisions of sections 351 and 354-a contain adequate safeguards, both procedural and substantive, to ensure due notice, an opportunity to represent, the consideration of the cause shown and an application of mind to relevant and germane circumstances. A reasoned order must be passed. The legislature was, in our view, acting in the public interest in ensuring that the urgent need of taking expeditious action against unauthorized constructions does not get lost in a maze of dilatory remedies in Civil Courts.

20. Before concluding it would be necessary to note that in the present case, the ad-interim relief was refused by the City Civil Court primarily in view of section 515-A, but also on the ground that corrective machinery is available in the form of a representation before the Grievance Redressal Committee. The circular that has been issued by the Commissioner of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation on 4 June, 2013 for the setting up of a Grievance Redressal Committee was as a result of the directions issued by this Court to the effect that there should be an appropriate mechanism for redressal of grievances pertaining to unauthorized constructions. The aim of the circular is to redress grievances received from a complainant in respect of action/non-action on unauthorized constructions. The circular provides in Clause-2.3 that the zonal committee shall not pass any order which will stop/stay the notice action initiated by the designated officer and the on going notice action will continue and be brought to its logical conclusion. Similarly, clause-6.5 requires the owner/occupier against whom a complaint is made to be called to attend the hearing. The circular, therefore, provides a remedy to citizens to complain against unauthorized structures. Be that as it may, the City Civil Court was on its interpretation of section 515-A justified in coming to the conclusion as it did on the bar of jurisdiction.

21. For the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any merit in the challenge to the constitutional validity of section 515-A of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1881. The petition shall accordingly stand dismissed. However, in view of the fact that the Petitioner should, in the interest of justice, be allowed to take recourse to the remedy of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for challenging the order passed under section 351, on 17 June, 2013, we direct that action for the implementation of the order shall not commence for a period of two weeks from today.

Order accordingly.