1. This Civil Revision Application takes exception to the order dated 17-1-2005 passed by the 2nd Ad hoc Additional District Judge, Dhule in Civil M.A No. 89 of 2003.

2. The background facts leading to file this Civil Revision Application as disclosed by the applicant are as under:

The applicant herein is the original plaintiff in Special Civil Suit No. 254 of 1996 and respondent No. 1 herein is the local authority governed by the Statute and respondent Nos. 2 and 3 are the responsible and concerned officers of respondent No. 1 and they are original defendants in the above mentioned Special Civil Suit No. 254 of 1996.

The applicant herein filed Special Civil Suit No. 254 of 1996 against the present respondents and in the said suit, the respondents appeared through their Counsel but they neither filed their written statement nor appeared for hearing. Hence, the trial Court decided the said special civil suit ex parte.

The present applicant, after passing the ex parte judgment and decree in the above mentioned suit, filed execution proceedings against the respondents. In the said execution proceedings also, the respondents appeared belatedly and filed application for stay of execution proceedings on 23-3-1998, but the Executing Court rejected the said application.

It is the case of the revision applicant that, with mala fide intention, the respondents herein filed application for restoration of the above referred suit under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure beyond limitation with the application of condonation of delay. The said application for condonation of delay was numbered as Misc. Civil Application No. 109 of 1997. The trial Court, after recording the evidence of both the sides and after hearing the parties, rejected the said application for condonation of delay on 24-4-2003, on the ground that, there is no sufficient cause made out by the present respondents for condonation of delay. Consequently, the said restoration application is finally disposed of by the learned trial Court.

Thereafter, the original defendants i.e respondents herein, filed appeal against the ex parte judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court in Special Civil Suit No. 254 of 1996 after a long delay which is near about 6½ years. The said appeal is accompanied with delay condonation application which is numbered and registered as Civil Misc. Application No. 89 of 2003. In the said Civil Misc. Application No. 89 of 2003 the respondents herein contended that, the above referred Misc. Civil Application No. 109 of 1997 was for restoration of the Special Civil Suit No. 254 of 1996, which was decided and decreed as ex parte. According to the revision applicant, this fact itself shows that, the original defendants with mala fide intention availed the different legal remedies one after another, in fact, the defendants could have take the precaution to avail proper single remedy or both remedies available to them simultaneously.

The said Civil Misc. Application No. 89 of 2003 for condonation of delay filed by the respondents herein, came to be allowed by order dated 17-1-2005. Being aggrieved by the said order allowing the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal by the District Court, Dhule, this Civil Revision Application is filed.

3. Learned Counsel appearing for the revision applicant submits that, the lower Appellate Court exercised its jurisdiction with material irregularity in allowing the application for condonation of delay without taking into consideration the fact that, the remedy availed by the respondents and the application filed by them for condonation of delay are barred by the principles of “resjudicata” and “estoppel”. It is submitted that, the lower Appellate Court exercised its jurisdiction illegally and not complied with the mandatory provisions of Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of the Civil Procedure Code. It is further submitted that, the lower Appellate Court has taken a wrong and lenient view on the ground that, the respondent is a public authority and the matter is concerned with public money. In fact, there is no law which provides different treatment for different aggrieved persons whether corporal or incorporal with respect of law of limitation unless expressly provided. It is further submitted that, the dispute is not regarding public money. Learned Counsel further submitted that, the lower Appellate Court has not taken into consideration the fact that, the respondents did not approach the Court with clean hands. The respondents misled the lower Appellate Court that, their application for restoration had rejected, in fact, that restoration application never registered or numbered. But the application for condonation of delay filed along with restoration application was rejected by the trial Court on merits, therefore, section 14 of the Limitation Act never attracted in the facts of the case. It is further submitted that, the remedy under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure was available to the present respondents and thereby they have rightly preferred the application under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure and therefore, it cannot be said that, the advice given by their Advocate to avail such remedy was wrong advice.

It is further submitted that, the revision application is perfectly maintainable in view of the observations of this Court in the case of Chandu s/o Jagannath Ambekar v. Digambar s/o Kisanrao Kulkarni, reported in 2004 (4) Mh.L.J 69. Learned Counsel further invited my attention to the judgment of this Court in the case of Maharashtra Rajya Sahakari Adiwasi Vikas Mahamandal Maryadit through its Regional Manager v. Kanti Shantilal and Company, reported in 2003 Vol. 105(2) Bom.LR 349 and submitted that, time consumed in the proceedings under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Civil Procedure Code to set aside exparte decree cannot be treated as sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of limitation.

4. Learned Counsel further submits that, the term “sufficient cause” as contemplated under section 5 of the Limitation Act even if it is to receive liberal construction it must comply with concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of concerned party. In support of this contention, learned Counsel appearing for the revision applicant placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Balwant Singh (dead) v. Jagdish Singh, reported in 2010 (6) ALL MR 480. Learned Counsel further invited my attention to the judgment of this Court in the case of Laxman N. Divekar… v. State Of Maharashtra…., reported in 1998 (1) Mh.L.J 745 : AIR 1998 Bombay 176 and submitted that, limitation is prescribed by law and the said provision has to be applied without carving separate standards, equally to all litigants, be it the State or private party. Learned Counsel further submitted that, the lower Appellate Court even without adverting to the contentions in the application for condonation of delay, has condoned the delay for altogether different reasons which are unsustainable. Therefore, there is a clear perversity in the findings recorded by the lower Appellate Court while condoning the delay.

Learned Counsel further invited my attention to the judgment in the case of Life Insurance Corporation of India v. S. Parekh and Company, reported in 2008 (4) Mh.L.J 816 : 2008 (6) Bom.C.R 494 and submitted that, this Court in said judgment held that, “in the absence of factual date disclosing sufficient cause for the inordinate delay in approaching the Court, no amount of crocodile tears and/or sermon can satisfy the Court to condone such delay.”

5. Learned Counsel further submits that, section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not lay down any standard or objective test. The test of “sufficient cause” is purely an individualistic test. In support of this contention, he placed reliance on the reported judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of R.B Ramlingam v. R.B Bhvaneswari., reported in 2009 ALL SCR 508.

6. The learned Counsel further invited my attention to the judgment of this Court in the case of Sureshchandra s/o Bagwantrao Doiphode v. Utlam s/o Dattatraya Jadhav, reported in 2010 (6) ALL MR 552 and submitted that, this Court can certainly interfere in its revisional jurisdiction if the findings recorded by the Appellate Court are perverse and if the Appellate Court failed to consider the evidence on record which amounts to failure to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it under the law and whole judgment is vitiated because of it. Learned Counsel further submitted that, even after disposal of the appeal also, the Court can examine the correctness of the order condoning the delay in said appeal.

7. It is further submitted that, the principle of “resjudicata” is applicable in different proceedings arising out of the same course of action and it also apply in different stages of the same proceedings. In support of this contention, he pressed into service the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Ishwar Dutt v. Land Acquisition Collector, reported in 2005 SAR (Civil) 684 and also another judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Amarendra Komalam v. Usha Sinha, reported in 2005 SAR (Civil) 451. It is further submitted that, once the application for setting aside ex parte decree is dismissed, the respondents are not entitled to raise the subject-matter of application under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure all over again in appeal before High Court in first appeal because it may lead to conflict of decisions which is not contemplated in law. In support of this contention, he placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar, reported in 2005 (2) Mh.L.J 839 : 2005 SAR (Civil) 165.

Learned Counsel further submitted that, if the party seeking benefit of the provisions of section 14 of the Limitation Act failed in earlier proceedings on merits and not on defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, it would not be entitled to the benefit of section 14 of the Limitation Act. Therefore, learned Counsel appearing for the revision applicant submits that, this Civil Revision Application deserves to be allowed.

8. On the other hand, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1 submitted that, the application for condonation of delay which was filed by the respondents was mainly on two grounds that, the remedy of preferring appeal was available to the Municipal Council, however, as per advice given by the Counsel appearing for the Municipal Council, the application for restoration of the suit was filed under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Learned Counsel invited my attention to the contents of the application which is placed at Exhibit-B of the compilation from pages 18 to 22. He further submits that, time which was spent in prosecuting the application which was filed under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure is required to be taken into consideration while considering the prayer for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. He further submitted that, Civil Misc. Application No. 109 of 1997 was preferred for restoration of the original suit which came to be decided on 24-4-2003 by the trial Court and as such, in view of the provisions of section 14 of the Limitation Act, the time till 24-4-2003 is saved and will have to be excluded from consideration as Municipal Council had bona fide brought the said restoration application with due diligence and there was no mala fide on its part. The officers of the Municipal Council believed on the advice of their Advocate and under such assumption only, the said restoration application came to be filed. It is further submitted that, respondent No. 1 is a body corporate constituted under the law regulated by rules and regulations. Certain steps are to be taken before bringing any legal action before the Court of law which consumes some time and under such circumstances, some time was consumed in taking proper decision. There was no deliberate or intentional delay or negligence on the part of the Municipal Council.

Learned Counsel appearing for the respondents vehemently submitted that, the Civil Revision Application cannot be entertained against the order of condoning the delay. Learned Counsel invited my attention to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Major S.S Khanna v. Brig. F.J Dillon, reported in AIR 1964 SC 497(1) and in particular Paragraphs 7 and 33 of the said judgment and submitted that, this Court may not entertain this Civil Revision Application.

Learned Counsel appearing for the respondents invited my attention to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of G. Ramegowda, Major etc. v. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore, reported in AIR 1998 SC 897 and submitted that, the expression ‘sufficient cause’ in section 5 of the Limitation Act must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay. He further invited my attention to the another judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State (Nct Of Delhi) v. Ahmed Jaan, reported in AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 695 and submitted that, the expression ‘sufficient cause’ should receive a liberal construction. He further invited my attention to the judgment of this Court in the case of Ghyanchand s/o Lalchand v. Municipal Corporation, Dhule, reported in 2009 (3) Mh.L.J 317, and submitted that, the discretion exercised by the Court in condoning the delay would not ordinarily be disturbed by the Superior Court much less in revisional jurisdiction unless the exercise of discretion was wholly on untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. Learned Counsel further submitted that, in the present case, after condonation of delay by the lower Appellate Court, the appeal is registered and further it is placed for arguments. Therefore, this Court may not interfere at this stage and reject this Civil Revision Application.

9. I have given anxious consideration to the rival submissions of the Counsel appearing for the parties. Perused the averments in the Civil Revision Application, annexures thereto, impugned judgment and order passed by the lower Appellate Court and also other documents placed on record by the parties and the judgments relied upon by the learned Counsel appearing for the respective parties. Since first objection is raised by the Counsel for the respondents about the maintainability of the Civil Revision Application, therefore, I feel it appropriate to deal with the said point first and then to proceed to decide other points raised in the matter.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shiv Shakti Co-op. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in (2003) 6 SCC 659 has considered the provisions of section 115 proviso (after amendment by Act 46 of 1999 w.e.f 1-7-2002).

In the aforesaid pronouncement, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, if the impugned order is interim in nature or does not finally decide the lis, the revision under section 115 will not be maintainable. The legislative intent is crystal clear. There is marked distinction in the language of section 32(2)(i) of the Amendment Act. While in the former, there was a clear legislative intent to save applications admitted or pending before the amendment came into force. Such an intent is significantly absent in section 32(2)(i). The amendment relates to procedures. No person has a vested right in a course of procedure. He has only the right of proceeding in the manner prescribed. If by a statutory change the mode of procedure is altered, the parties are to proceed according to the altered mode, without exception, unless there is a different stipulation.

Relying on the said judgment, this Court in the case of Chandu s/o Jagannath Ambekar v. Digambar s/o Kisanrao Kulkarni (supra) has taken a view that, if the delay condonation application is allowed by the lower Court, a revision against such an order can be maintained by the respondent-opponent in such a case because if the Court below had made an order on such an application in favour of the respondent/defendant the proceeding could have been finally disposed of.

(Emphasis supplied).

In the present case, the application filed by the respondents herein, for condonation of delay in filing the appeal, is allowed by the lower Appellate Court. If the lower Appellate Court had made an order on such an application in favour of the revision applicant, the proceeding could have been disposed of Therefore, in my considered view, the revision application is maintainable. The judgments which are relied upon by the Counsel for respondent No. 1 are delivered before the Amendment Act 46 of 1999, has come into force.

10. Another point which is raised by the Counsel for the revision applicant that, since the appeal is now numbered and fixed for final hearing, this Court may not enter into the exercise to see the correctness of the order on an application for condonation of delay is concerned, same point is answered by the Supreme Court in the case of G. Ramegowda, Major etc. v. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore (supra). The Supreme Court in the said judgment held; “the fact that the main appeals are themselves, in the meanwhile, disposed of finally on the merits by the High Court would not by itself detract from and bar the consideration of the correctness of the order condoning the delays. This is an instance of what are called ‘dependent-orders’ and if the order excusing the delays is itself set aside in the Supreme Court appeals, the further exercise, made in the meanwhile, by the High Court finally disposing of the appeals would be rendered nugatory.”

(Emphasis supplied).

11. As stated earlier, the respondents herein filed Civil Misc. Application No. 89 of 2003 for condonation of delay. In para-1 of the said application for condonation of delay, it is stated that, in the Special Civil Suit No. 254 of 2006 which was filed by the original plaintiff i.e revision applicant herein, the respondents herein caused appearance, however, unfortunately they could not file its written statement. Consequently, the said Special Civil Suit No. 254 of 1996 came to be decided against the Municipal Council by the trial Court.

In Para-2 of the said application for condonation of delay, it is stated that, though the remedy of preferring appeal was available to the Municipal Council, as per the advise given by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of Municipal Council in the said suit, an application for restoration of the said suit came to be filed in the same Court which came to be registered as Misc. Civil Application No. 109 of 1997 in the Court of the learned Civil Judge, S.D Dhule. However, the said Misc. Civil Application No. 109 of 1997 was dismissed by the Civil Judge, S.D Dhule.

Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said judgment and decree passed in Special Civil Suit No. 254 of 1996 dated 29-7-1997 the applicants intended to prefer an appeal before the lower Appellate Court. However, there is delay in filing the appeal and therefore, the applicants have moved the instant petition for condonation of delay.

The application for condonation of delay was moved on the grounds that, as per advise of the Advocate appearing on behalf of the Municipal Council, Misc. Civil Application No. 109 of 1997 was preferred for restoration of the original suit on file, which came to be decided on 24-4-2003. As such, in view of the provisions of section 14 of the Limitation Act, time till 24-4-2003 is saved and will have to be excluded from consideration as the Municipal Council had bona fidely brought the said restoration application with due diligence and there was no mala fides on its part.

In Para-4 of the said application, it is stated that, the appeal should have been preferred within a month from 24-4-2003, however, certified copies of the impugned judgment and decree were applied on 2-7-2003. Thus, there is delay of two months and eight days in applying for the certified copies. It is stated in Para-4 of the said application that, the impugned judgment and decree is dated 29-7-1997 and as clarified in earlier paragraph, limitation is saved up till 24-4-2003 in view of section 14 of the Limitation Act on which date the application for restoration of the suit came to be dismissed by the trial Court.

It is further stated in Para 5 of the said application that, applicant No. 1 is a body corporate constituted under law regulated by its rules and regulations. Certain steps are to be taken before bringing any legal action in the Court of law, which consumes some time. Under these circumstances, there was no deliberate or intentional delay or negligence on the part of the Municipal Council. The subject-matter in the present appeal is of public interest also. Other contentions are also taken in Para-5 of the said application and ultimately in Para-6 of the said application, it is prayed that, the delay of six years in filing the present appeal may kindly be condoned in the interest of justice. The period of limitation may kindly be saved under section 14 of the Limitation Act.

(Emphasis supplied).

12. On careful reading of the averments in the abovementioned application for condonation of delay, it is abundantly clear that, the respondents who are applicants in the said application, have not stated anywhere that their application was under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the said suit has been rejected on the ground of delay. The averments in the application gives impression that Misc. Civil Application No. 109 of 1997 was for restoration and the same came to be dismissed. In fact, the truth is that, the said Misc. Civil Application No. 109 of 1997 was filed by the respondents herein, for condonation of delay in filing the application under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure for setting aside ex parte decree. Therefore, I find considerable force in the arguments advanced by the Counsel for the revision applicant that, the respondents did not approach the District Court with clean hands and they did not disclose all relevant facts in the said application. At the cost of repetition, it has to be observed that, on careful perusal of the averments in the application for condonation of delay, it is abundantly clear that, the respondents nowhere have stated that, their application for restoration of Special Civil Suit No. 254 of 1996 came to be dismissed on the ground of delay. In fact, there was no occasion to number the restoration application, since the application filed for condonation of delay in filing the said application, was rejected by the trial Court.

13. Upon careful perusal of the contents of the application, three grounds are taken by the respondents in the application for condonation of delay. Firstly, though the remedy of appeal was available to the respondents to challenge ex parte decree of the trial Court in Special Civil Suit No. 254 of 1996, they filed application under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure for restoration of the said suit on the advise of their Counsel.

Indisputably, it was open to the respondents to file application for restoration of the suit under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure and also to file the appeal challenging the said decree in Special Civil Suit No. 254 of 1996. Both the remedies could have been availed simultaneously. The advice which was given by learned Counsel for the Municipal Council was not a wrong advice. The advice given by the learned Counsel for the Municipal Council to file application under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure was a proper advice. Therefore, it cannot be said that, such advice given by the learned Counsel appearing for the Municipal Council was not a correct advice.

Second ground which is taken in the application is that, as per advice of the Advocate appearing on behalf of the Municipal Council, Misc. Civil Application No. 109 of 1997 was preferred for restoration of the original suit on file. The said application came to be decided on 24-4-2003 by the trial Court and as such, in view of the provisions of section 14 of the Limitation Act, time till 24-4-2003 is saved and will have to be excluded from consideration as the Municipal Council had bona fide brought the said restoration application with due diligence and there was no mala fides on its part.

At this juncture, it would be appropriate to reproduce the provisions of section 14 of the Limitation Act, which reads thus:

“14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction.—

(1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.

(2) In computing the period of limitation for any application, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 2 of Order XXXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), the provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply in relation to a fresh suit instituted on permission granted by the court under Rule 1 of that Order where such permission is granted on the ground that the first suit must fail by reason of a defect in the jurisdiction of the court or other cause of a like nature.

Explanation.— For the purpose of this section.

(a) in excluding the time during which a former civil proceeding was pending, the day on which that proceeding was instituted and the day on which it ended shall both be counted;

(b) a plaintiff or an applicant resisting an appeal shall be deemed to be prosecuting a proceeding;

(c) misjoinder of parties or of causes of action shall be deemed to be a cause of a like nature with defect of jurisdiction.”

(Emphasis supplied).

14. A careful perusal of the provisions of section 14 of the Limitation Act would make it abundantly clear that, in computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a Court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a Court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.

In the instant case, the trial Court had jurisdiction to entertain the application under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the respondents herein, had rightly filed the said application for restoration of the suit. Therefore, in the facts of this case, it cannot be said that, there was any defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature and the trial Court was unable to entertain the said proceedings. Therefore, the contentions of the Counsel for the revision applicant that, the applicant is entitled or the benefit of provisions of section 14 of the Limitation Act, cannot be accepted.

This Court in the case of Maharashtra Rajya Sahakari Adiwasi Vikas Mahamandal Maryadit through its Regional Manager v. Kanti Shantilal and Company, (supra) held, long delay in filing the appeal, time consumed in proceedings under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure to set aside exparte decree is not a sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within time. This Court while concluding the aforesaid point has placed reliance on the judgment in the case of Jotiba Limbaji Kanashenavar…Defendant v. Ramappa Jotiba Kanashenavar…Plaintiff ., reported in 1940 Bom. L.R 957.

(Emphasis supplied).

15. The third point which is taken in the application is that, the applicant No. 1 is a body corporate constituted under law regulated by its rules and regulations and certain steps are to be taken before bringing any legal action in the Court of law which consumes some time. In fact, from perusal of the averments in the said application, no any particulars are given why the respondents herein could not take steps within time for filing the appeal. Only general averments are made in the said application that, public interest is involved and also certain steps are required to be taken before bringing any legal action in the court of law which consumes time, but no better particulars are provided in the application though there is inordinate delay of more than six years in filing the appeal.

It is true that, term “sufficient cause” under section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive liberal construction, however, it is equally true that, it must comply with concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of concerned party. In the instant case, as stated earlier, no any detail particulars are provided by the respondents. The Supreme Court in the case of Balwant Singh (dead) v. Jagdish Singh (supra) in para 13 held thus:

“The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of ‘reasonableness’ as it it understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right, as accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. The application filed by the applicants lack in details. Even the averments made are not correct and ex facie lack bona fide. The explanation has to be reasonable or plausible, so as to persuade the Court to believe that the explanation rendered is not only true, but is worthy of exercising judicial discretion in favour of the applicant. If it does not specify any of the enunciated ingredients of judicial pronouncements, then the application should be dismissed. On the other hand, if the application is bona fide and based upon true and plausible explanations, as well as reflect normal behavior of a common prudent person on the part of the applicant, the Court would normally tilt the judicial discretion in favour of such an applicant. Liberal construction cannot be equated with doing injustice to the other party. 2004 (5) ALL MR (SC) 110 Held per incurium”.

The Supreme Court in the case of P.K Ramchandran v. State of Kerala, reported in (1997) 9 JT (SC) 189 held thus:

“6. Law of Limitation may harshly effect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribe and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The discretion exercised by the High Court was thus, neither proper nor judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot be sustained. This appeal, therefore, succeeds and the impugned order is set aside”.

The Supreme Court in the case of G. Ramegowda, Major etc. v. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore (supra) held in Para-8 thus:

“The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private citizen as for Governmental authorities. Government, like any other litigant must take responsibility for the acts or omissions of its officers. But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross purposes with it. Therefore, in assessing what, in a particular case, constitutes ‘sufficient cause’ for purposes of section 5 it might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the considerations that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Government. Governmental decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural redtape in the process of their making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible”.

(Emphasis supplied).

16. Therefore, it follows from the above mentioned authoritative pronouncements so far law of limitation is concerned, it cannot be made applicable differently to a private citizen and as to Governmental authorities. From careful reading of the averments in the application for condonation of delay, the respondents herein, have utterly failed to provide better particulars or to show how the public interest is involved in the matter. Only vague averments are made in the said application.

17. In the reasoning part of the impugned judgment and order, the lower Appellate Court has not referred the contentions of the respondents that, due to wrong advice of their Counsel to file the application under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of the Civil Procedure, the respondents filed application for restoration of the suit in stead of filing the appeal and therefore, they are entitled for benefit under the provisions of section 14 of the Limitation Act. The lower Appellate Court by assigning reasons in Para-6, allowed the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. Para-6 & 7 of the impugned judgment and order reads thus:

“6. I have gone through certified copies of Judgment and decree of Special Civil Suit No. 254 of 1996 decided on 29-7-1997 and certified copy of Civil Misc. Application No. 109/1997 decided on 25-4-2003 I have gone through above said case laws. I relied on above said case laws ands held that the subject matter of above said special Civil Suit No. 254/96 is in respect of public Property and money and so 1 hold that delay mentioned in this main application No. 89/2003 deserves to be condoned for the sake of justice with costs of Rs. 3000/- given to the Respondent and accordingly I answer this point No. 1 in the affirmative.

7. POINT NO. 2 : On going through above discussion, I proceed to pass the following order for the sake of justice.

This application Civil Misc. Appln. No. 89/2003 is hereby allowed with costs of Rs. 3000/- given to the respondent.

Applicants shall pay or deposit cost of Rs. 3000/- to the respondent within 14 days from the date of this order.

Appeal against Judgment and decree of Civil Judge, Senior Division dated 29-7-1997 passed in Special Suit No. 254/1996 will be taken on file after paying above said cost of Rs. 3000/- to the respondent.”

18. A careful reading of Paras 6 and 7 reproduced hereinabove from the impugned judgment and order would make it clear that, none of the contentions raised in the application for condonation of delay formed the part of reasoning of the lower Appellate Court for allowing such application. It appears that, only on the ground that Special Civil Suit No. 254 of 1996 is in respect of public property and money and therefore, the Appellate Court held that the application for condonation of delay deserves to be allowed in the interest of justice. Such reasoning given by the lower Appellate Court is without any basis. There is no any discussion how the subject matter of Special Civil Suit No. 254 of 1996 is in respect of public property and money.

19. It is true that, while exercising revisional jurisdiction, the Court should not interfere in the discretion exercised by the Court in condoning the delay unless the exercise of discretion was wholly on untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. However, in the present case, it is abundantly clear from the discussion hereinabove that, the exercise of discretion by the Appellate Court was wholly on untenable grounds, said was arbitrary and perverse. There was delay of more than six years in filing the appeal. No better particulars are given in the application for condonation of delay. The Appellate Court has not passed the order condoning the delay on the grounds which are taken in the application for condonation of delay and by general observations that, the suit is in respect of public property and money and therefore, in the interest of justice, the delay is required to be condoned, the Appellate Court has allowed the application. Therefore, this is a fit case in which interference in the impugned judgment and order is warranted.

20. At the cost of repetition, it has to be observed that, in the entire application, the respondents have not disclosed that their application filed under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure for restoration of the suit and for setting aside ex parte decree passed by the trial Court, is rejected on the ground of delay in filing the said application. In fact, the application being Misc. Civil Application No. 109 of 1997 was for condonation of delay in filing the application for restoration of the suit. However, the respondents have given impression in the application that, such application was for restoration without mentioning that the said application was for condonation of delay.

21. This Court in the case of Laxman N. Divekar… v. State Of Maharashtra…., reported in 1998 (1) Mh.L.J 745 : AIR 1998 Bombay 176 has considered the scope of section 5 of the Limitation Act and in the facts of that case held that, the appeal filed by the Government where there was delay of 750 days, the ground of rush of administrative work and other preoccupations in the Government was pleaded as sufficient cause in the application for condonation of delay. The reasons in the application for condonation of delay are too vague and general ground for condoning delay of 750 days. No sufficient cause is shown and therefore, Law of Limitation is applicable equally to all litigants and hence, in the facts of that case, the application for condonation of delay came to be rejected.

22. The Supreme Court in the case of Oriental Aroma Chemicals Indus. Ltd. v. Gujarat Indisl Devt. Corp., reported in 2010 (5) Mh.L.J (SC) 262 : 2010 SAR (Civil) 298 in Para- & 10 held thus:

“9. In the light of the above, it is to be seen whether the respondents had offered any plausible/tangible explanation for the long delay of more than four years in filing of appeal and the High Court was justified in condoning the delay.

10. A reading of the impugned order makes it clear that the High Court did make a bald reference to the application for condonation of delay filed by the respondents but allowed the same without adverting to the averments contained therein and the reply filed on behalf of the appellant. Not only this, the High Court erroneously assumed that the delay was of 1067 days, though, as a matter of fact, the appeal was filed after more than four years. Another erroneous assumption made by the High Court was that the appellant had not filed reply to controvert the averments contained in the application for condonation of delay. It may have been possible for this Court to ignore the first error in the impugned order because by deleting the figures and words “4 years and 28” in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the application and substituting the same with the figure 1067, the respondents misled the High Court in believing that the delay was of 1067 days only but it is not possible to fathom any reason why the Division Bench of the High Court omitted to consider the detailed reply which had been filed on behalf of the appellant to contest the prayer for condonation of delay. Notwithstanding this, we may have set aside the impugned order and remitted the case to the High Court for fresh disposal of the application filed by the respondents under section 5 of the Limitation Act but, do not consider it proper to adopt that course, because as will be seen hereinafter, the respondents did not approach the High Court with clean hands”.

In the present case also like the facts of the case in the aforementioned judgment, the lower Appellate Court did make a bald reference to the application for condonation of delay filed by the respondents but allowed the same without adverting to the averments contained therein and the reply filed on behalf of the revision applicant herein.

23. In the case of R.B Ramlingam (supra), the Supreme Court, in Para 3 held that, section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not lay down any standard or objective test. The test of “sufficient cause” is, purely an individualistic test. It is not an objective test. Therefore, no two cases can be treated alike. The statute of Limitation has left the, concept of “sufficient cause” delightfully undefined, thereby leaving to the Court a well intentioned discretion to decide the individual cases whether circumstances exist establishing sufficient cause. There are no categories of sufficient cause. The categories of sufficient cause are never exhausted. Each case spells out a unique experience to be dealt with by the Court as such.

In the case of Sureshchandra s/o Bagwantrao Doiphode (supra), this Court has taken a view that, re-appreciation of the evidence is not possible in the revisional jurisdiction. However, this Court in its revisional jurisdiction can certainly interfere into the findings recorded by the Appellate Court if the Appellate Court fails to consider the evidence on record, which amounts to failure to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it under the law and whole judgment is vitiated because of it. This Court can also interfere in the judgment if perverse findings are recorded by the Appellate Court.

24. As stated earlier, the grounds taken by the respondents in the application for condonation of delay that, their Advocate has wrongly advised them to file application under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure for restoration of the suit, cannot be accepted. The said remedy was very much available to the respondents herein, and rightly their Advocate has advised the same. Therefore, it cannot be said that, wrong advice was given by the Advocate of the respondents. The provisions of section 14 of the Limitation Act would give aid to the respondents only in case, the trial Court had no jurisdiction to entertain their application under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In fact, the said application was perfectly maintainable and the said Court had jurisdiction to entertain the said application. Therefore, the benefit of section 14 of the Limitation Act was not available to the respondents herein.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jafar Khan v. Board of Revenue, U.P, reported in 1984 Supp SCC 505 : AIR 1985 SC 39 held that, if the party seeking benefit of the provisions of section 14 failed in the earlier proceeding on merits and not on defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, it would not be entitled to the benefit of section 14 of the Limitation Act.

In the facts of this case, as stated earlier, the application filed by the applicant under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure for restoration of the suit was perfectly maintainable and the application which was filed for condonation of delay in application for restoration of the suit came to be rejected.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shyam Sundar Sarma v. Pannalal Jaiswal, reported in 2005 (1) Mh.L.J (SC) 340 : 2004 (9) Scale 270 held that, “the position that emerges on a survey of the authorities is that an appeal filed along with an application for condoning the delay in filing that appeal when dismissed on the refusal to condone the delay is nevertheless a decision in the appeal”.

(Emphasis supplied).

25. In the present case also, the application for condonation of delay filed by the respondents herein, in the application for restoration of the suit was rejected. Therefore, the said decision will have to be considered as a decision in the application for restoration. Therefore, if such application was rejected, the remedy was available to the respondents and rightly they filed Writ Petition challenging the order of the dismissal of their application for condonation of delay. However, it appears that, the said Writ Petition came to be rejected in view of the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal was allowed by the lower Appellate Court.

26. If the decision in the restoration application is on merits in that case also, there is a remedy for filing the Appeal from Order under Order 43, Rule 1(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure.

27. I find considerable force in the arguments of Counsel for the revision applicant that, the principle of ‘resjudicata’ may apply in the present case. However, since for the reasons aforesaid, the application for condonation of delay filed by the respondents in appeal challenging exparte decree passed in Special Civil Suit No. 254 of 1996, should fail, other aspects of the matter need not be gone into.

28. The inordinate delay more than six years in filing the appeal is not properly explained. No sufficient cause has been disclosed in the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. The lower Appellate Court allowed the said application on altogether different reasons than the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay. It is also relevant to mention that, the delay which was caused in filing the application for restoration under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure also gets added and merged in the delay for filing the appeal. The respondents herein, have not stated anything about the same in their application and the lower Appellate Court has also not considered that aspect.

29. Learned Counsel appearing for the revision applicant has invited my attention to at least three judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Amarenda, Ishwar Dutt and Bhanukumar Jain (supra) and submitted that, the principle of ‘res judicata’ is applicable in the different proceedings arising out of the same course of action. He submits that, in the present case, the application filed by the respondents herein, under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure for setting aside ex parte decree was out of the same course of action for which the appeal is filed. Therefore, according to Counsel for the revision applicant, the principle of ‘res judicata’ would apply in this matter.

30. In my considered view, the application for condonation of delay filed by the respondents herein, in appeal challenging ex parte decree in Special Civil Suit No. 254 of 1996 should fail for not disclosing the sufficient cause. There was inordinate delay of more than six years in filing the said appeal and as stated earlier, the respondents cannot get benefit of the provisions of section 14 of the Limitation Act. Therefore, in the light of the reasons recorded hereinbefore and the discussion hereinabove, the Civil Revision Application succeeds. As a result, Civil Misc. Application No. 89 of 2003 filed by respondents herein, for condonation of delay in filing the appeal challenging ex parte decree in Special Civil Suit No. 254 of 1996, should fail and accordingly, the said application for condonation of delay stands rejected. As a result, the appeal filed by the respondents would not survive.

31. Civil Revision Application is allowed to above extent and same stands disposed of. Rule made absolute on the above terms.

32. Civil Application, if any, pending in this Civil Revision Application, stands disposed of, in view of the disposal of the Civil Revision Application.

At this stage, learned Counsel for the respondents prays for continuation of the interim relief which was operating during the pendency of this Civil Revision Application for further eight weeks. However, the said prayer is vehemently opposed by the learned Counsel appearing for the revision applicant. I feel it appropriate to continue the interim relief operating during the pendency of this Civil Revision Application for further four weeks. After expiry of four weeks, the interim relief will cease to operate.

Revision allowed.