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Shri Shivaji High School And Junior College v. Raju
Structured Summary of the Opinion — Letters Patent Appeal
Factual and Procedural Background
The respondent No. 1 was appointed as an Assistant Teacher on a post reserved for Scheduled Tribe candidates on the basis that he belonged to the caste "Halba." The Caste Scrutiny Committee, by order dated 20 February 2008, held that the respondent did not belong to the caste "Halba" and cancelled his caste certificate dated 28 September 1981. Following that cancellation, the appellants terminated the respondent's services on 26 February 2008.
The respondent appealed to the School Tribunal on 25 March 2008 relying on Government Resolutions dated 15-6-1995 and 30-6-2004; the School Tribunal dismissed that appeal by order dated 20 January 2009. The respondent then filed Writ Petition No. 1561 of 2009 against the School Tribunal's order. Separately, on 17 February 2009 the respondent filed Writ Petition No. 1900/2009 challenging the Caste Scrutiny Committee's decision; that petition was dismissed on 7 August 2009.
A learned Single Judge allowed Writ Petition No. 1561 of 2009 partly by judgment dated 16 October 2009 and directed the appellants/Management to reinstate the respondent in service within four weeks (failing which to pay monthly salary and benefits). The appellants preferred the present Letters Patent Appeal challenging that Single Judge judgment.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the learned Single Judge was justified in granting protection to the respondent on the basis of the Supreme Court's decision in State of Maharashtra v. Milind (referred to as "Milind's case").
- Whether the observations in Milind's case constitute binding ratio decidendi under Article 141 of the Constitution or were directions given in exercise of Article 142 and thus limited to the peculiar facts of that case (particularly admissions).
- Whether Milind's observations and any protection flowing from them are applicable to cases concerning employment obtained by false caste claims, as opposed to admissions to educational institutions.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The learned Single Judge erroneously concluded that the respondent was entitled to protection of service.
- The Single Judge failed to appreciate that the protection granted in Milind's case was granted under Article 142 of the Constitution and was confined to that case's peculiar facts.
- A Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No. 3590/2009, after referring to the Apex Court and Full Bench decisions (including Ganesh Rambhau Khalale), held that Milind's protection was under Article 142 and not a binding precedent applicable to appointments; that Division Bench's view was later the subject of a dismissed Special Leave to Appeal (order dated 26 March 2010).
- In light of the above, the impugned Single Judge judgment cannot be sustained and should be quashed and set aside.
Respondent No. 1's Arguments
- The respondent supported the impugned judgment and contended that he was entitled to protection under the Government Resolutions dated 15-6-1995 and 30-6-2004.
- The respondent also submitted that he was entitled to protection in view of the Supreme Court's judgment in Milind's case.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| State of Maharashtra v. Milind (2001 (1) Mh.L.J (SC) 1) | The Court observed a protection granted in that case but, as described in this opinion, those observations/directions were made in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution and were limited to the peculiar facts (an admission case). | The Court held that the learned Single Judge was not justified in granting protection to the respondent by relying on Milind. The Court treated Milind's observations as restricted to admissions and not applicable to employment cases obtained by false caste claims. |
| Union of India v. Dattatraya Namdeo Mendhekar, 2008 (2) Mh.L.J 720 | Explains Milind related to admissions and that the Supreme Court in Milind limited relief due to peculiar facts; further notes that Milind's approach should not be applied to employment cases where a false caste claim deprived a legitimate candidate of employment. | The opinion cites Mendhekar (paras 5 and 7) to show that Milind concerned admissions, and that in employment cases where appointment obtained by false caste claim the proper course is cancellation of the appointment. This supports the Court's conclusion that Milind does not justify protection in the present employment context. |
| Vishwanatha Pillai v. State of Kerala ((2004) 2 SCC 105 : AIR 2004 SC 1469) | Holds that observations in Milind's case do not constitute ratio decidendi; those observations were made while exercising power under Article 142 and are not law declared under Article 141. | The Court relied on Vishwanatha Pillai to support its view that Milind's observations are not binding precedent under Article 141 but were relief granted under Article 142 in peculiar circumstances; therefore Milind cannot be extended to employment cases by this Court. |
| Ganesh Rambhau Khalale v. State of Maharashtra, 2009 (2) Mh.L.J (FB) 788 : AIR 2009 Bombay 122 | The Full Bench concluded (as summarized in the opinion) that: (1) Milind's para 36 is not law under Article 141; (2) those observations/directions were issued under Article 142; (3) they have no application to appointment cases and are restricted to admissions; and (4) protection depends on Supreme Court's discretion under Article 142 and High Courts cannot grant Article 142 relief. | The Court treated the Full Bench's conclusions as a binding declaration of law on the subject and applied that reasoning to conclude the Single Judge erred in granting protection based on Milind. The Court relied on Ganesh Rambhau Khalale as authoritative and binding on co-ordinate Benches. |
| Vandana Bharat Kauthalikar (cited in the opinion) | The opinion refers to Vandana Bharat Kauthalikar together with Ganesh Rambhau Khalale as part of the Full Bench jurisprudence that constitutes the valid declaration of law on this subject. | The Court noted that the law declared by the Full Benches in Ganesh Rambhau Khalale and Vandana Bharat Kauthalikar is a valid declaration of law and binding on other Benches; it applied that position in setting aside the Single Judge judgment. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded by examining whether the Single Judge's reliance on the Supreme Court's decision in Milind justified granting the respondent protection of service. After hearing counsel for the parties and perusing the record, the Court concluded that the Single Judge was not justified in relying on Milind to grant protection.
The Court's analysis relied on several points as set out in earlier decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court:
- The Court quoted and applied the reasoning from Union of India v. Mendhekar to demonstrate that Milind related to admissions (medical college admission) and that the relief granted there arose from the peculiar facts of that case (long passage of time since admission; public interest considerations; not affecting degree or practice). Mendhekar emphasised that the decision in Milind did not apply to appointments obtained by false caste claims where a rightful candidate is deprived of employment.
- The Court relied on Vishwanatha Pillai (SCC) to record that the observations in Milind were not ratio decidendi but were made in exercise of Article 142; hence they do not amount to law under Article 141.
- The Full Bench decision in Ganesh Rambhau Khalale was treated as authoritative: the Full Bench concluded that Milind's para 36 is not law under Article 141, that the observations were under Article 142, that they do not apply to appointment cases, and that only the Supreme Court in exercise of Article 142 can grant such protection.
- The Court noted that a Division Bench of this Court had adopted similar reasoning in the judgment dated 5 December 2009 and that a petition for special leave against that judgment was dismissed by the Supreme Court on 26 March 2010. The Court treated the 5 December 2009 decision as binding on co-ordinate Benches.
- On this foundation, the Court concluded the Single Judge committed an error in granting protection to the respondent based on Milind, because Milind's reasoning is not a binding precedent applicable to employment cases where a caste certificate has been invalidated and the appointment was obtained by false claim.
The Court therefore set aside the Single Judge's impugned judgment for being inconsistent with the binding pronouncements of the Full Bench and Division Bench jurisprudence on the limited scope of Milind's observations.
Holding and Implications
Appeal allowed; the impugned judgment dated 16 October 2009 passed in Writ Petition No. 1561 of 2009 is quashed and set aside; Writ Petition No. 1561 of 2009 filed by respondent No. 1 stands dismissed.
Direct consequences for the parties:
- The reinstatement order and direction to pay salary/benefits issued by the Single Judge are vacated by this Letters Patent Appeal judgment.
- There shall be no order as to costs.
Broader implications (as reflected in the opinion):
- The Court applied and reaffirmed the view that the observations in Milind's case (particularly para 36) were made in exercise of Article 142 and do not constitute binding ratio decidendi under Article 141; consequently, Milind's observations are not generally applicable to appointment cases involving false caste claims.
- The opinion treats the Full Bench conclusions in Ganesh Rambhau Khalale (and related Full Bench authority cited) and the Division Bench decision dated 5 December 2009 as binding on other Benches of this Court on this point of law.
Appeal allowed.
F.M Reis, J.— Heard the learned Counsel for the appellants and the respondent No. 1.
2. Admit.
3. Heard finally with consent of the learned Counsel for the respective parties. The present Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred challenging the judgment dated 16th October, 2009 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No. 1561 of 2009, whereby the Writ Petition preferred by the respondent No. 1 was allowed and the appeal preferred by the respondent No. 1 before the School Tribunal was partly allowed and the appellants/Management was directed to reinstate the respondent No. 1 in service within a period of four weeks from the said date, failing which it shall start paying him monthly salary and further benefits referred to in the impugned judgment.
4. Brief facts of the case are as under:—
The respondent No. 1 was appointed as an Assistant Teacher on the post reserved for Scheduled Tribe on the basis that he belongs to caste “Halba”. The Caste Scrutiny Committee by its Order dated 20th February, 2008 held that the respondent No. 1 does not belong to the said caste ‘Halba’ and cancelled his Caste Certificate dated 28th September, 1981. Consequently, on 26th February, 2008 the appellants terminated the services of the respondent No. 1. On 25th of March, 2008 the respondent No. 1 preferred an appeal before the School Tribunal claiming protection in terms of the Government Resolutions dated 15-6-1995 and 30-6-2004. The School Tribunal dismissed the appeal preferred by the respondent No. 1 by order dated 20th January, 2009. The Writ Petition No. 1561 of 2009 was filed by the respondent No. 1 against the order passed by the School Tribunal. On 17-2-2009 the respondent No. 1 filed Writ Petition No. 1900/2009 against the order of the Caste Scrutiny Committee rejecting his caste claim, which came to be dismissed by order dated 7th August, 2009. By the impugned judgment dated 16-10-2009, the Writ Petition preferred by the respondent No. 1, challenging the order of the School Tribunal came to be partly allowed. Being aggrieved by the said judgment passed by the learned Single Judge, the present Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred by the appellants.
5. The learned Counsel appearing for the appellants has submitted that the learned Single Judge has erroneously come to the conclusion that the respondent No. 1 was entitled for protection of the service. The learned Counsel further submitted that the learned Single Judge failed to consider that the protection granted by the Hon'ble Apex Court in judgment reported in 2001 (1) Mh.L.J (SC) 1 in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Milind was under Article 142 of the Constitution. The learned Counsel further submitted that the Division Bench of this Court in the Judgment passed in Writ Petition No. 3590/2009, after referring the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court as well as the Full Bench of this Court, came to the conclusion that the law declared by the Full Benches of this Court in the case of Ganesh Rambhau Khalale v. State of Maharashtra, reported in 2009 (2) Mh.L.J (FB) 788 : AIR 2009 Bombay 122 shows that observation made by the Hon'ble Apex Court granting protection to the petitioner in Milind's case was in exercise of the power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case.
6. The learned Counsel for the appellants further submitted that a Special Leave to Appeal challenging the said judgment passed by this Court on 5th December, 2009 in Writ Petition No. 3590 of 2009, came to be dismissed by the Hon'ble Apex Court by Order dated 26th March, 2010. The learned Counsel further submitted that in fact the judgment impugned in the present appeal dated 16th October, 2009 was also referred to by the Division Bench of this Court while disposing the said Writ Petition No. 3590 of 2009. The learned Counsel further submitted that, as such the impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge cannot be sustained and deserves to be quashed and set aside.
7. On the other hand, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1, has supported the impugned judgment and submitted that the respondent No. 1 is entitled for protection in view of the said Government Resolutions dated 15-6-1995 and 30-6-2004. He further submitted that the respondent No. 1 is also entitled for protection in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court passed in Milind's case.
8. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record, we find that the learned Single Judge was not justified in granting any protection to the respondent No. 1 on the basis of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court passed in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Milind, 2001 (1) Mh.L.J (SC) 1.
9. This Court in the said judgment dated 5th December, 2009 has held that:—
“8). Similarly, the three Judges' Bench of the Supreme Court in paras (5) and (7) of the judgment in Union of India v. Dattatraya Namdeo Mendhekar, 2008 (2) Mh.L.J 720 has observed thus:
5. Milind (supra) related to a Medical College admission. The question that arose for consideration in that case was whether it was open to the State Government or Courts or other authorities to modify, amend or alter the list of Scheduled Tribes and in particular whether the “Halba-Koshti” was a sub-division of ‘Halba’ Tribe. This Court held that it was not permissible to amend or alter the list of Scheduled Tribes by including any sub-divisions or otherwise. On facts, this Court found that the respondent therein had been admitted in medical course in ST category, more than 15 years back; that though his admission deprived a scheduled tribe student of a medical seat, the benefit of that seat could not be offered to scheduled tribe student at that distance of time even if respondent's admission was to be annulled; and that if his admission was annulled, it will lead to depriving the services of a doctor to the society on whom the public money had already been spent. In these peculiar circumstances, this Court held that the decision will not affect the degree secured by respondent or his practice as a doctor but made it clear that he could not claim to belong to a Scheduled Tribe. But the said decision has no application to a case which does not relate to an admission to an educational institution, but relates to securing employment by wrongly claiming the benefit of reservation meant for Scheduled Tribes. When a person secures employment by making a false claim regarding caste/tribe, he deprives a legitimate candidate belonging to scheduled caste/tribe, of employment. In such a situation, the proper course is to cancel the employment obtained on the basis of the false certificate so that the post may be filled up by a candidate who is entitled to the benefit of reservation.
7. We are of the view that the High Court failed to appreciate the ratio of Milind. Having held that the first respondent had falsely claimed that he belonged to a Scheduled Tribe, it wrongly extended him the benefit of continuing in employment.’
The observation of the Apex Court in the above referred decision clearly demonstrate that the person securing employment by making a false claim regarding caste cannot be protected merely on the basis of length of service in the employment once his caste certificate is invalidated by the Caste Scrutiny Committee and the proper course in such situation is to cancel his appointment. Therefore, it can safely be concluded that the observations made by the Apex Court in Milind's case were in the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case, which cannot be made applicable in other cases, since they were restricted only to that case.
9) Similarly, the Apex Court in Vishwanatha Pillai v. State of Kerala ((2004) 2 SCC 105 : AIR 2004 SC 1469) has held that the observations made by the Apex Court in Milind's case do not constitute ratio decidendi of the said case, but are the observations made by the Apex Court in exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution to grant relief in view of peculiar facts and circumstances of the said case. It is, therefore, evident that the observations made by the Apex Court in para (36) of Milind's case not being the ratio decidendi of that case was not the law declared by the Apex Court under Article 141 of the Constitution and, therefore, protection granted to the petitioner in the said case by the Apex Court was by exercising power under Article 142 of the Constitution in the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case.
10) The Full Bench of this Court after taking into consideration the law laid down by the Apex Court in Milind's case as well as other decisions of the Apex Court referred to hereinabove, in para (13) of the judgment in the case of Ganesh Rambhau Khalale (cited supra) has observed thus:
‘13. Having regard to the legal position that emerges from the above referred judgments, we record the following conclusions and answer the question framed:
(1) The observations/directions issued by the Supreme Court in para 36 of the judgment in the case of State v. Milind reported in 2001 (1) Mah. L.J (S. C) 1 is not the law declared by the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India.
(2) The said observations/directions are issued in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution.
(3) The said observations/directions have no application to the cases relating to appointments and are restricted to the cases relating to admissions.
(4) The protection, if any, to be granted in the facts and circumstances of the case would depend upon the exercise of discretion by the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution. As the powers under Article 142 are not available to the High Court, no protection can be granted by this Court even in cases relating to admissions.”
10. The judgment of the learned Single Judge impugned in the Letters Patent Appeal has also been considered by this Court in the said judgment dated 5th December, 2009, and has held at Paragraph 17, as follows:—
“17. In the circumstances, the law declared by the Full Benches of this Court in the case of Ganesh Rambhau Khalale (cited supra) and Vandana Bharat Kauthalikar (cited supra) is a valid declaration of law on the subject and is binding on the other co-ordinate Benches, Division Benches and Single Benches of this Court.”
11. It is an admitted fact that the petition for special leave to appeal against the judgment of this Court dated 5th December, 2009 came to be dismissed by the Hon'ble Apex Court by order dated 26th March, 2010 in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 7899/2010.
12. Considering the said judgment passed by this Court dated 5-12-2009, the learned Single Judge was not justified in granting any protection to the respondent No. 1 on the basis of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Milind's case referred supra. The impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge as such cannot be sustained. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1 to the effect that the judgment in Milind's case is applicable to the present case cannot be accepted, in view of the judgments referred by this Court in the judgment dated 5th December, 2009. The learned Single Judge has committed an error while passing the impugned judgment dated 16th October, 2009 and granting protection of service to the respondent No. 1.
13. In the circumstances, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment dated 16th October, 2009 passed in Writ Petition No. 1561 of 2009 is quashed and set aside. The Writ Petition No. 1561 of 2009 filed by respondent No. 1 stands dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
Appeal allowed.
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