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Angath Arts. Pvt. Ltd. v. Century Communications Ltd.
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner, as the producer and original owner of the copyright in the film "Victoria No. 203," entered into an agreement dated 26th July 2007 with the respondents, assigning joint ownership in the rights to the film's negative on a 50:50 basis. A dispute arose regarding whether the assignment pertained to the copyright in the film itself or only the negatives, which was to be resolved by an arbitral tribunal. Clause 8(d) of the agreement allowed the respondents to enter into agreements concerning their rights only by making the petitioner a confirming party. Disputes between the parties led the petitioner to seek an interim injunction restraining the respondents from transferring, licensing, or sublicensing any rights in the copyright pending arbitration. Reliefs under prayers (b) and (c) were declined as not pressed. The petition was heard finally at the stage of admission.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the respondents, as joint owners of the copyright, can exploit or license the copyright in the film "Victoria No. 203" without the concurrence of the petitioner.
- Whether the principle regarding joint ownership and use of trademarks, as discussed in Power Control Appliances v. Sumeet Machines Pvt. Ltd., applies analogously to copyright.
- Whether the petitioner is entitled to an interim injunction restraining the respondents from exploiting the copyright pending arbitration.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner’s Arguments
- The petitioner is the original producer and copyright holder of the film.
- By agreement, the respondents were made joint owners of the copyright to the extent of 50%, with the condition that any exploitation by respondents requires the petitioner’s confirmation.
- The respondents negotiated with a third party for exhibiting the film abroad without the petitioner’s consent, which the petitioner claims is impermissible.
- Relied on the Supreme Court decision in Power Control Appliances v. Sumeet Machines Pvt. Ltd. to argue that joint owners must use the copyright jointly, and individual use is not allowed.
Respondents’ Arguments
- Contended that the Supreme Court’s observations in Power Control Appliances relate only to trademarks and not copyright.
- Argued that trademarks are tangible and thus joint use can be restricted, whereas copyright is intangible and the principle does not apply.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Power Control Appliances v. Sumeet Machines Pvt. Ltd., 1994 Vol. 2 SCC 448 | Principle that joint ownership requires joint use; individual use by one co-owner is impermissible. | The court applied this principle to copyright, holding that joint owners must jointly exploit copyright and individual exploitation without concurrence is not allowed. |
| Nav Sahitya Prakash v. Anand Kumar, AIR 1981 All 200 | Joint owner of copyright cannot grant licence or interest without consent of other joint owners. | Supported the court’s view that respondents cannot singly exploit or license the copyright without petitioner’s consent. |
| Powel v. Head, 1879 12 Ch D 686 (Chancery Division) | Established principle regarding joint ownership and consent for exploitation. | Followed by the Allahabad High Court and relied upon by this court to reinforce the principle applied. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court examined the agreement and found that the petitioner and respondents were joint owners of the copyright in the film "Victoria No. 203" in equal shares. Clause 8(d) explicitly required that the respondents could only enter into agreements concerning their rights with the petitioner as a confirming party. The court rejected the respondents’ argument that the Supreme Court’s decision in Power Control Appliances was limited to trademarks, holding instead that the principle of joint use applies equally to copyright. The court relied on the Allahabad High Court decision in Nav Sahitya Prakash and the English Chancery Division decision in Powel v. Head to affirm that a joint owner cannot grant licenses or exploit the copyright without the consent of the other joint owner. Given the respondents’ alleged negotiation with a third party without the petitioner’s consent, the court found that the petitioner was entitled to an interim injunction pending the constitution of the arbitral tribunal and arbitration proceedings.
Holding and Implications
The court granted an interim injunction restraining the respondents from assigning, transferring, licensing, sublicensing, or otherwise using the copyright in the film "Victoria No. 203" without the concurrence of the petitioner for a period of four months.
The direct effect is that the respondents cannot exploit the copyright individually during this period, ensuring protection of the petitioner’s rights pending arbitration. The petitioner is required to take steps for constitution of the arbitral tribunal within this timeframe. No broader precedent beyond the immediate parties was established.
By consent, heard finally at the stage of admission itself.
2. By this petition, petitioner seeks injunction restraining the respondents from transferring, licensing or sub-licensing any rights in the copyright of the film “Victoria No. 203” to any third party.
3. Reliefs claimed under prayers (b) and (c) are declined as not pressed.
4. The facts giving rise to the controversy between the parties are that the petitioner is the producer and first owner of copyright in the film “Victoria No. 203”. By an agreement dated 26th July 2007, the petitioner assigned to the respondent along with him joint ownership in the ratio of 50:50 the rights in the negative of the film. There is some dispute between the parties as to whether copyright in the film or only in the negatives of the film are assigned. That would be decided by the arbitral tribunal. At this stage suffice it to refer to clause No. 8(d) of the agreement which provides that the respondents shall be entitled to enter into an agreement in respect of his rights (under the agreement) by making the petitioner the confirming party to the agreement. The agreement provides that all disputes and differences arising between the parties in connection with the agreement shall be resolved by mutual consent failing which the disputes shall be referred to the arbitration.
5. Disputes having arisen between the parties and petitioner wants to refer the disputes to arbitration. Pending constitution of arbitral tribunal and reference, the petitioner has claimed interim injunction as mentioned above.
6. It is not disputed that the petitioner was the producer and original holder of the copyright in the film. Perusal of clause No. 8 of the agreement prima facie shows that the petitioner has made the respondents joint owners of the copyright to the extent of 50%. Petitioner has further given the right to the respondents to exploit the said copyright by entering into an agreement with others but subject to petitioner being made the confirming party to the agreement. According to the petitioner, the respondents have negotiated with the third party for exhibiting of the film abroad without the consent of the petitioner. According to the petitioner, the respondents have no right for exhibiting the said film without the concurrence of the petitioner.
7. Placing reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Power Control Appliances v. Sumeet Machines Pvt. Ltd., 1994 Vol. 2 SCC 448, Mr. Dhond submitted that in respect of joint ownership of a copyright, the use of the copyright must be made jointly by the co-owners and individual use by any one of the co-owners is not permissible. In paragraph No. 41 of the decision, the Supreme Court has observed thus:—
“It is a settled principle of law relating to trade mark that there can be only one mark, one source and one proprietor. It cannot have two origins. Where, therefore, the first defendant respondent has proclaimed himself as a rival of the plaintiffs and as joint owner it is impermissible in law. Even then, the joint proprietors must use the trade mark jointly for the benefit of all. It cannot be used in rivalry and in competition with each other.”
8. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the observations made in paragraph No. 41 are applicable only in re spect of the use of a trade mark and cannot apply in respect of use of a copy right. He submitted that trade mark is a tangible mark and therefore it is possible to restrict the joint use. Copy right is an in tangible thing and therefore observations made in paragraph No. 41 of the decision of the Supreme Court are not applicable. I am unable to agree. In my view the principle applies not only for use of a trade mark but also for use of a copyright. I am fortified in my view by a decision of Allahabad High Court rendered in Nav Sahitya Prakash v. Anand Kumar, AIR 1981 All 200, following the decision of the Chancery Division in Powel v. Head reported in 1879 12 Ch D 686. Therein the Allahabad High Court held that a joint owner of a copyright cannot, without the consent of the other joint owner, grant a licence or interest in the copyright. No other decision taking a contrary view was pointed out by counsel for the respondent.
9. In my view the respondents cannot ex ploit the copyright singly or individually. The exploitation of the copyright must be jointly made by the petitioner and respondents as they are the joint owner. The respondents are not entitled to grant licence for exploitation of the film “Victoria No. 203” without the concurrence of the petitioner. In view of this, in my view, petitioner is entitled to an injunction pending the arbitration. I accordingly pass the following order:—
10. Respondents are hereby restrained from an order of injunction from assigning, transferring, licensing or sub-licensing or in any other manner using the copyright in film “Victoria No. 203” without the concurrence of the petitioner, for a period of four months hereof. During the said period of four months, the petitioner shall take steps for constitution of the arbitral tribunal and thereafter may apply to the arbitral tribunal for appropriate interim reliefs u/S. 17 of the Arbitration Act.
Order accordingly.
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