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Suraiya Akbarali Jetha & Ors. v. Mumbai Municipal Corporation Of Greater Mumbai & Ors.
Structured Summary of the Judgment (Kumar Swatanter, C.J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The two writ petitions (Writ Petition No. 1067 of 2007 and Writ Petition No. 2108 of 2007) arise from the reservation and proposed acquisition of land (various C.S. Nos. of Mazgaon Division) that the petitioners (or their predecessors-in-title) claim to own. The lands had been reserved under the development plan (reservation in force since about 1964) and a notification for acquisition was issued by respondent No.5 on 18th September 1974 (published 5th December 1974). Acquisition proceedings earlier lapsed in 1986. A revised development plan for the relevant ward came into force on 23rd December 1991. After the ten-year period elapsed (i.e., by 22nd December 2001), the petitioners served notices under section 127 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (the Town Planning Act) on 16th October 2002 (received by respondents on 17th October 2002) seeking de-reservation or acquisition in accordance with law.
Respondent authorities (the Municipal Corporation and State) corresponded with the petitioners, requested ownership documents (which the petitioners provided on 6th December 2002), and thereafter the Corporation sent an application to the State Government on 10th April 2003 for acquisition. The petitioners reiterated their request in July 2003, and the Corporation replied (25th July 2003) stating that steps for acquisition had been taken by filing that application. A notification dated 22nd December 2003 (published 4th March 2004) declared that the property was needed for a public purpose and appointed respondent No.6 under the Land Acquisition Act to perform Collector functions. No award under the Land Acquisition Act was made then or up to the date of the judgment, and no compensation had been determined or paid.
The petitioners had also submitted building plans and pursued approvals; the authorities fixed a joint measurement/inspection and otherwise continued some processing. The petitioners challenged the notification and the authorities' actions by filing these writ petitions under Article 226, seeking quashing of the notification of 22nd December 2003 and directions to the respondents to cease withholding approvals and to deal with their development-plan applications.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the reservation of the petitioners' land had lapsed under section 127 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966, because no effective steps were taken for acquisition within the periods prescribed by law.
- Whether the actions taken by the respondents (notably the letter/application to the State Government dated 10th April 2003 and related Corporation steps) constituted "steps for acquisition" under section 127 such that the petitioners' purchase-notice under section 127 was rendered ineffective.
- Whether the petitioners' challenge was barred by delay and laches (as argued by respondents relying on precedent).
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- The reservation had lapsed in accordance with section 127 of the Town Planning Act because the revised development plan had come into force more than ten years earlier and no effective acquisition steps were taken within the periods required by law.
- The letter or application said to have been written by respondents to the Government did not constitute a "step for acquisition" under section 127; mere communication or application that may or may not result in acquisition cannot defeat the de-reservation mechanism in section 127.
- The respondents had no right to withhold sanction of the petitioners' development plans in the circumstances.
Respondents' Arguments
- The Municipal Corporation had made an application to the State Government for acquisition on 10th April 2003 and had deposited amounts towards acquisition costs with the State; therefore, steps for acquisition had been taken and the petitioners' purchase notice of 16th October 2002 was ineffective.
- The Corporation relied on internal decisions/resolutions (Improvement Committee Resolution No.337 dated 19th March 2003 and alleged sanction on 7th April 2003) and the subsequent Notification dated 22nd December 2003 under relevant provisions of the Development Act read with the Land Acquisition Act as evidencing commencement of acquisition proceedings.
- The respondents also argued that the petitions suffered from delay and laches, invoking Larsen & Toubro Ltd. v. State of Gujarat (1998) as authority for denying relief on that ground.
- The respondents pointed to a pending review or related appeals in the Supreme Court concerning the decision relied upon by petitioners (referencing Girar/Girnar Traders v. State of Maharashtra) and sought deferment or reliance on that pending litigation.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Girar Traders v. State of Maharashtra (as cited in the opinion; also referred to as Girnar Traders v. State of Maharashtra) — (2007) 7 SCC 555 | The Supreme Court's exposition that mere making of an application or taking a step which "may or may not culminate in acquisition" does not constitute steps for acquisition under the MRTP Act/section 127; the steps must result in actual commencement of acquisition (e.g., publication of declaration under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act or equivalent acts which mark commencement). | The High Court relied squarely on this dictum: the present Court accepted the Girar/Girnar Traders reasoning and held that the Corporation's letter/application (10th April 2003) and similar steps did not qualify as effective "steps for acquisition" under section 127 sufficient to defeat the petitioners' purchase-notice. The Court therefore rejected the respondents' contention that their April 2003 application prevented de-reservation. |
| Larsen & Toubro Ltd. v. State of Gujarat — (1998) 4 SCC 387 (cited in the opinion) | Principle that delay and laches can, in appropriate cases, defeat equitable relief — respondents relied on this precedent to contend that the petitions were barred by delay. | The Court considered this precedent but rejected the respondents' contention of delay and laches. The Court held that the petitioners acted after the statutory 10-year period and served notice in 2002, corresponded with authorities, and that the respondents' own conduct and defaults (including issuing the notification without completing award/compensation) undermined any laches defence. |
| Municipal Corporation of Crater Bombay "ease" (as referenced in the opinion) | The opinion states that the intent and purpose of sections 126 and 127 has been "well explained" in this Municipal Corporation decision (the text does not elaborate further in this judgment). | The Court referred to this decision in explaining legislative intent behind sections 126 and 127 (that acquisition of land reserved under the plan is to be expeditious and that timelines are material). The opinion does not provide further exposition of factual application from that case beyond this reference. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded step-by-step from the undisputed chronology and statutory text:
- Chronology and statutory periods: The petitioners served their purchase-notice under section 127 on 16th October 2002 (received 17th October 2002) after the revised development plan had been in force since 23rd December 1991 (i.e., more than ten years). The statutory six-month period to take steps after service of a section 127 notice is central.
- Respondents' claimed steps: The Corporation's application to the State Government dated 10th April 2003 and its other internal resolutions/letters were relied upon by respondents as constituting steps for acquisition within the six-month period (or otherwise preventing de-reservation).
- Precedent analysis (Girar/Girnar Traders): The Court analyzed in detail the Supreme Court's decision in Girar/Girnar Traders v. State of Maharashtra. That decision explains that the legislative scheme requires steps that truly commence and are likely to result in acquisition (e.g., declaration under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act) rather than mere communications or applications that may or may not culminate in acquisition. The Court emphasized the Supreme Court's statements (paras 54–57, 62–63 etc.) that mere application to the State Government or internal steps do not necessarily constitute "steps for acquisition" under the MRTP Act/section 127, especially where such application is made after the period when a declaration under section 126(2) could be issued as of right.
- Application of that precedent to facts: Relying on that clear dictum, the Court rejected the respondents' contention that the 10th April 2003 letter/application amounted to effective steps for acquisition sufficient to defeat the petitioners' section 127 notice. The Court described the Supreme Court's view that failure to take steps which result in actual commencement of acquisition cannot be cured by merely moving an application requesting Government to acquire the land.
- On delay and laches: The respondents had argued delay and laches (citing Larsen & Toubro). The Court examined the conduct and timing: reservation existed since 1964; petitioners waited the 10-year statutory period; petitioners served notice in 2002 and remained in correspondent interaction with authorities. Given respondents' own conduct (application dated 10th April 2003, issuance of notification on 22nd December 2003, and absence of any award or compensation), the Court found the laches/delay defence without merit and refused to dismiss the petitions on that ground.
- Resultant relief rationale: In sum, because the respondents had not taken steps constituting the commencement of acquisition as required by law and as explained in the controlling Supreme Court judgment, the reservation could not be allowed to be held indefinitely; the notification dated 22nd December 2003 (typed year noted as wrongly typed 2004 in the record) was quashed and the petitioners' development-plan applications were to be dealt with in accordance with law.
The Court expressly relied on the Supreme Court precedent and held that the respondents' principal contention was answered by that precedent; the Court also noted that a pending review application in the Supreme Court (in the related case) had been dismissed and therefore no reason remained to keep these petitions pending.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Rule is made absolute: the Notification dated 22nd December, 2003 is quashed.
Direct consequences and orders:
- The respondents are directed to deal with the application(s) filed by the petitioners with the Municipal Corporation in accordance with law.
- In the facts of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
- Both writ petitions are allowed to the extent indicated; the notification quashed and the petitions disposed accordingly.
Broader implications:
The Court applied and followed the Supreme Court's authoritative exposition concerning the interpretation of "steps for acquisition" under the MRTP/Town Planning Act and therefore did not purport to lay down a new precedent. The opinion confines itself to the direct relief ordered — quashing the specific notification and directing administrative reconsideration — and does not purport to expand or alter the controlling principles laid down by the Supreme Court.
Outcome: Petitions allowed; Notification dated 22nd December 2003 quashed; respondents to deal with petitioners' applications in accordance with law; no costs.
Kumar Swatanter, C.J:— By this judgment, we shall dispose of the above two writ petitions. In Writ Petition No. 1067 of 2007, the petitioners have approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying that the notice dated 22nd December, 2003 and the acquisition proceedings taken by respondent No. 4 in pursuance to the said Notification are illegal having lapsed in accordance with the statutory provisions of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as “the Town Planning Act”) in terms of section 127 of the Act. They also prayed that the respondents should be restrained from taking any action or steps in regard to acquisition and reservation of the land of which the petitioners are the owners. This prayer has been made on the premise that the petitioners and/or their predecessor in interest had purchased C.S No. 565 of Mazgaon Division from the sellers in terms of the Deed of Conveyance dated 18th November, 1943. Respondent No. 1 executed a Deed of Grant in relation to C.S No. 1/565 of Mazgaon Division in favour of the predecessor in title. On 26th February, 1944 these premises were leased out. After coming into force of the development plan in relation to Greater Mumbai, on 6th January, 1966 respondent No. 3 had informed the predecessor in title of the petitioners that the property in question had been reserved in the development plan for extension of Victoria Garden and Zoo and had requested for the willingness of the parties. A Notification was issued by respondent No. 5 on 18th September, 1974 which was published in the Official Gazette on 5th December, 1974. Notices under Clauses (3) and (4) of section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act were also issued to all persons, but on 21st November, 1986 respondent No. 6 informed the petitioners that they do not wish to acquire the said property on account of non-declaration of the award as contemplated, on or before 23rd September, 1986. The acquisition proceedings were allowed to lapse. Revised development plan for E Ward where the property in question was located was issued and came into force on 23rd December, 1991. After the lapse of ten years i.e as on 22nd December 2001, the revised development plan came into force and no action for completing the acquisition proceedings were taken by the concerned authorities resulting in issuance of a notice by the petitioners to respondent No. 7 under section 127 of the Town Planning Act on 16th December 2002 requiring the said authority to acquire the said property in accordance with law. This notice was received by them on 17th October 2002. On 28th October 2002 after receiving the letter issued by the petitioners, respondent No. 3 called upon the petitioners predecessor in title to submit ownership details in respect of the said property which were submitted on 6th December, 2002.
2. Vide letter dated 3rd July 2003, the predecessor in title of the petitioners and respondent No. 7 informed respondent No. 3 that more than six months have lapsed from the date of service of notice under section 127 and since no steps have been taken, the properties stand released automatically. However, vide their letter dated 25th July 2003, respondent No. 3 informed the petitioners and respondent No. 7 that application was made to the State Government as per the provisions of the Town Planning Act on 10th April, 2003 for acquisition of the said properties and as such steps for acquisition were taken in accordance with law and there was no question of the property being dereserved. A Notification was issued by respondent No. 5 on 22nd December 2003 declaring that the said property was needed for a public purpose and respondent No. 6 was appointed under the Land Acquisition Act to perform the functions of the Collector. This Notification was published in the Official Gazette of the State of Maharashtra on 4th March 2004. Proposed Building plans in relation to C.S No. 565 and 1/565 of Mazagaon Division were submitted by the predecessor in title of the petitioners on 7th June 2006 which were pursued by the Architect appointed by them. Thereafter on 12th June 2006, a letter was also written by the Architect informing the authorities concerned that both the plots have been amalgamated and NOC in that regard was claimed. Further documents which were asked by the authorities were duly submitted by the Architect appointed by the petitioners or through their predecessor in interest. While the matter was pending before the authorities concerned and the authorities had even informed by their letter dated 21st July 2007 that the matter would be pursued and finalized by the authorities shortly, unfortunately, son of petitioner No. 1 and father of petitioner Nos. 2 to 4 i.e Shri Akbarali H. Jetha died on 32th September 2006. On 15th January, 2007, a letter was issued by the respondents informing the petitioners that the joint measurement of the site in question was to be taken and date for inspection was fixed as 19th January 2007. Aggrieved by the issuance of the said letter and to get complete relief in relation to the notice issued by the petitioners under section 127 of the Town Planning Act on 16th October 2002, the petitioners have filed the, present writ petition. Writ Petition No. 2108 of 2007 has been filed by the petitioners from the same group. However, the only distinctive feature is that property bearing C.S No. 1-A and 1-B/565, Mazagaon Division was leased out to the father of the petitioner i.e Shri Hasambhoy Jetha for a period of 981 years on or about 26th April, 1944. All other facts and even the dates are similar to that of Writ Petition No. 1067 of 2007.
3. On this factual premise, the petitioners while claiming the other reliefs, have raised the legal issues that respondent Nos. 1 to 6 do not have any legal right to keep the properties belonging to the petitioners under reservation for such indefinite periods. The alleged letter even if written by the respondents to the Government without any effective measures cannot be termed as ‘a step for acquisition’ under section 127 of the Town Planning Act. There is complete abandonment of acquisition proceedings resulting in automatic release from reservation of the properties in question. The respondents, therefore, have no right to withhold the sanction of the development plans submitted by the petitioners with the respondents.
4. In Writ Petition No. 2108 of 2003, two different reply Affidavits have been filed. Shrikant Krishnaji Godbole has Filed an Affidavit on behalf of the Municipal Corporation dated 2nd May, 2008 and Sanjay Raghunath Kurvey has filed affidavit on behalf of the State dated 23rd January 2008. Primarily, the stand taken in both the Affidavits is common to some extent that the Corporation has deposited an amount of Rs. 5.15 crores towards costs of acquisition with the State Government. The Notification under section 125(2) and (4) of the Development Act read with section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act were issued on 22nd December 2003. The Corporation had submitted an application for acquisition of land to the State Government on 10th April 2003. Resultantly the purchase notice served on behalf of the petitioners dated 16th October, 2002 is ineffective and inconsequential. The letter written by the Corporation to the Government on 10th April 2003 is a step in the acquisition proceedings and as such under proviso to section 127 of the Town Planning Act no cause survives in favour of the petitioners. It is also stated that Improvement Committee vide their Resolution No. 337 dated 19th March, 2003 had recommended proposal to the Corporation for sanction to initiate the proceedings and further stated that the Corporation had accorded sanction as on 7th April, 2003. In pursuance to all these steps, the Notification dated 22nd December, 2003 has been issued and the acquisition proceedings having been initiated in accordance with law, the claim made by the petitioners cannot be accepted by the Court. The common stand taken in both the writ petitions is that the Corporation has filed a Review Application in the case of (Girar Traders v. State of Maharashtra)1, reported in 2008 (1) Bom.C.R (S.C) 454 : 2007 DGLS (soft) 871 : (2007) 7 SCC 555 : A.I.R 2007 S.C 3180 which is pending before the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 3922 of 2007 (SLP No. 11446 of 2005) and as such that judgment is of no help to the petitioners.
5. The relevant dates are hardly in dispute in the present case. The purchase notice under section 127 of the Town Planning Act was dated 16th October, 2002 and was served upon the respondents on 17th October 2002. The Corporation had submitted an application to the State Government on 10th April 2003. The Notification under section 126 read with section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was admittedly issued on 22nd December 2003 and no Award has been made till date. The Notification dated 22nd December, 2003 was also issued one year after the service of notice. The reservation on the properties in question has been in existence since 1964 onwards.
6. In both the Writ Petitions, the purchase notice was issued on 16th October 2002 and it was addressed to the Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai and Chief Engineer, Development Plan. This Notice specify the basic ingredients, of section 127 of the Town Planning Act and was admittedly served on the respondents on 17th October 2002. No action was taken by the authorities within the statutory period of six months and thereafter. Not only that the petitioners through their Architect had persisted their request before the Corporation to clear the plans. There was an attempt made to argue that the purchase notice in these writ petitions have not been served upon the appropriate authority as contemplated under the provisions of section 127 of the Town Planning Act. Firstly, we may notice that in the reply affidavits filed on behalf of the authorities, no such contention has been raised. Secondly, the notices served upon the concerned authorities were duly received and were acted upon by the authorities. The notice dated 16th October 2002 was first dealt with and accepted by the respondent Corporation vide their letter dated 28th October 2002, Exhibit “F” to Writ Petition No. 1067 of 2007, wherein while referring to the purchase notice under section 127 of the Town Planning Act, they had asked for ownership documents which were submitted by the petitioners vide their letter dated 6th December, 2002. Thereafter, the petitioners again reiterated their request vide their letter dated 3rd July, 2003. This letter was answered by the respondents vide their reply dated 25th July, 2003 which reads as under:
“Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai
No. ACQ/C/534 of 25/07/2003
Office of the Chief Engineer
(Development Plan)
4th Floor, Extn. Bldg.,
Municipal Head Office
Mahapalika Marg, Fort
Mumbai 400 001.
Shri Hansanali Hasambhoy Jetha
Shri Akbarali Hasambhoy Jetha Jetha
Building, Opp. Byculla Goods
Depot, Dr. Bose Saheb, Ambedkar Road
Byculla, Mumbai 400027.
Sub.: Purchase Notice under section 127 of M.R.T.P Act 1966 in respect of land bearing C.S No. 565, 1/565, 1.A/565.and 1-B/565 of Mazgaon Division ‘E’ Ward.
Please refer to your letter dt. 3.7.2003 regarding subject matter. I have to inform you that application to the State Government as per the provision of M.R and T.P, 1966 amended upto date for acquisition of plot under reference has already been made on 10.4.2003 i.e Steps for acquisition of the land have been taken by M.C.G.M
Yours faithfully,
Executive Engineer (Development Plan)(City)”
7. After responding to the letters of the petitioners, the respondents had issued the Notification dated 22nd December, 2003 (the year being wrongly typed as 2004). Thus, the respondents had not denied the fact that they had acted upon the notices issued by the petitioners but the petitioners were not entitled to the benefit of the provisions of section 127 of the Town Planning Act primarily for the reason that the Corporation had already taken steps in the acquisition proceedings by writing the letter dated 10th April 2003 and more so when the letter was backed by the decision of the Improvement Committee of the Corporation. This contention need not detain us any further as the matter is no more res integra and has been squarely answered by the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Girnar Traders v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 7 SCC 555, where the Supreme Court held as under:
“35. Shri Shekhar Naphade, Senior Advocate appearing for the State and Shri Bhimrao Naik. Senior Advocate appearing for the Municipal Corporation concluded that the steps were taken on 17/9/2002 when in pursuance of the resolution passed by the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai, the Chief Engineer (Development Plan) sent a letter to the State of Maharashtra enclosing therewith a copy of Resolution 956 dated 16/9/2002, requesting that the steps be taken for acquisition of the land and this step taken by the respondents would constitute “steps” for the acquisition of the land under Clause (c) of section 126(1) of the MRTP Act, the same having been taken on 17/9/2002 when the period of six months had not expired, the same to be expired on 18/9/2002 and, therefore, the provision of de-reservation under section 127 would not apply.
36. It is contended by Shri Soli J. Sorabjee and Shri U.U Lalit, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants, that the intent and purpose of section 127 of the mrtp act is the acquisition of land within six months, which could only be when a declaration under section 6 of the la act is published in the Official Gazette. It is submitted by the learned Senior Counsel that the words “if within six months from the date of the service of such notice, the land is not acquired or no steps as aforesaid are commenced for its acquisition” are not susceptible of a literal construction and the words have to be given a meaning which safeguards a citizen against arbitrary and irrational executive action which, in fact, may not result in acquisition of the land for a long period to come. It cannot be doubted that the period of 10 years is a long period where the land of the owner is kept in reservation. Section 127 gives an opportunity to the owner for de-reservation of the land if no steps are taken for acquisition by the authorities within a period of six months in spite of service of notice for de-reservation after the period of 10 years has expired.
….. ….. ….. ….. ….. …..
54. When we conjointly read sections 126 and 127 of the mrtp act, it is apparent that the legislative intent is to expeditiously acquire the land reserved under the Town Planning Scheme and, therefore, various periods have been prescribed for acquisition of the owner's properly. The intent and purpose of the provisions of sections 126 and 127 has been well explained in Municipal Corporation of Crater Bombay ease. If the acquisition is left for time immemorial in the hands of the authority concerned by simply making an application to the State Government for acquiring such land under the LA Act, 1894, then the authority will simply move such an application and if no such notification is issued by the State Government for one year of the publication of the draft regional plan under section 126(2) read with section 6 of the LA Act, wail for the notification to be issued by the State Government by exercising suo motu power under sub-section (4) of section 126; and till then no declaration could be made under section 127 as regards lapsing of reservation and contemplated declaration of land being released and available for the landowner for his utilisation as permitted under section 127. Section 127 permitted inaction on the part of the acquisition authorities for a period of 10 years for de-reservation of the land. Not only that, it gives a further time for cither to acquire the land or to take steps for acquisition of the land within a period of six months from the date of service of notice by the landowner for de-reservation. The steps towards commencement of the acquisition in such a situation would necessarily be the steps for acquisition and not a step which may not result into acquisition and merely for the purpose of seeking time so that section 127 does not come into operation.
55. Providing the period of six months after the service of notice clearly indicates the intention of the legislature of an urgency where nothing has been done in regard to the land reserved under the plan for a period of 10 years and the owner is deprived of the utilisation of his land as per the user permissible under the plan. When mandate is given in a section requiring compliance within a particular period, the strict compliance is required therewith as introduction of this section is with legislative intent to balance the power of the State of “eminent doman”. The State possessed the power to take or control the property of the owner for the benefit of public cause, but when the State so acted, it was obliged to compensate the injured upon making just compensation. Compensation provided to the owner is the release of the land for keeping the land under reservation for 10 years without taking any steps for acquisition of the same.
56. The underlying principle envisaged in section 127 of the mrtp act is either to utilise the land for the purpose it is reserved in the plan in a given time or let the owner utilise the land for the purpose it is permissible under the town planning scheme. The step taken under the section within the time stipulated should be towards acquisition of land. It is a step of acquisition of land and not step for acquisition of land. It is trite that failure of authorities to take steps which result in actual commencement of acquisition of land cannot be permitted to defeat, the purpose and object of the scheme of acquisition under the MRTP Act by merely moving an application requesting the Government to acquire the land, which Government may or may not accept. Any step which may or may not culminate in the step for acquisition cannot be said to be a step towards acquisition.
57. It may also be noted that the legislature while enacting section 127 has deliberately used the word “steps” (in plural and not in singular) which are required to be taken for acquisition of the land. On construction of section 126 which provides for acquisition of the land under the MRTP Act, it is apparent that the steps for acquisition of the land would be issuance of the declaration under section 6 of the LA Act. Clause (C) of section 126(1) merely provides for a mode by which the State Government can be required for the acquisition of the land under section 6 of the la act. The making of an application to the State Government for acquisition of the land would not be a step for acquisition of the land under reservation. Sub-section (2) of section 126 leaves it open to the State Government either to permit the acquisition or not to permit, considering the public purpose for which the acquisition is sought for by the authorities. Thus, the steps towards acquisition would really commence when the State Government permits the acquisition and as a result thereof publishes the declaration under section 6 of the la act.
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59. There is another aspect of the matter. If we read section 126 of the mrtp act and the words used therein are given the verbatim meaning, then the steps commenced for acquisition of the land would not include making of an application under section 126(1)(c) or the declaration which is to be made by the State Government under Sub-section (2) of section 126 of the MRTP Act.
….. ….. ….. …..
62. In the present case, the amended regional plan was published in the year 1991. Thereafter, the steps by making an application under Clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 126 for issuance of the declaration of acquisition and the declaration itself had to be made within the period of one year from the date of the publication of regional plan, that is, within the period of one year from 1991. The application under section 126(1)(c) could be said to be a step taken for acquisition of the land if such application is moved within the period of one year from the date of publication of regional plan. The application moved after the expiry of one year could not result in the publication of declaration in the manner provided under section 6 of the LA Act, under Sub-section (2) of section 126 of the MRTP Act, there being a prohibition under the proviso to issue such declaration after one year. Therefore, by no stretch of imagination, could the step taken by the Municipal Corporation under section 126(2)(c) of making an application be said to be a step for the commencement of acquisition of the land. After the expiry of one year, it is left to the Government concerned under sub-section (4) of section 126 to issue declaration under section 6 of the la act for the purposes of acquisition for which no application is required under section 126(1)(c). Subsection (4) of section 126 of the MRTP Act would come into operation if the State Government is of the view that the land is required to be acquired for any public purpose.
63. The High Court has committed an apparent error when it held that the steps taken by the respondent Corporation on 9/9/2002 and 13/9/2002 would constitute steps as required under section 126(1)(c) of the MRTP Act. What is required under section 126(1)(c) is that the application is to be moved to the State Government for acquiring the land under the LA Act by the planning/local authority. Passing of a resolution by the Improvement Committee recommending that the steps be taken under section 126(1)(c) or making an application by the Chief Engineer without there being any authority or resolution passed by the Municipal Corporation, could not be taken to be steps taken of moving an application before the State Government for acquiring the land under the LA Act. The High Court has committed an apparent error in relying on these two documents for reaching the conclusion that the steps for acquisition had been commenced by the Municipal Corporation before the expiry of period of six months which was to expire on 18/9/2002.”
8. Paragraph 56 of the judgment, clearly answers the objections raised by the respondents. It has been specifically held by the Supreme Court that “It is trite that failure of authorities to take steps which result in actual commencement of acquisition of land cannot be permitted to defeat the purpose and object of the scheme of acquisition under the MRTP Act by merely moving an application requesting the Government to acquire the land, which Government may or may not accept. Any step which may or may not culminate in the step for acquisition cannot be said to be a step towards acquisition.” In face of clear dictum of the Supreme Court, we have no hesitation in rejecting the only contention raised on behalf of the respondents. In fact, when these writ petitions came up for hearing on different occasions, the main plea raised on behalf of the Corporation used to be that they have filed a Review Application before the Supreme Court in that case and since the Review Application was pending, the disposal of these writ petitions were deferred. Admittedly, as the Review Application has since been dismissed by the Supreme Court, there is no occassion for the Court to keep these writ petitions pending any longer. They are covered on law by the judgment of the Supreme Court. While relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (Larsen & Toubro Ltd. v. State of Gujarat)2, 1998 DGLS (soft) 331 : (1998) 4 SCC 387 : A.I.R 1998 S.C 1608 : (1998) 4 SCC 387, it is argued that the present writ petitions suffer from the defect of delay and laches and as the challenge has not been made within a reasonable time, the writ petitions should be dismissed for that reason. This argument raised on behalf of the respondents again is without any merit. The reservation against the properties in question is in force since 1964 and after coming into force the relevant provisions of the Act, the petitioners were expected to wait for a period of ten years whereafter they served a notice dated 16th October 2002. This notice was duly entertained and acted upon by the respondents. At no point of time, they took up this plea. On the contrary, their case was that of compliance to the provisions of section 127 of the Town Planning Act in face of their letter dated 10th April, 2003. The Notification was issued on 22nd December, 2003 and no Award had been made till date and no compensation had ever been determined or paid to the claimants. In face of these defaults of the respondents themselves, they are hardly justified in taking up the plea of delay and laches against the petitioners. The petitioners had served a notice in the year 2002 and were in correspondence with the respondents who finally vide their letter dated 25th July 2003 had declined their request and despite such a reply no action was taken by the Government except that when they wanted to take joint measurement of the land in the year 2004. In these circumstances, we do not think that the present petitions suffer from defect of delay and/or laches.
9. Resultantly, in view of our above discussion, Rule is made absolute in both the writ petitions. Writ petitions are allowed to the extent that the Notification dated 22nd December, 2003 is hereby quashed and the respondents are directed to deal with the application filed by the petitioners with the Corporation in accordance with law. In the facts of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
10. Petitions allowed.
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