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Ms. Ruchi Mehta And Others v. Union Of India And Others
Summary of Opinion — F.I. Rebello, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioners challenged an order dated June 27, 2007 (identified by the petition as in respect of the property at Sr. No. 2 of that order) which respondent No. 3 purportedly made under section 281 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The factual matrix recorded in the opinion is as follows:
- M/s Simplex Enterprises was allotted shop No. 4 in Virwani Plaza, Pune (2403 sq. ft. with 1437 sq. ft. mezzanine) in June 1988; the defaulter had paid earnest money for that allotment.
- An ITCP-1 was served on January 23, 1997 for recovery of an outstanding demand.
- The opinion states that the defaulter paid the balance to the builder and obtained possession (the text records this as happening in June, 1997) and that in July, 1998 the petitioners purchased the rights, title and interest of the defaulter in the shop. A sale deed between the builders and the petitioners was executed in November, 1998, with the defendants as confirming party.
- The Tax Recovery Officer at Pune, under a certificate from the Tax Recovery Officer, Ward 18, Mumbai, attached the shop on January 10, 2001. That attachment was challenged before the Commissioner of Income-tax.
- By order dated August 27, 2003 the Commissioner held that as on January 23, 1997 the defaulter's interest was only an allotment letter and not immovable property; the Commissioner held the status became immovable when the balance was paid and possession taken (the Commissioner stated this occurred in June, 1998). The Commissioner found that the correct procedure would have been to attach by sending notice to the builders under section 226(3) of ITCP 3 of the Second Schedule and that no such communication with the builders was on record for the period January 23, 1997 to November 30, 2000. The Commissioner set aside the attachment of shop No. 4.
- Thereafter respondent No. 3 passed the impugned order on August 27, 2007 declaring the sale of the shop in November, 1998 to be null and void. The petitioners moved to impugn that order in this court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether respondent No. 3 had jurisdiction under section 281 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 to declare the transfer (sale deed of November 1998) void.
- Whether the order passed by respondent No. 3, which had civil consequences, was passed without giving the petitioners an opportunity of being heard (i.e., whether there was a breach of the principles of natural justice).
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- Relying on the Supreme Court judgment in TRO v. Gangadhar Viswanath Ranade (Deed.) [1998] 234 ITR 188, it was submitted that respondent No. 3 could not validly declare the transaction to be void under section 281.
- It was further submitted that the impugned order was passed without giving the petitioners an opportunity to be heard, and since the order involved civil consequences the petitioners should have been given at least that opportunity before such an order was made.
Respondents' Arguments
- The respondents' learned counsel contended that, on a proper reading of the terminology of section 281, it was not open to respondent No. 3 to have made the impugned order (the opinion records this contention and reproduces section 281).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| TRO v. Gangadhar Viswanath Ranade (Deed.) [1998] 234 ITR 188 | The Supreme Court observed that section 281 merely declared what the law was; it did not provide an adjudicatory machinery. To declare a transfer void under section 281 appropriate proceedings must be taken in accordance with law, in the same manner as required under section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act. The Department, as creditor, must file a suit for a declaration that the transaction is void under section 281. | The court relied on this precedent to conclude that respondent No. 3's action in declaring the transfer void was beyond his jurisdiction because section 281 does not authorize such an adjudicatory order by the officer and that the Department must follow appropriate judicial procedure (a suit) to obtain such a declaration. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court followed the law declared by the Supreme Court in TRO v. Gangadhar Viswanath Ranade (Deed.) [1998] 234 ITR 188. The reasoning set out in the opinion is as follows:
- The Supreme Court had held that section 281 states a legal position but does not prescribe any adjudicatory machinery to decide disputes under that provision; proceedings analogous to those under section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act are required, and the Department must file a suit for declaration if it desires the transfer to be declared void under section 281.
- Applying that authority, the court concluded that respondent No. 3's unilateral declaration that the transfer in favour of the petitioners was void was made without jurisdiction because section 281 does not empower respondent No. 3 to make such a declaration in the manner he did.
- The court also noted that the impugned order produced civil consequences; before passing such an order respondent No. 3 ought to have given the petitioners an opportunity to be heard on the question whether respondent No. 3 could exercise jurisdiction under section 281. That opportunity was not provided, leading to a breach of the principles of natural justice and fair play.
- For those combined reasons — lack of jurisdiction under the statutory scheme as interpreted by the Supreme Court, and breach of natural justice — the impugned order had to be set aside.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: Petition allowed; the impugned order passed by respondent No. 3 declaring the transfer void is set aside.
Implications for the parties:
- The impugned order is quashed on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and breach of natural justice.
- The respondents remain entitled to proceed against the suit property, but only by following the due procedure prescribed by law (for example, by initiating appropriate judicial proceedings as indicated by the Supreme Court authority cited).
- The court made the rule absolute and directed that there be no order as to costs.
This opinion does not purport to set a new precedent; it applies the Supreme Court's decision in TRO v. Gangadhar Viswanath Ranade (Deed.) [1998] 234 ITR 188 to the facts before the court and determines that the officer's order must be set aside for lack of jurisdiction and for violation of principles of natural justice.
F.I Rebello, J.:— Rule. Heard forthwith.
2. The petitioners have approached this court to impugn the order dated June 27, 2007, in respect of the property identified at Sr. No. 2 of the said order. The order is purported to have been made by respondent No. 3 in the purported exercise of his powers under section 281 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. One M/s. Simplex Enterprises had booked and was allotted shop No. 4 admeasuring 2403 sq. ft. (with 1437 sq. ft. of Mezzanine floor) in Virwani Plaza at Pune in June, 1988. The defaulter paid the earnest money for procuring the said allotment. On January 23, 1997, an ITCP-1 was served for recovery of the outstanding demand. In June, 1997, the defaulter paid the balance money to the builder and obtained the possession of the said shop. In July, 1998, the petitioner purchased rights, title and interest of the defaulter in the said shop. Sale deed was executed between the builders and the petitioners for sale of the said shop in November, 1998, with the defendants as a confirming party.
3. The Tax Recovery Officer at Pune under the certificate from Tax Recovery Officer, Ward 18, Mumbai, attached the said shop on January 10, 2001. That was challenged before the Commissioner of Income-tax. After considering various contentions, the Commissioner held that as on January 23, 1997, what the defaulter owned was a mere allotment letter which was not an immovable property. The status of movable property was changed into immovable property when the balance amount was paid to the builders and the possession was taken by the defaulter. This happened in June, 1998. Until then the status of the property continued to be movable property. This being so, the correct approach for the Tax Recovery Officer was to attach this allotment by sending a notice to the builders. This notice could be under section 226(3) of ITCP 3 of the Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act. There was nothing on record, that any communication was ever made with the builders in this regard during the four years period from January 23, 1997, to November 30, 2000 (i.e when the first letter was written to the petitioner). Some other reason was also given. By order dated August 27, 2003, the Commissioner held that the notice is non est and set aside the action taken of attachment of the subject property. Consequently, attachment of shop No. 4 was vacated.
4. It appears that thereafter respondent No. 3 came to pass the impugned order on August 27, 2007. By the impugned order respondent No. 3 declared the sale of the shop in November, 1998, as null and void.
5. On behalf of the petitioner it was submitted, firstly, relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in TRO v. Gangadhar Viswanath Ranade (Deed.) [1998] 234 ITR 188, that it was not open to respondent No. 3 to have passed the order declaring the transaction to be void and, secondly, it is submitted that at any rate that order was passed without giving opportunity to the petitioner herein. As the order involved civil consequences, the petitioner at least ought to have been given an opportunity to point out that the order proposed to be passed by respondent No. 3 could not have been passed.
6. On the other hand on behalf of the respondents, their learned counsel contends that considering the terminology of section 281 it was not open to respondent No. 3 to have made that order: Section 281 reads as under:
“Section 281: Where, during the pendency of any proceeding under this Act, any assessee creates a charge on or parts with the possession by way of sale, mortgage, exchange or any other mode of transfer whatsoever, of any of his assets in favour of any other person with intention to defraud the Revenue, such charge’ or transfer shall be void as against any claim in respect of any tax or any other sum payable by the assessee as a result of the completion of the said proceedings:
Provided that such charge or transfer shall not be void if made for valuable consideration and without notice of the pendency of the proceeding under this Act.”
7. Section 281 had come up for consideration before the Supreme Court in TRO v. Gangadhar Viswanath Ranade (Deed.) [1998] 234 ITR 188. The Supreme Court observed that section 281 merely declared what the law was. The Supreme Court further held that section 281 did not prescribe any adjudicatory machinery for deciding any question which may arise under section 281. The court further observed that in order to declare a transfer as fraudulent under section 281, appropriate proceedings would have to be taken in accordance with law in the same manner as they are required to be taken under section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act. After considering various provisions including rule 11 in the Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act, the court was pleased to hold as under (page 196):
“If the Department desires to have the transaction of transfer declared void under section 281, the Department being in the position of a creditor will have to file a suit for a declaration that the transaction of transfer is void under section 281 of the Income-tax Act.”
8. Considering the law declared by the Supreme Court, it will be clear that the action of respondent No. 3 in declaring that the transfer of property in favour of the petitioners be void is clearly without jurisdiction.
9. The impugned order also attracted civil consequences. Respondent No. 3 before passing any such order ought to have given opportunity to petitioners if in law respondent No. 3 could exercise jurisdiction under section 281. That opportunity was also not given. The order, therefore, must also be set aside for violation of the principles of natural justice and fair play.
10. For the aforesaid reasons, the petition will have to be allowed. We make it clear that the respondents are entitled to proceed against the suit property, by following the due procedure. Rule made absolute accordingly. No order as to costs.
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