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Rama Steel Industries & Ors. v. Union Of India & Anr.
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioners were defaulting debtors who had mortgaged immovable properties to respondent No.2 (a Bank). Respondent No.2 initiated recovery proceedings under Section 101 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act for recovery of Rs. 47,69,648/-. While those proceedings were pending, on 14-7-2003 respondent No.2 issued a notice under Section 13(2) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (the Securitisation Act). The Bank took physical possession of the secured assets on 18-9-2003.
The petitioners appealed; the Debts Recovery Tribunal dismissed their appeal on 4-10-2006. They then appealed to the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal (DRAT). During the DRAT proceedings the Supreme Court decided Greater Bombay Co-op. Bank Ltd. v. United Yarn Tex Pvt. Ltd. and Transcore v. Union of India. DRAT dismissed the petitioners' appeal on 20-7-2007, but left them liberty to raise before the Debts Recovery Tribunal the question of the Bank's right to pursue parallel remedies. The petitioners challenged in this Court the constitutional validity of the Central Government Notification dated 28-1-2003 (issued under Section 2(1)(c)(v) of the Securitisation Act) — which specified inclusion of Co-operative Banks as "bank" for purposes of the Securitisation Act — and they also challenged the correctness of the DRAT judgment dated 20-7-2007.
The opinion records that an earlier challenge to the validity of the Securitisation Act in the Supreme Court had been negatived on 8-4-2004, with only sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the Securitisation Act struck down; Section 17 provides a remedy of appeal before the Debts Recovery Tribunal to a defaulting debtor.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Notification dated 28-1-2003, issued by the Central Government under Section 2(1)(c)(v) of the Securitisation Act to specify "Co-operative Banks" as "bank" for the purposes of that Act, is constitutionally valid.
- Whether Co-operative Banks (as defined in clause (cci) of Section 5 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949) can be included as "bank" under the Securitisation Act by executive notification without amendment of parliamentary definitions such as "Banking Company".
- Whether the remedies under the Securitisation Act are available to Co-operative Banks notwithstanding that the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act (RDB Act) has not been made applicable to Co-operative Banks, and whether the availability of other recovery mechanisms (under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act) bars the remedy under the Securitisation Act.
- Whether the DRAT's dismissal of the petitioners' appeal on 20-7-2007 (leaving liberty to argue parallel remedies) was correct in law.
- Whether the insertion of provisions like those in the Securitisation Act falls within the legislative competence of the State or Central legislature as applicable to Co-operative Banks.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments (as recorded)
- The Central Government could not, by notification, include Co-operative Banks within the definition of "bank" under Section 2(1)(c)(v) of the Securitisation Act in a manner that the Parliament had not itself effected (i.e., without amending the definition of "Banking Company").
- Inclusion of "Co-operative Bank" as a "bank" by notification — without amending the statutory definition of "Banking Company" — is inconsequential and amounts to an impermissible and excessive exercise of delegated legislative power by the Central Government.
- The provisions of the RDB Act have not been made applicable to Co-operative Banks; therefore, the Securitisation Act cannot apply to Co-operative Banks, because the Acts are not complementary or additional to the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act.
- Insertion of clause (cci) in Section 5 of the Banking Regulation Act (defining Co-operative Bank) without amending other provisions (such as clause (c) of Section 5) was impermissible.
- The Notification dated 28-1-2003 has lost force in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Greater Bombay Co-op. Bank Ltd. v. United Yarn Tex Pvt. Ltd.
- The State Legislature lacked competence to provide the remedy to Co-operative Banks under the Securitisation Act; if the State could not, neither could the Central Government create such a remedy for Co-operative Banks.
Respondents' Arguments
This opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondents' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Greater Bombay Co-op. Bank Ltd. v. United Yarn Tex Pvt. Ltd. (AIR 2007 SC 1584) | Concerned the availability of remedies under the RDB Act to Co-operative Banks covered under State Co-operative Societies Acts; used to examine whether Co-operative Banks have remedies under RDB Act. | The court observed that Greater Bombay dealt with RDB Act remedies and was not a decision on remedies under the Securitisation Act; the Division Bench of this Court (Aurangabad) had considered its effect and the present Court relied on that Division Bench treatment. |
| Transcore v. Union of India (2006 (12) Scale 585 : AIR 2007 SC 712) | Referenced as a Supreme Court decision decided during DRAT proceedings (no specific principle extracted in this text). | Mentioned as one of the Supreme Court decisions that were decided while the DRAT proceedings were pending; the opinion does not elaborate a specific application from this case. |
| Khaja Industries v. The State of Maharashtra (Writ Petition No. 2672 of 2007; reported 2007 (5) AIR Bom R 722) | Division Bench decision of the Bombay High Court considering the effect of Greater Bombay and the inclusion of Co-operative Banks within the Securitisation Act; considered the penumbra of Notification dated 28-1-2003. | The court treated Khaja Industries as dispositive on the question of availability of remedies under the Securitisation Act to Co-operative Banks and relied on its reasoning; held that Khaja Industries considered the relevant issues and that the challenge in the present petition had no force in view of that decision. |
| Mardia Chemicals (AIR 2004 SC 2371) | Upheld the constitutional validity of the Securitisation Act (Supreme Court precedent on validity). | The court noted that Mardia Chemicals upheld the Act's validity and rejected the petitioners' attempt to treat that decision as per incuriam; it relied on Mardia as binding precedent that supports the validity of the Securitisation Act. |
| Subramanayan Chettiyar v. Muttuswami Goundan (AIR 1941 FC 47) | Principle relating to pith and substance analysis: legislation that touches matters in different lists should be examined for its true nature to determine constitutional competence. | The court invoked the principle to explain that an enactment may touch on subjects in different legislative lists without being invalid if its pith and substance falls within competence; used to counter the petitioners' competence/contention arguments. |
| Ghanshamda's case (referenced) | Raised the point that once the Supreme Court has decided the validity of the Securitisation Act in Mardia, a High Court cannot re-open the validity issue; related to challenges to various sections of the Act. | The Division Bench rejected arguments that Mardia was per incuriam and held that the High Court could not re-examine the Act's validity once the Apex Court had upheld it; the present court stated it is bound by that Division Bench holding. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded in a sequence anchored in statutory interpretation, reliance on binding precedent and constitutional principles:
- Deference to prior High Court Division Bench: The court treated the Division Bench decision in Khaja Industries (Aurangabad) as addressing the question of availability of remedies under the Securitisation Act to Co-operative Banks and as considering the effect of the Supreme Court's Greater Bombay judgment. Because Khaja Industries had already examined the issue, the present Court found no reason to take a different view.
- Clarifying statutory definitions and scope: The court emphasized the distinction between "bank" and "banking company" as defined in clauses (c) and (d) of Section 2(1) of the Securitisation Act. It reproduced the definitions to show that a "bank" may include entities specified by Central Government notification in clause (v), while "banking company" is defined by reference to Section 5(c) of the Banking Regulation Act. The court concluded that the petitioners were mistaken in treating these terms as interchangeable; the law does not require that every "bank" must be a "banking company", although every "banking company" may be a "bank".
- Wider definition of "secured creditor": The court noted that Chapter III of the Securitisation Act deals with enforcement by a "secured creditor", a term defined more broadly (clause (zd) of Section 5) than merely a "bank" or "banking company". Because the statutory scheme contemplates secured creditors wider than banks or banking companies, the petitioners' challenge based on conflating "bank" and "banking company" was predicated on a misconception and had to be rejected.
- Statutory relationship with other laws: The court contrasted Section 37 of the Securitisation Act (“provisions of this Act ... shall be in addition to and not in derogation of ... or any other law for the time being in force”) with Section 34(2) of the RDB Act (which lacks the phrase “or any other law for the time being in force”). The presence in Section 37 of the broader saving clause indicated that the Securitisation Act provides remedies in addition to remedies under any other law (including the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act). Therefore, the availability of other recovery mechanisms does not preclude relief under the Securitisation Act.
- Delegated legislation and competence arguments: The court rejected the petitioners' contention that the Central Government had exceeded delegated power in specifying Co-operative Banks by notification. It observed that subsequent legislative developments (insertion of clause (cci) in Section 5 of the Banking Regulation Act to bring Co-operative Societies undertaking banking into the Banking Regulation Act governance) showed the Legislature intended to bring Co-operative Banks within regulatory reach; it would not have sufficed merely to re-label them as "banking company". The court therefore rejected the argument that the notification was impermissible.
- Constitutional competence and pith-and-substance: The court relied on established principles — presumption of constitutionality and pith-and-substance analysis (quoting Subramanayan Chettiyar v. Muttuswami Goundan) — to reject the argument that inclusion of Co-operative Banks under the Securitisation Act was beyond legislative competence. The Division Bench's earlier paras (31–34) were reproduced and applied to demonstrate that touching upon matters in another legislative list does not automatically invalidate the legislation when its pith and substance is within competence.
- Binding precedent on validity of the Act: The court noted the Supreme Court's decision in Mardia Chemicals upholding the constitutional validity of the Securitisation Act and rejected contentions that Mardia was per incuriam. It also relied on the Division Bench's conclusion (in Ghanshamda and Khaja Industries) that once the Apex Court has decided the Act's validity, the High Court cannot re-open the issue.
- Conclusion of analysis: Taking into account the statutory text, the wider definition of "secured creditor", the saving clause in Section 37, and the binding precedents, the court found the petitioners' challenges to the Notification and the DRAT judgment to be without merit.
Holding and Implications
Holding: Petition dismissed.
Implications:
- The High Court rejected the petitioners' challenge to the Central Government Notification dated 28-1-2003 (specifying Co-operative Banks as "bank" under Section 2(1)(c)(v) of the Securitisation Act) and the challenge to the DRAT judgment dated 20-7-2007; accordingly, the petitioners' attempt to evade recovery of dues by contesting the applicability of the Securitisation Act failed.
- The court treated the Securitisation Act as providing remedies in addition to other laws (including the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act) and held that the availability of other recovery mechanisms does not bar remedies under the Securitisation Act.
- The decision follows and applies existing Supreme Court and Division Bench precedents (notably Mardia Chemicals and Khaja Industries) and does not purport to set new law; the Court explicitly stated it was bound by the Division Bench's reasoning and saw no reason to take a different view.
Petition dismissed.
R.C Chavan, J.:— The petitioners are the defaulting debtors of respondent No. 2-Bank. The petitioners had mortgaged immovable properties to respondent No. 2- Bank. Respondent No. 2 started proceedings under Section 101 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 for recovery of Rs. 47,69,648/-. On 14-7-2003, during the pendency of these proceedings, respondent No. 2-Bank issued a notice of demand under Section 13(2) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (for 3 short, hereinafter referred to as “the g Securitisation Act”). On 18-9-2003, respondent No. 2-Bank took physical possession of the secured assets.
2. The petitioners preferred an appeal, which was dismissed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal on 4-10-2006. The petitioners appealed to the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal. During the pendency of the proceedings before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, the Apex Court decided Greater Bombay Co-op. Bank Ltd. v. United Yarn Tex. Pvt. Ltd. (2007 (5) Scale 366) : (AIR 2007 SC 1584) and Transcore v. Union of India (2006 (12) Scale 585) : (AIR 2007 SC 712). The Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, however, dismissed the petitioners' appeal on 20-7-2007 leaving to the petitioners liberty to argue before the Debts Recovery Tribunal the question of Bank's right to pursue parallel remedies.
3. The petitioners have, therefore, rushed to this Court challenging the constitutional validity of Notification dated 28-1-2003 issued in exercise of powers wider Section 2(1)(c)(v) of the Securitisation Act and consequently the correctness of the judgment dated 20-7-2007 of the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal.
4. The challenge to the validity of the Securitisation Act before the Supreme Court was negatived on 8-4-2004. The Supreme Court struck down only sub-section (2) of Section-17 of the Securitisation Act as unconstitutional. The remedy of an appeal before the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17 of the Securitisation Act is available to a defaulting debtor.
5. We have heard both the learned Advocates for the petitioners and the respondents. Reliance is placed by the petitioner solely on the judgment of Apex Court in case of Greater Bombay Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. United Yarn Tex. Pvt. Ltd., reported in AIR 2007 SCW 2325.
6. The issue of availability of remedies under the Securitisation Act to the Co-operative Banks need no longer detain us, since it is covered by a decision of the Division Bench of this Court sitting at Aurangabad in Writ Petition No. 2672 of 2007 Khaja Industries v. The State of Maharashtra) decided on 3rd July, 2007: (reported in 2007 (5) AIR Bom R 722). This decision duly considers the effect of judgment of the Supreme Court in Greater Bombay Co-op. Bank Ltd. v. United Yarn Tex. Pvt. Ltd., referred to above.
7. It has been urged that legality of Notification dated 28-1-2003, which includes Co-operative Banks within the definition of term “Bank” under Section 2(c) of the Securiti-sation Act was not a matter of challenge in the case of Khaja Industries, (supra), before this Court. The learned Advocate for the petitioners has contended that the Central Government could not issue the impugned Notification dated 28-1-2003 in exercise of its powers under Section 2(1)(c)(v) of the Securitisation Act specifying “Co-operative Banks”, as defined in clause (cci) of Section 5 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 as “bank” for the purpose of the Securitisation Act, dehors the provisions contained in the Banking Regulation Act.
8. He submitted that the Central Government could not do something which the Parliament itself had not chosen to do, namely inclusion of Co-operative Bank in the definition of “Banking Company”. According to the learned Advocate for the petitioners, inclusion of “Co-operative Bank” as a “Bank”, without amending the definition of “Banking Company” was inconsequential. Therefore, since the impugned Notification amounts to excessive use of delegated authority by the Central Government, such exercise was impermissible.
9. In the judgment in case of Khaja Industries, (supra), though the Division Bench had not explicitly considered the challenge to Notification dated 28-1-2003 in the form in which it is raised before us, the Bench had considered entire penumbra of the said Notification. The discussion to follow would show that the challenge raised in this petition too has no force.
10. We have considered the contentions raised before us carefully. Apart from what has been held by the Division Bench of this Court sitting at Aurangabad, in Writ Petition No. 2672 of 2007, we would observe that the petitioners herein are confused about the terms “Bank” and ‘Banking Company” defined separately in clauses (c) and (d) of Section 2(1) of the Securitisation Act and also clauses (d) and (e) of Section 2 of the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (for short, hereinafter referred to as “the RDB Act”), which will show that the law does not require that every Bank has to be a Banking Company though every Banking Company may be a Bank.
11. The definitions of “Bank” and “Banking Company” in clauses (c) and (d) of Section 2(1) of the Securitisation Act, which are reproduced below, would bring out the distinction between the meaning of terms “Bank” and “Banking Company”.
“(c) “bank” means—
(i) a banking company; or
(ii) a corresponding new bank; or
(iii) the State Bank of India; or
(iv) a subsidiary bank; or
(v) such other bank which the Central Government may, by notification, specify for the purposes of this Act.”
“(d) “banking company” shall haw the meaning assigned to it in clause (c) of Section 5 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (10 of 1949).”
12. Section 5 of the Banking Regulation Act does not define a “Bank”. The said Act defines “Banking Company” in clause (c) of Section 5. However, “Co-opertative Bank” has been separately defined in clause (cci) of Section 5, which has been inserted by enacting Section 56 of the Banking Regulation Act.
13. Chapter III of the Securitisation Act provides for enforcement of security interest by a secured creditor. The term “secured creditor” is wider than a “Bank”, or a “Banking Company”, or a “Financial Institution”. Clause (zd) of Section 5 of the Securitisation Act defines “secured creditor”. This clause refers to a ‘Bank” but not to a “Banking Company”. In view of this the challenge of the petitioners reveals to be based on a misconception relating to the scope of expressions “Bank.” and “Banking Company” in the Securitisation Act, has to be rejected.
14. The question, which came up for consideration before the Apex Court in Greater Bombay Co-op. Bank Ltd. v. United Yarn Tex. Pvt. Ltd. (AIR 2067 SC 1584) was about the availability of remedy under the RDB Act to Co-operative Banks covered under the State Co-operative Societies Acts. The question before Hon'ble Apex Court in the said case was not about remedies available under the Securitisation Act. This has been succinctly brought out in the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court, sitting at Aurangabad, in Writ Petition No. 2672 of 2007 and, therefore, needs no further elaboration.
15. The learned Advocate for the petitioners next submitted that because the provisions of the RDB Act have not been made applicable to the Co-operative Banks, the provisions of the securitisation act also cannot apply, since the same are not complementary or in addition to the provisions contained in the Co-operative Societies Act. We may observe that the Securitisation Act is an independent enactment providing remedy, to a group of creditors (defined as secured creditors in clause (zd) of Section 5 of the Securitisation Act. A creditor seeking recovery under the provisions of the RDB Act need not necessarily have a secured interest on the basis of which he could claim realization of the debt while under the Securitisation Act, he would claim liquidation of debt on the strength of secured asset. It has to be noted that the scheme emerging through the Securitisation Act has not come up as a Chapter added to the RBD Act, and scheme of the Securitisation Act cannot be narrowed down and limited by taking aid of the RDB Act.
16. The distinction in the expression used in Section 37, of the Securitisation Act and sub-section (2) of Section 34 of the RDB Act, which has been underlined by the Division Bench of this Court at Aurangabad in Writ Petition No. 2672 of 2007 squarely debunks the arguments of the learned Advocate for the petitioners. These Sections may be usefully reproduced for ready reference as under:
“Section 37 of the Securitisation Act: Application of other laws not barred. — The provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 (42 of 1956), the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 (15 of 1992), the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993) or any other law for the time being in force.”
(Emphasis supplied).
“Sub-section (2) of Section 34 of the RDB Act: The provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, the Industrial Finance Corporation Act, 1948, the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951, the Unit Trust of India Act, 1963, the Industrial Reconstruction Bank of India Act, 1984 [the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 and the Small Industries Development Bank of India Act, 1989].”
It may be seen that the expression “or I any other law for the time being in force” appearing in Section 37 of the Securitisation Act is missing in Section 34(2) of the RDB Act. This is crucial, because it would show that the remedy provided is in addition to remedy under any other law for the time being in force, which, as held by the Division Bench of this Court at Aurangabad in Writ Petition No. 2672 of 2007, includes the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960.
17. The question of availability of other mechanism of recovery cannot be a bar for providing remedy under the Securitisation Act, since such remedy is in addition to those available under any other law.
18. The contention of the learned Advocate for the petitioner that insertion of clause (cci) in Section 5 of the Banking Regulation Act, without amending the provisions of clause (c) of Section 5 of the said Act, was impermissible, has to be rejected, because the Legislature had to later on bring the Co-operative Societies undertaking Banking within the control and governance of Banking Regulation Act. Therefore, it would not have sufficed to include Co-operative Banks within the definition of “Banking Company”. The Banking Regulation Act defines “Banking” in clause (b) of Section 5 apart from term “Banking Company” defined in clause (c) of Section 5. The scheme and object of the Banking Regulation Act is entirely aimed at different object and it cannot be used to defeat a special enactment brought into force for objects, which are duly proclaimed.
19. The contention of the learned Advocate for the petitioners that the impugned Notification dated 28-1-2003 has lost its force, because of the judgment of the Apex Court in Greater Bombay Co-op. Bank Ltd. v. United Yarn Tex. Pvt. Ltd., (AIR 2007 SC 1584) referred to above, has to be rejected, because it has been considered and negatived by a Division Bench of this Court, sitting at Aurangabad, in Writ Petition No. 2672 of 2007 and we see no reason to take a different view.
20. The learned Advocate for the petitioner contended that insertion of a provision like the one in the Securitisation Act was beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature. Since the State Legislature could not have provided such a remedy to Co-operative Banks covered under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, the Central Government too could not have created such a remedy. This contention as well has been duly considered by the Division Bench of this Court at Aurangabad in Writ Petition No. 2672 of 2007 and we would merely reproduce paras 31 to 34 of the said judgment to underscore our rejection of this contention. The said paras 31 to 34 read as under:
“31. The submission is based on Schedule VII, List I, Entry 43 and Schedule VII, List II, Entry 32 of the Constitution, which read as under:—
“Schedule 7, List 1, Union List
43. Incorporation, regulation and winding up of trading corporations, including banking, insurance and financial corporations but not including co-operative societies.
Schedule 7 List 2. State List
32. Incorporation, regulation and winding up of corporations, other than those specified in List I, and universities; unincorporated trading, literary, scientific, religious and other societies and associations co-operative societies.”
It was submitted that disputes between the members at the co-operative societies can be agitated only under Sections 91 and 101 of M.C.S Act and not under any other Act including the Securitisation Act.
“32. It is necessary to keep in mind two principles while considering the challenge to the constitutional validity of an enactment. Firstly, the approach of the Court while examining the challenge to the constitutionality of an enactment is to start with a presumption of constitutionality. The Court should try to sustain the validity of an enactment to the extent possible. It should strike down the enactment only when it is not possible to sustain it, (paragraph 75 of the judgment in Greater Bombay Co-operative Bank Ltd. (AIR 2007 SC 1584). Secondly, as observed by the Federal Court in Subramanayan Chettiyar v. Muttuswami Goundan, AIR 1941 FC 47.
“It must inevitably happen from time to time that legislation though purporting to deal with a subject in one list; touches also upon a subject in another list, and the different provisions of the enactment may be so closely intertwined that blind adherence to a strictly verbal interpretation would result in a large number of statutes being declared invalid because the Legislature enacting them may appear to have legislated in a forbidden sphere. Hence the rule which has been evolved by the Judicial Committee, where the impugned statute is examined to ascertain its pith and substance or its true nature and character for the purpose to determine whether it is legislation with respect to matters in this list or that.”
“33. At the outset it must be noted that the Supreme Court in Mardia Chemicals (AIR 2004 SC 2371) upheld the constitutional validity of the Securitisation Act. It was however contended that the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mardia Chemicals is per incuriam as the Supreme Court had failed to consider the relevant provisions of law including of the Constitution of India and is therefore not binding on us. We are unable to agree.”
“34(A). It is important in this regard to refer to Ghanshamda's case. Two of the reliefs claimed in the Writ Petition in that case were for a writ striking down the Securitisation Act and in the alternative striking down Sections 9, 13, 15, 19, 34, 35, 41 and 42 of the Securitisation Act. It was contended before the Division Bench that though the Supreme Court had upheld the constitutional validity of the Securitisation Act in Mardia Chemical certain points of challenge were not before the Supreme Court. It was contended that though the entire Act was challenged, the Supreme Court referred to certain aspects which were not answered.
(B) The contention was rejected by the Division Bench inter alia in paragraphs 22 to 25 of the judgment which we have set out earlier. The Division Bench held that once the Apex Court had decided the validity of the Securitisation Act in Mardia's case, it was not open to the High Court to consider the validity of the Securitisation Act once again.
(C) We are bound by the judgment of the Division Bench. The contention must be rejected on this ground alone.”
21. To sum up, this attempt of the petitioner to evade recovery of dues by action under the Securitisation Act must, therefore, fall, since the contentions raised have absolutely no force. The petition is therefore, dismissed.
Petition dismissed.
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