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Vijay Ganesh Gondhlekar v. Indranil Jairaj Damale

Bombay High Court
Oct 4, 2007
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Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns an application under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code filed by the accused seeking to quash an order dated 12-3-2007 passed by the Sessions Judge, which confirmed an earlier order of the Magistrate. The underlying complaint was instituted under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The complainant alleged that the accused borrowed Rs. 20,000 on 1-3-1995 and issued a cheque in favor of the complainant for repayment. Although the loan was initially to be repaid within one year, extensions were granted up to 1999. The cheque was subsequently dishonoured, prompting the filing of the complaint.

The accused moved for discharge and dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the debt was barred by the law of limitation, contending that the limitation period for recovery of the loan was three years and that the cheque dated 1-3-1999 could not revive a barred debt. The accused filed this application for discharge six years after appearing in the case.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a cheque issued after the expiry of the limitation period can revive a debt barred under civil law.
  2. Whether the acknowledgment or revalidation of the debt by the accused within the limitation period affects the enforceability of the debt under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
  3. The applicability of sections 18 of the Limitation Act and 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act in determining the legal enforceability of the debt and the cheque.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

  • The limitation period for recovery of loan under civil law is three years, and since the cheque is dated 1-3-1999, the claim seeks to recover a barred debt.
  • There was no acknowledgment of the debt within the limitation period, thus the debt was completely barred on the date of issue of the cheque.

Respondent/Complainant's Arguments

  • The complainant filed a deposit receipt signed by the accused showing renewal of the debt in 1996 and 1997, extending the repayment date to 1-3-1998, constituting an acknowledgment under the Limitation Act.
  • The cheque itself, bearing the amount, payee name, drawer’s signature, and date, constitutes an acknowledgment and a fresh promise under section 18 of the Limitation Act and section 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act.
  • Even if the debt was barred, the revalidation and renewal of the cheque by the accused revived the debt and restarted the limitation period.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Narendra V. Kanekar v. The Bardez Taluka Co-op. Housing Mortgage Society Ltd., 2006 (7) Mh. L.J 11 : 2006 (3) All MR 673 Recognition that a signed written acknowledgment before expiry of limitation restarts limitation period; cheque alone does not revive barred debt unless it is a promise to pay a legally enforceable debt. Court applied this precedent to hold that the accused’s signed renewal of the debt constituted acknowledgment, making the debt recoverable within limitation.
Ashwini Satish Bhat v. Shri Jeevan Divakar Lolienkar, II (1999) BC 519 Addressed the effect of acknowledgment and promises on limitation and enforceability of debts. Court found this precedent inapplicable because an acknowledgment existed before expiry of limitation in the present case.
Veera Exports v. T. Kalavathy, 2002 (1) All MR 275 (SC) Confirmed that a drawer can voluntarily revalidate a negotiable instrument, including a cheque, thereby reviving the instrument. Used to support the view that revalidation of the cheque by the accused constituted a fresh promise and acknowledgment, reviving the debt.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined whether the debt was barred by limitation at the time the cheque was issued and the complaint filed. It found that the complainant produced a deposit receipt signed by the accused, showing renewal and extension of the repayment period, which amounted to an acknowledgment under section 18 of the Limitation Act. This acknowledgment restarted the limitation period, making the debt legally recoverable within three years from the last renewal date.

Further, the court analyzed the legal effect of the cheque itself under section 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act, concluding that issuance and subsequent revalidation of the cheque constituted a fresh promise to pay, thereby creating a legally enforceable liability and restarting the limitation period.

The court also relied on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Veera Exports v. T. Kalavathy, confirming that a drawer can revalidate a negotiable instrument, including a cheque, which supports the finding that the accused’s actions revived the debt.

Consequently, the court rejected the accused’s contention that the claim was barred by limitation and dismissed the application to quash the complaint.

Holding and Implications

The application to quash the complaint is dismissed.

The direct consequence of this decision is that the complaint under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act will proceed, as the court found the debt to be legally enforceable and not barred by limitation due to acknowledgment and revalidation by the accused. No new precedent was established; the court applied existing legal principles regarding acknowledgment, limitation, and enforceability of debts.

Show all summary ...

Rule.

2. Heard finally with consent of parties.

3. This is an application under section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code seeking to quash order dated 12-3-2007 passed by the Sessions Judge whereby he confirmed the order of the Magistrate.

4. The facts are as follows:

5. The present application under section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code is filed by the accused in Criminal Complaint instituted under section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act. It is alleged that the accused/applicant had borrowed a sum of Rs. 20,000/- from the complainant on 1-3-1995 and the accused-applicant issued a cheque in favour of the complainant. The loan was to be repaid within a period of one year but was not, and an extension of one more year was granted. Further extension of yet another one year was sought and it was also granted by the complainant and ultimately time was extended upto the year 1999. The cheque was tendered in the bank thereafter and it was dishonoured. Hence the complaint came to be filed under section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act.

6. Accused filed an application for his discharge and dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the debt sought to be recovered is barred by law of limitation. Although the complaint was filed in the year 1999 and accused had appeared in the case in 1999 he chose to file this application for discharge in the year 2005 i.e after 6 years. The main ground upon which discharge was sought was that the period of limitation for recovery of loan had already expired when the complaint case was filed and cheque could not have revived the barred debt. Loan was advanced on 1-3-1995 and the cheque is dated 1-3-1999.

7. Mr. Kalar learned counsel for the accused/applicant contended that the limitation for recovery of loan amount under civil law is only 3 years and the cheque is dated 1-3-1999. He submits that the complainant seeks to recover the barred debt. He also submits that there is no acknowledgment at all of the debt within limitation and hence the debt is completely barred on the date of issue of cheque. The argument has no force for two reasons. Firstly complainant along with the complaint has filed a deposit receipt said to be issued by the accused. It shows that it was first renewed in 1996 and then in 1997. It is renewed under the signature of the accused. The said acknowledgment mentions that the date of repayment was extended upto 1998. Finally there is an endorsement that the contract is renewed upto 1-3-1998. As said earlier it is under the signature of the accused. It is obvious that the accused acknowledged the debt by making endorsement on the same document that the contract is renewed. Thus if this acknowledgment is taken into consideration the debt could be recovered even under the civil law within 3 years from 1-3-1997. The time of three years from 1-3-1997 would expire on 1-3-2000. The cheque was tendered in bank on 10-3-1999. Even complaint under section 138 is filed in April, 1999. Obviously even on date of institution of complaint the debt was legally recoverable. The ratio in Mr. Narendra V. Kanekar v. The Bardez Taluka Co-op. Housing Mortgage Society Ltd., 2006 (7) Mh. L.J 11 : 2006 (3) All MR 673 cited by Shri Kalar could squarely be applied to this case. Next reason is that, the cheque was issued and renewed from time to time could itself, be treated as an acknowledgment. The cheque bears the amount, the name of the payee and the signature of the drawer of the cheque as well as the date of issue. Therefore, a cheque itself is a document which could fall within the scope of section 18 of the Limitation Act. Acknowledgment is given before the expiry of period of limitation since time was extended under the signature. In the instant case therefore we need not go into the question whether the claim could be said to be barred by limitation if a suit was to be filed. In fact in Narendra Kanekar's case cited supra the Court has observed as follows:

“Mere giving a cheque, without anything more, will not revive a barred debt, because cheque has to be given, as contemplated by the explanatory in discharge of a legally enforceable debt. There is no doubt that in terms of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963, a signed acknowledgment of liability made in writing before the expiration of the period of limitation, is enough to start a fresh period of limitation. Likewise, when a debt has become barred by limitation, there is also section 25(3) of the Contract Act, by which, a written promise to pay, furnishes a fresh cause of action. In other words, what Clause (3) of section 25 of the Indian Contract Act in substance does is not to revive a dead right, for the right is never dead at any time, but to resucitate the remedy to enforce payment by suit, and if the payment could be enforced by a suit, it means that it still has the character of legally enforceable debt as contemplated by the explanation below section 138 of the Act. As far as this aspect of the case, is concerned, the learned Division Bench observed that to determine as to whether or not a liability is legally enforceable, the provisions of the contract act cannot be said to be irrelevant. This can provide a cause for a legal liability. Although the primary question answered by the Division Bench was that a cheque becomes a promise to pay under section 25(3) of the Contract Act, this view need not be followed by this Court in the light of the Judgment of this Court in the case of Ashwini Satish Bhat v. Shri Jeevan Divakar Lolienkar (supra) and the other two Judgments referred to hereinabove. Nevertheless, the Division Bench Judgment is relevant to the extent that it holds that a promise to pay in writing as per section 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act, 1982, matures into an enforceable contract, which can be enforced by filing a Civil Suit. If a suit could be filed pursuant to a promise made in writing and signed by the person to be charged therewith, as contemplated by clause (3) of section 25 of the law of Contract, then, in my view, the debt becomes legally enforceable and if a cheque is given in payment of such debt is dishonoured and subsequently, the statutory notice is not complied with, then the person making the promise in writing and issuing the cheque, would still be liable to be punished under section 138 of the Act.”

8. Learned counsel for the applicant had also relied on a decision of this Court in Smt. Ashwini Satish Bhat v. Shri Jeewan Divakar, II (1999) BC 519. This decision has no bearing on the case at hand as in the case at hand there is an acknowledgment before expiry of limitation.

9. Assuming for the sake of argument that there was no acknowledgment before the expiry of period of limitation and the cheque is issued after a period of expiry of limitation, still whether there is an enforceable liability or not will have to be considered. I have already observed above that the cheque is issued under the signature of the debtor after putting the sum payable. The cheque directs the bank to pay the bearer sum mentioned in the cheque. As such it becomes the promise in favour of the payee within the meaning of section 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act. Once it becomes a fresh promise, fresh period of limitation of 3 years would begin to run from the date of cheque. Hence the liability would certainly be a legally enforceable liability.

10. In a case reported in Veera Exports v. T. Kalavathy, 2002 (1) All MR 275 (SC), Supreme Court has observed as follows:

“In our view this reasoning is entirely fallacious. There is no provision in the Negotiable Instruments Act or in any other law which stipulates that a drawer of a negotiable instrument cannot re-validate it. It is always open to a drawer to voluntarily revalidate the negotiable instrument, including a cheque.”

11. Thus when a drawer revalidates cheque form time to time which is permissible, it could be said that on each occasion there was a fresh promise as envisaged by section 25 of the Contract Act as well as an acknowledgment within the meaning of section 18 of the Limitation Act if such revalidation is made within the period of limitation. In the instant case admittedly the accused-applicant had extended the date of cheque from time to time under his own signature and had validated the cheque. As said earlier such validation amounts to a fresh promise and therefore, he has revived a barred debt. The proceedings have been filed within 3 years from the last such revalidation and in view of this it could not be said that under the cheque the applicant sought to recover a barred debt. In view of this I find no substance in the application. It is dismissed.

Application dismissed.