R.M Lodha, J.:— The Division Bench requested the Chief Justice to constitute larger Bench to decide the following issue:

“Whether the provisions of the limitation act would apply or not in case of an appeal filed under section 260-A of the Income Tax Act, 1961?”

2. Accordingly, the present Full Bench has been constituted by the Chief Justice.

3. In our view, the question needs to be reframed. The question is:

“Whether section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 shall apply in case of an appeal filed under section 260-A of the Income Tax Act, 1961?”

4. This is how the aforesaid question arises. The revenue challenged the order dated 3 January, 2006 passed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Panaji Bench by filing an appeal under section 260-A of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Since the appeal suffered from delay of 11 days, an application was made by revenue for the condonation of delay. The assessee raised the objection that section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be invoked by the revenue as it is excluded by necessary implication.

5. Mr. S.K Kakodkar, Senior Counsel for the assessee forcefully submitted, that he always does, that the Income Tax Act, 1961 is a complete code in itself; it provides for all aspects relating to levy and recovery of income-tax, the procedure therefor, remedies including appeals and revisions and penalties and prosecution. Section 260-A that provides for an appeal to the High Court on substantial questions of law is exhaustive in all respects including the period of limitation and the said provision also being a complete code in itself relating to the remedy of appeal to the High Court, the application of section 5 of the Limitation Act is excluded by necessary implication. The submission of the Senior Counsel is that section 260-A clearly provides in compulsive form that appeal shall be filed before the High Court within 120 days and the longer limitation having already been provided, the legislature impliedly excluded the applicability of section 5 of the Limitation Act. According to him, resort to the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act in the appeal preferred under section 260-A is impermissible. Mr. S.K Kakodkar would submit that the collection of revenue cannot brook delay and, therefore, the legislature by providing the different period of limitation which is longer than the period of limitation provided in Article 116 of the Limitation Act, clearly indicates its intention in excluding section 5 by necessary implication. His submission is that there is no equity in the tax laws nor the law of limitation. In support of his submission that the Income Tax Act, 1961 is self contained Code and exhaustive of the matters dealt therein, Mr. S.K Kakodkar, the Senior Counsel heavily relied upon the two judgments of the Supreme Court; (i) Ravulu Subba Rao v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras, AIR 1956 SC 604, and (ii) Sales Tax Officer, Banaras v. Kanhaiya Lal Makund Lal Saraf AIR 1959 SC 135. The Senior Counsel also relied upon: (i) Fairgrowth Investments Ltd. v. Custodian., (2004) 11 SCC 472, (ii) L.S Synthetics Ltd. v. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd., (2004) 11 SCC 456, (iii) Gopal Sardar v. Karuna Sardar., (2004) 4 SCC 252, (iv) Union Of India v. Popular Construction Co.., (2001) 8 SCC 470, (v) Commissioner of C.Ex, Meerut-II v. Salora International, 2006 (206) E.L.T 61 for the proposition that section 29(2) or for that section 5 of the Limitation Act is excluded by necessary implication.

6. Mr. S.R Rivonkar, the Counsel for the revenue, on the other hand, submitted that Income Tax Act, 1961 is a consolidated and amending act and the provisions of section 260-a are not the complete code in itself. By virtue of sub-section (7) of section 260-A that provides that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code relating to appeals are made applicable to appeals under section 260-A, the Counsel for the revenue would submit that section 260-A is not code in itself. He submits that under Order 41, Rule 3-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, the application for condonation of delay for condoning the delay in appeals is maintainable and that procedure is made applicable to appeals under section 260-A and, therefore, it cannot be said that section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to appeals under section 260-A. Mr. S.R Rivonkar also submitted that appeals filed under sections 249, 253 and applications under section 256(1) of the Income Tax Act lay before the authorities/tribunals constituted under the Income Tax Act and since these authorities and tribunals are not Courts, the specific provisions have been made therein authorising such authorities/Tribunals to condone the delay while filing appeals/applications but no such provision has been made under sections 256(2) and 260-a for condoning the delay in filing the applications/appeals, to High Court, as section 29(2) of the Limitation Act is attracted and, therefore, the legislature did not feel it necessary to expressly provide for condonation of delay by the High Court in the appeals under section 260-A or the erstwhile provision of section 256-A. He relied upon the following decisions in support of his submissions: (i) Commissioner Of Customs (Import) v. S.C Gupta No. 1 of 2001, decided on 27-7-2006), (ii) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Anandilal Podar and Sons Ltd., (2005) 279 I.T.R 104 (Cal), (iii) Premchand Bansal and Sons v. Income Tax Officer, 237 I.T.R 65 (Del), (iv) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Orissa Concrete and Allied Industries Ltd., 2003 (264) I.T.R 186, and (v) Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker., (1995) 5 SCC 5 : AIR 1995 SC 2272.

7. section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads thus—

“Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.”

8. That the following twin conditions must be satisfied for the applicability of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act have been clearly exposited by the Supreme Court in Mukri Gopalan.

(i) There must be a provision for period of limitation under any special or local law in connection with any suit, appeal or application;

(ii) The said prescription of period of limitation under such special or local law should be different from the period prescribed by the schedule to the Limitation Act.

9. In Mukri Gopalan, the Supreme Court said that, if the two requirements are satisfied the consequences contemplated by section 29(2) would automatically follow.

10. Fairgrowth Investments Ltd., added additional dimension for applicability of section 29(2) to the twin requirements exposited in Mukri Gopalan. The Supreme Court said that there is an additional requirement viz. That the special/local Act does not expressly exclude the application of the Limitation Act. The word “exclusion” also includes “exclusion by necessary implication”.

11. In the present case, the real question is whether the provisions contained in section 260-A exclude the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act by necessary implication. This question has to be seen in the light of the submissions advanced by the Senior Counsel for the assessee that the Income Tax Act is a code in itself and section 260-A is exhaustive of the matters dealt with therein. It is true that the Income Tax Act forms a code complete in itself but what is important is that the question of exclusion of the provision of the limitation act must be separately considered with reference to different provisions of the special act and not in connection with the provisions of a Special Act as a whole. Seen thus, we find that section 260-A itself provides that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code relating to appeals, as far as possible, are applicable to the appeals under section 260-A. It would mean that section 260-A is not exhaustive of all the facets, aspects and matters with regard to the appeals under section 260-A. We have to look beyond section 260-A relating to appeals filed thereunder with regard to various aspects as provided in the Code of Civil Procedure relating to appeals. How can it be said then that section 260-A forms a code complete in itself and is exhaustive of the matters relating to the appeals filed under the said provision. Mr. S.K Kakodkar, the Senior Counsel for the assessee contended that merely because the provision has been made in sub-section (7) of section 260-A that the provisions of Civil Procedure Code relating to appeals are made applicable to appeals under section 260-A (as far as possible) would not mean that section 260-A is not a code in itself. According to him, instead of specifying the provisions relating to appeal as provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, the legislature has incorporated the said provisions by enacting sub-section (7). The submission of Mr. S.K Kakodkar does not impress us. Rather it seems to us that the legislature did not intend to make the provision of section 260-a water-tight. The exclusion of the provisions of sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act as provided in section 29(2) cannot be lightly inferred. Implied exclusion is not readily inferred. To infer the exclusion of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, by necessary implication, the language of section 260-A must suggest that the provision contained therein is mandatory and compulsive and, though not expressly stated, the legislature intended unequivocally that the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act are impliedly excluded.

12. Section 260-A of the Income Tax Act reads thus—

“260-A. (1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from every order passed in appeal by the Appellate Tribunal, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law.

(2) [The Chief Commissioner or the Commissioner or an assessee aggrieved by any order passed by the Appellate Tribunal may file an appeal to the High Court and such appeal under this sub-section shall be]

(a) filed within one hundred and twenty days from the date on which the order appealed against is [received by the assessee or the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner];

(b) [******]

(c) in the form of a memorandum of appeal precisely stating there in the substantial question of law involved.

(3) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question.

(4) The appeal shall be heard only on the question so formulated, and the respondents shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question:

Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question.

(5) The High Court shall decide the question of law so formulated and deliver such judgment thereon containing the grounds on which such decision is founded and may award such cost as it deems fit.

(6) The High Court may determine any issue which—

(a) has not been determined by the Appellate Tribunal; or

(b) has been wrongly determined by the Appellate Tribunal, by reason of a decision on such question of law as is referred to in sub-section (1).

(7) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), relating to appeals to the High Court shall, as far as may be, apply in the case of appeals under this section.]

13. That the legislature has used the words ‘shall be filed’ in sub-section (2) means that the limitation for filing the appeal is as provided therein but that does not make section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 inapplicable. The High Court being the Superior Court, the power to condone the delay in filing the appeal must be read to be existent, moreso by virtue of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, unless there is clear indication of its exclusion by implication. The use of the word ‘shall’ and the longer period of limitation (120 days) are not indicators of such exclusion. Nor from the position that section 260-A is silent about applicability of section 29(2), any justifiable inference can be drawn for inapplicability of that provision. What is obvious need not be stated and, therefore, legislature may have thought fit that it was not necessary to express specifically about the power of the High Court to condone the delay in view of existence of section 29(2). When the statute is silent, the presumption is not drawn automatically about the exclusion of section 29(2) or for that matter section 5 of the Limitation Act. In our thoughtful consideration of the whole matter there is nothing to indicate that the application of section 29(2) is excluded except providing a special limitation. Section 260-A does not necessarily imply the exclusion of sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act.

14. Insofar as the issue before the Supreme Court in the case of Fairgrowth Investments Ltd. is concerned, in our considered view, the said decision cannot be applied to section 260-A of the Income Tax Act. In Fairgrowth Investments Ltd., the Supreme Court was concerned with the question whether the Special Court was constituted under the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992 has power to condone the delay in filing the petition under section 4(2) of the Act. In holding that section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply to the proceedings under section 4(2), the Supreme Court principally relied on three grounds; (one) that the time limit for filing the petition for objection under section 4(2) is mandatory and compulsive in the sense that the period prescribed cannot be extended by the Court under any inherent jurisdiction of the said Act; (two) an express provision for condonation of delay under section 10(3) and (three) non obstante provision in section 13 i.e, section 13 has an overriding effect. The analogy flowing from the aforesaid three grounds, we are afraid, cannot be applied to section 260-A. Firstly section 260-A by providing that appeal shall be filed in 120 days only provides for special period of limitation and the language does not make it so compulsive so as to exclude the power of condonation of delay; Secondly, and equally importantly, there is no provision of overriding effect in section 260-A or elsewhere in Income Tax Act in this regard.

15. In the State Of Goa v. Western Builders, 2006 (6) Mh. L.J (S.C) 737 : (2006) 6 SCC 239, the Supreme Court was concerned with the question of applicability of section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. That was a case where the award was given by the sole arbitrator on 7th February, 1995. Aggrieved by the award, the petition was filed before the Civil Court, Civil Judge, Margao under sections 30 and 53 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 for making the award rule of the Court. An objection was raised by the State of Goa that since the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 has come into force, the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings under the Arbitration Act, 1940. The Civil Judge disposed of the proceedings by holding that the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was applicable and that there is no provision for making the award as rule of the Court. The State of Goa then filed petition under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for setting aside the award and made an application under section 14 read with section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for condoning the delay and for the exclusion of the time which was spent in the proceedings before the Civil Judge, Senior Division. The said application was rejected by the IInd Additional District Judge, South Goa on the ground that there was no provision for extension of time under the Act of 1996 and section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 was not applicable. In the appeal preferred before this Court, Panaji Bench at Goa, the learned Single Judge heard and held that the application under section 14 of the Limitation Act was not maintainable in view of sub-section (3) of section 34 of the Act of 1996. The Supreme Court held that since there was no prohibition provided in section 34 of the Act of 1996, section 14 of the Limitation Act can be read in the Act of 1996 which advances the cause of justice. This is what the Supreme Court has to say in this regard:

“19. There is no provision in the whole of the Act which prohibits discretion of the Court. Under section 14 of the Limitation Act if the party has been bona fidely prosecuting his remedy before the Court which has no jurisdiction whether the period spent in that proceedings shall be excluded or not. Learned Counsel for the respondent has taken us to the provisions of the Act of 1996: like section 5, section 8(1), section 9, section 11, sub-sections (4), (6), (9) and sub-section (3) of section 14, section 27, sections 34, 36, 37, 39(2) and (4), section 41, sub-section (2), sections 42 and 43 and tried to emphasise with reference to the aforesaid sections that wherever the legislature wanted to give power to the Court that has been incorporated in the provisions, therefore, no further power should lie in the hands of the Court so as to enable to exclude the period spent in prosecuting the remedy before other forum. It is true but at the same time there is no prohibition incorporated in the statute for curtailing the power of the Court under section 14 of the Limitation Act. Much depends upon the words used in the statute and not general principles applicable. By virtue of section 43 of the Act of 1996, the Limitation Act applies to the proceedings under the Act of 1996 and the provisions of the Limitation Act can only stand excluded to the extent wherever different period has been prescribed under the Act, 1996. Since there is no prohibition provided under section 34, there is no reason why section 14 of the Limitation Act be read in the Act of 1996, which will advance the cause of justice. If the statute is silent and there is no specific prohibition then the statute should be interpreted which advances the cause of justice. Our attention was invited to various decisions of this Court but we shall refer to a few of them which have some relevance.”

16. It is pertinent to notice here that before the Supreme Court, argument was advanced that section 34 was a complete code in itself and the operation of sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act was excluded was accepted only with regard to section 5 because of expression “but not thereafter” in proviso to sub-section (3) of section 34. In respect of exclusion of section 14 of the Limitation Act, the argument was rejected. The Supreme Court observed that since there is no prohibition, there is no reason why section 14 of the Limitation Act be not read in the Act, 1996.

17. The Calcutta High Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax v. Anandilal Poddar and Sons Ltd., (2005) 279 I.T.R 104 (Cal) has taken the view that the High Court has power to condone the delay in filing the appeal under section 260-A. It was held thus—

“Admittedly, the Income-tax Act is a special Act. It expressly provides in section 260-A for a period of limitation for preferring an appeal to the High Court, which is 120 days. But the reference to Article 116 of the Limitation Act is wholly misplaced since the limitation provided therein applies to an appeal provided under the Code of Civil Procedure. This period is substituted in respect of an appeal under section 260-A by the period prescribed in clause (a) of sub-section (2) thereof. This special period of limitation will prevail over and exclude the period provided in the Limitation Act for preferring appeal. This prescription of the special period, however, does not necessarily imply that the application of sections 4 to 24 is excluded. In order to exclude the application of sections 4 to 24 within the meaning of section 29 of the Limitation Act, the exclusion must be express and such express exclusion is to be inferred by necessary implication from the statute itself. When the statute is silent and does not even by implication express that sections 4 to 24 would not apply, then the Court is not supposed to presume exclusion on account of the statute being silent in that aspect.

Sub-section (2) of section 29 makes it clear that if a period prescribed in the special statute is different from that prescribed in the Limitation Act, the period provided in the Limitation Act shall be subject to the special period prescribed by the special statute and the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 would apply on the basis of such special period so prescribed insofar as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special law.

It appears that under section 256(1), a period has been provided together with a power to condone the delay within a limited period as prescribed in the proviso to section 256(1). This was done in view of the fact that the Limitation Act had no manner of application before the Tribunal before whom an application for reference under section 256(1) is to be made. But when it incorporated the provisions for reference to the High Court under sub-section (2), it had only provided the period within which such an application is to be made, remaining silent with regard to the question of exclusion of the application of sections 4 to 24. At the same time, section 260-A while providing for special period of limitation, in sub-section (2), the statute remains silent with regard to the question that by necessary implication the application of sections 4 to 24 is excluded, the Court is not supposed to presume such exclusion, particularly, when there is nothing to hold that the provisions of section 260-a are hit by section 29(2) of the Limitation Act or that the application of sections 4 to 24 is expressly excluded or even by necessary implication.

Therefore, we are unable to agree with the contention raised by Mr. Murarka, learned Counsel for the respondent, that section 5 has no manner of application in respect of an appeal preferred under section 260-A.”

18. It is true that Calcutta High Court has not considered Fairgrowth Investments Ltd. and the argument was not advanced before that Court in the manner it has been advanced by Mr. S.K Kakodkar before us but, in our view, the conclusion would not be different for the reasons that we have already indicated above and which we need not repeat.

19. As to whether an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 seeking condonation of delay in filing the application under section 256(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 can be maintained, the Delhi High Court speaking through R.C Lahoti, J. (As His Lordship then was) held that section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 was attracted. This is how the matter was considered by the Delhi High Court:

“The first question for consideration is whether the applicability of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is at all attracted. It is true that the period of limitation for filing an application under section 256(2) of the Income-tax Act is provided in section 256 itself and not by the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, Here, the change in law brought by the introduction of the Limitation Act, 1963, over its predecessor enactment assumes significance. Under the Limitation Act, 1908, section 5 could not be applied to a period of limitation prescribed by special or local law unless its applicability was specifically attracted. Under section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply to the periods of limitation prescribed by any special or local law unless such applicability is expressly excluded. It is not disputed that the applicability of the Limitation Act section 5 has not been excluded by section 256 of the Income-tax Act. This controversy stands resolved by the Supreme Court in Mukhri Gopalan v. Cheppilat Putharipurayil Aboobacker, (1995) 5 SCC 5 : AIR 1995 SC 2272. Their Lordships have held.

“Section 29(2) would apply even to a case where a difference between the special law and Limitation Act arose by the omission to provide for limitation to a particular proceeding under the Limitation Act.

There is no express exclusion anywhere in the Rent Act taking out the applicability of section 5 of the Limitation Act to appeals filed before appellate authority under section 18 of the Act. Consequently all the legal requirements for applicability of section 5 of the Limitation Act to such appeals in the light of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act can be said to have been satisfied.” For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, applies to petitions under section 256(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Such is the view taken by a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in CIT v. Taylor Instrument Co. (India) Ltd., (1992) 64 Taxman 6.”

20. The Division Bench of this Court in The Commissioner Of Customs (Import) v. S.C Gupta No. 1 of 2001, decided on 27 July, 2006 was concerned with the question of applicability of section 5 of the Limitation Act in respect of the application for reference to the High Court from Central Excise and Gold Control Appellate Tribunal (CEGAT) under section 130-A of the Customs Act. The Division Bench inter alia considered: (i) CIT v. Taylor Instrument Co. (India) Ltd., (1992) 64 Taxman 6, (ii) Nihalkaran v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax, 168 (1987) I.T.R 508, (iii) State of Haryana v. Free While (India) Ltd., 104 (1997) I.T.R 259, (iv) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Orissa Concrete and Allied Industries Ltd., 264 (2003) I.T.R 186, and (v) Fairgrowth Investments Ltd. and held that the Customs Act, 1962 does not contain any provision which excludes the applicability of sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act.

21. Thus, there is overwhelming line of cases holding section 5 of the Limitation Act applicable to the matters in appeal and reference applications to the High Court under the Indian Income Tax Act, Customs Act and Bombay Sales Tax Act. Our conclusion in this regard is in line with these cases.

22. We have already indicated above as to why the judgment of the Supreme Court in Fairgrowth Investments Limited cannot be applied to the issue before us. We need not repeat. As regards the decision in the case of Gopal Sardar, the Supreme Court specifically held that looking to the scheme of the West Bengal Act and nature of right of pre-emption, section 5 of the Limitation Act for the purpose of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act was expressly excluded. The Supreme Court held in para 7 of its report thus—

“7. In section 8 of the Limitation Act there is reference to suits to enforce rights of pre-emption stating therein that nothing in section 6 or section 7 applies to suits to enforce rights of pre-emption, or shall be deemed to extend, for more than three years from the cessation of the disability or the death of the person affected thereby, the period of limitation for any suit or application. In Article 97 of the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act under the heading suits relating to miscellaneous matters there is reference to enforcement of rights of pre-emption. Thus, there is reference to suits in section 8 and Article 97 of the Limitation Act, but there is no reference to an application for enforcement of right of preemption. Having regard to the fact that the Act is a self-contained code in relation to the enforcement of rights of pre-emption and looking to the provisions of the limitation act, as stated above, it appears to us that when one applies for enforcement of rights of pre-emption under section 9 of the Act, the proceedings initiated are in the nature of a suit. The words “application “and” suit” have been defined in sections 2(b) and 2(1) of the Limitation Act.” Application” includes a petition but “suit” does not include an appeal or an application. The Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Serish Maji after elaborate consideration, referring to various decisions and on analysis of different provisions, in paras 25 to 50 of the judgment has concluded that a proceeding initiated by an application of section 8 is to be construed as a “suit” for the purpose of Limitation Act. We have good reason to approve the said view. This being the position, section 5 of the Limitation Act is not attracted to the proceedings initiated under section 8 of the Act. The right conferred under section 8 is a statutory right. Even otherwise, in our view, the position as regards the applicability of section 5 of the Limitation Act to an application under section 5 of the Act does not get altered. As already stated above, the Act is a self-contained code inasmuch as the Act provides to enforce the rights of preemption, forum is provided, procedure is prescribed, remedies including the appeals and revisions are provided, penalties are indicated for non-compliance with the orders and powers are given for restoration of land. Further period of limitation is also specifically prescribed to make an application under section 8 of the Act and for preferring appeals or revisions under the provisions of the Act. All these and a few other provisions are clear enough to indicate that the Act is a complete code in itself dealing with the rights of pre-emption. The second proviso to section 14-H specifically provides for the application of section 5 of the Limitation Act in the matter of preferring an appeal or revision. Section 14-0(1) specifically enables the Appellate Authority to allow to prefer an appeal even after the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed on showing sufficient cause. Similarly, the second proviso to section 19(2) of the Act expressly provides for application of section 5 of the Limitation Act to an appeal to be preferred under the said section. Section 51-A of the Act deals with preparation and revision of record-of-rights. Rule 26 of the Rules framed under the Act provides that every appeal under section 51-A of the Act is to be filed within one month from the date of passing of the order appealed against. The proviso to the said Rule states that an appeal may be admitted after the said period if the appellant satisfies that he had sufficient reasons for not preferring the appeal within the said period. Thus either section 5 of the Limitation Act or its principles have been expressly and specifically incorporated in the various sections aforementioned. In contrast, although section 8 of the Act prescribes the period of limitation for applying to enforce pre-emption rights, it does not speak of application of section 5 of the Limitation Act or its principles. If in the same Act, consciously and expressly, the legislature has made provision for application of section 5 of the Limitation or its principles expressly and specifically to other proceedings such as appeal or revision etc. and such a provision is not made for initiation of the proceedings under section 8 of the Act, it necessarily follows that the legislature did not intend to give benefit of section 5 of the Limitation Act having regard to the nature of right of pre-emption which is considered a weak right.”

23. Gopal Sardar, thus, does not carry the contention of Mr. S.K Kakodkar further.

24. We need not separately deal with the various decisions at the bar as this exercise is unnecessary in what we have already discussed above.

25. We shall finally conclude thus:

26. section 5 of the Limitation Act shall apply in case of the appeals filed under section 260-A of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

27. Let the miscellaneous civil application for condonation of delay be posted before the Bench taking up tax matters.

Order accordingly.