Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Syed Babali Sayed Lal & Ors. v. State Of Maharashtra .

Bombay High Court
Aug 13, 2007
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellants were prosecuted for the murder of Digamber Shamrao Wankhede (the deceased) of Hadgaon and for intentionally insulting and provoking him to commit breach of peace. The Ad hoc Additional District Judge, Nanded convicted the appellants under sections 302 read with 34 of the Penal Code and acquitted them of the offence under section 504 of the Penal Code by an order dated 10 June 2005. This conviction was challenged by the present appeal (Criminal Appeal No. 447 of 2005).

Relevant facts, as set out in the opinion: the deceased lived with his parents and brothers; bad relations existed between the families, including a Chapter Case under section 107 Cr. P.C. arising from a complaint by the mother of appellant No. 1 against the mother of the deceased. On 9 April 2004, after a quarrel at a common water tap, the appellants allegedly went to the deceased's house, abused him, poured kerosene on him and set him on fire. The father allegedly saw appellants sprinkling kerosene and setting the deceased ablaze; the appellants fled; the deceased was taken to a rural hospital and later to Civil Hospital, Nanded. Two dying declarations were recorded (one by ASI Tulshiram and a second by a Judicial Magistrate). The deceased later died of 74% burns on 27 April 2004. Articles from the scene (including a can of kerosene and burnt clothes) were seized and sent to a forensic laboratory. The appellants were tried, convicted on the basis of the dying declarations and sentenced; they appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the trial Judge was correct in placing implicit reliance on the dying declarations of the deceased to convict the appellants for murder under sections 302 r/w 34 of the Penal Code.
  2. Whether the dying declarations in the present case were reliable and free from tutoring, prompting or animosity such that they could form the sole basis for conviction.
  3. Whether infirmities or inconsistencies in the medical record, dying declarations and witness testimony (including the father's changed testimony) undermine the probative value of the dying declarations and require acquittal.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The trial Judge erred in placing implicit reliance on the dying declarations without properly applying the principles governing cases based on sole dying declarations.
  • The first disclosure to the medical officer indicated the burns were self-inflicted; there are material variances between the two dying declarations and contradictions with other evidence.
  • Given previous enmity and quarrels between the families, along with the infirmities in the dying declarations, there is a possibility of false implication and the convictions are unsustainable.

Prosecution's Arguments (Respondent)

  • Both dying declarations were recorded after verification of the deceased's fitness to make a statement and are consistent; they deserve credence.
  • The trial Judge properly considered the evidence and facets of the controversy and rightly convicted the appellants; there is no need to interfere with the conviction.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
P.V. Radhakrishna v. State of Karnataka (2003) 6 SCC 443; A.I.R. 2003 S.C. 2859 Principle referred to as "nemo moriturus promittere mentiri" — weight and authenticity to be given to dying declarations (i.e., belief that a dying man would not lie). The trial Judge referred to this decision and the principle in support of implicit reliance on the dying declarations; the appellate court noted the reference but found the trial Judge did not adequately marshal facts to sustain implicit reliance in this case.
State of Maharashtra v. Sanjay D. Rajhans (2004/2005) (cited with A.I.R. 2005 S.C. 97; 2004 (13) SCC 314) A decision of the Apex Court relevant to the assessment of dying declarations (trial Judge had distinguished this decision). The appellate court observed that the trial Judge distinguished this ruling but did not give cogent reasons for doing so; the appellant court criticized that omission when evaluating the trial Judge's implicit reliance on the dying declarations.
Muttu Kutty v. State (2005) 9 SCC 113; A.I.R. 2005 S.C. 1473 Principles governing dying declarations: though such declarations are entitled to great weight, courts must scrutinize them because the accused cannot cross-examine the declarant; trustworthiness and voluntariness must be satisfied. The court quoted para 15 of the decision to restate the settled approach: dying declarations can form sole basis for conviction if the court is satisfied they are true and voluntary; they require close scrutiny for tutoring, prompting or animosity.
Panchdeo Singh v. State of Bihar (2002) 1 SCC 577; A.I.R. 2002 S.C. 526 Reaffirmation that where a dying declaration inspires confidence it can sustain conviction; otherwise corroboration should be sought — emphasis on the "confidence of the Court". The court cited this decision (which itself refers to Arvind Singh) to emphasize that dying declarations must inspire judicial confidence; if any infirmity exists, corroboration is desirable.
Arvind Singh v. State of Bihar (2001) 6 SCC 407; A.I.R. 2001 S.C. 2124 Discussed as authority on trustworthiness and care/caution factors applicable to dying declarations (referred within Panchdeo Singh). Referenced (via Panchdeo Singh) to support the principle that the dying declaration must be trustworthy and the Court's confidence in it is the decisive factor.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The appellate court set out the governing legal framework: Section 32 of the Evidence Act creates an exception permitting statements as to the cause of one's death (dying declarations) to be admissible though ordinarily hearsay is excluded under section 60. The court emphasized settled principles from Supreme Court authorities that dying declarations, while entitled to weight, are untested evidence and must be carefully scrutinized to ensure they are free from tutoring, prompting or animosity and that the declarant was in a fit state of mind.

Applying those principles to the present case, the court accepted that both dying declarations were recorded after verification of fitness by the officer and the Judicial Magistrate. However, on closer scrutiny the court identified multiple infirmities and inconsistencies in the totality of the record which, in the court's view, eroded the reliability of the dying declarations:

  • The medical officer's initial letter to police (Ex. 26) contained a disclosure that the patient had sustained self-inflicted burns and stated the patient was not in a position to make a statement — an admission by the doctor which bore on alternative possibilities for causation.
  • Inconsistency as to the location of the incident: the dying declaration's language suggested the incident occurred inside the house when the deceased was alone, whereas the panchanama and the father's testimony placed the event in the courtyard; the can of kerosene was found on the compound wall.
  • Contradiction about the presence of the mother: the first dying declaration included a statement that both parents came to the house after the alarm; the second dying declaration lacked that narration, and the father admitted during trial that his wife had been away and met her son for the first time at the hospital, which, if true, falsifies the first dying declaration's account of parental presence.
  • The father materially changed his earlier 161 Cr. P.C. statement in court, moving from an account that he saw appellants beating and setting his son on fire to a narrative that he found his son burning while returning from the tap; this change “goes to the root” because the dying declarations did not refer to the father seeing the incident, and the father's retraction cast doubt on the veracity of other accounts.
  • Given the prior enmity between the families, the appellate court observed that motive could point both ways — while enmity was relied upon by the prosecution as motive, it also raised the possibility of false implication.
  • There was an absence of independent eyewitnesses despite the locality being densely populated and the incident occurring at about 9:00 a.m., which the court regarded as undermining the completeness and credibility of the investigation.

The court also noted that the trial Judge had referred to authoritative dicta in P.V. Radhakrishna but had not given cogent reasons for distinguishing the Supreme Court's decision in State of Maharashtra v. Sanjay D. Rajhans. The appellate court concluded that the trial Judge had placed implicit reliance on the dying declarations without properly marshalling and scrutinizing relevant facts and circumstances. Because the identified infirmities materially eroded the reliability of the dying declarations, the appellate court found it could not concur with the trial Judge's findings.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: Criminal Appeal No. 447 of 2005 is allowed; the conviction and sentence of the appellants are quashed and set aside; the appellants are acquitted of the offences charged and convicted.

Direct consequences ordered by the court (as stated in the opinion):

  • Conviction and sentence of the appellants are quashed and set aside.
  • The appellants are acquitted of the offences with which they were charged and convicted.
  • Any fine paid by the appellants is to be refunded.
  • Appellant No. 1 (Syed Babali) who is in jail shall be released forthwith if not wanted in any other case.
  • Bail bonds of appellant Nos. 2 to 4 stand cancelled.

Implications beyond the parties: The opinion confines itself to the direct effect on the parties and the setting aside of the conviction. It emphasizes careful application of established principles governing dying declarations and the necessity of scrutinizing such untested evidence in light of all surrounding circumstances. The judgment does not state that it establishes any new legal precedent beyond the application of existing authorities to the facts of this case.

Show all summary ...

Per Kukday S.P, J.:— Appellants are prosecuted for having committed murder of Digamber Shamrao Wankhede of Hadgaon, in furtherance of their common intention and for intentionally insulting and provoking him to commit breach of peace. They are convicted for offences punishable under sections 302 r/w 34 and are acquitted for offence punishable under section 504 of the Penal Code by Ad hoc Additional District Judge, Nanded. This order dated 10th June, 2005 is impugned in the present appeal.

2. At the outset we may notice relevant facts. Shamrao Wankhede resides with his wife Shantabai and three sons in the hutment at Hadgaon. His twenty year old elder son Digamber (deceased) was unemployed. The appellants also reside in this locality. Relations between both the families were strained as Chapter Case under section 107 Cr. P.C was registered against mother of the deceased on the basis of complaint filed by Umdabi, mother of appellant No. 1. On 9th April, 2004, at about 9.00 a.m Digambar had a quarrel with the appellants Babali, his wife Begum and Shabana wife of Gaffar, at the common water tap, over taking of water. After the quarrel the deceased returned to the house and his father took over the work of taking water. Mother of the deceased went out from the house at about 9.30 a.m Taking advantage of the fact the deceased was alone at the house; the appellants went there, abused him, poured kerosene over his person and set him on fire. In response to the cries of the deceased his father came to the house. He saw the appellants sprinkling kerosene over Digamber after beating him and saw them setting him on fire. On arrival of Shamrao, the appellants ran away. Parents of the deceased then brought him to Rural Hospital at Hadgaon. Medical Officer Dr. Haribhau Gadekar treated the deceased and informed the Police of the occurrence by letter (Ex. 26). On receipt of the intimation, ASI Tulshiram Atram (P.W 9) came to the hospital and recorded statement of the deceased (Ex. 61) after verifying from the medical officer that the deceased is in fit state of mind to make a coherent statement. On the basis of this statement offence came to be registered against the appellants under sections 307, 504 r/w 34 I.P.C On registration of the offence PSI Deepak Waghmare (P.W 7) took over the investigation. He visited the spot and attached can of kerosene found near the place of occurrence on the compound wall of the Court yard of the house along with pieces of burnt clothes of the deceased under spot panchnama (Ex. 49). The appellants were arrested on the same day under Arrest Panchnama (Exs. 52 to 55). The patient was referred to Civil Hospital, Nanded, where second dying declaration (Ex. 41) was recorded by Judicial Magistrate First Class Smita Tanna (P.W 4) at 4.05 p.m The deceased succumbed to the injuries on 27th April, 2004. ASI Motware of Vazirabad Police Station held inquest (Ex. 29) on the dead body and referred it for post-mortem. Dr. Hemant Godbole (P.W 5) performed post-mortem and prepared report (Ex. 45) giving cause of death as 74% burns. Articles attached from the spot were taken to Forensic Laboratory by Constable Sk. Wahid Ali (P.W 3) on 1st May, 2004. On completion of the investigation the appellants were charge-sheeted. At the trial appellants adopted defence of false implication in view of the previous quarrels and complaint filed by appellant No. 4 Shabana, which resulted in filing of Chapter Case against Shantabai, mother of the deceased.

3. The prosecution examined nine witnesses in support of its case. Dr. Gadekar (P.W 1) treated the deceased at Hadgaon Hospital and sent intimation (Ex. 26) to the Police mentioning therein that the patient is not in a position to make a statement. However, by the time ASI Tulshiram reached the hospital, condition of the patient had improved. ASI Tulsiram, recorded statement of the deceased in his presence at 10.30 in the morning. The Medical Officer has made an endorsement (Ex. 27) on this dying declaration (Ex. 61) certifying fitness of the patient to make a statement. During the cross-examination the medical officer admitted that he did mention in letter (Ex. 26) that the patient had set himself on fire and had suffered burns. ASI Tulsiram (P.W 9) recorded dying declaration (Ex. 61), registered offence against the appellants and handed over investigation to PSI Deepak. Smita Tanna (P.W 4) recorded second dying declaration (Ex. 41) of the deceased at Civil Hospital, Nanded. Both of them have mentioned that before recording of the statement they verified that the deceased was in a fit mental state to make a coherent statement. Shamrao Wankhede (P.W 8), father of the deceased abandoned version of the incident mentioned in his statement recorded under section 161 Cr. P.C that he saw appellants beating his son and setting him on fire. Instead Shamrao stated that he heard shouts from the house while taking water from the tap and returned to the house with half filled water pot. On his way back, he found his son burning and saw him falling in the Court yard. At that time there was no one else in the Court yard of the house. However, after hearing the shouts at the water tap, he saw appellants running away from his house. The prosecution has duly proved portion A from the statement of Shamrao to establish that the witness has changed his earlier version of the incident. During the cross-examination the witness admitted that the water tap is at a distance of about 1000 feet from his house and that his house is not visible from the water tap. The witness further admitted that his wife had gone out at about 9.30 a.m and returned to the house after one hour. After the incident she saw her son at the hospital.

4. At the conclusion of the trial, the Sessions Judge found that the previous enmity between the families and quarrel at the water tap between the deceased and the appellants is not in dispute. He further found that both the dying declarations were recorded by the ASI and the Judicial Magistrate First Class after due verification of the fitness of the declarant to make a statement. Applying principle “nemo moriturus prossumitur mentin (a man would not meet its maker with a lie in his mouth) referred to in (P.V Radhakrishna v. State Of Karnataka)1 2003 DGLS (soft) 271 : 2003 Cri. L.J 3717 : 2003 (6) S.C.C 443 : A.I.R 2003 S.C 2859 and distinguishing decision of the Apex Court in (State of Maharashtra v. Sanjay D. Rajhans)2, 2005 (1) Bom. C.R (Cri.) 737 (S.C) : 2004 DGLS (soft) 767 : 2005 All. M.R (Cri.) 211 : A.I.R 2005 S.C 97 : 2004 (13) S.C.C 314, the trial Judge placed implicit reliance on the dying declaration of the deceased. Relying on the dying declaration of the deceased the trial Judge convicted the appellants of the offence punishable under sections 302 r/w 34 of the Penal Code and sentenced them as stated earlier.

5. Learned Counsel for the appellant Shri S.G Chincholkar would argue that the trial Judge has committed a grave error in placing implicit reliance on the dying declaration. It is contended that the trial Judge has not taken into consideration the fact that the first disclosure to the medical officer was that the deceased had sustained self inflicted burns. The variance between the two dying declarations and the fact that the father of the deceased had made improvement in his evidence has been connived at by the trial Judge while accepting the dying declarations. Learned Counsel would submit that approach of the trial Judge is not in conformity of the principles governing a case based on the sole evidence of dying declarations. The facts and circumstances of the present case clearly disclose that the dying declarations are not reliable; thus, conviction of the appellants based on erroneous premise that the dying man would not meet his maker with a lie in his mouth is unsustainable and deserves to be set aside.

6. Learned A.P.P Shri P.M Shinde contends that both the dying declarations are recorded after verification of the fitness of the deceased. Both the dying declarations are consistent and deserve credence. According to learned A.P.P the trial Judge has considered all the facets of the controversy and after due consideration of the evidence has rightly convicted the appellants, it is thus, not necessary to interfere with the order of conviction passed by the trial Judge.

7. Undisputedly, the present case is entirely based on the dying declaration. Principles governing dying declarations are by now well settled. Section 32 is an exception to the general rule embodied in section 60 of the Evidence Act that oral evidence of a relevant fact must be direct. Eight clauses of section 32 provide an exception to the general rule which exclude hearsay evidence. clause (1) of section 32 makes the statement of a person as to the cause of his death admissible in evidence, on the principle that on the verge of death, all the pride and prejudices vanish. At such a solemn moment the only powerful consideration for the dying man is to speak the truth. This is the reason why sanctity of oath is bestowed on the dying declaration. There is no rule of law which requires corroboration to the dying declaration before it can be accepted and conviction can be founded on the basis of a dying declaration. The Court looks for the corroboration as a matter of prudence, as the accused had no opportunity to test veracity of the statement made behind his back. However, if the Court is satisfied that the version of the incident given by the deceased is reliable, there can be no impediment in convicting the accused on the sole basis of the dying declaration. Evidentiary value of the dying declaration necessarily depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. There can be no set rules or a formula for testing veracity of a dying declaration. However, as the dying declaration is an untested piece of evidence, it is the duty of the Court to carefully scrutinize the dying declaration and to satisfy itself that the statement made by the deceased is free from tutoring, prompting or animosity. The dying declaration is to be treated as any other species of evidence. Its credibility is to be decided by the application of the rules governing appreciation of evidence. Adverting to the principles applicable to cases founded on dying declaration in (Muttu Kutty v. State)3, 2004 DGLS (soft) 822 : 2005 (9) S.C.C 113 : A.I.R 2005 S.C 1473 the Apex Court observed in para 15 of the report:

“15. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross-examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the Court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the Court in its correctness. The Court has to be on guard that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring, or prompting or a product of imagination. The Court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once the Court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence.”

8. In (Panchdeo Singh v. State Of Bihar)4, 2001 DGLS (soft) 1458 : 2002 (1) S.C.C 577 : A.I.R 2002 S.C 526 the Supreme Court observed in para 3 of the report:

“3. One of the latest pronouncements of this Court pertaining to the subject finds place in the decision of (Arvind Singh v. State of Bihar)5, 2001 DGLS (soft) 725 : 2001 (6) S.C.C 407 : A.I.R 2001 S.C 2124 wherein, this Court observed that apart from the care and caution factors as noticed earlier the dying declaration ought otherwise to be treated as trustworthy. The issue thus becomes as to whether the dying declaration has been able to bring about a confidence thereon or not-is it trustworthy or is it a mere attempt to cover up the laches of investigation it must allure to the satisfaction of the Court that reliance ought to be placed thereon rather than a distrust: the confidence of the Court is the summum bonum and in the event of there being any affirmation thereto in the judicial mind, question of any disbelief or distrust would not arise. In the event however of there being some infirmity, howsoever negligible it be, the Court unless otherwise satisfied about the credibility thereof, ought to look for some corroboration, if however it is otherwise, question of requirement of a corroboration would not arise: dying declaration alluring confidence of the Court would be a sufficient piece of evidence to sustain conviction. There is no format as such of dying declaration, neither the declaration need be of any longish nature and neatly structured. As a matter of fact, perfect wording and neatly - structured dying declaration may bring about an adverse impression and create a suspicion in the mind of the Court since dying declaration need not be drawn with mathematical precision - the declarant should be able to recollect the situation resulting in the available state of affairs.”

9. In the light of the above principles, the acceptability of the alleged dying declaration in the present case will have to be decided. The dying declaration is only a piece of untested evidence and must like any other evidence, satisfy the Court that what is stated therein is the unalloyed truth and that it is absolutely safe to act upon it. If after careful scrutiny, the Court is satisfied that it is true and free from tutoring, prompting or animosity and is coherent and consistent, there can be no legal impediment in accepting the dying declaration. However, if the circumstances indicate existence of a possibility of false implication, the benefit must go to the accused.

10. In the present case the fact that there was enmity between the two families and that there was a quarrel between the deceased and the appellant over taking of water from the tap is not in dispute. It is also not in dispute that no direct evidence against the appellants is available. The prosecution case solely rests on the dying declarations recorded by ASI Tulshiram (P.W 9) and Judicial Magistrate, First Class Smita Tanna (P.W 4). Both of them have followed the procedure correctly and have recorded the dying declarations after due verification of the mental state of the declarant. Thus, the evidentiary value of the statement will have to be Decided on scrutiny of the circumstances brought on record. The version of the incident given by the deceased in both the dying declarations, on the casual scrutiny appears to be consistent. However, closer look at the text, in the context of the facts brought on record, disclose infirmities in the version of the incident found in these statements. The first circumstance is the admission of Dr. Gadekar (P.W 1) that in the letter sent to the police (Ex. 26) he did mention that the patient had suffered self inflicted burns and is not in a position to make a statement. Phraseology used in this letter bears out this version of the medical officer. The second circumstance is the statement of the deceased that the appellants entered the house when they found him to be alone and set him on fire after sprinkling kerosene which in terms shows that the incident took place inside the house, whereas, the testimony of the father and the panchanama of the scene of occurrence discloses that the incident took place in the Court yard. The can of kerosene is shown to have been found on the compound wall of the house. Third circumstance is the contradiction about presence of the mother. In the first dying declaration the deceased mentioned that his father and mother came to the house in response to the alarm raised by him and brought him to the hospital. This narration is absent in the second dying declaration (Ex. 41) recorded by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class at Civil Hospital, Nanded, During his cross-examination Shamrao has categorically admitted that his wife had gone out at 9.30 in the morning and returned to the house after one hour. She met her son Digamber at the Rural Hospital for the first time after the incident (para 4 of his deposition). This admission would falsify the statement in the first dying declaration that father and mother had come to the house after the alarm was raised by the deceased. The fourth circumstance is the fact that the father has resiled from his earlier version that he saw the appellants beating his son, sprinkling kerosene over him and setting him on fire. Instead, he made an improvement by mentioning that he saw the appellants running away from the house while he was returning with partially filled water pot. The change of version goes to the root, as the dying declarations do not refer to the father having seen the incident. If the father could see the incident, the deceased would also have seen the father approaching the house as the first reaction of the besieged would be to look for assistance. If, in fact, the father had witnessed the incident, his normal reaction would have been to challenge the appellants and to disclose this fact to the medical officer at the time of the admission of the deceased. The change of version in the evidence given during the trial appears to be well thought but lets the cat out of the bag and casts a shadow of doubt on the truthfulness of the version of the incident found in the dying declarations. The earlier enmity is relied upon by the prosecution as motive for the commission of the offence but the enmity is a double edged weapon and in view of the infirmities found in the present case, possibility of false implication can not be ruled out. The fact that no independent witness is examined by the prosecution though the house of the deceased is in thickly populated locality and the incident took place at 9.00 o'clock in the morning when all the neighbours would normally be at their house, raises doubt about the credibility of the investigation. The trial Judge has referred to the dictum regarding the authenticity of the dying declaration from the decision of the Apex Court in P.V Radhakrishna v. State Of Karnataka, 2003 Cri. L.J 3717 but has not given cogent reasons for distinguishing ruling of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Sanjay D. Rajhans, 2005 All. M.R 211. Discussion in para 25 of the judgment would show that without marshalling facts of the case, implicit reliance is placed on the dying declarations to arrive at the conclusion of the guilt of the appellants. The omission to scrutinize the evidence in proper perspective has resulted in erroneous conclusion which is negated by the circumstances mentioned earlier. In our considered opinion, having regard to the infirmities discussed earlier, it is not possible to concur with the findings recorded by the trial Judge. The findings reached by the trial Judge without proper scrutiny of the circumstances which erode the reliability of the dying declaration can not be sustained. In this view of the matter we set aside the conviction of the appellants.

11. Criminal Appeal No. 447 of 2005 is thus allowed. Conviction and sentence of the appellants is hereby quashed and set aside. The appellants are acquitted of the offences with which they are charged and convicted. Fine, if paid by the appellants, be refunded to them. Since appellant No. 1 Syed Babali s/o. Syed Lal is in jail, he be released forthwith if not wanted in any other case. Bail bonds of appellant Nos. 2 to 4 stand cancelled.

12. Appeal allowed.