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Popcorn Entertainment And Another v. City And Industrial Development Corpn. And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioners, Popcorn Entertainment Corporation Limited and Platinum Entertainment, were allotted plots of land by the City and Industrial Development Corporation (CIDCO) in Navi Mumbai for constructing multiplex entertainment complexes and related commercial activities. The petitioners paid the fixed price and took physical possession of the plots. Subsequently, CIDCO cancelled the entire transaction and sought possession of the plots, prompting the petitioners to file writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, challenging CIDCO's cancellation of the lease agreements and seeking injunctions against possession and stop work notices. The matter was initially heard during vacation and adjourned multiple times, with the Court questioning the maintainability of the petitions given the availability of alternate remedies through civil suits.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the writ petitions filed under Article 226 are maintainable despite the availability of efficacious alternate remedies, specifically civil suits for declaration and injunction.
- Whether the cancellation of the lease agreements by CIDCO involved violations of fundamental rights, principles of natural justice, or was wholly without jurisdiction, thereby justifying writ jurisdiction.
- Whether the alleged discrimination by CIDCO in cancelling the petitioners' agreements while granting plots to others without tender violates Article 14 of the Constitution.
- Whether the public interest in having entertainment facilities in Navi Mumbai justifies the invocation of writ jurisdiction in this case.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- The petitions are tenable despite alternate remedies because the case involves larger public interest in providing entertainment facilities in Navi Mumbai.
- The cancellation of the executed lease agreements by CIDCO amounts to a violation of the principles of natural justice.
- CIDCO's unilateral cancellation of their agreements, while granting plots to others without tender, constitutes discrimination violating Article 14 of the Constitution.
- All three exceptions to the bar on writ jurisdiction—violation of fundamental rights, violation of natural justice, and orders wholly without jurisdiction—apply in their case.
- The interim relief granted earlier should be continued to protect their interests.
Court's Observations on Arguments
- The Court rejected the public interest argument, holding that the existence of entertainment facilities does not constitute a matter of grave public interest warranting writ jurisdiction.
- The Court held that the unilateral cancellation of an executed contract is a matter for civil courts, not writ jurisdiction, and that principles of natural justice are to be considered by civil courts in such disputes.
- The Court found no violation of Article 14, reasoning that corporate bodies cannot claim fundamental rights of equality in this context and that CIDCO's differing treatment does not amount to arbitrariness.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Raja Bahadur Motilal Poona Mills Limited v. State of Maharashtra, 2002 (4) ALL MR 429 | Writ jurisdiction should not be invoked when efficacious alternate remedy is available. | The Court relied on this principle to emphasize the availability of civil remedies and to question maintainability of the writ petitions. |
| Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trademarks Mumbai, (1998) 8 SCC 107 | Exceptions to bar on writ jurisdiction: violation of fundamental rights, violation of natural justice, or orders wholly without jurisdiction. | The Court examined if any of these exceptions applied and held that none were present in the present petitions. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court analyzed the maintainability of the writ petitions by examining the availability of efficacious alternate remedies. It noted the settled legal principle that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 should not be exercised if an effective remedy exists, except in well-known exceptions. The Court considered the petitioners' claims that these exceptions applied—violation of fundamental rights, principles of natural justice, and lack of jurisdiction—but found them unsubstantiated.
The Court rejected the argument that the entertainment complex served a public interest sufficient to invoke writ jurisdiction, viewing the matter as a private contractual dispute. It held that unilateral cancellation of an executed contract, while justiciable, should be addressed through civil suits where interim reliefs are available. The Court also found no violation of Article 14, reasoning that corporate bodies do not possess the fundamental right to equality in this context and that CIDCO's actions were not arbitrary.
Consistent with prior decisions, the Court emphasized judicial discipline in refusing to entertain writ petitions where alternate remedies exist. It declined to consider the merits of the case, focusing solely on procedural maintainability.
Holding and Implications
DISMISSED
The Court dismissed both petitions on the ground that efficacious alternate remedies by way of civil suits are available, and none of the recognized exceptions to bar writ jurisdiction apply. The interim orders previously granted were vacated. The decision directly affects the parties by denying writ relief and requiring them to seek redress through civil litigation. No new precedent was established beyond reaffirming the principle that writ jurisdiction is not to be exercised when alternate remedies exist.
V.G Palshikar, J.:— By these two petitions the petitioners have challenged the action taken by the respondents the City and Industrial Development Corporation (hereinafter referred to as “CIDCO”). The petitioners Popcorn Entertainment Corporation Limited in Writ Petition No. 9467 of 2005 and Platinum Entertainment in Writ Petition No. 9468 of 2005 were allotted plot of land by CIDCO for erecting entertainment complex in Navi Mumbai district. That was to be a commercial building to be erected by construction of multiplex complex and allied complimentary activities. The price fixed by CIDCO was paid by the petitioners and the petitioners were put in physical possession of the plot.
2. By the impugned communication CIDCO has cancelled the entire transaction and claimed possession of the plot from the petitioners. Hence they have filed these petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for quashing of the entire action and interim relief of injunction restraining CIDCO from taking possession. Both the petitions assail the order passed by CIDCO cancelling agreement of lease as also praying for quashing of stop work notice issued by CIDCO. Initially the matter was heard in vacation and thereafter was adjourned from time to time. When the matter was called out today the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners was asked to explain the maintainability of the petition as effective alternate remedy by way of civil suit for declaration and injunction was available to the petitioners. When on earlier occasion such query was made by the Court relying on certain judgments of the Bombay High Court time was sought by the learned Advocate to consider those judgments and make submissions.
3. Accordingly today the learned counsel made his submissions and relying on certain passages in the judgments itself contended that these petitions are tenable. This Court in the Case of Raja Bahadur Motilal Poona Mills Limited v. State of Maharashtra, 2002 (4) ALL MR 429 held that when efficacious alternate remedy is available writ jurisdiction should not be invoked. This Court has observed as under:
“The tendency to flout the rule of law is on increase and consequently judicial activism is also increased, and in several cases writ jurisdiction is moved in spite of the fact that alternative efficacious remedy is available on a specious plea and it is expedient in public interest to do so. In an exceptional case of public interest where large number of people are affected it may be that a writ petition could be entertained but the question is whether it would be a writ jurisdiction to be invoked as a matter of course even in dispute intra parties where there is no public interest at all or involved at all. Taking into consideration the fact that the question is ever repeated, the Court are pressed to decide that question so that as far as our Court is concerned the same principle of law that writ jurisdiction should not be invoked where alternate remedy is possible, has to be followed. It is a mandate issued by the Supreme Court that the powers therein, i.e Article 226 shall not be exercised in cases where alternate remedy is available, always leaving apart certain well known glaring exceptions.”
4. Learned counsel relied upon the observations of this Court that in exceptional case of public interest where large number people are affected it may be that a writ petition could be entertained and it was contended placing heavy reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trademarks Mumbai (1998) 8 SCC 107 that the present petition is tenable. The Supreme Court of India has observed in para 15 of its judgment as under:
“15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. There is a plethora of case-law on this point but to cut down this circle of forensic whirlpool, we would rely on some old decisions of the evolutionary era of the constitutional law as they still hold the field.”
(emphasis supplied).
5. The Supreme Court has observed in the quotation above that at least in three contingencies a writ petition can be entertained by the High Court and those exceptional contingencies were mentioned. They are (i) Violation of fundamental right; (ii) Violation of principles of natural justice and (iii) The Impugned order of proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction. The contention of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners was that all the three ingredients are present in these petitions.
6. It was the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that building of multiplex complex for entertaining and other commercial activities was a necessity in public interest as large section of people residing in Navi Mumbai will be deprived of their public entertainment if this complex is not allowed to come up. This according to him, is larger public interest to safeguard which we must exercise writ jurisdiction. We are unable to accept this submission that the existence of entertainment facilities in a particular town is a matter of grave public interest requiring interference by this Court it is discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. In our opinion, interfering with a cancellation of an agreement involving building of entertainment complex is certainly not a public interest requirement for which the golden rule of non-interference should be kept away.
7. Second submission of the learned counsel was that there has been gross violation of the principles of natural justice. Factually what has been done by CIDCO is in spite of having entered into an agreement of lease and having executed it by receiving money and delivering the possession the CIDCO could not cancel the executed agreement. It is obviously a case where the execution of contract is unilaterally cancelled. Such action of course is justiciable and can be questioned by filing appropriate civil suit in which all interim reliefs of the kind necessary for the petitioners as are claimed in these petitions can be asked for. There are enough safeguards in the Code of Civil Procedure to seek urgent orders from Civil Courts of competent jurisdiction. It cannot therefore be said that the remedy of civil suit is not efficacious. Similarly unilateral cancellation of executed contract is the cause of action. In such an event there is no question of principles of natural justice being violated. The CIDCO has unilaterally cancelled the agreement. Whether it can do so or not can be decided by Civil Court of competent jurisdiction. Whether principles of natural justice are attracted to a particular action or not is also something which Civil Court can decide. We are unable to accept the submission that wherever there is violation of principles of natural justice no other Court is competent to deal with it except this Court in its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.
8. It was then contended that CIDCO has given plot of lands to several others without inviting tenders for the same. It had done so in relation to the petitioner also earlier. Earlier grant without auction is maintained by CIDCO whereas grant in favour of the petitioners is unilaterally cancelled. This according to him, amounts discrimination which is framed by Article 14 of the Constitution. Article 14 of the Constitution reads thus:
“Article 14. Equality before law. — The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.”
9. It is therefore fundamental right of a citizen. Both the petitioners are corporate bodies and they cannot claim any such fundamental right. Assuming that there can exist such right in corporate body merely because CIDCO has acted in particular manner in relation to a particular group it cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily when it thinks not to act with the petitioners in the same manner. In our opinion, there is, therefore no violation of Article 14 of the Constitution.
10. According to us, none of the well known exceptions carved out by the Supreme Court of India in Whirlpool Corporation's case exist in the present petitions. Same are therefore liable to be dismissed for availability of efficacious alternate remedy. Since we have dismissed petitions as being not tenable for availability of alternate remedy we do not think it necessary to hear the learned counsel on factual merits of the case. Lastly it was submitted that the interim order granted earlier should be continued for four weeks. In our opinion, the petitioners being corporate bodies engaged in development and building activities basically for entertainment and other commercial purposes do not deserve any such protection. Hence their request is rejected.
11. We would like to note here that it is consistent view taken by this Court in relation to alternate remedy. Factually two such petitions where identical action was challenged have been dismissed by this Court in limine for existence of alternate remedies. Apart from this aspect, judicial discipline requires us to take consistent view in all cases where according to us alternate remedy exists. We have been consistently rejecting entertainment of petitions when alternate remedies exist. These petitions also therefore deserve the same treatment and therefore we do not consider several other factual submissions sought to be made by the learned counsel as we do not wish to entertain petitions on merits. In the result, both the petitions are dismissed. Interim orders earlier granted are vacated.
Petitions dismissed.
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