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Shekoba Auto Pvt. Ltd. v. B.D Hajare And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
This petition challenges the order dated 29 September 1999 of the Industrial Court, Pune, which held that the petitioner (Shekoba Auto Pvt. Ltd.) committed an unfair labour practice under Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (MRTU and PULP Act) when it retrenched respondent Nos. 1 to 40. The Industrial Court ordered the petitioner to continue those employees in service and to pay each of them Rs. 1,000 as compensation and Rs. 1,000 by way of costs.
Background facts as stated in the opinion: the petitioner is a private company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956. Its antecedent is a partnership firm, Electro Components Company, which in 1978 discontinued manufacture of automobile ignition capacitors and that manufacturing line was taken over by a sister concern, Auto Components Company. Twenty‑five employees connected with the automotive line were offered employment with Auto Components Company; some of those employees are among respondent Nos. 1 to 40 and accepted employment. Auto Components Company subsequently incorporated as Shekoba Auto Pvt. Ltd. (the petitioner). Electro Components continued other manufacturing and was taken over circa 1984 by Neotroniks (respondent No. 41).
The petitioner says that due to lack of orders, continuous losses and obsolescence of the product it stopped manufacturing and retrenched respondent Nos. 1 to 40, paying legal dues on 17 March 1999, and asserting compliance with the procedures prescribed under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The retrenched employees filed Complaint (ULP) No. 70 of 1999 under Item 9 of Schedule IV of the MRTU and PULP Act. The Industrial Court after evidence (23 witnesses for complainants; petitioner examined its director Mr. Surendra Shenoy) found functional integrality between the petitioner and respondent No. 41 and held the petitioner guilty of unfair labour practice under Item 9.
The petitioner has filed this petition contesting (a) the Industrial Court's jurisdiction to entertain a complaint concerning termination (arguing exclusive jurisdiction lies with the Labour Court), (b) the clubbing of employees of two separate companies for purposes of applicability of sections 25-K and 25-L of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and (c) the factual findings of functional integrality, which it contends are contrary to the record and perverse.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Industrial Court had jurisdiction to decide a complaint arising from termination/retrenchment of employees (i.e., whether such matters fall under Item 1 of Schedule IV and therefore within the exclusive remit of the Labour Court under section 7 of the MRTU and PULP Act).
- Whether two separately incorporated companies (the petitioner and respondent No. 41) could be treated as functionally integrated for the purpose of aggregating their workmen and thereby invoking provisions such as sections 25-K and 25-L of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
- Whether the findings of the Industrial Court on factual matters (trade marks, excise certificates, common workforce, common ownership/management, and other indicia) legitimately supported a conclusion of functional integrality.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The Industrial Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain complaints arising from termination/retrenchment because such matters fall under Item 1 of Schedule IV and are to be adjudicated by the Labour Court under section 7 of the MRTU and PULP Act.
- Two legally distinct companies cannot be clubbed together for counting "workmen" for the purposes of sections 25-K and 25-L of the Industrial Disputes Act; employees of a different company are not the petitioner's "workmen."
- The Industrial Court's factual finding of functional integrality between the petitioner and respondent No. 41 is erroneous and perverse, contrary to documentary evidence and witness testimony, and therefore the judgment should be set aside.
- The Industrial Court misdirected itself in law while reaching its conclusions on the question of functional integrality.
Respondents' Arguments
- The respondents supported the Industrial Court's judgment, contending that the petitioner and respondent No. 41 were, in effect, the same companies (functionally integrated) despite being under different names, and that the Industrial Court's finding should be upheld.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Lokmat Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. v. Shankarprasad, 1999 (II) CLR 433 | Scope and ambit of Item 1 of Schedule IV is wide and includes cases of retrenchment. | Cited to support that termination/retrenchment falls under Item 1 and thus is not properly before the Industrial Court under Item 9. |
| Pepsi Co. India Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Noshir Elavia, 2002 (1) CLR 953 | Cases of termination of service must be filed under Item 1 of Schedule IV and Item 9 is not the proper provision for such cases. | Relied upon to reinforce the view that termination complaints belong to Labour Court jurisdiction under Item 1. |
| Supertex (India) Corporation v. Radheshyam Pandey, 2001 (III) CLR 299 | The Industrial Court cannot deal with complaints in respect of termination of services falling under Item 1 of Schedule IV. | Used to support the proposition that the Industrial Court lacked jurisdiction to decide the present complaints about retrenchment. |
| Dilip Wawande v. Industrial Court, Nagpur, 1995 (II) CLR 897 | Jurisdiction to try issues of termination lies with the Labour Court as contemplated under section 7 of the Act. | Cited to show established High Court precedent placing termination jurisdiction with Labour Court. |
| Chittoori Subbanna v. Kodappa Subbanna, AIR 1965 SC 1325 | A pure question of law not dependent on facts can be raised at a late stage; jurisdictional questions cannot be conferred by party conduct. | Invoked to justify raising the jurisdictional objection at the stage of this petition despite it not being taken earlier before the Industrial Court. |
| Isha Steel Treatment, Bombay v. Association of Engineering Workers, AIR 1997 SC 1478 | Two factories manufacturing the same products, even in close proximity, may still not be clubbable; interdependence/survival is the critical consideration. | Applied to hold that even if products were similar, similarity alone does not establish functional integrality; interdependence is decisive. |
| Hindustan Steel Work Construction Co. Ltd. v. Hindustan Steel Construction Ltd. Employees Union, 1995 (1) CLR 598 | Unity of ownership, management and machinery alone are not decisive; local/contractual and specific work factors may make units distinct. | Referred to show that transfer or temporary utilization of labour and common control does not by itself establish that units are not distinct. |
| Association of Engineering Workers v. Sewree Iron and Steel Company Ltd., 1992 (2) CLR 629 | Transfers of employees or common partners do not by themselves satisfy the test of functional integrality. | Cited to support that mere transfers or common partners are insufficient to conclude functional integrality. |
| Saurashtra Trust Karmachari Sangh v. State People (P) Ltd., 1995 (2) CLR 71 | Interdependence (one unit cannot survive without the other) is the superior test for functional integrality in retrenchment/closure cases. | Used to emphasize that interdependence/functional interdependency is the predominant test and that survival of one unit without the other is a key factor. |
| Associated Cement Company's case, 1960 (1) L.L.J 1 | Early development of multiple tests; later case law has distilled functional integrality and interdependency as the superior tests. | Referenced as part of the jurisprudential history leading to the predominance of the interdependence test. |
| Yeshwant G. Chikhalikar v. Killics Nikson Ltd., 1999 (2) CLR 390 | Supports the view that interdependency is an important consideration in determining functional integrality. | Relied upon to support the proposition that the survival test/interdependency is central to the functional integrality inquiry. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded in two principal strands: jurisdictional competence and the factual/legal test for functional integrality.
First, on jurisdiction, the court noted that the complainants had invoked Item 9 of Schedule IV of the MRTU and PULP Act. It reviewed the statutory scheme: Industrial Courts are established under section 4 and duties enumerated in section 5 of the Act; section 5(d) empowers Industrial Courts to decide complaints relating to unfair labour practices except those falling under Item 1 of Schedule IV; section 7 assigns to the Labour Court complaints relating to unfair labour practices described in Item 1. The court relied on binding precedent (Lokmat Newspapers; Pepsi; Supertex; Dilip Wawande) establishing that termination/retrenchment claims fall within Item 1. On that basis the court concluded that the Industrial Court lacked jurisdiction to try retrenchment/termination complaints under Item 9, and that the issue of jurisdiction could properly be raised at this stage because a pure question of law may be raised late (Chittoori Subbanna).
Second, on the question of functional integrality (the factual basis on which the Industrial Court found unfair labour practice), the court examined the specific findings and the evidence relied upon by the Industrial Court: use of trademarks, contents of an excise certificate, occasional performance of work by the petitioner's employees at respondent No. 41's premises, family control, a common time‑keeper, and alleged shared management/finance/workforce/geographical proximity.
The court found these inferences to be contrary to the record and to applicable law. It emphasized discrete factual points from the record: brochures and witness evidence indicated distinct trademarks (Borger for petitioner; El‑Ci‑Ar for respondent No. 41); the excise certificate showed different product profiles (petitioner: plastic film capacitors; respondent No. 41: wire wound resistors and plastic film capacitors) and the certificate's revenue purpose limited its evidentiary weight on product usage or end‑use; the witness Surendra Shenoy gave evidence about product lines and brand names that went uncontradicted by respondent witnesses. More fundamentally, the court applied the settled test from higher authorities that interdependence or functional interdependency — i.e., the inability of one unit to survive without the other — is the decisive factor in determining functional integrality. The court observed that respondent No. 41 continued to operate despite the petitioner's closure, which directly undercuts the theory of interdependence. The court also noted that although a single union represented employees in both companies, the union had always presented separate charter demands and entered separate settlements for each company, indicative of practical recognition of separate entities by employees and union.
On these recorded facts and the legal principle that mere similarity of product, occasional transfer of a few employees, common partners or family involvement do not by themselves establish functional integrality (per Hindustan Steel, Association of Engineering Workers, Sewree Iron & Steel), the court concluded that the Industrial Court had misread the evidence, drawn impermissible inferences, and erred in law and fact in finding functional integrality.
Holding and Implications
PETITION ALLOWED; THE ORDER OF THE INDUSTRIAL COURT IS QUASHED AND SET ASIDE.
Direct effect on the parties: the rule was made absolute, the petition allowed in terms of the plaintiff's prayer (a) and the matter stands disposed of with no order as to costs. The Industrial Court's finding that the petitioner committed an unfair labour practice under Item 9 based on an alleged functional integrality with respondent No. 41 has been quashed.
Ancillary directions: the petitioner was restrained from withdrawing the deposited amount for a period of four weeks.
Broader implications: the court's decision applies existing jurisprudence (as cited) on jurisdictional allocation between Industrial Courts and Labour Courts and on the proper test for functional integrality (interdependence). The opinion does not purport to announce a novel legal principle beyond the application of the cited authorities; its practical consequence is to confirm that retrenchment/termination complaints are to be pursued under Item 1 (Labour Court jurisdiction) and that functional integrality requires proof of interdependence.
Petition allowed.
1. This petition is preferred by the petitioner impugning the order dated 29th September, 1999 passed by the Industrial Court, Pune, inter alia, holding that the petitioner had committed unfair labour practice under Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Union and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the said “MRTU and PULP Act”) while retrenching the respondent Nos. 1 to 40, who were the complainants, and directing the petitioner to continue them in service with further direction to pay each of them Rs. 1000/- as compensation and further sum of Rs. 1000/- by way of cost.
2. I have heard the learned counsel for both the parties. Perused the record.
3. The petitioner is a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956. In or about 1972 a partnership firm by name Electro Components Company was formed which was engaged in the manufacture of capacitors for electronics and automobile industries. On 15-11-1978, the said “Electro Component Co.” discontinued its manufacturing of automobile ignition capacitors. The said line of manufacturing was taken over by its sister concern known as “Auto Components Company”. 25 employees of the said Electro Components Company who were connected with the manufacturing of automobile ignition were given option to take employment with Auto Components Co. Some of the employees amongst respondent Nos. 1 to 40 were those 25 employees. All of them exercised their option and opted for working with the said Auto Components Co. The said Auto Component Co. thereafter incorporated into a private limited company and is known as “Shekoba Auto Pvt. Ltd.” i.e the petitioner herein. The petitioner since beginning was in the line of manufacturing of automobile ignition capacitors. In the meantime, the Electro Components Company continued to manufacture Electronic Capacitors and Wire Bound Resistors. In or about 1984 an existing company by name Neotroniks i.e respondent No. 41 took over Electro Components Company. The said Neotroniks is in existence since 1964.
3-A. The petitioner found that orders were not forthcoming and company was continuously suffering losses, the petitioner therefore decided to stop the manufacturing activities. It was also found that the product had become obsolete. The petitioner accordingly retrenched respondent Nos. 1 to 40 by paying their legal dues on 17-3-1999. It is the case of the petitioner that they had followed the procedure and made all the payments as contemplated under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
4. The respondent Nos. 1 to 40 being aggrieved by the termination filed a complaint under Item 9 of Schedule IV of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971. The said complaint was numbered as Complaint (ULP) No. 70 of 1999. It was the contention of the petitioner (sic: respondents) that the petitioner and the respondent No. 41 were functionally integrated and amongst both of them, they had employed more than 100 employees and therefore, the termination was violation of Chapter VB of the Industrial Disputes Act. The petitioner contested the complaints by written statement denying the allegations taken up by the respondents. It was the case of the petitioner that the petitioner as well as the respondent No. 41 was separate and distinct and there was therefore no question of functional integrity. The petitioner while replying the contentions raised in the complaint also pointed out that though one union by name Neotroniks and Shekoba Auto Pvt. Ltd. Kamgar Sangatana was operating in both the companies, they always raised separate charter demands for both the companies and always separate settlements were signed between the parties.
5. The respondent No. 41 also filed his written statement and pointed out its separate existence.
The respondents sought production of various documents including order book, which was allowed and evidence was led as many as 23 witnesses on behalf of the respondents. The petitioner examined its Director one Mr. Surendra Shenoy. The Industrial Court after hearing both the parties and on the basis of available evidence came to the conclusion that the petitioner has engaged in unfair labour practice under Item 9 of Schedule IV of the MRTU and PULP Act. The Industrial Court has recorded the said finding based upon its conclusion that the petitioner and respondent No. 41 are functionally integrated. Hence, the present Petition.
6. The case sought to be made on behalf of the petitioner is to the effect that the Industrial Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain the complaint when the termination of service is under challenge and exclusive jurisdiction in this behalf is vested in the Labour Court. The order of the Industrial Court also challenged on the ground that there cannot be any question of clubbing together two different employers for the purpose of applying sections 25-K and 25-L of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The number of “workmen” is to be seen, and “workmen” can only be those employed by the employer who is closing down or retrenching workmen. Employees of an altogether different company can never be clubbed as they are not the “workmen” of the petitioner-company. It was further submitted that the findings recorded by the Industrial Court in respect of functional integrality between the petitioner and the respondent No. 41 are not erroneous but are also perverse as they are contrary to the record and therefore, the judgment is liable to be set aside. It was also contended on behalf of the petitioner that the Industrial Court having been appraised of the law on the said issue has completely misdirected itself while coming to the said conclusion.
On the other hand the learned counsel for the respondents vehemently supported the judgment of the Industrial Court on all counts submitting that the petitioner and respondent No. 41, though under different options, are in fact same companies and therefore, the petition is sought to be dismissed.
7. In this regard, it is to be noted that the complaint has been filed by the respondent Nos. 1 to 40 under Item 9 of Schedule IV of the MRTU and PULP Act. Under section 4 of the Act, the Industrial Courts are established. Under section 5, the duties of the Industrial Courts are enumerated. As per provisions of section 5(d) of the Act, it is the duty of the Industrial Court to decide complaints relating to unfair labour practices except unfair labour practice falling under Item 1 of Schedule IV. Section 7 of the Act, casts duty upon the Labour Court to decide complaints relating to unfair labour practices described in Item 1 of Schedule IV of the Act. Thus, it is clear that the cases of termination are to be tried by the Labour Court as contemplated under section 7 of the Act. The Apex Court in the case of Lokmat Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. v. Shankarprasad, 1999 (II) CLR 433 has laid down the preposition of law that the scope and ambit of Item 1 is extremely vide and also includes the cases of retrenchment. The said issue was also considered by our High Court in the case of Pepsi Co. India Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Noshir Elavia, 2002 (1) CLR 953 wherein it was held that the cases of termination of service will have to be filed under Item 1 of Schedule IV and Item 9 cannot be invoked for the said purpose. The said issue was also again came up for consideration before the High Court in the case of Supertex (India) Corporation v. Radheshyam Pandey, 2001 (4) Mh.L.J 706 : 2001 (III) CLR 299 wherein it was held that the Industrial Court cannot deal with a complaint in respect of termination of services falling under Item 1 of Schedule IV of the MRTU and PULP Act. For this purpose, we can also refer to judgment of our High Court in the case of Dilip Wawande v. Industrial Court, Nagpur, 1995 (II) CLR 897 wherein it was held that jurisdiction to try the issue of termination is squarely with Labour Court as contemplated under section 7 of the Act
8. It was sought to be contended on behalf of the respondent that the said issue was not taken up before the Industrial Court and therefore the said question cannot be decided at this juncture. However, it is to be noted that the said argument may not be good in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Chittoori Subbanna v. Kodappa Subbanna, AIR 1965 SC 1325. It was held by the Apex Court that a pure question of law not depended upon the determination of any question of fact should be allowed to be raised even at the last stage. It is also needless to mention that the jurisdiction of the Court cannot be conferred by the conduct of the parties.
9. The next question which requires consideration is in respect of finding given by the Industrial Court in respect of functional integrality between the petitioner and the respondent No. 41. On perusal of the judgment of the lower Court, it is clear that the Industrial Court has held the issue against the petitioner on various counts including the fact that use of trade mark as “Borger” and “E1- Ci-Ar” for the manufactured product, the Excise Certificate issued by the Excise Authority mentions that products manufactured are similar. Further it is held that sometimes the production of the respondent No. 41 was carried out by the employees of the petitioner and the business is of one or two families. It was further held that the partners of petitioner and respondent No. 41 are same. One time keeper is supervising the employees. The Management, Finance, Geographical Proximity, Unity of Ownership, Trade Mark, Work Force, were common for both petitioner and respondent No. 41. These were the pieces of evidence mainly the lower Court to decide the issue of functional integrality between the petitioner and the respondent No. 41.
However, on perusal of the entire record, it is seen that the inferences drawn by the lower Court appear to be contrary to the record and are also contrary to the law laid down by the Apex Court as well as this Court. It is pertinent to note that the documents produced before the Industrial Court as well as the evidence on record would clearly proved that Borger was the trade mark used by the petitioner whereas the El-Ci-Ar was the trade mark used by the respondent No. 41, which is quite clear from the brochures produced by the petitioner on record. For the said purpose we can also rely upon the evidence of Mr. Shenoy and in para 4 of his examination-in-chief he has stated in respect of the brand names of petitioner as well as respondent No. 41. This witness was appears to be extensively cross-examined, however, there was even no suggestion to that effect was given on behalf of the respondent Nos. 1 to 40.
10. The finding that the petitioner and the respondent No. 41 are manufacturing similar product which the Industrial Court has based upon the Excise Certificate issued by the Excise Authorities is also appears to be contrary to the record. The Certificate issued by the concerned authorities shows that the petitioner were manufacturing plastic film capacitors whereas the respondent No. 41 manufactures wire wound resistors and plastic film capacitors. In any event the excise certificate is only for revenue purpose and has nothing to do with the specific types of capacitors or the end usage of the same. Whereas one company made capacitors for automobile ignitions, the other made them for the electrical/electronics industry. The witness Surendra Shenoy also explained the line of the production in his evidence. Moreover, even if it is assumed that the petitioner and the respondent No. 41 were manufacturing same and similar product, it would not mean that the petitioner and the respondent No. 41 were functionally integrated. In this regard reference must be made to the ruling of the Apex Court in the case of Isha Steel Treatment, Bombay v. Association of Engineering Workers reported in AIR 1997 SC 1478 wherein the Apex Court was considering the factories which were barely 200 yards away from each other and were manufacturing the same products. The Apex Court after considering the entire case law on the issue, ultimately came to the conclusion that the two factories though were in the same line of business cannot be clubbed together. The issue is also considered by the Apex Court to the effect that both the units being controlled by the same employer and that the business of heat treatment processing was carried on in both the units and the Supreme Court had given importance to the fact that despite unit No. 1 is closed the unit No. 2 continue to operate.
11. It was vehemently urged by the learned counsel for the respondents that there was common work force in both the companies. It appears from the judgment of the lower Court that it has weighed on the ground by the learned lower appellate Court judge that on few occasions the employees of the petitioner were asked to work with respondent No. 41. However, it appears that the Industrial Court has not correctly understood the context in which these employees (who were very few in numbers) were asked to work in the respondent No. 41 company. It is to be noted that the said employees were asked when there was no work available with the petitioner, however, they were always being treated as employees of the petitioner. It is to be noted that the witness examined on behalf of the respondent Nos. 1 to 40 have also not accepted that whenever work with the petitioner was not available only then and in that case the employees were asked to work with respondent No. 41.
In this connection reference may be made to the ruling of the Apex Court in the case of Hindustan Steel Work Construction Co. Ltd. v. Hindustan Steel Construction Ltd. Employees Union, 1995 (1) CLR 598, wherein the Apex Court has considered the effect of transfer of employees from one establishment to another. It is held thus —
“In case the construction company like the appellant which undertakes construction work wherever awarded does that work and winds up that establishment there and particularly where the number of local persons have to be and are appointed for the purpose of particular work. Merely unity of ownership management and machinery are not of much significance. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case and the material on record the conclusion inevitable is that the units at Hyderabad were distinct.”
Similar issue was also raised before this Court in the case of Association of Engineering Workers v. Sewree Iron and Steel Company Ltd., 1992 (2) CLR 629 wherein it was observed that “merely because the employees are transferred from one company to other or merely because the partners of two are common will not be sufficient to come to the conclusion that the test of functional integrality is satisfied”.
The issue of functional integrality also came up for consideration before this Court in the case of Saurashtra Trust Karmachari Sangh v. State People (P), Ltd., 1995 (2) CLR 71. While considering the aspect of functional integrality this Court has observed that by looking into the entire case law then available on the said issue right from the case of Associated Cement Company's case reported in 1960 (1) L.L.J 1 till the judgment of Hindustan Steel, 1995 (I) CLR 598 and held thus:—
“The survey of precedent of Apex Court shows that although several tests were evolved in Associated Cement Company's case, the test of functional integrality and functional interdependency has emerged superior particularly in case involving retrenchment and closure.”
It was further found therein that the interdependence is the superior test of functional integrality. The two companies, therefore, should be so integrated that one cannot survive without other. This issue has been time and again discussed by this Court as well as the Apex Court and inevitable conclusion as has been drawn to the effect that survival of one unit without another is important factor to decide the case of functional integrality. This view is also supported by the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Yeshwant G. Chikhalikar v. Killics Nikson Ltd., 1999 (2) CLR 390.
Therefore, taking into account the relevant circumstances revealed from the record and looking into the entire law established in this regard one can easily see that interdependency is the single most important and superior factor to consider the case of functional integrality. Therefore, while considering the facts of the present case, if we consider the evidence led by the parties in the matter, the fact that in spite of closure of the petitioner company, respondent No. 41 company has continued to operate is itself sufficient to hold that both the units are not at all interdependent and that there is any functional integrality between both the units. It is also to be noted that on behalf of the workers have nowhere stated that running of respondent No. 41 is crippled because of the closure of the petitioner company. If we considered the evidence of the witness examined on behalf of the petitioner, it is clear that he has stated in unequivocal terms accepting that after the closure of the petitioner, respondent No. 1 was continues to operate. The Industrial Court has observed that the question of not surviving in absence of another in the case of closure of one establishment cannot be accepted as a superior test in this particular case. In this regard I must note that I prefer to disagree with this observation, especially when it is exactly contrary to the law laid down by this Court as well as the Apex Court.
12. Therefore, looking into the available evidence and consideration, coupled with the prevailing legal position, it must be noted that both the companies are separately incorporated and are not the unit of each other and it appears that the Industrial Court has lost sight of this factual aspect while considering the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which does not contemplate two independent companies to be one industrial establishment or undertaking.
13. Therefore, having considered the entire scenario revealed from the record vis-a-vis the prevailing legal position, I have no doubt whatsoever that the following facts emerge; that both the companies are separately incorporated under the provisions of the companies act and that both the companies are assessed separately for the purpose of Income Tax, Sales Tax etc. Further, both the companies are having their different products. Also most importantly that the respondent No. 41 has survived despite closure of the petitioner-company. It must further be noted that the Union that was representing the employees was one Union in both the Companies, however, Union always raised separate demands of both the employers and there were always separate settlements signed. This aspect should indicate that the employees had for all practical purpose right from the beginning had accepted that both the companies were completely independent.
14. Therefore, for the reasons recorded, I hold that the order passed by the Industrial Court besides being without jurisdiction and is contrary to the material on record. The Industrial Court also appears to have misread the evidence and have not considered the evidence given in right perspective. Under the circumstances, the order of the Industrial Court is found to be erroneous, it is liable to be quashed and set aside.
15. In the result, the Rule is made absolute and petition is allowed in terms of prayer clause (a) and stands disposed of with no order as to costs.
16. At this stage, the learned counsel for the respondents made submission that the petitioner should not withdraw the deposited amount for some time. In view of the facts and circumstances, the petitioner shall not withdraw the amount for the period of four weeks.
Petition allowed.
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