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Bombay Isle Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. Kamladevi Jagdish Diwan And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal was filed by the original defendant No. 1 challenging the City Civil Judge's Judgment and Order dated 2 March 2006 in Notice of Motion No. 3454 of 2005 in L.C. Suit No. 3105 of 2005. The trial court had dismissed defendant No.1's notice of motion seeking a reference of the matter to arbitration under section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1966. The trial court concluded that several issues raised in the suit could not be adjudicated by arbitration and that the cause of action against defendant No.2 (the municipal corporation), which is not a party to the arbitration agreement, was inseparable from the dispute. The appeal challenges that conclusion.
The suit arises from a development agreement dated 31-10-2001 which the plaintiff alleges was terminated; notwithstanding termination, the appellant (defendant No.1) continued development activity, obtained commencement certificates from the municipal authority, and proceeded with construction. The plaintiff sought multiple reliefs from the civil court, including declarations regarding termination and invalidity of commencement certificates, cancellation/revocation of sanctioned plans and certificates by the municipal corporation, permanent and temporary injunctions restraining further construction and demolition, directions to the municipal corporation to issue stop-work notices and cancel commencement certificates, and ancillary reliefs and costs. The trial court found it necessary for the plaintiff to invoke civil jurisdiction, including reliefs against the municipal corporation.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the trial court erred in refusing to refer the dispute to arbitration under section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1966.
- Whether the issues and reliefs pleaded in the plaint fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement between the plaintiff and defendant No.1 (i.e., whether they are arbitrable).
- Whether the cause of action insofar as it involves defendant No.2 (the municipal corporation), a non-party to the arbitration agreement, is inseparable from the matters allegedly arbitrable and therefore prevents a partial reference to arbitration.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The plaint was framed with dexterity to persuade the court that issues raised cannot be tried in arbitration; in substance, the primary claim (prayer (a)) is arbitrable between the plaintiff and defendant No.1.
- The reliefs sought against defendant No.2 are dependent on and governed by the same substantive dispute as prayer (a); therefore issues governed by the arbitration agreement should first be resolved by arbitration.
- Relied on precedents: P. Anand Gajapathi Raju v. P.V.G. Raju (AIR 2000 SC 1886) and Padmasundara Rao v. State of Tamil Nadu (Judgments Today 2002 (3) SC 1), and sought to distinguish Sukanya Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Jayesh H. Pandya.
Respondent's (Plaintiff's) Arguments
- The plaintiff had no option but to approach the Civil Court because, despite termination of the development agreement, the appellant continued construction and obtained commencement certificates from the municipal authority.
- Initial communications with municipal officers did not stop the appellant's construction activity; given the municipal authority's role and the need to seek directions against it, the plaintiff was compelled to seek civil remedies.
- Certain reliefs (notably those in prayer clauses (b) and (f) relating to compliance with Intimation of Disapproval conditions and cancellation of commencement certificates) cannot be considered in arbitration proceedings and therefore the suit cannot be split for arbitration.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Sukanya Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Jayesh H. Pandya, 2003 (3) ALL MR 325 (SC) | Principle that there is no provision for "splitting the cause" or "parties" and referring part of the suit to arbitration; bifurcation leads to delay, increased costs, potential harassment and possibility of conflicting decisions. | The trial court relied on Sukanya to hold that because reliefs outside the arbitration agreement (e.g., against the municipal corporation) are inseparable from the suit, the motion to refer to arbitration could not be accepted; the appellate court found Sukanya squarely applicable and adopted that conclusion. |
| P. Anand Gajapathi Raju v. P.V.G. Raju, AIR 2000 SC 1886 | Arbitration agreement can be entered into while an action is pending; conditions under section 8 include that the subject-matter of the action must be the same as the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement. | The court observed this principle but found it inapplicable because the suit here involves matters outside the arbitration agreement and an inseparable cause of action involving a non-party municipal corporation. |
| Padmasundara Rao (Dead) v. State of Tamil Nadu, Judgments Today 2002 (3) SC 1 | Deals with principles of construction of statute. | The court held that this decision on statutory construction was not of assistance to the appellant's contention in the present case. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court considered the plaint and the reliefs claimed and agreed with the trial court's conclusions. The analytical steps, grounded in the opinion, are:
- Examination of the plaint and the reliefs: The court reproduced and examined the reliefs (prayers (a)–(l)) and assessed which of those fell within the arbitration agreement and which did not.
- Assessment of arbitrability: The court concluded that not all issues raised in the plaint were governed by the arbitration agreement between the plaintiff and defendant No.1.
- Inseparability of cause of action against non-party: The court found that the cause of action against defendant No.2 (the municipal corporation), which is not a party to the arbitration agreement, is inseparable from the matters raised; therefore a partial reference to arbitration was not feasible.
- Practical necessity to approach civil court: Relying on the plaint (paragraphs from No.37 onwards), the court accepted the plaintiff's contention that, because construction continued and the municipal authority had issued a commencement certificate despite alleged non-compliance with Intimation of Disapproval (I.O.D.) conditions, the plaintiff had no practical alternative but to seek urgent remedies from the civil court, including directions against the municipal corporation to stop work and cancel the certificate.
- Non-arbitrability of certain reliefs: The court held that reliefs claimed in prayers (b) and (f) (relating to the municipal corporation's issuance and cancellation of commencement certificates and compliance with I.O.D. conditions) cannot, "by no stretch of imagination," be considered in arbitration proceedings.
- Application of precedent: The court applied Sukanya to conclude that bifurcating the suit (referring some issues to arbitration while retaining others for the civil court) is not permissible in this context because it would frustrate speedy disposal, increase cost and harassment, and risk conflicting findings. The court considered but found P. Anand and Padmasundara inapplicable or unhelpful on the facts before it.
- Conclusion on the interlocutory application: On these bases, the court saw no merit in the appeal and upheld the trial court's order dismissing the application for reference to arbitration; the civil application was also disposed of accordingly.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: APPEAL DISMISSED.
Direct consequences stated in the opinion:
- The trial court's order dismissing the notice of motion for reference to arbitration under section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1966 is upheld.
- In view of the dismissal of the appeal, the related Civil Application is also disposed of.
Broader implications noted by the court (as expressed in the opinion):
- The court emphasized that none of the observations in the order should be construed as an expression of opinion on the substantive issues still pending before the trial court; the trial court must decide remaining proceedings on their own merits uninfluenced by the appellate decision.
- The opinion does not purport to lay down a new precedent beyond application of cited authorities to the facts; it resolves the interlocutory issue by reference to the established principle (Sukanya) regarding non-splittability of causes/parties for arbitration in the circumstances described.
Appeal dismissed.
A.M Khanwilkar, J.:— Heard the counsel appearing for the parties. Perused the materials placed on record. This Appeal by the original defendant No. 1 takes exception to the Judgment and Order passed by the City Civil Judge dated 2nd March, 2006 in Notice of Motion No. 3454 of 2005 in L.C Suit No. 3105 of 2005. By this impugned order, Trial Court has dismissed the Notice of Motion taken out by the defendant No. 1 for referring the matter to Arbitration in terms of the provisions of section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1966. The Trial Court has in the first place found that several issues have been raised in the suit which cannot be adjudicated in arbitration proceedings. Besides, the cause of action for instituting the suit against the other defendants who are not party to the Arbitration agreement is inseparable. On that finding, relying on the decision of the Apex Court in Sukanya Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Jayesh H. Pandya reported in 2003 (3) ALL MR 325 (SC) it is held that the cause being inseparable the claim in the Notice of Motion cannot be accepted. This is the limited issue for my consideration.
2. According to the counsel for the appellant the plaint has been drafted with such dexterity so as to persuade the Court to hold that the issues raised therein cannot be tried in the Arbitration proceedings. It is submitted that the suit claim is essentially dependent on the substantive relief in terms of prayer clause (a) and that is an issue which can be considered in arbitration proceedings between the plaintiff and the defendant No. 1. It is contended on behalf of the appellant that relief claimed against the defendant No. 2-Corporation is also dependent on the relief in terms of prayer clause (a). In such a case contends learned Counsel, the parties will have to be first allowed to resolve the issues which are governed by the arbitration agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant No. 1. Counsel for the appellant referred to. the decision of the Apex Court in case of P. Anand Gajapathi Raju v. P.V.G Raju reported in AIR 2000 SC 1886 as well as another decision in the case of Padmasundara Rao (Dead) v. State of Tamil Nadu reported in Judgments Today 2002 (3) SC 1. Counsel appearing for the appellant has made an attempt to distinguish the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sukanya's case (supra) relied upon by the Trial Court.
3. Before I proceed to consider the above submissions, it will be apposite to advert to the reliefs claimed in the subject suit. The same read thus:
“(a) that it may declared that the plaintiff having already terminated the development agreement dated 31-10-2001 with the defendant No. 1, the defendant No. 1 are not entitled to carry out any further work of construction in the suit building being building known as Kamal Vishranti Kutir of Ground + 2 storied building standing on Plot No. 140-D, Bandra T.P.S III bearing City Survey No. F/405-A, Village Bandra.
(b) that it may be declared by this Honourable Court, that the Commencement Certificate dated 4-6-2005 issued by the defendant No. 2 to the defendant No. 1 is illegal, ultra vires the Intimation of Disapproval conditions, bad in law and is liable to be revoked and cancelled by the Bombay Municipal Corporation.
(c) that it may be declared that the plans of the defendant No. 1 sanctioned by the defendant No. 2 dated 27-5-2002 and 25-2-2005 are ultra vires and per se not in accordance with the Development agreement dated 31-10-2001, as the said plans are fraudulent and not in consultation with the plaintiff and the said plans are liable to be revoked forthwith by the defendant No. 2.
(d) that the defendant No. 1, their servants, agents and all persons claiming through them may be restrained by a permanent order and injunction of this Honourable Court from loading additional construction over the existing suit building being building known as Kamal Vishranti Kutir of Ground + 2 storied building standing on Plot No. 104-D, Bandra T.P.S.III bearing City Survey No. F/405-A, Village Bandra, pursuant to the sanctioned plan dated 27-5-2002 and 25-2-2005 and the commencement certificate dated 4-6-2005.
(e) that the defendant No. 1, their servants, agents and all persons claiming through them may be restrained by a permanent injunction from demolishing the existing garages in the compound of the suit building being two garages in the compound i.e Northern Garage of the plaintiff and the Southern Garage of Dr. Advani standing on Plot No. 104-D, Bandra T.P.S III bearing City Survey No. F/405-A, Village Bandra.
(f) that this Honourable Court may be pleased to issue a order and direction to the defendant No. 2 to issue a stop work notice to the defendant No. 1 for not complying with the Intimation of Disapproval conditions as specified in Intimation of Disapproval dated 27-5-2002 and to forthwith cancel and revoke the Commencement Certificate dated 4-6-2005 issued in favour of the defendant No. 1 and further may be directed by this Honourable Court not to issue any further commencement certificate in favour of the defendant No. 1.
(g) that pending the hearing and final disposal of the suit, the defendant No. 1 their servants, agents and all persons claiming through them may be restrained by a temporary order and injunction of this Honourable Court from loading additional construction over the existing suit building being building known as Kamal Vishranti Kutir of Ground + 2 storied building standing on Plot No. 104-D, Bandra T.P.S.III bearing City Survey No. F/405-A, village Bandra, pursuant to the sanctioned plan dated 27-5-2002 and 25-2-2005 and the commencement certificate dated 4-6-2005.
(h) that pending the hearing and final disposal of the suit the defendant No. 1 their servants, agents and all persons claiming through them may be restrained by a temporary injunction from demolishing the existing garages in the compound of the suit building being two garages in the compound i.e Northern Garage of the plaintiff and the Southern Garage of Dr. Advani standing on Plot No. 104-D, Bandra T.P.S.III bearing City Survey No. F/405-A, Village Bandra building.
(i) that pending the hearing and final disposal of the suit this Honourable Court may be placed to issue a interim order and direction to the defendant No. 2 to issue a stop work notice to the defendant No. 1 for not complying with the Intimation of Disapproval conditions as specified in Intimation of Disapproval dated 27-5-2002 and to forthwith cancel and revoke the Commencement Certificate dated 4-6-2005 issued in favour of the defendant No. 1 and further the Honourable Court may be pleased to issue a interim order against the defendant No. 2 not to issue any further Commencement Certificate in favour of the defendant No. 1.
(j) ad-interim reliefs in terms of prayers (g), (h) and (i) above.
(k) for such other and other further reliefs as the nature and circumstances of this case may require.
(l) costs and professional costs of this suit may be provided for.”
4. Having considered the rival submissions, I have no hesitation in taking the view that this Appeal is devoid of merits. I am in agreement with the conclusion reached by the Trial Court that all the issues raised in the plaint are not governed by the arbitration agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant No. 1; and that the cause of action for instituting the suit against defendant No. 2-Corporation who is not party to the Arbitration agreement is inseparable.
5. The respondent has rightly invited my attention to the averments in paragraph No. 37 onwards of the plaint to contend that the respondent-plaintiff had no option but to rush to the Court. According to the plaintiff although the development agreement dated 31st October, 2001 was terminated by the plaintiff, the appellant continued with the development activity unabated. As a consequence, the plaintiff had no option but in the first place to rush to the municipal authority. Initially, some response was given by the officers of the municipal authority but the appellant continued with the construction activity after obtaining commencement certificate. In my opinion, there is substance in the grievance made by the plaintiff that in such a situation, the respondent-plaintiff had no other option but to rush to the Civil Court so as to seek appropriate direction also against the municipal authority directing it to abjure from issuing any permission or allowing the appellant-defendant to continue with the construction activity for the reasons noted in the plaint.
6. Assuming that the appellant is justified in contending that the relief claimed in prayer (c) to (e) are dependent on the outcome of the decision on relief claimed in prayer clause (a) which is amenable to arbitration proceedings. However, for the nature of the entire controversy in the plaint, the plaintiff had no option but to invoke the jurisdiction of the Civil Court so as to seek appropriate relief even against the defendant No. 2-municipal authority. In any case my understanding of the plaintiff's case in relation to relief in terms of prayer clauses (b) and (f) claimed in the plaint, the same cannot be considered in arbitration proceedings. The same is in respect of not complying with the conditions of the I.O.D and in spite of that commencement certificate is issued by the Corporation, as a consequence the appellant started construction activities. In the background of that allegation the plaintiff has sought relief against the defendant No. 2 to issue stop work notice to the appellant and also to cancel and revoke the commencement certificate issued in favour of the appellant-defendant No. 1. The said relief by no stretch of imagination can be considered in arbitration proceedings. The decision in the case of Sukanya in my opinion, squarely covers the controversy on hand. In that decision, the Apex Court has taken a view that there is no provision for “splitting the cause” or “parties” and referring the subject-matter of the suit to the arbitrator. In other words, as the relief in terms of prayer clauses (b) and (f) is outside the scope of arbitration agreement and inseparable, the course suggested by the appellant cannot be acceded to. For, in paragraph No. 17 of the decision in the case of Sukanya, it is observed that such bifurcation of suit in two parts, one to be decided by the arbitral tribunal and other to be decided by the civil Court would inevitably delay the proceedings. The whole purpose of speedy disposal of dispute and decreasing the cost of litigation would be frustrated by such procedure. It would also increase the cost of litigation and harassment to the parties and on occasions there is possibility of conflicting judgments and orders by two different forums.
7. That takes me to the two decisions relied upon by the appellant. The first is the case of P. Anand Gajapathi Raju (Supra). In that case, during the pendency of the appeal “all the parties” entered into an arbitration agreement and agreed to refer their disputes in the appeal to a sole arbitrator. The Apex Court in para 6 of the reported decision observed that : it is not necessary that the arbitration agreement must be already in existence before the action is brought in the Court but also include an agreement brought into existence while the action is pending. This exposition has no application to the case on hand. Indeed, in paragraph No. 5 of the same decision the Court has spelt out the conditions which are required to be satisfied under section 8 of the Act before the Court can exercise its powers to refer the parties to arbitration. One of the condition is that the subject-matter of the action is the same as the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement. However, in the earlier part of this judgment I have affirmed the conclusion of the trial Court that the suit pertains to a matter which is outside the arbitration agreement and inseparable. Viewed thus, this decision is of no avail. The next decision pressed into service is in the case of Padmasundara (supra). That however, deals with the principles of construction of statute. Even this decision is of no avail to the appellant.
8. Hence, the Appeal is dismissed. In view of this Order Civil Application is also disposed of.
9. It is made clear that none of the observations made in this order be construed as expression of opinion or finding on the issues that are still pending or under consideration before the Trial Court. Trial Court will decide the proceedings before it on its own merit uninfluenced by this decision.
Appeal dismissed.
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