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Snehadeep Structures... v. Maharashtra Small Sc...

Bombay High Court
Nov 24, 2006
Smart Summary (Beta)

Judgment Summary — Bobde S.A., J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant is a private limited company registered as a small scale industry. The respondent is a government-owned company of Maharashtra constituted to promote small scale industries. The respondent had obtained a tender from the Maharashtra State Electricity Board (MSEB) and, in turn, placed three work orders on the respondent; under the Marketing Assistance Scheme, the respondent placed several supply orders on the appellant for supply, transportation and laying of ash disposal pipelines and allied civil work. The aggregate value of the supply orders was Rs. 4,18,04,825/-.

The appellant claimed interest for delayed payment under the Interest on Delayed Payments to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993 (the "Interest Act"). The respondent denied the claim in correspondence. Writ petitions filed by the appellant were dismissed as inappropriate. The appellant then invoked the arbitration clause; a sole arbitrator issued an interim award (16-6-2005) and a final award (9-8-2005) denying the appellant's claim for interest. The appellant challenged the arbitrator's awards under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before a single Judge, who dismissed the petition. The appellant appealed against that order to the court whose opinion is summarized here.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the respondent is a "buyer" and the appellant a "supplier" within the meaning of the Interest Act.
  2. Whether the Interest Act applies to the transactions between the appellant and the respondent.
  3. Whether payment by the respondent was made without delay under Clause 25 of the supply orders, or whether payment was delayed with reference to the provisions of the Interest Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The Interest Act applies to the transactions between the appellant and the respondent and therefore the appellant is entitled to interest under section 3 of the Interest Act for delayed payment.
  • There was a delay in payment by the respondent; the appellant contended that even if supply orders were issued before the Interest Act came into force, claims for goods supplied or services rendered after the Act's commencement would still fall within the Act's scope.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent disputed that it was a "buyer" vis-à-vis the appellant, contending that, if at all, the appellant was the supplier to MSEB rather than to the respondent.
  • The respondent contended that the Interest Act does not apply to the transactions in issue.
  • Relying on Clause 25 of the supply orders, the respondent argued that its obligation to pay arose only upon receipt of payment from MSEB and that it made payment soon after receiving MSEB's payment; therefore there was no delay attracting interest.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Assam Small Scale Industries Development Corpn. Ltd. v. J.D. Pharmaceuticals, (2005) 13 SCC 19 Establishes that the 1993 Interest Act is not retrospective; it does not apply to supply orders entered into prior to the Act's commencement on 23-9-1992. The court applied this precedent to conclude that the Interest Act does not apply to the supply orders issued by the respondent prior to 23-9-1992 and, consequently, the appellant cannot claim interest under that Act for those orders.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court reviewed the arbitrator's approach, the single Judge's conclusions, the parties' contentions on appeal and relevant statutory provisions and precedent. The reasoning proceeded in the following steps, drawn strictly from the text of the opinion:

  1. The arbitrator's findings (interim award): the arbitrator had accepted that the Interest Act applied to the supply orders (which he characterized as works contracts) and that the appellant's claim was not barred by limitation. The arbitrator treated the respondent as a "buyer" under the Interest Act and divided the relevant time into three periods for assessment:
    • Before 23-9-1992 (date the Interest Act came into force): the arbitrator held the Act was not retrospective and noted supply orders prior to this date.
    • Between 23-9-1992 and 10-8-1998: the arbitrator relied on Clause 25 of the supply orders, which required payment by the respondent only upon receipt of payment from the consignee (MSEB), and held that the respondent's obligation to pay arose only upon its receipt from MSEB; since the respondent paid soon after receipt, there was no delay in this period.
    • After 1998: the arbitrator held that post-amendment (after the amending Act came into force) the appellant could claim interest only if the respondent paid beyond 120 days as provided by the amendment.
  2. At the final award stage the arbitrator found the appellant had not proved entitlement to interest for the period after August 1998 and thus denied the claim in its entirety.
  3. The single Judge upheld the arbitrator's construction of Clause 25: Clause 25 made respondent's obligation contingent upon receipt from MSEB; since payment by the respondent followed receipt from MSEB without delay, there was no breach by respondent. The Judge further observed that Clause 47 (which required MSEB to make payment to respondent within a stipulated time) did not impose a corresponding obligation on the respondent to pay the appellant within the same time.
  4. On appeal, the court recorded the principal questions addressed by the parties (buyer/supplier status, applicability of the Interest Act, and whether payment was delayed). The court observed that neither party had laid emphasis on a dispositive factual-legal point: all the supply orders were issued prior to the coming into force of the Interest Act (23-9-1992).
  5. Relying on the cited Supreme Court precedent (Assam Small Scale Industries Devn. Corpn. v. J.D. Pharmaceuticals), the court accepted the principle that the Interest Act is not retrospective and therefore does not apply to supply orders entered into before 23-9-1992. The court quoted para. 37–38 of that decision, which held that transactions prior to the Act's commencement would not attract the Act's provisions.
  6. Because all supply orders at issue were issued before the Interest Act came into force, and because the precedent establishes that the Act cannot be applied retrospectively to such orders, the court concluded that the appellant was not entitled to interest under the Interest Act in respect of those orders.
  7. The court expressly rejected the appellant's contention that, although the orders were prior to the Act, claims in respect of goods supplied or services rendered after the Act's commencement would nonetheless fall within the Act's ambit — holding that this contention could not be accepted in view of the Supreme Court's clear observations in the cited precedent.
  8. Given this determination on applicability, the court found it unnecessary to decide the other disputed questions posed by the parties.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED — The appeal is dismissed.

Direct consequences as stated in the opinion:

  • The appellant is not entitled to claim any interest under the Interest on Delayed Payments to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993 in respect of the supply orders that were issued prior to the Act's commencement on 23-9-1992.
  • The court relied on the Supreme Court precedent (Assam Small Scale Industries Devn. Corpn. Ltd. v. J.D. Pharmaceuticals) to determine that the Interest Act is not retrospective; because the supply orders were antecedent to the Act, the Act's provisions do not apply to those contracts.
  • Because the court's decision rests on the non‑applicability of the Interest Act to these pre‑commencement supply orders, the court did not address and did not decide the other contested legal questions concerning the construction of contract clauses beyond what was necessary for this holding.

The opinion does not state that it is laying down any new legal precedent beyond applying the existing Supreme Court authority; its effect is the dismissal of the appellant's claim for interest on the factual and legal basis set out above.

Show all summary ...

Bobde S.A, J.:— This is an appeal against the order of a learned single Judge of this Court dismissing the appellant's petition under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 against the interim award dated 16-6-2005 and the final award dated 9-8-2005 passed by the Arbitrator. The Arbitrator has denied the appellant's claim for interest based on the Interest on Delayed Payments to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993, hereinafter referred to as the “Interest Act”.

2. The appellant is a Private Limited Company and is registered as a small scale industry. The respondent is a company wholly owned by the Government of Maharashtra incorporated, inter alia, with the object of promoting Small Scale Industries. In the usual course of business, the respondent was awarded a tender by Maharashtra State Electricity Board, for short “MSEB”. MSEB placed three Work Orders upon the respondent as follows:—

“1. Work Order No. 1166 dated 4th April, 1991.

2. Work Order No. 3602 dated 13th December, 1991.

3. Work Order No. 583 dated 24th February, 1992.”

3. In turn, under the Marketing Assistance Scheme, the respondent placed corresponding supply orders for supply, transportation and laying of ash disposal pipelines along with allied civil work from Bhusawal Thermal Power Station to Ash Disposal Area. The supply orders were as follows:—

1. Supply Order No. 706 dated 24th June, 1989;

2. Supply Order No. 262/391 dated 25th April 1991;

3. Supply Order No. 450/3576 dated 31st December 1991; and

4. Supply Order No. 533/4659 dated 10th March 1992.

4. The aggregate value of the supply order is Rs. 4,18,04,825/-. Both the contracts between MSEB and the respondent and the respondent and the appellant are on a principal to principal basis. According to the appellant, the respondent delayed payment in terms of the Interest Act, though payment was made by the respondent soon after receipt of payment from MSEB, and is, therefore, liable to claim interest under section 3 of that Act which reads as follows:—

“Liability of buyer to make payment.- Where any supplier supplies any goods or fenders any services to any buyer, the buyer shall make payment therefore on or before the date agreed upon between him and the supplier in writing or, where there is no agreement in this behalf before the appointed day:—

Provided that in no case the period agreed upon between the supplier and the buyer in writing shall exceed one hundred and twenty days from the day of acceptance or the day of deemed acceptance.”

5. According to the appellant, the payment was not made on the appointed date which is defined by section 2(b) of the Interest Act which reads as follows:—

“2. Definitions.- In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-

(a) ……………………………..

(b) “appointed day” means the day following immediately after the expiry of the period of thirty days from the day of acceptance or the day of deemed acceptance of any goods or any services by a buyer from a supplier;

Explanation.-For the purposes of this clause,-

(i) “the day of acceptance” means,-

(a) the day of the actual delivery of goods or the rendering of services; or

(b) ………………………….

(ii) ………………………….’

6. The appellant made a claim of interest on account of delayed payment which was denied by the respondent in the correspondence between them. The appellant had attempted to make the claim by way of writ petitions which were dismissed as not being appropriate proceedings for the purpose. The appellant then invoked the arbitration clause and made the claim before the Sole Arbitrator, who heard the matter and denied the appellant the claim for interest.

7. By the interim award dated 16-6-2005, the learned Arbitrator held that the Interest Act is applicable to the supply orders in question which were in the nature of works contract and that the appellant's claim is not barred by limitation. The Arbitrator also held that the respondent is a “buyer” as defined by the Interest Act. For deciding the appellant's eligibility to interest, the Arbitrator divided the period in question into three parts:—

(i) Before 23-9-1992: This is the date on which the Interest Act came into force. The Arbitrator held that the Act was not retrospective in operation. The Arbitrator took note of the supply orders which were prior to this date.

(ii) Between 23-9-1992 and 10-8-1998: The second terminus of this period was the date when the amending Act came into force on 10-9-1998, and provided that in no case, the period of payment agreed upon between the supplier and the buyer shall exceed 120 days from the date of acceptance of the goods and/or services. As regards the claim for interest during this period, the learned Arbitrator referred to Clause 25 which reads as follows:—

“The price of the goods delivered and accepted by the consignee and when received from the consignee (emphasis supplied) will be paid to the supplier by the Corporation subject to deductions of advances, if any, paid by the Corporation and the service charges and other monies payable to the Corporation by the supplier. No advance payment will be made for any supply of the goods unless otherwise agreed to by the Corporation.”

Relying on that clause, the Arbitrator held that the respondent's obligation to pay the appellant arose only upon receipt of payment from MSEB. Since the respondent had made payment soon after receiving the corresponding payment from MSEB, there was no delay and, therefore, there is no question of paying any interest.

(iii) After 1998: The learned Arbitrator held that the appellant would be end tied to claim interest if the payment was made by the respondent beyond the period of 120 days provided by the amending Act.

8. The Arbitrator directed the parties to file their respective statements for ascertaining their claim for interest within the parameters set out above.

9. At the time of the final award, it was found that the appellant had not demonstrated that it was entitled to receive any interest for the period after August 1998.

10. In the result, the appellant's claim for interest was denied.

11. The appellant challenged the awards before the learned Single Judge. The learned single Judge held that Clause 25 had been correctly construed by the Arbitrator and that the respondent was not bound to make payment to the appellant until it received payment from MSEB; there having been no delay in making the payment, after the respondent received payment from MSEB, the appellant was not entitled to any part of its claim. As regards the other clause, viz., Clause 47 which requires MSEB to make payment to the respondent within the specified time, the learned Judge observed that this clause did not have the effect of requiring the respondent to make payment to the appellant within the time stipulated therein.

12. In the appeal before us, the parties addressed us on the following questions:—

(i) Whether the respondent is a “buyer” and the appellant is a “supplier” within the meaning of the Interest Act?

The respondent submitted that it is not a buyer and the appellant is a supplier, if at all of MSEB.

(ii) Whether the Interest Act applies to the transactions between the appellant and the respondent?

The appellant submitted that it applies and the respondent that it does not.

(iii) Whether the payment is made by the respondent without delay in accordance with Clause 25 of the supply orders or whether the payment is delayed with reference to the provisions of the Interest Act?

The appellant submitted that there is a delay and the respondent that there is none since the payment is in accordance with Clause 25.

13. Though the matter was heard at length, no emphasis whatsoever was placed on the facts constituting the basis of the claim and the position in law applicable to that basis. In other words, no emphasis was placed, even on behalf of the respondent, on the fact that all the supply orders issued by the respondent to the appellant were outside the purview of the Interest Act since they had been issued prior to its enactment on 23-9-1992. It is clear that the appellant is not entitled to any claim for interest under the Interest Act since each of the supply orders was prior to its enactment, vide (Assam Small Scale Industries Development Corpn. Ltd. v. J.D Pharmaceuticals)1, (2005) 13 SCC 19. That was a case which arose in circumstances similar to the present case. In paragraphs 37 and 38, the Supreme Court observed as follows:—

“37. We have held herein before that Clause 8 of the terms and conditions relates to the payments of balance 10%. It is not in dispute that the plaintiff had demanded both the principal amount as also the interest from the Corporation, Section 3 of the 1993 Act imposes a statutory liability upon the buyer to make payment for the supplies of any goods either on or before the agreed date or where there is no agreement before the appointed day. Only when payments are not made in terms of section 3, section 4 would apply. The 1993 Act came into effect from 23-9-1992 and will not apply to transactions which took place prior to that date. We find that out of the 71 suit transactions, Serial Nos. 1 to 26 (referred to in the penultimate para of the trial Court judgement), that is supply orders between 5-6-1991 to 28-7-1992, were prior to the date of the 1993 Act coming into force. Only the transactions at Serial Nos. 27 to 71 (that is supply orders between 22-10-1992 to 19-6-1993), will attract the provisions of the 1993 Act.

38. The 1993 Act, thus, will have no application in relation to the transactions entered into between June 1991 and 23-9-1992. The trial Court as also the High Court, therefore, committed a manifest error in directing payment of interest at the rate of 23% upto June 1991 and 23.5% thereafter.”

14. The Supreme Court thus held that the Act was not applicable to supply orders prior to the date of coming into force of the Act. It was, however, contended on behalf of the appellant before us that while supply orders may have been prior to the Interest Act, the Act still applied to a claim in respect of goods supplied and services rendered after the Act came into force under those supply orders. This contention can only be rejected in view of the clear observations of the Supreme Court in para 37 of the case cited above. We find that the appellant is, therefore, not entitled to claim any interest whatsoever in respect of the supply orders in question which were issued by the respondent prior to the coming into force of the Interest Act. In the view that we have taken, we see no reason to go into the other question reproduced earlier, since all those questions are liable to be considered only if the Interest Act is applicable to the transactions in question.

15. In this view of the matter, there is no merit in the appeal which is hereby dismissed.

16. Appeal dismissed.