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Shailendra Kumar Sengupta v. State Of Maharashtra And Another

Bombay High Court
Aug 26, 2005
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The applications before the High Court were brought under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India to challenge the issuance of summons by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, 5th Court, Nagpur in Criminal Complaint Case No. 152/2000. The complaint was instituted by respondent No. 2 (the complainant).

The complainant, a Sikh belonging to the Mehtar caste (a Scheduled Caste), was employed as Diesel Mechanic Grade-I in South Eastern Railway, Motibagh Diesel Shed, Nagpur. The three petitioners (accused Nos. 1 to 3) were his seniors in the same office: accused No. 1 was Sectional Engineer (Electrical), accused No. 2 was Assistant Mechanical Engineer, and accused No. 3 was Senior Sectional Engineer.

The complainant alleged caste-based harassment by accused No. 1, including a specific incident on 1-2-1999 in which accused No. 1 allegedly said in the presence of staff: “You are Mehtar by caste, I shall never listen to your complaint. You will never improve, Mehtar - Mehtar - Mehtar.” The complainant reported the matter internally and subsequently faced disciplinary action: accused No. 3 issued a charge-sheet (24-2-1999) and inflicted punishment (9-3-1999), according to the complaint.

After internal steps and an alleged failure by the accused to apologize, the complainant filed a criminal complaint in July 2000 under section 3(1)(x) and 3(2)(vii) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 read with section 500 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The Magistrate issued summons to accused Nos. 1 to 3, and each accused challenged the issuance of summons by separate applications to the High Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the learned Magistrate had jurisdiction to issue summons in respect of offences under section 3(1)(x) and 3(2)(vii) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, or whether only the Special Court constituted under that Act can take cognizance.
  2. Whether previous sanction under section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was necessary before the Magistrate could take cognizance and issue summons, given that the accused were public servants and the alleged acts had a nexus with their official duties.
  3. Whether the complaint was mala fide — specifically, whether it was instituted as a counterblast to the disciplinary proceedings against the complainant — and thus liable to be dismissed.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners / Accused Nos. 1 to 3 — Arguments

  • The complaint was instituted mala fide, as a counterblast to the disciplinary proceedings in which the complainant was punished; therefore it should be dismissed.
  • The learned Magistrate lacked jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence under section 3(1)(x) and 3(2)(vii) of the Act because only the Special Court constituted under the Act can take cognizance of such offences; the Special Court cannot be approached directly by way of a private complaint or charge-sheet.
  • Previous sanction under section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was necessary because the accused were public servants employed in connection with the affairs of the Union and the alleged acts were committed while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duties. In the absence of such sanction, the proceedings are vitiated and must be quashed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
M.A. Kuttappan v. E. Krishnan Nayanar, (2004) 4 SCC 231 Referenced (in the company of other decisions) in support of the proposition that Gangula Ashok's ratio applies regarding the Special Court's cognizance. The Court noted this case was cited by petitioners but treated it as part of a group of authorities referring to the Gangula Ashok ratio; the High Court relied on the Gangula Ashok principle when addressing jurisdiction to issue summons.
Vidyadharan v. State of Kerala, 2004 (2) Mh. L.J (SC) 596 : 2004 Cri. L.J 605 (SC) Referenced (as cited by petitioners) in support of the same general proposition relating to Gangula Ashok. Used by the Court as part of the authorities emphasizing the Gangula Ashok position; the Court concluded Magistrate's issuance of summons was not illegal under that principle.
Arun s/o Balwantrao Mahurkar v. State of Maharashtra, 2003 (1) Mh. L.J 927 (Bombay) Referenced (as cited by petitioners) alongside other decisions invoking Gangula Ashok. The Court recorded that this decision was cited but relied on the Gangula Ashok ratio to hold that the Magistrate could issue summons pending possible committal to the Special Court.
Nana Narayan Shinde v. State of Maharashtra, 2000 (3) Mh. L.J 833 (Bombay) Referenced (as cited by petitioners) in the same group of authorities referring to Gangula Ashok. The Court acknowledged citation of this case and applied the Gangula Ashok principle to reject the jurisdictional challenge to issuance of summons.
Gangula Ashok v. State of Andhra Pradesh, JT 2000 (1) SC 379 : AIR 2000 SC 740 : (2000) 2 SCC 504 The ratio is explicitly stated: the Special Court constituted under the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act can take cognizance of offences under the Act only after the case is committed by the Magistrate in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure; a charge-sheet or private complaint cannot be filed directly before the Special Court. The Court applied this ratio to hold that issuance of summons by the Magistrate was not illegal, because the Magistrate could, after appearance, commit the case to the Special Court; the Special Court could not take cognizance unless the Magistrate committed the case.
State of Maharashtra v. Dr. Budhikota Subbarao, (1993) 3 SCC 339 Holds that cognizance of any offence by any Court is barred by section 197 of the CrPC unless previous sanction is obtained if the offence was committed in discharge of official duty; the bar is absolute and mandatory. The Court relied on this authority to analyse whether the accused were entitled to protection under section 197; it supported the conclusion that absence of sanction precludes cognizance where the offences relate to discharge of official duties.
Shambhoo Nath Misra v. State of U.P., AIR 1997 SC 2102 States that sanction to prosecute a public servant is required where the offence alleged was committed while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duties; the protection under section 197(1) applies when an act is integral to performance of public duty. The Court used this principle to determine that the alleged acts had a reasonable nexus with official duties, thereby invoking the need for previous sanction under section 197.
State through the CBI v. B.L. Verma, (1997) 10 SCC 772 Holds that where alleged actions by a public servant were done in purported discharge of duties, even if amounting to abuse of power, the trial court could not take cognizance in absence of sanction under section 197. The Court applied this principle to reinforce the conclusion that absence of sanction vitiates the complaint where the acts have nexus with official duty.
Abdul Wahab Ansari v. State of Bihar, (2000) 8 SCC 500 Holds that plea that sanction under section 197(1) was required can be raised at any stage of the proceedings. The Court referenced this authority to note that the petitioners could properly rely on absence of sanction even at the stage of the present applications; the Court accepted the plea and acted on it by quashing the complaint.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court addressed the two principal legal contentions raised by the petitioners: (1) that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of offences under the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act because only the Special Court could do so, and (2) that previous sanction under section 197 of the CrPC was necessary because the accused were public servants and the alleged acts had a nexus with their official duties.

On the jurisdiction issue, the Court considered the line of authorities cited by the petitioners and concentrated on the ratio in Gangula Ashok's case. The Court recorded Gangula Ashok's principle that the Special Court may take cognizance of offences under the Act only after committal by the Magistrate and that a private complaint or charge-sheet cannot be filed directly before the Special Court. Applying that principle to the facts, the Court observed that the Magistrate had issued summons to the accused and that, following appearance, the Magistrate could commit the case to the Special Court. Therefore, the issuance of summons by the Magistrate was not illegal and did not provide a ground for quashing the proceedings.

On the sanction issue under section 197 CrPC, the Court relied on several Supreme Court authorities (including State of Maharashtra v. Budhikota Subbarao, Shambhoo Nath Misra, and State through the CBI v. B.L. Verma) that articulate the mandatory nature of prior sanction where the alleged offence is committed while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duties. The Court found that the acts complained of in the present case had a reasonable nexus with the official duties of the accused persons — for example, alleged caste-related abuse by a superior and the disciplinary actions taken thereafter by other senior officers. Given that reasonable nexus, the petitioners were entitled to the protection afforded by section 197. Because no previous sanction had been obtained, the Court concluded that the complaint was vitiated.

The Court also noted the procedural availability of the contention that sanction was required: citing Abdul Wahab Ansari, the Court acknowledged that the plea regarding absence of sanction can be raised at any stage of the proceedings and therefore was appropriately considered at this stage.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The applications are allowed and Criminal Complaint Case No. 152/2000 pending before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, 5th Court, Nagpur is hereby quashed.

Implications:

  • The direct, operative consequence is that the criminal complaint in respect of the alleged offences under section 3(1)(x) and 3(2)(vii) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act read with section 500 and 34 IPC has been quashed for want of prior sanction under section 197 of the CrPC, because the Court found a reasonable nexus between the alleged acts and the accused persons' official duties.
  • The Court also clarified (by application of Gangula Ashok) that the Magistrate's issuance of summons in such cases is not per se illegal because a Magistrate may, after appearance, commit the case to the Special Court; thus the jurisdictional challenge to the Magistrate's issuance of summons was rejected.
  • No broader precedent beyond the application of established Supreme Court authorities was announced; the decision applies the existing principles (as cited) to the facts before the Court and resolves the petitioners' applications by quashing the complaint for lack of sanction. The opinion does not state that it establishes any new legal principle.

Applications allowed.
Show all summary ...

By these applications under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India issuance of summons by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, 5th Court, Nagpur for the offence punishable under section 3(1)(x), 3(2)(vii) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”) upon Criminal Complaint Case No. 152/2000 instituted by respondent No. 2 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Complainant’) has been challenged.

2. The complainant is a Sikh belonging to Mehtar caste which is a Scheduled Caste. At the relevant time he was serving as Diesel Mechanic Grade-I in South Eastern Railway, Motibagh Diesel Shed, Nagpur. Heeralal Pande, the petitioner in Criminal Application No. 2221/2003 (hereinafter referred to as accused No. 1) was serving as Sectional Engineer (Electrical). Srinivasa Kalyanaraman, the petitioner in Criminal Application No. 2524/2003 (hereinafter referred to as accused No. 2) was serving as Assistant Mechanical Engineer. Shailendrakumar Sengupta, the petitioner in Criminal Application No. 663/2003 (hereinafter referred to as accused No. 3) was serving as Senior Sectional Engineer in the same office. They were the superiors of the complainant.

3. According to the complainant, accused No. 1 knowing the caste of the complainant, used to harass the complainant on one or the other excuse and used to abuse him on caste. Despite protest by the complainant accused No. 1 did not stop humiliation to the complainant.

4. On 1-2-1999 accused No. 1 pointing to the complainant uttered following words in presence of the staff:—

“You are Mehtar by caste, I shall never listen to your complaint. You will never improve, Mehtar - Mehtar - Mehtar”

5. The complainant immediately reported the incident to one M.M Majhi, who advised him to make complaint to accused No. 2. Accordingly on 2-2-1999 the complainant made complaint to accused No. 2 who patiently heard the complainant and assured that suitable action against accused No. 1 would be taken. On 6-2-1999 the complainant lodged written complaint to accused No. 2 whereupon accused No. 2 warned him by communication dated 11-2-1999.

6. In violation of the Discipline and Appeal Rules, accused No. 3 issued charge-sheet dated 24-2-1999 against the complainant. Despite cogent explanation dated 8-3-1999 submitted by the complainant, accused No. 3 inflicted punishment on the complainant on 9-3-1999. On 5-5-1999 the complainant served notice to the accused persons calling upon them to tender unqualified apology. However they did not respond. Hence in July, 2000 the complainant filed complaint against accused Nos. 1 to 3 for the offences punishable under section 3(1)(x) and 3(2)(vii) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 read with section 500 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code. On the basis of the said complaint, the learned Magistrate issued summons to accused Nos. 1 to 3 to appear before him. The said action has been challenged by the accused persons by preferring three separate applications.

7. I have heard Shri Shyam Dewani, Advocate for the petitioners/accused Nos. 1 to 3, Shri S.S Doifode, APP for respondent No. 1.State and Shri S.T Dhurve, Advocate for respondent No. 2.complainant.

8. While assailing the issuance of summons by the learned Magistrate against accused Nos. 1 to 3, Shri Dewani, the learned counsel for accused Nos. 1 to 3, submitted that the complainant instituted the complaint only as a counter blast to the disciplinary proceedings in which he was punished. Thus the complaint is mala fide and is liable to be dismissed.

9. Shri Dewani further submitted that the learned Magistrate has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence punishable under section 3(1)(x), 3(2)(vii) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and it is only the Special Court constituted under the said Act which can take cognizance of the offences under the said Act. In support of his submission Shri Dewani relied on the following cases:

i) M.A Kuttappan v. E. Krishnan Nayanar, (2004) 4 SCC 231 ii) Vidyadharan v. State Of Kerala, 2004 (2) Mh. L.J (SC) 596 : 2004 Cri. L.J 605 (SC) iii) Arun s/o Balwantrao Mahurkar v. State of Maharashtra, 2003 (1) Mh. L.J 927 (Bombay) iv) Nana Narayan Shinde v. State of Maharashtra, 2000 (3) Mh. L.J 833 (Bombay)

10. In all the above cases Gangula Ashok v. State of Andhra Pradesh, JT 2000 (1) SC 379 : AIR 2000 SC 740 : (2000) 2 SCC 504 has been referred to.

11. The ratio of Gangula Ashok's case is that the Special Court constituted under the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 can take cognizance of the offence under the said Act only after the case is committed by the Magistrate in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. A charge-sheet or private complaint cannot be filed before the Special Court directly.

12. In the instant case after receiving the complaint the Magistrate issued summons to the accused persons to appear before him. After appearance of the accused before him the Magistrate may commit the complaint case to the Special Court for trial. Unless the case is committed by the Magistrate, the Special Court cannot take cognizance of the offence punishable under the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. Thus there is no illegality in the action of the learned Magistrate in issuing summons to the accused persons. Hence the ground put-forth by the accused persons for quashing the proceedings on this count is devoid of any force.

13. Shri Dewani, the learned counsel for accused Nos. 1 to 3, further submitted that the learned Magistrate could not have taken cognizance of the offences in the absence of previous sanction of the Central Government. Shri Dewani submitted that accused Nos. 1 to 3 were at the time of the commission of the alleged offence employed in connection with the affairs of the Union. Shri Dewani submitted that, according to the complainant, accused No. 1 abused him on caste when the complainant was working as subordinate of accused No. 1. Shri Dewani submitted that the alleged act of accused No. 1 can be said to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty and as such previous sanction under section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is necessary. In respect of accused Nos. 2 and 3 the allegations are that they protected accused No. 1 by not taking action against him. Shri Dewani submitted that this was also done by accused Nos. 2 and 3 while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of their official duties. As such previous sanction of the Central Government under section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is necessary. In the absence of such sanction the proceedings initiated by the learned Magistrate are vitiated and they need to be quashed.

14. In State Of Maharashtra v. Dr. Budhikota Subbarao., (1993) 3 SCC 339, it has been held as under:—

“So far public servants are concerned the cognizance of any offence, by any Court, is barred by section 197 of the code unless sanction is obtained from the appropriate authority, if the offence, alleged to have been committed, was in discharge of the official duty. The word ‘cognizance’ means ‘jurisdiction’ or ‘the exercise of jurisdiction’ or ‘power to try and determine causes’. In common parlance it means taking notice of. A Court, therefore, is precluded from entertaining a complaint or taking notice of it or exercising jurisdiction if it is in respect of a public servant who is accused of an offence alleged to have committed during discharge of his official duty. The mandatory character of the protection afforded to a public servant is brought out by the expression, ‘no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction’. Use of the words, ‘no’ and ‘shall’ make it abundantly clear that the bar on the exercise of power of the Court to take cognizance of any offence is absolute and complete. Very cognizance is barred. That is the complaint cannot be taken notice of.

15. In Shambhoo Nath Misra v. State of U.P, AIR 1997 SC 2102, it is held as under:—

“The essential requirement postulated for sanction to prosecute the public servant is that the offence alleged against the public servant must have been done while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties. In such a situation, it postulates that the public servant's act is in furtherance of his performance or his official duties. If the act/omission is integral to performance of public duty, the public servant is entitled to the protection under section 197(1) of Criminal Procedure Code. Without previous sanction, the complaint/charge against him for the alleged offence cannot be proceeded with the trial. The sanction of the appropriate Government or competent authority would be necessary to protect a public servant from needless harassment or prosecution. The protection of sanction is an assurance to an honest and sincere officer to perform his public duty honestly and to the best of his ability. The threat or prosecution demoralises the honest officer. The requirement of sanction by competent authority of appropriate Government is an assurance and protection to the honest officer who does official duty to further public interest.”

16. In State through the CBI v. B.L Verma, (1997) 10 SCC 772, it has been held that:

“where the actions alleged against a public servant and constituting the offences had been done in purported discharge of his duties, even though amounting to abuse of power, the trial Court could not, in absence of sanction under section 197, take cognizance of the said offences.”

17. In Abdul Wahab Ansari v. State of Bihar, (2000) 8 SCC 500, it has been held that:

“Plea that sanction was required to be obtained under section 197(1) before taking cognizance of offence can be raised at any stage of the proceedings.”

18. It may be seen that in the present case the acts complained by the complainant against the accused persons have a reasonable nexus with the official duties of the accused persons. Hence, they are entitled to protection from criminal proceedings in the absence of sanction under section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Since no sanction has been obtained by the complainant the complaint is vitiated and it needs to be quashed. Hence the order:

i) The applications are allowed.

ii) Criminal Complaint Case No. 152/2000 pending before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, 5th Court, Nagpur is hereby quashed.

Applications allowed.