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Jairaj N. Shetty v. Union Of India .

Bombay High Court
Jun 21, 2005
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Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, referred to as the workman, joined the Central Railway as a Casual Cook on April 21, 1988, working intermittently until his services ended on July 1, 1994. The dispute arose over the legality of his termination. The matter was referred to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 2, which on April 9, 1999, held that the termination was illegal and unjustified, directing reinstatement with continuity and payment of back wages. The railways challenged this award by filing a writ petition. The Single Judge allowed the writ petition on July 4, 2003, setting aside the Industrial Tribunal’s award on the ground that the workman was not in continuous service as required by law. The workman appealed against this order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the workman was in continuous service within the meaning of the relevant provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, specifically section 25-B and section 25-F, despite not having worked continuously for 240 days or 120 days in the year or six months preceding termination.
  2. The correct interpretation of "continuous service" and whether the requirement of working 240 days in the preceding twelve months is mandatory for entitlement to reinstatement and back wages under section 25-F.
  3. The applicability and scope of the Supreme Court judgment in U.P Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Co. Ltd. v. Ramanuj Yadav in determining continuous service and retrenchment benefits.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The learned counsel for the appellant argued that the Single Judge erred in construing "continuous service" to require the workman to have worked 240 days or 120 days in the preceding year or six months before termination.
  • Reliance was placed on the Supreme Court judgment in U.P Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Co. Ltd. v. Ramanuj Yadav, which clarified that the requirement of 240 days within the preceding twelve months is not mandatory for continuous service.
  • The appellant contended that the workman’s prior years of service exceeding 240 days should qualify him as being in continuous service for the purpose of retrenchment benefits.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The learned Single Judge had held that the workman was not in continuous service as he had not completed 240 days or 120 days in the relevant preceding period before termination.
  • Initially, the respondent sought time to consider the Supreme Court’s judgment but ultimately conceded that the Single Judge’s view could not be supported in light of that precedent.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
U.P Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Co. Ltd. v. Ramanuj Yadav, (2003) 8 SCC 334 Clarification on the interpretation of "continuous service" under section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, emphasizing that working 240 days in the preceding twelve months is not a mandatory requirement. Relied upon to overturn the Single Judge’s decision and restore the Industrial Tribunal’s award, holding that prior years’ service exceeding 240 days qualifies as continuous service.
Sur Enamel and Stamping Works Ltd. v. Workmen Interpreted sections 2(eee) and 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, originally requiring employment for 12 months and 240 days within that period for continuous service. Explained as the basis for amendments to section 25-B in 1964 to address anomalies in the original interpretation.
Mohan Lal v. Management Of M/S Bharat Electronics Ltd. Interpretation of clause (2)(a) of section 25-B regarding the deeming fiction of continuous service based on 240 days worked in the preceding twelve months before retrenchment. Clarified that continuous service may be deemed even if uninterrupted service is lacking, provided 240 days are worked in the relevant preceding period, but did not address the issue of prior years’ service aggregation.
Ramakrishna Ramnath v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Nagpur Requirement of enquiry into whether workman worked not less than 240 days in the twelve months immediately preceding retrenchment. Held that a workman need not show 240 days worked in every year of employment, rejecting a narrow interpretation.
U.P State Co-op. Land Development Bank Ltd. v. Taz Mulk Ansari Interpretation of clause (a) of section 6-n of the U.P Act. Distinguished as inapplicable to the present case involving section 25-B and section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the legislative history and judicial precedents concerning the definition and interpretation of "continuous service" under section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and related provisions. It noted that the original requirement that a workman must have worked 240 days in the preceding twelve months before termination was an anomaly addressed by the 1964 amendment, which introduced the concept of "preceding" twelve calendar months and a deeming fiction for continuous service.

The court relied extensively on the Supreme Court’s decision in U.P Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Co. Ltd., which clarified that a workman who has worked more than 240 days in earlier years need not have worked 240 days in the year immediately preceding termination to qualify as being in continuous service. The court found that the Single Judge erred in strictly applying the 240-day requirement to the year immediately before termination.

The court further considered the Mohan Lal judgment, which explained the application of the deeming fiction but did not support the narrow interpretation advanced by the railways. It also referred to other precedents confirming that welfare legislation should be broadly construed to protect workers’ rights and that semantic rigidity is misplaced in "bread-and-butter" statutes.

On this basis, the court concluded that the workman’s prior years of service exceeding 240 days qualified him for the benefits of continuous service and reinstatement under the Industrial Disputes Act, overriding the Single Judge’s contrary finding.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is allowed, the Single Judge’s judgment dated July 4, 2003, is set aside, and the award of the Industrial Tribunal dated April 9, 1999, is restored.

Implications: The court’s decision affirms that the requirement of working 240 days in the twelve months immediately preceding termination is not mandatory for continuous service under section 25-B and section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. This ensures that workers with substantial prior service are protected from arbitrary termination without compliance with retrenchment procedures. The workman is entitled to reinstatement with continuity and back wages, subject to the clarification that he shall not claim the remaining 50% of back wages for the period from July 1, 1994, to April 9, 1999, as he has waived that claim. The railways are directed to reinstate the workman within six weeks and pay due back wages. No new precedent beyond the clarification of existing law is established.

Show all summary ...

R.M Lodha, J.:— Heard Mr. Sandeep Marne, the learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Suresh Kumar, the learned counsel for the respondent.

2. The appellant (hereinafter to be referred as ‘the workman’) joined the service of the Central Railway (hereinafter to be referred as ‘the railways’) as Casual Cook in the Catering Section of the Commercial Department, Central Railway, Mumbai V.T on April 21, 1988. The workman worked with the railways for the period from 21-4-1988 to 30-6-1988, 7-8-1988 to 14-5-1989, 6-4-1990 to 30-6-1990, 2-5-1991 to 30-6-1991. 3-4-1993 to 30-4-1993, 16-5-1993 to 30-6-1993 and 7-4-1993 to 30-6-1994. The petitioner's services came to an end with effect from 1-7-1994. The dispute concerning the petitioner's termination was referred by the appropriate government to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 2. The Industrial Tribunal vide its award dated 9-4-1999 held that the termination of the workman was not legal and justified and directed the railways to reinstate the workman with continuity and pay him all backwages. The railways challenged the award of the Industrial Tribunal by filing writ petition. By an order dated 4-7-2003 the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition filed by the railways and set aside the award dated 9-4-1999 passed by the Industrial Tribunal. Aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge the workman is in appeal before us.

3. The reason that prevailed with the learned Single Judge in setting aside the award was that the workman was not in continuous service in the year preceding the date of termination. The learned Single Judge held that it was necessary that the workman had completed 240 and 120 clays of service during the period of one year or six months as the case may be preceding the date of termination dated 1-7-1994. On consideration of the facts, the learned Single Judge held that the workman had neither completed 240 days in a year nor 120 days in six months preceding the date of termination i.e 1-7-1994. In view thereof, the learned Single Judge held that there was no question of breach of section 25F and he set aside the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal.

4. That the learned Single Judge was not right in construing the expression ‘continuous service’ to mean that the workman must have worked for 240 days or 120 days as the case may be in the year preceding the date of termination, the learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of U.P Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Co., Ltd. v. Ramanuj Yadav, (2003) 8 SCC 334.

5. When the matter came up before the earlier Bench on May 4, 2005, the Division Bench passed the order thus:

“We have heard this matter for some time. The judgment of the Supreme Court in U.P Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Co. Ltd. v. Ramanuj Yadav, (2003) 8 SCC 334, was relied upon by the learned counsel for the workmen which prima facie supports his contention that it is not necessary to establish that the workmen has worked for 240 days during the period of 12 months preceding before the date of termination. Mr. Suresh Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the respondents states that he needs time to consider the judgment. Adjourned to 20-6-2005. Both parties agree that the appeal may be disposed of at the admission Stage itself.”

6. In U.P Drugs & Pharmaceuticals Co. Ltd., the Supreme Court discussed section 25B as existed originally and so also after amendment by the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1964. In paras 9, 10 and 11 of the report, it was held thus:

“9. The amending Act of 1964 deleted section 2(eee), having incorporated in section 25-B itself the definition of ‘continuous service’. It also brought in the concept of ‘preceding’ twelve calendar months. The earlier definition did not mention preceding with reference to the period of twelve calendar months, it appears that the decision of this Court in Sur Enamel and Stamping Works Ltd. v. Workmen interpreting Sections 2(eee) and 25-B led to the amendments made by the amending Act of 1964. In Sur Enamel interpreting Sections 2(eee) and 25-B, it was held that twin conditions were required to be fulfilled before a workman can be considered to have completed one year of continuous service in an industry. It must be shown first that the workman was employed for a period of not less than twelve calendar months and next that during those twelve calendar months, he had worked for not less than 240 days. In that case, the workman had not been employed for a period of twelve calendar months. Therefore, the Court held that it was unnecessary to examine whether actual days of work were 240 or more for in any case the requirements of section 25-B would not be satisfied by the mere fact of number of working days being not loss than 240 days. The effect was that if a workman completes actual 240 or more days of work in less than twelve calendar months, he would not be entitled to the benefit of beneficial legislation. This anomaly led to the amendment of the ID Act in the manner abovestated.”

10. Under the aforesaid legislative background, the question involved is required to be reconsidered, section 2(g) of the U.P Act does not require a workman, to avail the benefit of the deeming provision of completion of one year of continuous service in the industry, to have worked for 240 days during the ‘preceding’ period of twelve calendar months. The word ‘preceding’ has been used in section 25-B of the ID Act as incorporated in the year 1964. section 2(g) does not use the word ‘proceeding’. The concept of ‘preceding’ was introduced in the ID Act so as to give complete and meaningful benefit of the welfare legislation to the working class. The approach to be borne in mind while interpreting the welfare legislation is illustrated in Surendra Kumar Verma v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court where this Court has observed that semantic luxuries are misplaced in the interpretation of ‘bread-and-butter’ statutes. Welfare statutes must, of necessity, receive a broad interpretation. Where legislation is designed to give relief against certain kinds of mischief, the Court is not to make inroads by making etymological excursions.

11. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, relies upon Mohan Lal v. Management Of M/S Bharat Electronics Ltd. In that case, the Court was considering the scope of section 25-B of the ID Act. It was observed that in order to invoke the fiction enacted in clause (2)(a) of section 25-B, it is necessary to determine first the relevant date i.e the date of termination of service which is complained of as retrenchment. After that date is ascertained, move backward to a period of twelve months just preceding the date of retrenchment and then ascertain whether within a period of twelve months, the workman has rendered service for a period of 240 days. It was held that if these three factors are affirmatively answered in favour of the workman pursuant to the deeming fiction enacted in clause (2)(a), it will have to be assumed that the workman is in continuous service for a period of one year and he will satisfy the eligibility qualification enacted in section 25-F. In Mohan Lal case the appellant was employed with the respondent from 8-12-1973. His services were abruptly terminated by a letter dated 12-10-1974 w.e.f 19-10-1974. This Court said that it is not necessary for the purpose of clause (2)(a) of section 25-B that a workman should be in service for a period of one year. It was held that if he is in service for a period of one year and that his service is continuous service within the meaning of sub-section (1), his services would be governed by sub-section (1) and his case need not be covered by sub-section (2). Subsection (2) envisages the situation not governed by sub-section (1). Clause (2)(a) provides for a fiction to treat a workman in continuous service for a period of one year despite the fact that he has not rendered uninterrupted service for a period of one year but he has rendered service for a period of 240 days during the period of twelve calendar months counting backward and just preceding the relevant date i.e the date of retrenchment. These were the facts under which it v/as held as to how the period of 240 days was to be calculated. The decision in the case of Mohan Lal does not lay down that if a workman had worked for more than 240 days in any number of years and if during the year of his termination, he had not worked for the said number of days, he would not be entitled to the benefit of section 25-B. The question with which we are concerned was not under consideration in Mohan Lal case. If the viewpoint propounded by the management is accepted, then every year the workman would be required to complete more than 240 days. If in any one year the employer gives him actual work for less than 240 days, the service of the workman can be terminated without compliance with section 6-N of the U.P Act, despite his having worked for a number of years and for more than 240 days in each year except the last. Such an intention cannot be attributed to the U.P Act. In the present case, as already noticed, the finding of the Labour Court is that the respondents worked for more than 240 days in each year from 1983 to 1986 but not having worked for 240 days in the year of termination, the termination was held by the Labour Court not to be violative of section 6-N. Reference may also be made to the decision in Ramakrishna Ramnath v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Nagpur where this Court observed that the provision requiring an enquiry to be made to find out whether the workman has actually worked for not less than 240 days during period of twelve calendar months immediately preceding the retrenchment does not show that a workman, after satisfying the test, has further to show that he has worked during all the period he has been in service of the employer for 240 days in the year. The interpretation propounded for the appellant is wholly untenable. The decision in U.P State Co-op. Land Development Bank Ltd. v. Taz Mulk Ansari relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant has no applicability since that was a case of clause (a) of section 6-n and, therefore, section 2(g) had no relevance.”

7. Mr. Suresh Kumar, the learned counsel for the railways could not dispute that in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of U.P Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Co. Ltd., the view of the learned Single Judge could hardly be supported. He fairly stated that in the light of the judgment cited supra, the legal position is crystallised that under section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, if a workman has worked for more than 240 days in earlier years, or any one of the earlier years, he would be deemed to be in continuous service. In our view this is correct reading of U.P Drugs & Pharmaceuticals Co. Ltd. and in view thereof the judgment of the learned Single Judge has to be set aside.

8. We were informed by the learned counsel for the workman that for the period from 1-7-1994 upto 9-4-1999, the railways have deposited 50% of backwages vide order dated 7-2-2000. We are of the view that workman must be permitted to withdraw the said amount. For the remaining 50% amount of backwages for the period from 1-7-1994 to 9-4-1999, the learned counsel for the workman made the statement that workman would not claim that amount.

9. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The judgment of the learned Single Judge passed on 4-7-2003 is set aside. The award of the Industrial Tribunal dated 9-4-1999 is restored. It is clarified that the back wages for the period from 1-7-1994 to 9-4-1999 shall not be claimed by the workman as stated by his counsel before us. The amount of backwages deposited by the railways in this Court for the period from 1-7-1994 to 9-4-1999 along with accrued interest is permitted to be withdrawn by the workman.

10. We record the statement of Mr. Suresh Kumar, the learned counsel for the railways that within the period of six weeks the workman shall be reinstated and the due backwages shall also be paid within this time.

Appeal allowed.