- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Kotak Mahindra Finance Ltd. Claimants v. Mafatlal Industries Ltd.
Structured Summary of the Opinion — Khanwilkar A.M., J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The claimants (creditors) had extended a loan to the respondents under a loan agreement dated 17 October 1994 and a memorandum of hypothecation over certain equipment. Disputes led to arbitration and an arbitral award recorded by consent terms on 21 January 2000. During the arbitration/execution process a Court Receiver (High Court, Bombay) was appointed and took possession of the hypothecated equipment; the respondents were appointed as agents of the Receiver in December 1999.
Execution Application Lodging No. 270 of 2000 was disposed of on the basis of consent terms on 28 August 2000, which included payment schedules, interest provisions and default consequences (including handover of equipment to claimants). While these proceedings were pending, respondents filed Case No. 104 of 2000 before the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (B.I.F.R.) under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (SICA). The B.I.F.R. issued notices to creditors, formulated a rehabilitation scheme and ultimately sanctioned a final scheme on 30 October 2002 (with an order dated 16 January 2003 also referenced).
The sanctioned scheme made a specific provision for the claimants (a secured term liability of Rs. 63,00,000 as reflected in the scheme), and the respondents had paid sums to the claimants before the final scheme (Rs. 486,96,037.12 between 15 December 1998 and 31 July 2002) but made no payments thereafter in conformity with the final scheme. Claimants protested before the B.I.F.R. but the scheme was sanctioned. Respondents filed the present chamber summons seeking a declaration that the claimants' rights are governed by the sanctioned B.I.F.R. scheme (dated 30 October 2002 read with order 16 January 2003) and that they are not entitled to recover further amounts under the earlier consent terms; respondents also sought discharge of the Court Receiver and handover of the hypothecated equipment.
The claimants resisted the chamber summons on grounds of maintainability and on merits, relying on earlier case law and contending the consent decree remained enforceable until satisfied.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, in the circumstances of this case, the rights of the claimants are governed by the sanctioned scheme dated 30 October 2002 (read with the order dated 16 January 2003), such that the claimants are not entitled to recover any further amounts from the respondents under the consent terms dated 20 January 2000 and 31 July 2000.
- Whether the chamber summons filed by the respondents is maintainable in the executing Court (invoking section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure) even though the execution application had been disposed of earlier.
- Whether, and to what extent, provisions of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (notably sections 18(8), 19(2), 22(1), 26 and 32) operate to bind creditors and to preclude the civil court from entertaining reliefs that would effectively challenge or undermine a scheme sanctioned by the B.I.F.R.
Arguments of the Parties
Claimants' Arguments
- The chamber summons is not maintainable because the execution application was already disposed of on 28 August 2000; the executing court should not entertain additional proceedings in the disposed execution matter.
- Having agreed to disposal of the execution by consent terms, the respondents cannot later contend that the claimants are not entitled to recover amounts under those consent terms.
- Reliance was placed on precedent (Kadia Distilleries Ltd. and other authorities) to support the proposition that section 22(1) of SICA does not apply to execution of a consent decree and that the consent decree remains enforceable.
- So long as the decree has not been satisfied in accordance with Order XXI, Rule 2 C.P.C., the decree remains enforceable against the respondents; there is nothing on record showing satisfaction of the decree.
- Reference to section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was invoked (as part of the broader submission) in relation to the finality/assailability of arbitral awards/decrees recorded in consent terms.
Respondents' Arguments
- The chamber summons is maintainable as a remedy under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure because it raises questions relating to the execution or satisfaction of the decree, and such questions can be considered by the executing Court even after the execution application has been disposed of.
- The B.I.F.R. proceedings under SICA were properly initiated and the sanctioned final scheme (30 October 2002) was formulated after notice to the claimants; the claimants either expressly consented to the initial proposal (with a reservation on cut-off date) or were deemed to have consented to the final scheme under section 19(2) SICA (no response within the prescribed period).
- On a conjoint reading of sections 18(8), 19(2) and 32 of SICA, the sanctioned scheme is statutorily binding on creditors (including the claimants) and crystallises their claims in accordance with the provisions of the scheme — consequently the claimants cannot recover outside the scheme.
- Clause 10 of the consent terms (which conditions payment upon disbursement under a revival package) is inapplicable because the final scheme contains no provision for disbursement of amounts by financial institutions; therefore the triggering event for Clause 10 did not arise.
- The claimants had an available remedy before the B.I.F.R. (they in fact filed an application in Case No. 104 of 2000 seeking recall/modification of the scheme and permission under section 22(1) to execute the decree) and therefore the civil court should not entertain a collateral challenge to the scheme in exercise of its jurisdiction.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Kadia Distilleries Ltd. v. Appellate Authority for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction, 2002 (109) Com. Cas. 444 (Madhya Pradesh High Court) | Held that provisions of section 22(1) of SICA were not attracted to execution of a consent decree and that a consent decree was not to be displaced by section 22 of SICA. | Cited by the claimants. The court recorded the reliance but concluded that the decisions pressed on behalf of the claimants were not of avail in the present case because the specific question before this Court was not the same as in the cited authorities. |
| Industrial Development Bank of India v. Nira Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd., 1992 (1) Bom. C.R. 693 : 1994 (79) Com. Cas. 811 | Principle that properties in the custody of a Court Receiver become custodia legis and that, where such custody exists, section 22 SICA may not apply to displace that custody; defendants were holding as agents of the Receiver. | Cited by the claimants. The court noted the authority but held that the issue in the present case was different and that the precedent did not assist the claimants on the principal question before this Court. |
| ICICI Limited v. Alpine Industries Ltd., 1999 (3) Bom. C.R. 771 | Addressed the effect of registration of a reference with B.I.F.R. in relation to property which is custodia legis. | Cited by the claimants. The court observed the decision but concluded that the principles there were not decisive for the present question and thus were not of assistance to the claimants in this context. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in two principal analytical strands: (A) the maintainability of the chamber summons under section 47 C.P.C., and (B) the substantive effect of the B.I.F.R. sanctioned scheme under SICA on the claimants' ability to enforce the consent decree.
A. Maintainability:
- The Court observed that the chamber summons was properly characterised as a remedy referable to section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure because it raised a question between parties to proceedings in which a decree had been passed relating to the execution or satisfaction of that decree. Section 47's expansive provision permits the executing Court to consider such questions.
- The fact that the execution application had been disposed of earlier was not a bar to the present chamber summons because, under the claimants' own argument, the decree had not in fact been satisfied as required by Order XXI, Rule 2 C.P.C., so the question of execution/satisfaction remained live.
B. Effect of the B.I.F.R. Sanctioned Scheme under SICA:
- The Court identified the principal question as whether the claimants' rights were now governed by the sanctioned scheme dated 30 October 2002 (and order 16 January 2003), thereby precluding any further recovery under the earlier consent terms.
- Relying on the statutory language and interplay of provisions, the Court analysed sections 18(8), 19(2) and 32 of SICA:
- Section 18(8) — a sanctioned scheme, from its coming into operation, becomes binding on the sick company, transferee (if any), shareholders, creditors and guarantors.
- Section 19(2) — a scheme circulated to persons required to provide financial assistance is subject to deemed consent if no reply is received within the prescribed period; the claimants either expressly consented to the initial proposal (with a reservation only as to cut-off date) or were deemed to consent to the final scheme for failure to respond within the stipulated time.
- Section 32 — SICA and schemes framed under it have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent in other laws; thus a sanctioned scheme can override conflicting provisions of other laws insofar as inconsistency exists.
- On that basis the Court concluded that the final sanctioned scheme crystallised the claim of the claimants against the respondent company in accordance with the provisions of the scheme and that the scheme was statutorily binding on the claimants as creditors. The Court emphasised that a creditor could recover further amounts only if the scheme itself provided for it or if the scheme were suitably modified, including by the B.I.F.R. in exercise of its powers (for example under section 22 if appropriate).
- The Court further observed that entertaining the claimants' grievance in the civil court would, in effect, be a collateral attack on the correctness of the scheme sanctioned by the B.I.F.R., which is foreclosed by section 26 of SICA (barring civil court jurisdiction on matters the Board/Appellate Authority is empowered to determine and precluding injunctions in respect of actions under SICA).
- Specific contractual provision (Clause 10 of the consent terms) relied upon by the claimants — which required repayment within six months if a revival package was sanctioned — was held to be inapplicable because the final scheme made no provision for disbursement of amounts by financial institutions; consequently the triggering condition for Clause 10 did not arise.
- The Court also noted that the claimants had in fact filed a substantive application before the B.I.F.R. (Case No. 104 of 2000) seeking recall/modification of the scheme and/or permission under section 22(1) to proceed with execution, and that such remedies before the statutory authority were the appropriate avenue for the claimants' grievances.
- Although the claimants relied upon precedents to support the enforcement of the consent decree, the Court found that those authorities did not directly address the precise question arising here and were therefore not decisive.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The Chamber Summons filed by the respondents is allowed and made absolute in terms of prayer Clauses (a) and (b).
Explicit reliefs granted:
- Declaration that the rights of the claimants are governed by the sanctioned scheme dated 30 October 2002 read with the order dated 16 January 2003 and that the claimants are not entitled to recover any further amounts from the respondents under the consent terms dated 20 January 2000 and 31 July 2000.
- Discharge of the Court Receiver, High Court, Bombay (appointed in the award/arbitration and execution proceedings), with directions to hand over formal possession of the hypothecated equipment back to the respondents.
Consequential and procedural directions:
- No order as to costs was made.
- The operation of the order was stayed for a period of six weeks from the date of the judgment to enable the claimants to take the matter in appeal, if so advised.
- The Court expressly confined its decision to the principal legal question relating to execution or satisfaction of the decree and stated that observations in the judgment should not influence the ongoing proceedings before the B.I.F.R. or other proceedings between the parties.
Broader implications: The Court did not purport to set a new general precedent beyond the application of the cited SICA provisions to the facts before it; the direct effect is that, on these facts, the sanctioned B.I.F.R. scheme governs the claimants' entitlement and precludes enforcement outside the scheme unless and until the scheme is modified or the statutory authority grants permission otherwise.
Khanwilkar A.M, J.:— By this chamber summons, the respondents pray for declaration that the rights of the claimants are governed by the sanctioned scheme dated 30th October, 2002 read with order dated 16th January, 2003 and are not entitled to recover any further amounts from the respondents under consent terms dated 20th January, 2000 and 31st July, 2000. The respondents further pray that the Court Receiver, High Court, Bombay, appointed as Receiver in the award/arbitration proceedings and execution proceedings be discharged, with directions to hand over formal possession of the hypothecated equipments back to the respondents.
2. The claimants had extended loan facility to the respondents, in respect of which loan agreement dated October 17, 1994, was executed between the parties. Besides the loan agreement, memorandum of hypothecation of equipments, belonging to the respondents, was also executed. As dispute arose between the parties, the matter was referred to sole arbitrator, who, in turn, passed Arbitral Award on 21st January, 2000 as per the consent terms signed by the parties. The claimants had filed Arbitration Petition No. 359 of 1999, in which Court Receiver was appointed as per order dated 29th October, 1999. The Court Receiver took possession of the subject property and appointed the respondents as agents of the Court receiver in December, 1999. The above factual position is not in dispute. However, after the Arbitral Award was passed by the sole arbitrator, in February 2000 Case No. 104 of 2000 came to be filed before the B.I.F.R at the instance of the respondents under the provisions of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as SICA for the sake of brevity). While the said proceedings were pending, Execution Application Lodging No. 270 of 2000 came to be filed by the claimants in this Court, which, however, was disposed of, again on the basis of consent terms on 28-8-2000, clause 8-a of the consent terms provides that the respondents do pay to the claimants amount specified therein together with further interest at the rate of 21% per annum on the reducing balance from 1st July, 2000 till the date of actual payment and/or realisation thereof, on or before the dates and in the manner set out in the schedule appended thereto as Exhibit 2-A. Clause 8-B provides that the respondents do pay to the claimants the Indian Rupees equivalent of US Dollar 315,040.50, together with further interest thereon at the rate of six month London Inter Bank Offer Rate (LIBOR) plus 3.665 percentage points per annum on the reducing balance from 15th May, 2000, on or before the dates and in the manner set out in the schedule annexed as Exhibit 2-B. It further provides that the Indian Rupee equivalent shall be worked out on the basis of the prevailing exchange rate as on the relevant dates of payment and/or realisation. Clause 10 of the said consent terms provides that the respondent is ordered and directed that if a revival package for the respondent is sanctioned by B.I.F.R, the respondent do pay to the claimants the entire balance of the decretal amount outstanding as on that date, within a period of 6 (six) months from the date of disbursement of amounts under such revival package. It is apposite to make reference to Clause 16 of the said consent terms, which reads thus:
“It is further ordered that if any of the aforesaid default is committed or occurred, then in that event.
(i) the entire decretal amount together with further interest as provided herein till the date of payment and/or realisation thereof (less the amounts paid if any after the date hereof), shall become forthwith payable by the respondent to the claimants and the respondent do pay the same to the claimants; and
(ii) Without preceding to the other rights and remedies of the claimants including right and remedy to recover and receive from the respondent the amount mentioned in sub-clause (i) hereinabove, the Court Receiver, High Court, Bombay is ordered to forthwith take actual physical possession of the hypothecated equipment (described in the Schedule being Exhibit “A” to the Statement of Claim) and hand over the same to the claimants and on such handing over of the hypothecated equipment to the claimants, the Court Receiver, High Court, Bombay shall stand discharged without passing any accounts and the claimants shall be entitled to sell and/or otherwise transfer the hypothecated equipment (described in the schedule annexed as Exhibit “A” to the statement of claim) to such persons, in such manner and at such price as the claimants may deem fit and receive and appropriate the proceeds thereof in the following manner:
(a) firstly towards the costs, charges and expenses relating to the sale/transfer of the equipment and
(b) secondly towards the amount due and payable by the respondent to the claimants and the decree shall be marked partly satisfied accordingly.
Provided that the claimants shall not sell the hypothecated equipment, if the respondent pays all the amounts due and payable by them to the claimants within a period of 15 days after the date on which notice of sale is received by the respondent from the claimants.
(iii) Without prejudice to the other rights and remedies of the claimants including right and remedy to recover and receive from the respondent the amounts mentioned in sub-clause (i) hereinabove and right to sell the hypothecated equipment and appropriate the sale proceeds as mentioned in sub-clause (ii) hereinabove, the claimants shall be entitled to proceed with the above execution proceedings for the recovery of balance amount due.”
3. After the Execution Application was disposed of on the basis of the aforesaid consent terms on 28-8-2000, the proceedings before the B.I.F.R continued further in which the claimants, being creditor, was given notice pursuant to which the claimants by a letter placed on record its agreement for the proposal mooted in respect of the respondent company, but expressed reservation only with regard to cut off date to be changed to March 31, 2001. This position is reflected in the minutes of the joint meeting held on September 24, 2001 at page 61. Having regard to the stand taken on behalf of the claimants and other creditors etc., with regard to the proposal of revival of the respondent company and their respective claim qua the respondent company, the scheme came to be framed. Again second notice was issued to the claimants. However, the claimants did not participate in the joint meeting held on August 21, 2002, as is reflected from the minutes at page 72. Since the claimants did not respond to the notice given regarding the proposal of rehabilitation, it was deemed that consent has been given by the claimants. Eventually, final scheme has been sanctioned by the B.I.F.R vide order dated October 30, 2002. Insofar as the claim of the claimants against the respondent company, the same is adverted to by the B.I.F.R in the sanctioned scheme as can be discerned from Clause 5.1 A, but no provision for default has been provided, as has been done in respect of another secured credit, I.L.F.S, in terms of Clause (viii) of the said para. It is not in dispute that the respondents have paid sum of Rs. 486,96,037.12 from time to time from 15th December, 1998 till 31st July, 2002. No payment has been made by the respondents to the claimants after the final scheme has been framed by the B.I.F.R, as referred to above, which makes provision for total sum of Rs. 63,00,000/- only insofar as the claimants is concerned, being secured term liabilities as can be discerned from Appendix III at page 123. It is relevant to advert to the letters sent by the claimants dated October 8, 2002, at pages 75 and 76 respectively, inter alia, making grievance that consent order has been passed in favour of the claimants and the company was expected to honour its commitment under the said consent terms. Although this grievance was placed on record before the B.I.F.R, the B.I.F.R proceeded to formulate the scheme on 30th October, 2002, as referred to above. It is in this backdrop the present application has been filed by the respondents for declaration and further relief, as referred to above.
4. This chamber summons is resisted by the claimants on the ground that the application is not maintainable and moreover, the relief as claimed cannot be granted by this Court.
5. Insofar as the objection regarding maintainability of the present chamber summons is concerned, it is contended on behalf of the claimants that as the execution application has already been disposed of on 28-8-2000, the question of entertaining this chamber summons in the disposed of execution application does not arise. This submission has been rightly countered by the respondents by contending that the chamber summons is obviously referable to remedy under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. There is substance in the argument that in view of the expansive provision contained in section 47 of the code, the chamber summons as filed is obviously maintainable, because it raises question between the parties to the proceedings in which decree has been passed, which is relating to the execution or satisfaction of the decree. Such question can be considered exclusively by the Court executing the decree. The fact that the execution application has been finally disposed of is no impediment in considering the present chamber summons, because, going by the arguments of the claimants, it is obvious that the decree has not been satisfied in terms of requirements of Order XXI, Rule 2, C.P.C In that sense, the question relating to the execution of the decree or satisfaction of the decree does arise and has been raised by way of the present chamber summons filed by the respondents.
6. Indeed, the Counsel appearing for the parties made submissions with regard to several aspects and placed reliance on the documents on record, but, in my opinion, the principal question that needs to be addressed is: Whether the rights of the claimants are now governed by the sanctioned scheme and they are not entitled to recover any further amounts from the respondents, much less under the consent terms dated 20th January, 2000 and 31st July 2000? According to the claimants, the respondents having agreed for disposal of the execution application by filing consent terms cannot be heard to say that the claimants are not entitled for recovery of amounts as per the consent terms entered into between the parties. Reliance was placed on the Division Bench decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court reported in 2002 (109) Com. Cas. 444 (Kadia Distilleries Ltd. v. Appellate Authority for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction)1. In the said decision, it has been held that the provisions of section 22(1) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisional) Act, 1985, were not attracted to the execution of a consent decree, even though such decree was technically a decree within the meaning of section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure and was also executable. It is relevant to note that in that case respondent was not party to the B.I.F.R proceedings and his request for impleadment was rejected. However, after the order was passed by the Board declaring the petitioner therein as sick company and calling upon it to submit a rehabilitation scheme, that was challenged by the respondent in appeal wherein it was held that section 22 of the SICA cannot be invoked to resile from the consent decree passed by the Court. On that view, the Appellate Authority allowed the respondent to execute the decree against the assets of the petitioner company, which view is upheld by the High Court in the facts of that case. Reliance is then placed on the decision of this Court reported in 1992 (1) Bom. C.R 693 : 1994 (79) Com. Cas. 811 (Industrial Development Bank of India v. Nira Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd.)2. In that case, the Court rejected the plea of the defendants that the Court Receiver appointed by the Court cannot be continued in view of the subsequent reference made to B.I.F.R The Court held that the properties in question became custodia legis and the defendants were holding those properties only as agents of Receiver. The Court has found that the date on which the B.I.F.R passed orders, the defendants had no independent possession of the suit properties in their own rights as lawful owners thereof and for which reason, section 22 of the SICA did not apply. Reliance is also placed on the decision of this Court reported in 1999 (3) Bom. C.R 771 (ICICI Limited v. Alpine Industries Ltd.)3, which deals with the issue as to what is the effect of registration of reference with B.I.F.R in relation to property, which is custodia legis.
7. The above arguments have been, in my opinion, rightly countered by the Counsel for the respondents on the argument that in the present case, it cannot be disputed that the arbitration proceedings, as also the execution application, has been disposed of on the basis of consent terms entered into by the parties. However, the proceedings before the B.I.F.R under the provisions of the SICA were initiated and scheme for rehabilitation of the respondent company has been framed therein. That has been done after following necessary procedure, including by issuing notice to the claimants. Indisputably, the claimants initially consented for the original proposal with reservation only regarding the cut off date. The consent obviously was in context of the provision relating to the claim of the claimants in the proposed scheme of (sic) it is on that basis the scheme for rehabilitation of the respondent company came to be formulated by the B.I.F.R, the claim of claimants would get crystalised as per the said scheme. This is so having regard to the mandatory of law, as can be spelt out on conjoint reading of section 18(8), section 19(2) and section 32 of the SICA. Section 18(8) is a provision regarding preparation and sanction of schemes, which postulates that on and from the date of coming into operation of the sanctioned scheme any provision thereof, the scheme or such provision shall be “binding” on the sick industrial companies and the transferee company or, is the case may be the other company and also on the shareholders, “creditors” and guarantors and employees of the said companies. The scheme so formulated is statutorily binding on the claimants, because, in the present case, rightly contended on behalf of the respondents, in the first scheme as formulated, in fact; and, in the final scheme dated 30th October, 2002, in law, the claimants have consented thereto. Section 19(2) postulates that every scheme referred to in that section shall be circulated to every person required by the scheme to provide financial assistance for his consent within a period of sixty days from the date of such circulation or within such further period, not exceeding sixty days, as may be allowed by the Board, and if no consent is received within such period or further period, it shall be deemed that consent has been given. As mentioned earlier, when the first scheme was formulated, the claimants gave express consent with reservation only regarding the cut off date, as stated in the minutes dated 24th September, 2001. That was consent, in fact. Whereas, before the final scheme was framed, no response was given by the claimants within the specified time, as is mentioned in the minutes dated 21st August, 2002. This is consent in law in view of the deeming fiction envisaged in section 19(2) of the SICA. It is not the case of the claimants that the proposed scheme was not circulated to it at all. Understood thus, the scheme crystallises the claim of it claimants qua the respondent company in terms of the scheme and the provision made therefore in the scheme and the same is statutorily binding on the claimants. It is only if the scheme was to be suitably modified so as to make further provision for the claim of the claimants, it would become entitled to recover further amount commensurately. It is also possible to take the view that if the B.I.F.R was to grant permission to the claimants under section 22 of the SICA to proceed with the execution, even then the claimants may become entitled to recover further amounts as per the decree of the Court, having participated in the process of finalisation of the scheme notwithstanding. The authority while considering the request to grant consent under section 22 of the SICA or modify the scheme can legitimately consider the grievance of the claimants that the sickness claimed by the respondents post decree is or is not an induced sickness and a stratagem to resile from its own commitments already consciously made.
8. Be that as it may, section 32 of the SICA expressly provides that the provisions of SICA and of any Rules or “schemes” made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force, Understood thus, on conjoint reading of sections 18(8), 19(2) and 32 of the SICA, the final scheme formulated by the B.I.F.R in respect of the respondent company not only binds the claimants, but its claim as against the respondent company is crystallised in accord with the provision made in the said scheme for that purpose.
9. As mentioned earlier, the claimants had registered its protest on record before the B.I.F.R while the final scheme was being formulated, making reference to arbitration proceedings between the parties and the consent terms and the agreements arrived at, as expressed in the consent terms duly signed and accepted in Court. Inspite of the said representation, the final scheme has been formulated making provision in respect of the claim of the claimants being creditors. If the grievance of the claimants were to be entertained in this Court, that would virtually amount to entertaining an argument questioning the correctness of the scheme framed by the B.I.F.R in exercise of the powers under the SICA. To my mind, such a course is not open in view of the express bar provided in section 26 of the SICA which provides that an order passed or proposal made under the Act shall be appealable except as provided therein and “no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of any matter which the Appellate Authority or the Board is empowered by, or under, this Act to determine” and no injunction shall be granted by any Court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act. In my opinion, if the grievance of the claimants as it were to be is one of wrongful exclusion of their claim in the scheme finally made, such a grievance can be considered only by the specified authority in terms of SICA.
10. On the above reasoning, to my mind, none of the decisions pressed into service on behalf of the claimants will be of any avail. The question that arises for my consideration was obviously not in issue in any of the abovesaid decisions.
11. I also find substance in the argument canvassed on behalf of the respondents that the claimants cannot be permitted to agitate the above grievance before this Court, especially when the claimants have already filed proper application before the B.I.F.R in Case No. 104 of 2000 praying for the following reliefs:
“(a) recall its order dated 30th October 2002 read with order dated 16th January, 2003, insofar as it relates to the applicant;
(b) order and direct the company to make provision for the repayment of the entire decretal amount outstanding in accordance with the order dated 28th August 2000 of the Hon'ble High Court, Bombay;
(c) to declare the sanctioned scheme as failed in the event the company fails to provide and pay the entire decretal amount outstanding as per Prayer (b) above;
(d) in any event and without prejudice to Prayer (a), (b) and (c) above, grant immediate permission under section 22(1) of the Act, if found to be required, to proceed with the execution of its decree as per the order dated 28th August, 2000 passed in the matter of consent terms dated 31st July, 2001;
(e) to pass a speaking and reasoned order with respect to the prayers contained in Clauses (a) to (d) above; and
(f) for such other order/s and direction/s as it deems appropriate in the facts and circumstances of the case.”
12. On the above reasoning, the principal question that arises in the present case as to whether the claimants is governed and bound by the sanctioned scheme and is not entitled to recover any further amounts from the respondents under consent terms dated 20th January, 2000 and 31st July, 2000 will have to be answered in the affirmative in favour of the respondents.
13. The Counsel for the claimants had placed reliance on Clause 10 of the consent terms filed in execution application, which provides that if a revival package for the respondent company is sanctioned by the B.I.F.R, the respondent would be required to pay to the claimants the entire balance of the decretal amount outstanding as on that date within a period of six months from the date of disbursement of the amount under such revival package. I find substance in the argument of the respondent that the said clause could be of avail to the claimants only if the final scheme (revival package) was to provide for disbursement of amounts by the financial institution. In the present case, however, the final scheme, as formulated by the B.I.F.R, makes no provision for disbursement of amounts by financial institutions. Understood thus, the liability of the respondents to pay the entire balance of the decretal amount cannot be said to have arisen on account of this clause. In any case, for the reasons already mentioned above, having regard to the mandatory provisions of SICA, the final scheme binds the claimants being creditor and it cannot be permitted to set up claim for recovery of any further amount, as no such provision has been made in the scheme.
14. Counsel for the claimants vehemently contended that so long as the decree is not satisfied in the manner provided by the provisions of Order XXI, Rule 2, C.P.C, such a decree was enforceable against the respondents in law. It was his submission that there is nothing on record to show that the decree as passed in terms of consent terms has been satisfied by the respondents. It was argued that this Court ought not to countenance the situation that the decree passed by competent Civil Court is rendered into a paper decree, having regard to the fact that the same was passed when the proceedings before the B.I.F.R were pending and the respondents consciously agreed for the disposal of the execution application inspite of the pendency of those proceedings under SICA. Moreover such plea is untenable in view of the mandate of section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Indeed, it is not the case of the respondents that the decree in terms of consent terms has been satisfied by them. It is also not the case of the respondents that the Arbitral Award in excess of the amounts specified in the final scheme be set aside. To my mind, although the argument raised on behalf of the claimants seems to be attractive, however, for the reasons already recorded earlier, that the final scheme would bind the claimants being creditor, it would not be entitled for any further claim save and except provided for in the scheme as framed or to be modified in future, having regard to the mandate of provisions contained in SICA, the argument deserves to be rejected. Understood thus, in the present case, the fact that the decree passed by the Competent Court has not been satisfied or that it was a consent decree will be of no avail, because the claimants would be entitled to recover amounts only in conformity with the provision made in the final scheme or such or further order to be passed by the authority under the SICA. No more and no less.
15. As the principal question has been answered in favour of the respondents, as a necessary consequence, the respondents will be entitled also for the relief in terms of prayer Clause (b), because it is seen from the record that the respondents have already paid to the claimants amount, which is much more than the amount provided for and payable to the claimants in the final scheme.
16. While parting, it is made clear that none of the observations made in this judgment ought to influence the proceedings taken out by the claimants before the B.I.F.R or any other or further proceedings between the parties filed or to be instituted hereafter, inasmuch as I have confined this decision to the principal legal question that was raised before me relating to the execution or satisfaction of the decree.
17. Accordingly, this Chamber Summons is made absolute in terms of prayer Clauses (a) and (b), which read thus:
“(a) For a declaration that the rights of the claimants are governed by the sanctioned scheme dated 30th October, 2002 read with Order dated 16th January, 2003 and are not entitled to recover any farther amounts from the respondent under consent terms dated 20th January, 2000 and 31st July, 2000.
(b) That the Court Receiver, High Court, Bombay appointed Receiver in the above award/arbitration proceedings and Execution proceedings be discharged with directions to hand over formal possession of hypothecated equipments back to the respondents.”
18. No order as to costs. At this stage, Counsel for the claimants prays that the operation of this order be suspended for some time to enable the claimants to take the matter in appeal, if so advised, I think the request is reasonable. Accordingly, operation of this order is stayed for a period of six weeks from today.
19. All concerned to act on duly authenticated copy of this decision to be issued by the Court Stenographer/Associate of this Court.
20. Order accordingly.
Alert