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Mulraj Jayantilal Sheth v. Governor, Reserve Bank Of India, Bombay And Another

Bombay High Court
Apr 29, 2003
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Judgment Summary — R.M. Lodha, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, a senior citizen, filed a writ petition seeking issuance of a writ of mandamus or other directions to the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and the Government of India to ensure that banks revise low saving deposit interest rates (described in the petition as "paltry 4% or 4.5%") and pay at least 12% interest on deposits. The petitioner also sought directions restraining banks from penalising depositors who fail to maintain the banks' self-determined minimum balances. The petitioner's case was grounded in the submission that RBI, under section 35-A of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, is the regulatory authority with power to decide interest rates and banking policy in the interest of the public and depositors.

The petition was supported by argumentation from the petitioner's counsel (Mr. M.B. Kotak) emphasizing constitutional and social-welfare duties towards senior citizens and the poor, and citing several cases. RBI filed an initial counter-affidavit and a later supplementary affidavit explaining the rationale for the existing savings deposit rate and the monetary policy context. The court heard submissions, analysed relevant statutory provisions (sections 5(ca) and 35A of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949), considered precedent on judicial deference in economic regulation, and disposed of the writ petition and a Civil Application treated as part of the writ petition. The court ordered no costs and expedited certified copy.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Court, in writ jurisdiction under Article 226, may direct the RBI and Government to fix a specific higher interest rate (12%) for bank deposits and restrain banks from imposing penal charges for falling below self‑determined minimum balances.
  2. Whether the RBI's formulation and specification of "banking policy" and its exercise of powers under section 35A of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 are amenable to judicial interference on the grounds advanced by the petitioner (i.e., whether the policy is patently arbitrary, discriminatory or mala fide).
  3. Whether the constitutional duty of the State (and the regulatory authority) to promote social welfare of senior citizens provides a legal basis for judicial direction altering monetary/banking policy or interest rates fixed by the monetary regulator.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • It is the constitutional duty of the State to undertake social welfare for the aged; India lacks adequate social security and medical care for the aged, many of whom live below the poverty line.
  • RBI and policy‑makers must ensure reasonable interest rates for bank deposits because many senior citizens depend on deposit interest for livelihood; current rates (4%–4.5%) are inadequate and exploit depositors.
  • Banks should be restrained from imposing penalties when depositors fail to maintain arbitrarily fixed minimum balances.
  • Relied on multiple precedents (e.g., State of Haryana v. Darshana Devi; Sovintorg (India) Ltd. v. SBI; Panjikaran Paulose Joseph v. Kusum Vithal Patil; Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji; M.S. Grewal v. Deep Chand Sood) to argue public duty and the judiciary's role to remove injustice and meet social aspirations.

Respondent (RBI) Arguments

  • Fixation of savings account interest rate is determined by RBI in tune with monetary and credit policy, and takes into account monetary and credit conditions and the overall banking scenario.
  • Given the deregulated interest rate environment and recent reductions in government small savings schemes, there was a case for deregulation; however, RBI considered it inopportune to deregulate savings account rates immediately because most savings deposits are held by households (including rural and semi‑urban) and deregulation might reduce rates harming small depositors.
  • The then effective yield of 3.4% was argued to be reasonable relative to other short‑term instruments and marginally higher than the average inflation rate (3.34% for 2002–03).
  • International comparisons and desire for global competitiveness justify comparable interest rates; monetary policy objective includes imparting greater flexibility to interest rate structure; nominal rates had fallen in line with global trends.
  • Reduction in small savings rates by the Government and linkage of those rates to average yields of Government securities in secondary market were explained; bankers themselves had expressed views that savings deposit rates should be reduced or deregulated, but RBI refrained from full deregulation to protect small depositors.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State Of Haryana v. Darshana Devi (Smt) & Others, 1979 ACJ 205 Cited by petitioner to support the proposition that branches of the State must make rules to effectuate legislation meant to help the poor. The court noted this citation but later stated that the judgments relied upon by the petitioner did not have direct relevance to the specific questions in the writ petition.
Sovintorg (India) Ltd. v. State Bank Of India, New Delhi, 1999 CCJ 1142 Relied on by petitioner in support of claim for higher award of interest. The court observed that the judgments cited by the petitioner, including this one, did not have direct relevance to the issue of interest rates fixed by the monetary regulator.
Panjikaran Paulose Joseph v. Kusum Vithal Patil, 1993 ACJ 242 Authority for the proposition that liability to pay interest lies on those who have had the use of money legitimately belonging to claimants. The court treated this citation as relating to interest in claim cases and not directly relevant to regulatory fixation of savings deposit rates.
Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107 Cited by petitioner to support the judiciary's role in removing injustice and responding to social needs. The court referred to this case among others cited but concluded none had direct bearing on the RBI's policy decisions regarding interest rates.
M.S. Grewal v. Deep Chand Sood, 2001 ACJ 1719 Used by petitioner to buttress the point that courts exist for society and must meet social aspirations. The court noted the citation but found it not directly relevant to the monetary/regulatory question before it.
R.K. Garg v. Union of India, (1981) 4 SCC 675 : AIR 1981 SC 2138 Principle that laws relating to economic activities should attract greater judicial deference; courts should be self‑restrained in economic regulation matters. The court relied upon this case to explain the need for judicial deference to legislative and executive judgment in economic regulation and applied that principle to the RBI's policy decisions.
More v. Doud, (1956) 354 US 457 Quoted (via R.K. Garg) for the proposition of judicial self‑restraint and deference in utilities, tax and economic regulation cases. The court reproduced the observation to justify judicial deference in economic policy matters and to caution against substituting judicial preferences for policy judgments.
State of M.P. v. Nandlal, (1986) 4 SCC 566 : AIR 1987 SC 251 Extends deference principles to executive action in economic matters; judicial interference permissible only if decision is patently arbitrary, discriminatory or mala fide. The court applied this yardstick to the RBI's policy and held that the policy did not meet the threshold for interference (not patently arbitrary/discriminatory/mala fide).
Metropolis Theatre Company v. State of Chicago, (1912) 57 L Ed 730 Cited for the point that governmental decisions in practical matters may justify rough accommodations and that what is best is not always discernible. The court invoked the underlying theme to support judicial restraint in complex economic matters.
Permian Basin Area Rate cases, (1968) 20 L Ed (2d) 312 Referenced for the proposition that governmental pragmatic adjustments are permissible in regulation. The court used this as part of the broader jurisprudential basis for deferring to policy decisions in economic regulation.
Quinn v. Leathern, 1901 A.C. 495 Authority for the proposition that a case is only authority for what it actually decides. The court invoked this to caution that the cases cited by the petitioner should not be read beyond their actual holdings; the court concluded those cases did not control the regulatory issues in the petition.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first identified and set out the statutory provisions central to the petition: the definition of "banking policy" in section 5(ca) and the power of the Reserve Bank to give directions under section 35A of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. The definition of "banking policy" was emphasised as a policy formulation exercise by the Reserve Bank that must have due regard to depositors' interests, volume of deposits, resources of banks, equitable allocation and efficient use of resources.

The court analysed the petition through the lens of established precedent requiring judicial deference in matters of economic regulation. It relied upon R.K. Garg and State of M.P. v. Nandlal (among other authorities quoted) for the principle that courts should show restraint and grant a "measure of freedom" to the executive or policy‑making authorities in complex economic matters. The court reiterated that while legislation or executive action affecting civil rights might invite closer judicial scrutiny, laws and executive decisions relating to economic regulation call for greater latitude and deference because they are often empirical, contingent and involve expert judgment.

Applying that yardstick, the court examined the RBI's affidavit and supplementary affidavit detailing the monetary and credit policy considerations: the deregulated interest environment, the recent decline in government small savings rates, concerns about household depositors (including rural and semi‑urban holders), the effective yield of savings accounts relative to short‑term instruments and inflation, and the RBI's apprehension that deregulation could drive savings rates below a level that protects small depositors.

The court concluded that the RBI's formulation and exercise of banking policy under section 5(ca) and the directions power under section 35A could not be characterised as patently arbitrary, discriminatory or mala fide. The RBI had taken into account the factors listed in section 5(ca) and relevant monetary considerations. Consequently, the court held that it would not, in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226, re‑weigh or substitute its view for the RBI's policy judgment on interest‑rate fixation.

The court accepted that senior citizens dependent on interest income suffered under a low interest regime but observed that that problem is one for policy makers to address. The court also stated that the individual precedents cited by the petitioner related to interest in claim cases and did not bear directly on the question of interest rates fixed by the monetary regulator.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition and the Civil Application (treated as part of the writ petition) were DISPOSED OF.

Immediate consequences: The court refused to issue directions compelling the RBI or Government to mandate payment of a specific higher interest rate (such as 12%) or to restrain banks from imposing penal charges for minimum‑balance breaches. The petition was not allowed; no costs were awarded; a certified copy was to be expedited.

Broader implications: The court reaffirmed the principle of judicial deference in economic and monetary policy matters—interference is warranted only if the policy or executive action is patently arbitrary, discriminatory or mala fide. The opinion does not purport to establish a new precedent displacing this principle; rather, it applies established jurisprudence to decline interference with the RBI's policy choices. The court expressed a hope that policy makers would address the welfare concerns of senior citizens, but noted that the remedy lies with the policy‑making authorities rather than through the judicial rewriting of regulatory policy.

Order: "With the aforesaid observations, we dispose of the writ petition and Civil Application as well. No costs. Certified copy expedited." — Order accordingly.

Show all summary ...

R.M Lodha, J.:— The petitioner is a senior citizen. In this writ petition his prayer is for issuance of writ of mandamus or order or direction to the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and Government of India to ensure that the banks revise their paltry 4% or 4.5% interest rates and pay at least 12% interest on the deposits. The petitioner also prays that the said respondents be refrained from penalising the deposits when they cannot maintain bank's self-determined minimum balance. The aforesaid prayers are sought in view that RBI is regulatory authority for the banks under section 35-A of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 and it has authority to decide interest rates and banking policy in the interest of public and depositors.

2. Mr. M.B Kotak, the learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously and vehemently argued before us that the social welfare is the constitutional duty of the State. In India no welfare work is done for ageds except retiring them from work and making them dependent upon others. There is no social security system. Old aged is refuge of variety of illnesses. Forty per cent of the ageds in India live under poverty line. The medical care for aged is almost negligible. The number of senior citizens in India exceeds 7.5 crore. In this background, it is the constitutional duty and obligation of the regulatory authority like RBI and policy makers to ensure that reasonable rate of interest is given by the banks on the deposits. It is also contended by Mr. M.B Kotak, the learned counsel for the petitioner that by not giving adequate and reasonable interest on the deposits, the banks are virtually exploiting the depositors. He would urge that the bank must not be allowed to penalise the account holders if their balance falls below minimum balance which is arbitrarily fixed by them.

3. Mr. M.B Kotak placed reliance on State Of Haryana v. Darshana Devi (Smt) & Others 1979 ACJ 205 in support of his submission that it is a public duty of each branch of the State to obey the rule of law and uphold the tryst with the Constitution by making rules to effectuate legislation meant to help the poor. He pressed into service Sovintorg (India) Ltd. v. State Bank Of India, New Delhi, 1999 CCJ 1142 in support of his submission for higher award of interest. He also cited Panjikaran Paulose Joseph v. Kusum Vithal Patil, 1993 ACJ 242 wherein it was held that the liability to pay interest is upon those who had have had the use of money which legitimately belonged to the claimants. In support of his submission that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical ground, but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Mr. M.B Kotak referred to Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107. He also referred to M.S Grewal v. Deep Chand Sood, 2001 ACJ 1719 to buttress his point that law Courts exist for the society and they have an obligation to meet the social aspirations of citizens and law Courts must also respond to the needs of the people.

4. In response to the writ petition, initially counter affidavit was filed by RBI on 4-7-2002, but later on supplementary affidavit was filed on 25-4-2003. By way of reply affidavits. RBI has submitted that fixation of interest rate of savings bank accounts is in tune with the monetary and credit policy and the policy statements. The interest rate is fixed taking into account not only the monetary and credit situation of the country but also the banking scenario at large. In the monetary and credit policy announced on 29-4-2002 it was observed that in view of the present deregulated interest rate environment and the reduction in interest rates on Government's small savings schemes in the recent period, there is an apparent case for deregulation of interest rates on savings account also. However, considering the fact that bulk of such savings deposits are held by households, including households in rural and semi-urban areas, it is not considered as opportune time to deregulate the interest rate on savings account for the present. In any case, the present effective yield of 3.4 per cent is quite reasonable in relation to other prevailing interest rates on short-term instruments. It is submitted that keeping in mind the interest of small depositors, the present saving deposit rate is fixed marginally higher than the average inflation rate of 3.34 per cent for 2002-03. Giving the details of select international interest rates, it is submitted by the RBI that Indian economy to be globally competitive, it is desirable that interest rates in India are comparable to interest rates in other major low inflation countries. The RBI submitted that one of the objectives of monetary policy in India is to impart greater flexibility to the interest rate structure in the medium term. In line with monetary easing measures and also the declining trend of inflation rate worldwide, nominal interest rates has fallen in India. It is submitted that Government of India has reduced the small savings rates during the recent years. These rates are currently linked to the average yields of the Government securities of corresponding maturities that are traded in the secondary market. It is submitted by the RBI that one of the reasons for relatively modest decline in short term deposit rate relate to the implicit floor-set by the savings deposit rate. Most of the bankers in the regular meetings with the RBI felt that saving deposit rate should be either reduced or deregulated. In the opinion of RBI complete deregulation of saving deposit rate is not considered appropriate as it may go below the rate stipulated by the RBI and thereby adversely affect the small depositors. Therefore, an adjustment of saving deposit rate was due in view of decline in interest rates in the economy in general. The present interest rate on savings deposit rate is well aligned with those of small savings deposits and other short term deposit rates.

5. It is no doubt true that petitioner has raised a very vital issue concerning bank depositors generally and aged and senior citizens in particular. The question is: is it the domain of the Court in such matters.

6. Banking Regulation Act, 1949 is the Act to consolidate the law relating to banks and to provide nature of transactions that can be carried on by the banks in India. Since the entire thrust of the petitioner's argument is based on sections 5(ca) which defines banking policy and section 35A that deals with the power of RBI, we deem it proper to first refer to the said provisions. Section 5(ca) defines “banking policy” thus:—

“(ca) “banking policy” means any policy which is specified from time to time by the Reserve Bank in the interest of the banking system or in the interest of monetary stability or sound economic growth, having due regard to the interests of the depositors, the volume of deposits and other resources of the bank and the need for equitable allocation and the efficient use of these deposits and resources;”

7. Section 35A deals with the power of RBI. It reads thus:

“Power of the Reserve Bank to give directions.— (1) Where the Reserve Bank is satisfied that —

(a) in the public interest; or

(aa) in the interest of banking policy; or

(b) to prevent the affairs of any banking company being conducted in a manner detrimental to the interests of the depositors or in a manner prejudicial to the interests of the banking company; or

(c) to secure the proper management of any banking company generally;

it is necessary to issue directions to banking companies generally or to any banking company in particular, it may, from time to time, issue such directions as it deems fit, and the banking companies or the banking company, as the case may be, shall be bound to comply with such directions.”

8. There cannot be any dispute that RBI is monetary regulator and it forms banking policy. Such banking policy is specified by RBI from time of time in the interest of banking system or monetary stability or sound economic growth. While formulating banking policy, RBI gives due regard to the interest of deposits and other resources of the bank and need for equitable allotment and efficient use of these deposits and resources. The ‘banking policy’ as the definition itself suggests is in the nature of policy. It is formulated by the Reserve Bank keeping in view: i) interest of depositors, ii) volume of depositors, iii) other resources of the bank, iv) need for equitable allocation, v) efficient use of these deposits and resources. We are afraid while sitting in the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 this Court would not examine the merits of policy to find out that there could have been better policy and interfere with such policy. Banking policy requires economic and fiscal expertise. The experts who are qualified to address the issue relating to interest rate on bank deposits take into consideration the norms and parameters suggested in section 5 (ca). On matters affecting policy and those requiring expertise, the Court should show deference to interfere unless such policy is contrary to statutory provisions, arbitrary or otherwise unconstitutional. In R.K Garg v. Union of India, (1981) 4 SCC 675 : AIR 1981 SC 2138, constitution bench of the Apex Court was examining constitutional validity of Special Bearer Bonds (Immunities and Exemptions) Act, as well as Special Bearer Bonds (Immunities and Exemptions) Ordinance. The Apex Court observed that the laws relating to economic activities should be viewed with greater latitude than laws touching civil rights such as freedom of speech, religion etc. The Court should feel more inclined to give judicial deference in legislative judgment in the field of economic regulation than in other areas where fundamental human rights are involved. The Apex Court referred to More v. Doud, (1956) 354 US 457 where Frankfurter, J. in his inimitable style observed thus:—

“In the utilities, tax and economic regulation cases, there are good reasons for judicial self-restraint if not judicial deference to legislative judgment. The legislature after all has the affirmative responsibility. The Courts have only the power to destroy, not to reconstruct. When these are added to the complexity of economic regulation, the uncertainty, the liability to error, the bewildering conflict of the experts, and the number of times the judges have been overruled by events self-limitation can be seen to be the path to judicial wisdom and institutional prestige and stability.”

In the backdrop of the aforesaid observations of Frankfurter, J., the Apex Court went on to observe:

“The Court must always remember that “legislation is directed to practical problems, that the economic mechanism is highly sensitive and complex, that many problems are singular and contingent, that laws are not abstract propositions and do not relate to abstract units and are not to be measured by abstract symmetry” that exact wisdom and nice adoption of remedy are not always possible and that “judgment is largely a prophecy based on meager and uninterpreted experience.”

9. What was said by the Supreme Court while considering the legality and constitutionality of the laws relating to the economic activities was equally applied to the matters challenging executive action in the field of economic activities by Apex Court. In the State of M.P v. Nandlal, (1986) 4 SCC 566 : AIR 1987 SC 251, the Supreme Court observed thus:—

“What we said in that case in regard to legislation relating to economic matters must apply equally in regard to executive action in the field of economic activities, though the executive decision may not be placed on as high a pedestal as legislative judgment insofar as judicial deference is concerned. We must not forget that in complex economic matters every decision is necessarily empiric and it is based on experimentation or what one may call ‘trial and error method’ and, therefore, its validity cannot be tested on any rigid ‘a priori’ considerations, or on the application of any strait jacket formula. The Court must while adjudging the constitutional validity of an executive decision relating to economic matters grant a certain measure of freedom or ‘play’ in the “joints” to the executive. “The problem of Government” as pointed out by the Supreme Court of the United States in Metropolis Theatre Company v. State of Chicago, (1912) 57 L ed 730 “are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations, illogical, it may be, and unscientific. But even such criticism should not be hastily expressed. What is best is not discernible, the wisdom of any choice may be disputed or condemned. Mere errors of Government are not subject to our judicial review. It is only its palpably arbitrary exercise which can be declared void”. The Government, as was said in Permian Basin Area Rate cases, (1968) 20 L ed (2d) 312, is entitled to make pragmatic adjustments which may be called for by particular circumstances. The Court cannot strike down a policy decision taken by the State Government merely because it feels that another policy decision would have been fairer or wiser or more scientific or logical. The Court can interfere only if the policy decision is patently arbitrary, discriminatory or mala fide. It is against the background of these observations and keeping them in mind that we must now proceed to deal with the contention of the petitioner based on Article 14 of the Constitution.”

10. Applying the aforesaid yardstick, we are afraid, the banking policy framed by RBI and under challenge before us, cannot be said to be patently arbitrary or discriminatory or mala fide. Nor can it be said that the RBI has not taken into consideration diverse factors such as interest on deposits, value of deposits, resource of the bank, need for equitable allocation, efficient use of such deposits and resources, decline in interest rates in economic yield of Government Securities of corresponding maturities and low interest rates in other major low inflation countries, while formulating the banking policy. The very fact that the RBI has not acceded to demand of various banks for non deregulation of interest rates, itself suggests that RBI has had due regard to the interest of depositors. RBI apprehends that in the event deregulation of interest rate is made, interest rate on saving deposits may still go low. Interest of depositors thus, has been kept in mind. In the regime of liberalized economy, if policy makers, to make Indian market competitive and comparable with global market, have gone in for soft interest rates, they must have freedom to play in the joints. All in all the power conferred upon RBI to give directions under section 35A cannot be said to have not been exercised in public interest or in the interest of banking policy. It is true that senior citizens who are dependent on interest income have been victims of low interest regime and because of lack of social security and health care have suffered substantially, but this problem has to be addressed by policy makers and early it is done, better it is. We fervently hope that the concerned authorities shall address this issue for welfare of large number of ageds and senior citizens in the country.

11. We do not find it necessary to refer to the judgments cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners individually as in our considered view none of those judgments has direct relevance or bearing on the questions raised in this writ petition. We remind ourselves of the classic statement of the Privy Council in Quinn v. Leathern, 1901 A.C 495 that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides and not what seems to logically follow from it. The judgments referred to, relied upon and cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners relate to controversy raised therein concerning interest in claim cases and has nothing to do with the interest rate fixed by monetary regulator.

12. We may also observe that while hearing the writ petition, we have taken into consideration the amendments proposed by the petitioner in the Civil Application treating it as part of the Writ Petition.

With the aforesaid observations, we dispose of the writ petition and Civil Application as well. No costs. Certified copy expedited.

Order accordingly.