S.J Vazifdar, J.:— The plaintiffs have filed this suit to restrain the defendant from using the mark “PIZZA HUT” or any other mark similar thereto as part of its corporate name/trading style and from using, upon or in relation to any business relating to restaurants and food products the said mark or the “PIZZA HUT” logo or any other mark/logo similar thereto and from infringing the plaintiffs statutory rights in the PIZZA HUT logo/PIZZA HUT mark which are either registered or pending registration. The plaintiffs have also claimed a perpetual order and injunction restraining the defendant from using the said mark and logo in any manner in relation to any business or food products sold/served by the defendant so as to pass off or enable others to pass off the said good/business as and for that of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have further prayed that the defendant be directed to change its corporate name/trading style so that the mark PIZZA HUT does not form a part thereof. Finally the plaintiffs have sought a decree for damages and in the alternative a decree for accounts.

2. The plaintiffs have taken out the above Notice of Motion for the usual interim reliefs in relation to an action for infringement and passing off. Plaintiff No. 1, Pizza Hut International, L.L.C and plaintiff No. 2, Pizza Hut Inc., are corporations incorporated under the laws of the United States of America. Plaintiffs No. 3 Tricon Restaurants (India) Pvt. Ltd., is a Private Company limited by shares incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956. Plaintiff Nos. 1 and 3 are subsidiaries of Tricon Restaurants International.

3. Plaintiff No. 3 is authorised by the Government of India to set up, run and operate Pizza Hut and KFC Restaurants in India through self-owned and franchised outlets.

4. The defendant is a Private Company limited by shares incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956. The authorised share capital of the defendant is Rs. 5,00,000/-. However, the paid up capital of defendant is only Rs. 2,000/-. The main objects for which the defendant has been incorporated include carrying on the business of manufacturing, exporting, importing and dealing in all types of processed food including pizzas.

5. The defendant proposes to engage itself in the same field of activity as the plaintiffs. This is evident from its Memorandum of Association that lists the following as one of the objects for which the defendant was incorporated:—

“To carry on business of manufacturers, exporters, importers and deal in all types of processed food, pizza, canned food stuff, fruits, vegetables, spices, pickles, confectionery, sweet meat, jams, jelly and other food, agro products of every description whether for human, animal or poultry or piggery consumption.”

6. The trade mark PIZZA HUT, written in its distinctive style/lettering with the word HUT below the word PIZZA and a hat above and covering the words, is registered under Registration No. 483960-B under Class 29 of Schedule IV which pertains to meat, fish, poultry and game not being live and vegetables all being preserved, dried or cooked, edible oils and edible fats. The registration is however subject to the condition/disclaimer that it shall give no right to the plaintiff to the exclusive use of the word “PIZZA”. The registration is subsisting.

7. The plaintiffs had applied for registering the above trade mark in Class 30 relating to Pizzapies, preparations made from cereals for food for human consumption, bread and non-medicated confectionery. The application bearing No. 483959 has been accepted for advertisement in the Trade Marks Journal and after the suit was filed, the trade mark was registered.

8. By their applications dated 5-2-1996 the plaintiffs applied for registering the trade mark PIZZA HUT (words per se) in classes 29 and 30. The above applications are pending before the Registrar of Trade Marks.

9. The above applications were made by plaintiff No. 2. Consequent upon a world-wide assignment of rights in the marks/logo, plaintiff No. 1 made an application to the Registrar of Trade Marks to record its name as the subsequent proprietor of the registrations and applications for registration in India and abroad. The said applications are pending.

10. At this stage it would be convenient to set out the manner and extent to which the aforesaid marks/logo have been used by the plaintiffs.

11. The plaintiffs case is that the marks/logo are internationally famous and have been adopted and used by the plaintiffs/their predecessors in title at least since 1958 in relation to the Pizza Hut chain of restaurants and sale of Pizza Hut food products.

12. In over 120 countries the plaintiffs/their predecessors in title have either had the marks registered or have applied for registration thereof. In over 115 countries, the plaintiffs have had the PIZZA HUT logo registered or have applied for registration thereof.

13. It is not necessary to refer to all the countries in the list. It is important to note however that the list includes countries such as Australia, countries from the Middle East (including Dubai, Saudi Arabia and the UAE) and Europe (including France, Germany, Switzerland and Greece), Canada, Singapore, Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia, Mauritius, New Zealand, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Thailand, United Kingdom and United States of America. In about twenty countries in the list, Pizza Hut Restaurants were opened in or prior to 1981.

14. Residents of this country, have been for years travelling and continue in large numbers to travel to these countries. There is considerable trade between these countries necessitating Indians travelling there for business. Thousands of Indians are also employed or study in these countries. It would be safe to presume that almost all of them would visit India frequently with their families.

15. The growth of the plaintiffs restaurant business over the years is equally impressive. In 1980 the plaintiffs sales were to the tune of US $ 945,100,000. By 1994 the sales had increased to 6,794,000,000- a growth of almost 700 per cent in 14 years.

16. Between 1981 and 1984 the plaintiffs spent internationally almost 50,00,000 US Dollers towards advertising expenses for promoting the PIZZA HUT chain of restaurants and PIZZA HUT food products. In the affidavit in support of the Notice of Motion, the plaintiffs have annexed the relevant extracts from the annual report of the plaintiffs for the years 1987 to 1997 which indicates the success of the PIZZA HUT chain of restaurants and products. The plaintiffs have also referred to various articles and newspapers reports which have referred to the plaintiffs business.

17. Considering both, the countries as well as the number of countries in which the plaintiffs have been doing business as well as the extent of such business, I have little hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the plaintiffs enjoy a worldwide reputation including in India. Indians travelling abroad for whatever reason must have come across the plaintiffs restaurants and its products in one way or the other. The plaintiffs reputation was established in India long before they actually started doing any business in India.

18. For an entirely different purpose, Mr. Chitnis invited my attention to a judgment of the Federal Court of Australia in the case of (TGI Friday's Australia Pty Ltd. v. TGI Friday's INC)1, 45 I.P.R 43, which I did not find to be of any assistance to the defendant's case as the judgment turned on its own peculiar facts. There is however a passage in the judgment which assists the plaintiffs in establishing its reputation and goodwill in India long before it actually commenced any business in India. At page 47 of the report, the Full Bench observed:—

“I have mentioned the ubiquitousness of the applicant's restaurants or those of its franchisees. It does not matter that developments saw a need to promote the brand name in Australia. I may be permitted to know of the importance of brand marketing in modern commerce. The very size of chain, both the number of sites and sales volumes, will readily permit an inference to be drawn as to its reputation. There are, of course, many brand names, such as say XXXX, which are well known in one country for one product and in another for a very different product. But in this case the evidence of overseas visits by a number of Australians allows me to be satisfied that the TGI Fridays restaurants have acquired a not insignificant reputation in Australia.”

(emphasis supplied).

19. It is now settled law as far as this Court is concerned, that if the plaintiffs' trade marks/logos enjoy a transborder reputation, they are entitled to be protected against infringement and passing off in India.

20. In (Aktiebolaget Volvo v. Volvo Steels Limited)2, 1998 P.T.C 18 a Division Bench of this Court held that transborder reputation is recognised by Indian courts and that actual sale in India is not necessary for a plaintiff to establish its goodwill and reputation in India. The Division Bench cited with approval the following observation of the judgment of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in the case of (N.R Dongre v. Whirpool Corpn.)3, reported in 1996 P.T.C 476:—

“Thus a product and its trade name transcends the physical boundaries of a geographical region and acquires a trans-border or overseas or extra-territorial reputation not only through important of goods but also by its advertisement. The knowledge and the awareness of the goods of a foreign trader and its trade mark can be available at a place where goods are not being marketed and consequently not being used.”

21. The decision of the Supreme Court confirming the decision in (N.R Dongre v. Whirpool Corpn.)4, reported in 1996 (16) P.T.C 583.

22. Trans border reputation may be developed in any manner. I do not read the judgments as having laid down that trans-border reputation is developed only by goods being advertised in India. There are a variety of ways in which trans-border reputation may be developed in India even though the goods may not actually be sold in India. Even if the plaintiffs restaurants and food products are not advertised in India, the plaintiffs have developed a trans-border reputation in India for the reasons and in the manner aforesaid.

23. In 1993 with the approval of the Government of India, plaintiff No. 3 was incorporated as a wholly owned subsidiary of plaintiff No. 2. Plaintiff No. 3 commenced business in India and opened PIZZA HUT outlets in Bangalore, Delhi, Jaipur, Pune, Agra and Chandigarh between June, 1996 and May, 1998. The outlets are located centrally including in the hub of the commercial and tourist areas of these cities. It is unnecessary to set out in detail the gross sales figures in each of these outlets every year. Suffice it to say that the business is in several crores of rupees.

24. The defendant, on the other hand, has not commenced business in India. The only step taken by the defendant was to have itself incorporated and registered under the Companies Act, 1956, in 1990.

25. Dr. Virendra v. Tulzapukar, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs submitted that the words “PIZZA HUT” are an essential feature of their registered trade marks/logo. Dr. Tulzapuarkar further submitted that the defendant by including in its corporate name the words “PIZZA HUT” infringed the plaintiffs' trade marks/logo. Both the submissions are well founded.

26. The words “PIZZA HUT” are an essential feature of the corporate names of plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2. The essential feature of the corporate name of the defendant is also the words “PIZZA HUT”. The other words “India”, “Private” and “Limited” whether taken together or individually can hardly be said to be an essential feature in the defendant's corporate name.

27. (a) Equally well founded is the second limb of his argument viz. that the use of anothers trade mark in a corporate name or trading style amounts to infringement.

28. (b) In support of this submission Dr. Tulzapuarkar relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of (Poddar Tyres Ltd. v. Bedrock Sales Corporation Limited)5, reported in 1993 (1) Bom. C.R 505 : A.I.R 1993 Bom. 237. The plaintiffs therein were the proprietors of various registered/unregistered trade marks in most of which the word “Bedrock” formed a prominent part. The first defendant company was in the same line of business as the plaintiffs and had the potential to be a trade rival of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs called upon the defendants to desist from using the name “Bedrock” as a part of their trading name and style and to apply to the Registrar of Companies for a change in their name. It was contended on behalf of the plaintiffs that the adoption of the word “Bedrock” as a part of corporate name of the first defendant constituted an act of infringement of the plaintiffs trade mark. B.N Srikrishna, J., (as His Lordship then was) observed in paragraphs 24 and 36 as under:—

“24…….. In the instant case, it is not disputed that a part of the corporate name of the first defendants is identical with the registered trade mark “Bedrock”, of which the plaintiffs are the registered proprietors. Thus, prima fade, there is infringement of the plaintiffs' registered trade mark “Bedrock”, unless the first defendants are entitled to succeed by invoking the exception in section 34 or on any other ground that they urge.”

36. ….. I, am, therefore, unable to accept the contention of the first defendant that, by their purportedly selling exclusively “Bedrock” goods, they are entitled to adopt the word “Bedrock” as a part of their company name or trading style. That they have done so is not really disputed. In my view, therefore, there is both infringement and passing off action, prima facie.”

29. (c) Dr. Tulzapurkar also relied upon the judgment in the case of (Kirloskar Diesel Recon Ltd. v. Kirloskar Proprietary Ltd.)6, 1996 (2) Bom. C.R 642 : A.I.R 1996 Bom. 149 where Jhunjhunuwala, J., held as under:—

“9. ….The very definition of trade mark includes mark and the very definition of mark includes name and as such the terms trade mark in section 105(c) of the Act must, therefore, be considered to be a comprehensive term including within itself ‘trade name’ under which articles, goods etc., are sold. What is necessary is connection or nexus between the mark used in relation to the goods and the person claiming a right to use the same.”

30. (d) Dr. Tulzapuarkar's reliance upon the judgments is well founded as they clearly apply to the present case. I am bound by and in respectful agreement with their Lordships' judgments. I would only venture to add that to hold to the contrary would frustrate and enable dishonest traders to frustrate, one of the main object of the Act-to protect the rights of proprietors in their trade marks. For instance even if the defendant opens a restaurant or sells its products under a different name the mere mention of the corporate name of the defendant at the premises or on the containers of the food products is itself likely to deceive and cause confusion.

31. (e) Thus the defendant, by using the essential feature viz., the words “PIZZA HUT” in its companies name, has committed an act of infringement, as contemplated under section 27 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958.

32. In the circumstances, the defendant has committed an act of infringement of the plaintiffs' registered trade marks and will have committed an act of infringement on the registration of the plaintiffs trade marks/logo which are at present pending registration.

33. Mr. R. Chitnis, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the defendant stated that the defendant would apply for rectification of the register to have the registration of the plaintiffs' trade marks cancelled. Be that as it may, the same does not prevent this Court from considering an application for interlocutory reliefs. See A.I.R 1993 Bombay 237 (41).

34. Dr. Tulzapuarkar further submitted that the defendant's acts also constitute the tort of passing off.

35. I have already dealt with the aspect of the plaintiffs reputation throughout the world including India.

36. We have also seen that if the defendant commences business, it will be in the same field of activity as the plaintiffs. The probability of confusion and deception is thus inherent. There is not only a likelihood but an almost certainty that in most cases the members of the public are likely to be deceived and confused into believing that the restaurants and the goods of the defendants, as and when the defendants commences business, are run and manufactured by the plaintiffs or at the very least that the same are connected with the plaintiffs pursuant either to a joint venture, license, franchise, agency or such other business association or connection.

37. The plaintiffs have further established, at least prima facie, that their chain of restaurant whether owned, franchised or licensed by their food products adhere to very high standards of quality control and supervision. Very high standards of quality, cleanliness, service and facilities are maintained by them. To maintain these standards the plaintiffs have developed specifications and processes which are communicated to the outlets. The plaintiffs thus enjoy a very high reputation and goodwill throughout the world including India. The trade marks/logo have become distinctive of and are exclusively associated with the plaintiffs. There is nothing brought to my notice which indicates the contrary.

38. It is obvious that any one would connect the trade mark PIZZA HUT and PIZZA HUT logo with the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs are more than justified in believing that if any one came across the defendant's corporate name either on food products or a restaurant, they would consider the same as belonging to and/or franchised by the plaintiffs. That this would constitute misrepresentation hardly requires any argument. That the same would cause enormous damage to the plaintiffs, is equally obvious. The defendants' paid up capital is only Rs. 2,000/-. Apart from having the company incorporated the defendant has done nothing. If the defendant commences any business and the quality of goods and the services provided by it are not up to the same standard as that of the plaintiffs, which is highly probable, the customers are bound to attribute the same to the plaintiffs. Moreover, if the defendant goes into liquidation for any reason any publicity to that effect would reflect upon and adversely affect the plaintiffs reputation.

39. In (Taco Bell Corporation v. Taco Bell)7, 2000 (1) P.L.R 197 the plaintiff brought an action for infringement and passing off. The plaintiff had a chain of restaurants named Taco Bell selling maxican food. They operated over 6000 restaurants worldwide using the trade mark Taco Bell and the Taco Bell logo in different versions. The trade mark Taco Bell and Taco Bell logo were registered in more than 17 countries including India in classes 29 and 30. The plaintiffs there alleged that their restaurants were visited by Indians during their visits abroad and that the same were also known in India by means of media publicity and advertisements in leading international magazines and journals. On finding that the defendants also sold fast food under the name Taco Bell, the plaintiffs brought an action for infringement and passing off. A.P Shah, J., rejected as absurd, the explanation given by the defendants for adopting the word Taco Bell. The defendants there alleged that on a perusal of the dictionary he came across the word ‘Taco’ which means maxican food in folded or rolled tortilla which rang the bell prompting the defendants to adopt the word Taco Bell. The learned Judge held that the intention was to trade upon the famous marks of the plaintiffs.

40. I do not have any hesitation in coming to the conclusion that in the present case also the defendants sole intention was to trade on the plaintiffs well established and worldwide reputation and famous marks/logo.

41. It is pertinent to note that the defendant has not even attempted to explain how or why it adopted the words ‘PIZZA HUT’. This, despite the fact that the plaintiffs in their affidavit in rejoinder categorically stated that the defendants had failed to offer any explanation for its adopting the words PIZZA HUT as part of its corporate name. I must say to its credit that the defendant has not filed a false affidavit to the effect that it was not aware of the existence of the plaintiffs business and marks/logo. The defendant candidly admitted in its affidavit in reply that the plaintiffs were not in existence in India and at the time when there was an absolute ban/restriction on foreign companies from either enter into and/or operating in India it had itself incorporated in 1990. No real ban existed. At least none has been shown to me though I am not sure that the existence of a ban at a given point of time would have altered the situation.

42. Mr. Chitnis, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the defendants, submitted that the plaintiffs are not entitled to an injunction as the defendants had used the trade mark for almost ten years before the plaintiff filed the present suit.

43. Mr. Chitnis, submitted that the fact of incorporation itself constitutes a use of the words PIZZA HUT. Counsel addressed me on what constitutes use of a trade mark. In the facts of this case, I find it unnecessary to go into any detailed consideration of what constitutes use of a trade mark. Whatever it may be in a given case or in relation to other laws, mere incorporation cannot possibly constitute the use of the words as a trade mark. A non-registered use acquires a proprietary right in a mark only when the goods are available in the market. Admittedly, the defendant has not commenced any business. The defendant, therefore, has no right at all in the mark PIZZA HUT.

44. In its affidavit in reply, the defendant has alleged that it had conducted extensive research as to the scope of the mark and potential of the said business. No particulars have, however, been furnished to establish this. There is not even a statement on affidavit as to the nature or scope of the research. Neither is there any statement regarding the expenses incurred by the defendants for the same. It is difficult to imagine, without anything more, that a company with a paid up capital of Rs. 2,000/- had the funds to finance such research. I do not suggest that the paid up capital of the company is the only source of funds available to it but then no other source of funds available to it has been indicated by the defendant.

45. It is further alleged that the defendant scouted for, identified and negotiated the acquisition of premises for conducting its business, but that on account of disputes and differences which arose in 1991 between the partners of the firms/companies who were the owners of the premises, the “ambitious much planned and awaited project” of the defendants could not take off as planned. In an attempt to establish that the defendants had carried on some activities since 1990, the defendants have made the following totally untenable statements:—

“The defendants also scouted for suitable premises in several parts of Bombay and after a search, identified such premises and negotiated for acquisition thereof. However on account of disputes and differences which arose in 1991 between the partners of the firms/companies who were the owners of such premises including inter alia appointment of Official Liquidator, High Court, Bombay, the ambitious much planned and awaited project of the defendants could not take off as planned and was temporarily stalled till the said disputes could be resolved and which the defendants were assured from time to time was imminent. After the resolution of the said disputes, the defendants once again continued the said negotiations for setting into operation the fast food outlets.”

46. Once again there are no particulars in support of these allegations. But let me assume that they are true. It would make no difference. If the partners of the prospective vendors had disputes inter se, nothing stopped the defendants from acquiring other premises. If indeed the defendant had, and to use its words, “ambitious, much planned and awaited project”, it is inconceivable that it would not have scouted for other premises. Further the defendants say that due to the disputes between the vendor inter se it temporarily stalled its “ambitious much planned and awaited project”. What exactly does the defendants mean by the term “temporarily”? Surely, nine years is not a temporary stalling of an “ambitious much planned and awaited project” and we are left wondering as to the outcome of the alleged continued negotiations after the resolution of the said disputes. The defendant has said nothing of that. The case I am afraid is, to put it midly, untenable.

47. Mr. Chitnis relied upon paragraph 20 of the judgment in the case of (Reliance Industries Ltd. v. Reliance Polycrete Ltd.)8, 1997 (17) P.T.C 581, where Variava, J., (as His Lordship then was) held as under:—

“20. Further the defendants have been using the word “Reliance” as its corporate Name as well as a Trade Mark since 1991 at least. The figures of sales shown by the defendants indicate that these defendants also have a fairly large sale and their products are widely advertised. The plaintiff company which claims to be such a big company could hardly have not noticed these advertisements for all these years. Even presuming they did not, still the fact remains that not a single instance of deception or confusion could be pointed out. Also it is not the plaintiff's case that the defendants have dishonestly adopted the name or the mark.”

48. The judgment is clearly distinguishable on facts. In that case by 1990 there were in existence 167 Joint Stock Companies with the name “Reliance” as their corporate name. In the telephone directory itself there were more than 92 companies and firms with the name ‘Reliance’ as the corporate/firm name. The word Reliance had either been registered as a trade mark or applications for registration of the word Reliance as a trade mark had been made in as many as 50 countries. The learned Judge found on facts that there was no material or evidence to show that the word reliance was associated by the public only with the plaintiffs or its group in all fields of activities. It was further held that the defendants were not manufacturing or selling any items manufactured by the plaintiffs company. Moreover, and this is important, an undertaking was given on behalf of the defendants that it would only manufacture its good for personal consumption and that the same would not be sold in the market under the mark Reliance. The Court accepted the undertaking and held that was sufficient protection.

49. In the case before me the plaintiffs field of activity and the defendants proposed activity are not merely similar but identical. The defendants have not even commenced any business. There are no other companies, at least to the knowledge of the parties with the firm name including the words PIZZA HUT. The present case is clearly distinguishable on facts on all material aspects.

50. (a) Mr. Chitnis also relied upon the following observations of S.H Kapadia, J., the case of (Cluett Peabody & Co. Inc.… v. Arrow Apparals….)9, 1998 (18) P.T.C 156:—

“It is true that the defendants should have inspected the register before putting the mark to use in 1985, but as pointed out by the learned Counsel for the defendants, the goods were never in use in India and, therefore, user from 1985 by the defendants cannot be treated as dishonest. In the present case, the order passed by this Court is not based on abandonment or acquiescence on the part of the plaintiffs. This order is only based on the footing that user of the mark by the defendants from 1985 till 1997 has affected the nature of relief and it is for this reason that this Court is not inclined to grant injunction because it would totally disrupt the organized business of the defendants in India. It is true that registration of the mark confers proprietary rights even if the mark is proposed to be used and it is not actually used but if the mark is registered and it is not prima facie used for thirty years, then the Court should be slow in granting injunction.”

51. (b) Dr. Tulzapurkar mentioned that the matter has been carried in appeal. That, however, would make no difference. The judgment is binding on me.

52. (c) However, this judgment is also clearly distinguishable on facts.. The facts of this case are actually converse to the facts in the case before us. In that case, as the above extract indicates, the plaintiffs goods were never used in India. Further in that case the defendant had been using the marks for twelve years. This, the Court held, affected the nature of the reliefs and the Court was not inclined to grant an injunction as it would totally disrupt the organised business of the defendants in India. The plaintiff there had its marks registered for 30 years but never used the same. There was no evidence of when the reputation of the mark travelled to India. In the case before as there is.

53. (d) That the judgment has no application to the present case is further clear from paragraph 31 of the judgment which reads as under:—

“The object of the Trade Marks Act is to protect the proprietary right of a registered trademark holder. However, if the mark is registered and not used for thirty years, depending on the facts, prima facie, it becomes a source of monopoly which is not the object of the Act. Just as the right of customers or the purchasers of the goods are required to be protected so also traders who are in business over a long period of time, cannot be harassed by threat of litigation by registered proprietors, particularly when after registration, they have not used the mark for long period. In the present case, prima facie, I am satisfied that there is no user of the mark in India, particularly when there is no evidence of the date on which the reputation of the mark travelled into India. This again, is only my prima facie observation in the context of the nature of relief which this Court should grant depending on the facts of the present case. The entire order is based only on facts of this case.”

(emphasis supplied).

54. This, I believe, sets of rest any doubt as to the relevance of the judgment in the case before me.

55. Mr. Chitnis then relied upon an unreported judgment of D.K Deshmukh, J., dated 29th October, 2001 in Notice of Motion No. 3550 of 1999 in Suit No. 5898 of 1999 in the case of (Four Seasons Hotels (Barbados) Ltd. v. Sukh Hotels Motels Pvt. Ltd.)10. I do not see how this judgment can be of any assistance to Mr. Chitnis. In fact, the learned Judge in paragraph 4 observes that the trade marks relating to goods and trade marks relating to service constitute different classes and are not comparable. In that view of the matter, the learned Judge held that judgments relating to trade marks in relation to goods are not relevant for deciding the question which fell for consideration before him in relation to hotels. Moreover, even on facts, the learned Judge had come to the conclusion that the plaintiff had not established that it had any reputation or goodwill in India. The defendant in that case ran a three star hotel. Four Seasons runs an extremely expensive chain of hotels in several countries. It is hardly likely that a customer who chooses to stay in or use any facilities provided by the chain of hotels run by the plaintiffs in that case would be deceived into believing that the three star hotel run by the defendant had any connection with the plaintiffs' chain on hotels. The difference in price between the two would be enormous. The difference in price of items like pizzas and food products is not likely to distinguish the services and products of the plaintiffs from those of the defendants. The judgment, therefore, has no application in the facts of the present case.

56. The balance of convenience is also in favour of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs apart from their operations abroad also started conducting business in India in 1996. On the other hand, the defendant apart from having itself registered under the Companies Act, 1956 has done nothing. The defendant has no reputation or goodwill in India. It has never even attempted to built any reputation or goodwill in India. In the circumstances, grant of an injunction cannot and will not prejudice the defendant in any manner. On the other hand if the plaintiffs are refused interlocutory reliefs, they will suffer irreparable harm and prejudice. In the circumstances, the Notice of Motion is mode absolute in terms of prayers (a), (b) and (c). The defendant is directed to take all necessary steps to ensure compliance with pryer (c) within eight weeks from today.

57. Certified copy expedited.

58. Parties to act on an ordinary copy of this order duly authenticated by the Associate of this Court.

59. Notice of Motion made absolute.