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Chandrakant Govind Sutar v. M.K Associates And Another

Bombay High Court
Dec 11, 2002
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Summary of the Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This Civil Revision Application under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code challenges an order passed by the District Judge, Raigad dated 29th July, 1998 in Civil Misc. Application No. 114 of 1997. The Miscellaneous Application sought condonation of delay in filing an appeal. The District Court rejected that application on the ground that no sufficient cause was made out by the petitioner. The petitioner filed this Revision Application against that decision. The Revision was heard on 3rd December, 2002; the court initially indicated the view that the Revision was maintainable but, following a fair request by the petitioner's counsel (Mr. Oka) to place additional decisions, the matter was kept for rehearing. Companion revision matters were heard together on the present day.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the order passed on an application for condonation of delay in filing an appeal is an order passed in "other proceedings" (i.e., proceedings under section 5 of the Limitation Act) or whether it is an order passed in the appeal itself.
  2. Consequentially, whether a Revision Application under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (as amended) is maintainable against an order rejecting an application for condonation of delay in filing an appeal.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Appellant's) Arguments (as presented by Mr. Oka)

  • The application for condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act constitutes an "other proceeding" and is not part of the proceedings in the appeal.
  • Reliance was placed on provisions of Order XLI Rule 3(A) of the Civil Procedure Code read with Rules 337 and 453 of the Civil Manual applicable to the State of Maharashtra to support the proposition that the application is substantive or an "other proceeding".
  • If the order on condonation is treated as disposing of "other proceedings" (and not as an order in appeal), then Revision under section 115 would be maintainable because the order would finally dispose of those "other proceedings."
  • Counsel later brought to the court's attention decisions relevant to the question of maintainability which complicated/supporting the issue; counsel requested the court not to sign the earlier pronounced judgment and to rehear maintainability after fuller briefing.

Note: The opinion records that counsel for the petitioneds in companion matters adopted Mr. Oka's argument. The opinion does not set out any detailed or distinct arguments advanced by the respondents in opposition.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mela Ram & Sons v. Commissioner Of Income Tax, Punjab, AIR 1956 SC 367 Statement that "an appeal presented out of time is an appeal, and an order dismissing it as time-barred is one passed in appeal." The court treated this decision as clinching the issue and relied on its principle to hold that an order dismissing an appeal as time-barred is an order passed in the appeal (i.e., not an order in "other proceedings").
Rani Choudhury v. Lt.-Col. Suraj Jit Choudhury, (1982) 2 SCC 596 : AIR 1982 SC 1397 Reiterated the principle that an order dismissing an appeal as time-barred is one disposing of the appeal. The court relied on paragraph 4 of this decision to support the proposition that an order dismissing an appeal as time-barred is an order in appeal and therefore not amenable to revision under section 115 when such an order does not finally dispose of the appeal in a manner that permits revision.
Essar Constructions v. N.P. Rama Krishna Reddy, (2000) 6 SCC 94 Observation (para 20) that limitation is a defence available in suit, appeal or application; and commentary on Order 41 of the CPC regarding admission of appeals barred by limitation. The court considered this authority was relied upon by Mr. Oka but found it inapposite to the present question; the court held the observation must be understood in context and would not assist the petitioner on the maintainability issue.
Bhagwan G. Godsav v. Kachrulal B. Samdariya, 1987 (2) Bom. C.R 153 (paras 17–18) Held (as relied upon by petitioner) that a memorandum of appeal barred by limitation and accompanied by an application for condonation under Order 41, Rule 3A(1) is not an appeal but a proposed appeal until delay is condoned. The court noted this reliance but distinguished the present question: the court treated the settled law in Mela Ram and Rani Choudhury as controlling and found Bhagwan G. Godsav not decisive for the maintainability question before it.
Nagorao alias Arun s/o Narayan Yerawar v. Narayan s/o Nagan Yerawar, C.R.A No. 803 of 1996 (since reported in 2002 (4) Mh. L.J 615) and companion CRA decisions (Rajabhau v. Dinkar; Bharatkumar v. Anita Trust) High Court decisions applying the amended provisions of the Code and addressing related questions of maintainability of revision. The court referred to these decisions (including CRA Nos. 859 of 2002 and 57 of 2002) as supporting the view that in light of amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure the present Revision Application is not maintainable.
Zahida Nizamuddin Jalal v. Abidali Jafferali Syed, C.R.A No. 1674 of 2002 (since reported in 2002 (4) Mh. L.J 913) Another reported decision relied upon concerning maintainability under the amended Code. Referred to by the court as part of the body of decisions demonstrating that the present Revision is not maintainable after amendment to the Code.
Re. T.V. Choudhary, (1987) 3 SCC 258 Recognised the professional duty of the advocate to the court; approval of comments about counsel's duty. The court quoted this decision in the context of commending Mr. Oka's fairness in placing adverse authorities before the court.
Randel v. W., (1996) 3 All E.R 657 (Lord Denning, M.R.) Observations on the duty of counsel to choose between duty to client and duty to the court. Quoted by the court to praise Mr. Oka's conduct for placing authorities adverse to his client before the court.
(1988) 1 SCC 80 : AIR 1988 SC 371 Dictum of the Apex Court relied upon when the court acceded to the petitioner's request not to sign the judgment and to keep the matter for rehearing. The court relied on the dictum to justify not signing the immediately pronounced judgment and to permit rehearing to consider authorities not yet placed before the court.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court framed the central legal issue as whether an order on an application for condonation of delay in filing an appeal is an order passed in "other proceedings" (i.e., separate proceedings under section 5 of the Limitation Act) or whether it is an order passed in the appeal itself. The outcome of that classification determines whether revision under section 115 CPC (as amended) is available.

The court analyzed consequences of each alternative:

  • If the order on condonation is an order in "other proceedings", then a successful revision could finally dispose of those proceedings and thus revision under section 115 might be amenable.
  • If the order on condonation is an order passed in the appeal, then allowing revision would require this Court to revive appeal proceedings before the appellate court; because such an order would not finally dispose of the appeal proceedings in the sense required for revisional jurisdiction under section 115 (as amended), revision would be unavailable.
  • The court acknowledged an important caveat: where the first appellate court allows the condonation application, and the revisional court were to interfere and set aside that allowance, the appeal itself might be finally disposed of in consequence; in such a case revision under section 115 could be available.

The court found the authorities of the Apex Court decisive. It relied principally on Mela Ram and Rani Choudhury for the legal proposition that an appeal presented out of time remains an appeal and that an order dismissing it as time-barred is an order passed in appeal. Applying that principle, the court concluded that the order passed on an application for condonation of delay in filing an appeal is an order passed in the appeal. Accordingly, the court considered the petitioner's reliance on Essar Constructions and Bhagwan G. Godsav but found both inapposite or distinguishable in context: Essar's observations about limitation as a defence were said to be contextual and not helpful; Bhagwan G. Godsav addressed whether a memorandum is an appeal or a proposed appeal but did not alter the settled law as articulated in the Apex Court decisions relied upon.

The court further referred to decisions from the Bombay High Court (several CRA decisions reported in 2002 (4) Mh. L.J) and to changes in the Code of Civil Procedure by amendment, concluding that in the present circumstances the Revision Application is not maintainable.

Holding and Implications

Application dismissed.

Holding

The court dismissed the Revision Application. It held that the order rejecting the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal is an order passed in the appeal (i.e., not an order solely in "other proceedings"), and therefore, on the view of the law as stated in the cited Apex Court decisions and in light of amendments to the Code, the Revision under section 115 CPC is not maintainable in the circumstances of the present case.

Implications

The direct consequence for the parties is that the District Court's order dated 29th July, 1998 refusing condonation of delay in filing the appeal remains intact; the Revision is dismissed. The court expressly left "all questions ... open," indicating that the decision was confined to the maintainability issue presented and applied existing precedent; the opinion does not purport to lay down new law beyond applying the cited authorities.

Other Notable Observations in the Opinion

The court made a special mention of the fairness of Mr. Oka, Advocate, commending him for placing adverse authorities before the Court and describing his conduct as discharging his overriding duty to the Court. The court quoted authoritative remarks on the professional duties of counsel (including Lord Denning and Re. T.V. Choudhary) in this context.

End of summary. This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion.

Show all summary ...

1. This Civil Revision Application under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code takes exception to the order passed by the District Judge, Raigad dated 29th July, 1998 in Civil Misc. Application No. 114 of 1997. The said Misc. Application was filed for condonation of delay in filing the Appeal. The District Court rejected that application on the ground that no sufficient cause was made out by the petitioner. That decision is the subject matter of challenge in the present Revision Application.

2. This Revision Application was heard on 3rd December, 2002, when I was persuaded to take a view that it is maintainable, amended provisions of Civil Procedure Code notwithstanding. However, after that view was pronounced in open Court, immediately thereafter Mr. Oka, learned Counsel for the petitioner, mentioned the matter and in his usual fairness brought to my notice that certain decisions relevant on the issue of maintainability of the Revision have not been placed before the Court. He, therefore, requested me not to sign the judgment pronounced in the Court and instead to keep the matters for rehearing on some other day on the question of maintainability of the Revision Application. This request was acceded to having regard to the dictum of the Apex Court in (1988) 1 SCC 80 : AIR 1988 SC 371. In this background, along with this petition companion Revision Applications have been kept for hearing today. Counsel appearing for the petitioneds) in the companion matters have adopted the argument of Mr. Oka.

3. On the previous occasion Mr. Oka supported by other Counsel appearing in the companion petitions contended that the order passed on an application for condonation of delay in filing appeal is an order passed in “other proceedings” - as the application is one under section 5 of the Limitation Act. To buttress this proposition, Mr. Oka had relied upon the relevant provisions of Order XLI Rule 3(A) of Civil Procedure Code read with the provisions in Rules 337 and 453 of the Civil Manual applicable to the State of Maharashtra. Relying on these provisions it was contended that the application for condonation of delay in filing Appeal is not part of the proceedings in the Appeal but a substantive or “other proceedings” and, therefore, order passed thereon is not an order passed in Appeal. If this contention were to be accepted then, Mr. Oka would be justified in arguing that the Revision Application would be maintainable because the order passed on application for condonation of delay in filing the Appeal would finally dispose of the “other proceedings”, namely, proceedings other than the appeal, if the Revision was to be allowed in favour of the Petitioner. However, in all fairness Mr. Oka has now brought to my notice decisions which would clinch the question that arises for consideration.

4. The principal aspect that needs to be addressed while examining the question of maintainability of Revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure in the present case is; whether the order passed on application for condonation of delay is an order passed in any “other proceedings” or in the appeal? If the answer to this querry is that it is former, it would necessarily follow that Revision Application under section 115 Civil Procedure Code as amended would be amenable; whereas if the answer is the latter, then the Revision Application will be unavailable inasmuch as if the Revision Application against the order rejecting the application for condonation of delay in filing the Appeal was to be allowed then this Court will have to necessarily revive the appeal proceedings before the appellate Court and, since the appeal will not be finally disposed of by the order of this Court, this Court is precluded to exercise re visional jurisdiction under section 115. The position would, however, be different when the first appeal Court allows the application for condonation of delay in filing the Appeal, for if this Court was to interfere in the Revision Application filed by the aggrieved party and set aside the order passed on the application for condonation of delay then, obviously, the appeal itself would stand finally disposed of. In other words, in cases where the application for condonation of delay is allowed by the subordinate Court, revision under section 115, Civil Procedure Code would be available.

5. The decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mela Ram & Sons v. Commissioner Of Income Tax, Punjab, Punjab reported in AIR 1956 SC 367 would clinch the issue. No doubt the Apex Court was considering the provisions of section 30(1) of the Income Tax Act but in para 9 of its decision has observed as follows:

“On the principles laid down in these decisions, it must be held that an appeal presented out of time is an appeal, and an order dismissing it as time-barred is one passed in appeal”

6. This statement of law is founded on the precedents which construed the provisions of the Code, as referred to in paragraph 9 of the same decision. This principle has been reiterated by the Apex Court in a subsequent decision reported in (1982) 2 SCC 596 : AIR 1982 SC 1397 in the case of Rani Choudhury v. Lt.-Col. Suraj Jit Choudhury. In paragraph 4, Justice R.S Pathak (as he then was) has observed as follows:

“There can be no dispute then that in law what the respondent did was to file an appeal and that the order dismissing it as time barred was one disposing of the appeal.”

7. Having regard to this statement of law, indubitably the order passed on an application for condonation of delay in filing appeal is one passed in appeal. The fact that the Court refused to entertain the appeal being barred by limitation does not mean that the order is not passed in appeal as such.

8. Mr. Oka, however placed reliance on the observation of the Apex Court in the case of Essar Constructions v. N.P Rama Krishna Reddy reported in (2000) 6 SCC 94. Reliance was placed particularly on observation in paragraph 20 where the Apex Court has observed that limitation, like the question of jurisdiction may be provided for in a separate statute but it is a defence available in the suit, appeal or application. The Apex Court further observed that of course, the question as far as appeals are concerned may be debatable having regard to the provisions of Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to admission of appeals as an appeal may not be admitted at all because it is barred by limitation. Much emphasis was placed on this observation. However, to my mind, it has to be understood in the context of the issue considered by the Court in that case. The same will be of no avail to the petitioner. Moreover, this submission overlooks that the Apex Court then went on to observe that it was expressing final view in the matter. In my view, reliance placed on this decision is inapposite. Mr. Oka also placed reliance on the decision of the Division Bench of our High Court in Bhagwan G. Godsav v. Kachrulal B. Samdariya reported in 1987 (2) Bom. C.R 153 (para 17 and 18) to contend that memorandum of appeal which is barred by limitation and accompanied by an application for condonation of delay under Order 41, Rule 3A(1) is not an appeal but a proposed appeal after the delay is condoned and heard under Rule 11. To my mind, the question that needs to be addressed in this case is not as to whether the memorandum of appeal which is presented beyond limitation is an appeal or a proposed appeal or whether the Court will have jurisdiction to entertain the appeal and pass any other order till the delay in filing the same is condoned. Whereas, the proposition that arises for consideration in the present case is the settled legal position as would be seen from the reported decisions of the Apex Court in the case of Mela Ram (supra) and in particular in Rani Choudhary (supra). The law is well settled that the order dismissing the Appeal as time barred is the one passed in Appeal. The Apex Court in Rani Chaudhary's case (supra) while dealing with the provisions of Civil Procedure Code has observed that an appeal may also be dismissed on the ground of limitation, if condonation of delay in filing an appeal is not allowed by the Court. The consequence of dismissing the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal in law is one of disposing of the appeal as time barred and therefore one passed in appeal.

9. A priori, having regard to the view taken by this Court in C.R.A Nos. 803 of 1996, Nagorao alias Arun s/o Narayan Yerawar v. Narayan s/o Nagan Yerawar (since reported in 2002 (4) Mh. L.J 615), 859 of 2002 Rajabhau s/o Mahadeorao Rahale v. Dinkar s/o Shantaram Ingole and 57 of 2002, Bharatkumar s/o Shriramnarayan Agarwal Anita Trust (since reported in 2002 (4) Mh. L.J 597) decided by Justice Palshikar at Nagpur Bench as well as C.R.A No. 1674 of 2002 Zahida Nizamuddin Jalal v. Abidali Jafferali Syed (since reported in 2002 (4) Mh. L.J 913) decided by Justice Khandeparkar at Bombay bench and in view of the amendment to the provisions of the Code of Civil procedure, this Revision Application is not maintainable.

10. In the circumstances, the same is dismissed. All questions are left open.

11. While parting I would like to make a special mention regarding the fairness of Mr. Oka, Advocate. He conducted the matter with a sense of detachment. In his own inimitable style he did the wonderful act of balancing of his duty to his client and as an officer of the Court concerned in the administration of justice. He has fully discharged his overriding duty to the Court to the standards of his profession, and to the public, by not withholding authorities which go against his client. As Lord Denning, M.R in Randel V.W, (1996) 3 All E.R 657 observed - the Counsel has time and again to choose between his duty to his client and his duty to the Court. This is a conflict often difficult to resolve; and he should not be under pressure to decide it wrongly. Whereas, when the Advocate puts his first duty to the Court, he has nothing to fear. But it is a mistake to suppose that he (Advocate) is the mouth piece of his client to say what he wants. The Code which obligates the Advocate to disregard the instructions of his client, if they conflict with his duty to the Court, is not a code of law - It is a code of honour. If he breaks it, he is offending against the rules of the profession and is subject to its discipline. This view is quoted with approval by the Apex Court in Re. T.V Choudhary, (1987) 3 SCC 258.

Application dismissed.