Hindustan Aeronautics, Ltd. v. Nashik Workers Union And Others

1. Apart from the merits of the matter, on behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection was raised that the petition should be dismissed, relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Air India Statutory Corporation v. United Labour Union [1997 (1) L.L.N 75], on the ground that the appropriate Government was the Central Government. In the instant case the complaint was filed by Respondent No. 1 before the Labour Court on the ground that the appropriate Government is the State Government. It is, however, contended that in view of the law declared by the Apex Court in Air India Statutory Corporation (vide supra), the appropriate Government in the case of the petitioner herein would be the Central Government. If the appropriate authority is the Central Government then the complaint itself is not maintainable and consequently the complaint should have been dismissed on that count alone. Before addressing myself to the said issue, which needs to be decided, a few facts may be set out, which would be relevant for the purpose of deciding all issues that arise in the present petition.

2. Petitioner is a public limited company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act. Its corporate office is at Bangalore. It has factories all over the country, one of which is situated at Nasik District. The said factory is engaged in manufacture of modem Fighter Aircrafts of Supersonic MIG series warplanes for the Indian Airforce. Petitioner is a fully owned Government of India Undertaking which works under the supervision and control of Department of Defence Production and Supplies of the Ministry of Defence. In Nasik it engages about 6,700 employees. Their terms and conditions of services are governed by the settlements entered into with the registered Trade Union, i.e, HAL (ND) Employees union.

2A. Respondent No. 1 is a Trade Union claiming to represent apprentice trainees who were undergoing training under the petitioners' apprenticeship training scheme. That Scheme came to an end or was discontinued. The first respondent espousing the cause of the said apprentice trainees filed complaint of unfair labour practices against the petitioner. Therein they prayed for reinstatement with continuity of services and full back-wages. It seems that the Government of India and the then Republic of U.S.S.R entered into an agreement for manufacture of modified version of fighter aircrafts which required specialised training. In view of that petitioner introduced the training scheme. The said scheme provided no job guarantee on completion of training. However, those who were trained would be considered for employment if sponsored by Employment Exchanges. The petitioner had two schemes, one under the Apprenticeship Act and the other a more specialised training scheme, which was their own in-house scheme. The scheme of the petitioner was open to all and not confined to only those trained under the Apprenticeship Act in the petitioner's factory but also to those trained in other industrial establishments. In 1988 the petitioner inducted about 134 trainees under the scheme. They were issued letters offering specialised training on the terms and conditions referred to therein initially for a period of 12 months. The trainees confirmed that the said training was only an offer and they had no right to claim employment in the petitioner's factory. Out of 134 trainees on completion of training, 8 trainees were absorbed after requisite tests and interviews, as per the Recruitment Rules and a special drive for SC/ST as per the Central Government's directive. Eight other trainees voluntarily left before completion of training; On 10 June 1989, the Managing Director issued a confidential letter freezing all recruitments at the Nasik Division with exception of recruitment of SC/ST categories and to appointment offers which had already been sent to prospective candidates before issuing the circular. On 20 September 1989 petitioner issued a circular extending the period of training of 52 trainees referred up to 31 December 1989. In terms of the said circular the period was to expire on 31 December 1989. Before the period could expire the first Respondent filed a petition before this Court being Writ Petition No. 5445 of 1989. This Court initially granted ad interim relief restraining petitioner from terminating the trainees. When the petition came up for hearing the Court recorded the following as an order:

“Learned counsel for the respondent makes statement before this Court here recorded to the effect that as and when vacancies arise, the petitioners and others similarly situated will be given first preference in filling up the said vacancies and the said filling up will be in order of their respective seniority, but subject to the petitioners and others similarly situate being found otherwise qualified.

In view of the aforesaid statement, Sri Phadnis, learned counsel for the petitioners seeks leave to withdraw this petition. Petition is allowed to be withdrawn. Ad interim orders stand vacated.”

It may be mentioned that no leave was sought from this Court to pursue the grievance before any other forum or before this Court when the petition was withdrawn. Subsequent to the order of this Court on 30 January 1990, 1 February 1990 the ad interim orders earlier granted were vacated. In the meantime between the period 23 June 1989 to 12 February 1990 the petitioner had to relieve further 25 trainees by its circular, dated 12 February 1990, with effect from the dates mentioned against each name. The petitioner could also not recruit in view of the freezing of recruitment.

3. On 9 February 1990 the first respondent filed a complaint under the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971. being Complaint (ULP) No. 35 of 1990 for reinstatement of the trainees referred to in the annexures to the complaint with continuity of services and back-wages. Interim relief was also prayed for. As further employees were relieved, a fresh complaint being Complaint (ULP) No. 36 of 1990 was filed Interim relief was also prayed therein. Two other complaints being Complaint (ULP) Nos. 44 of 1990 and 45 of 1990 were also filed.

4. In a related development at Lucknow, the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court by an order, dated 13 May 1991, issued a mandamus to the petitioner to provide suitable employment in wage group “B” to trainees who approached the Court, in accordance with the rules governing the recruitment based on seniority giving preference to the trainees whose cause was espoused by the unrecognised union in Writ Petition No. 6723 of 1988. Aggrieved by that order, the petitioner herein approached the Apex Court by a special leave petition. That was disposed of by order, dated 3 September 1999. The Apex Court clarified the order of the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court as under:

“The first paragraph of the impugned order of the High Court has to be read as a whole and the mandamus in the order issued is, in fact to consider the claims of the 35 trainees for appointment in order of seniority at the time of completion of training under the opposite parties and giving them priority in the matter of employment in relation to others.

The employer would obviously, in the process of consideration, take into account their suitability and comply with its prevailing rules.”

In the meantime evidence came to be led in the complaint filed. Second respondent thereafter passed the impugned order directing the petitioner to reinstate the trainees within one month. Directions were given based on the findings recorded that the trainees were in fact in employment of the petitioner. Being aggrieved, the petitioner herein filed revision applications which were numbered as 182, 183, 184 and 185 of 1994 before the Industrial Court at Nasik. They were transferred to the third respondent and they were renumbered as 140 of 1994, and 28, 29 and 30 of 1995. By an order of 8 July 1997 the third Respondent dismissed the revision applications and upheld the order of the second respondent. Consequently, the present petition.

4A. During the pendency of the petition on behalf of the petitioner an additional affidavit has been filed of one P. Santhana Bhoopathy, dated 29 January 2001. In the said affidavit it is set out that out of 127 apprentices, except for 9 machinists remaining 118 apprentices were called for test/interview. 90 attended the interview out of which 87 were found suitable and were issued appointment letters. From them 78 accepted offer and joined services of the petitioner. On completion of the period of temporary employment and contract 64 have been absorbed in May/June, 2000 and 12 were absorbed in July, 2000. In other words what the petitioner seeks to contend is that subsequent to the change of policy of removing the freeze on recruitment apart from 9 machinists to whom they could not offer any employment, the rest have either being considered or appointed.

5. With the above background, we may now proceed to dispose of the first contention that the Complaint itself was not maintainable. This as set out earlier is based on the judgment in the case of Air India Statutory Corporation [1997 (1) L.L.N 75] (vide supra). On behalf of the petitioner, their learned counsel has drawn my attention to Para. 24 of the said judgment wherein the Apex Court has observed as under:

“In the light of the above principles and discussions, we have no hesitation to hold that the appropriate Government is the Central Government from the inception of the Act.”

While so holding the Apex Court took the view that the common law principles which were earlier applied while taking the view taken in Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union v. State of Bihar, [(1969) 1 SCC 765 : A.I.R 1970 S.C 82], and the subsequent judgment thereto including the judgment in the case of petitioner themselves being Hindustan Aeronautics, Ltd. v. Their workmen [1975 (2) L.L.N 235], no longer bore any relevance when tested on the anvil of Art. 14. The Apex Court therefore held that the earlier view of the appropriate Government taken by those judgments would no longer hold. It may be made clear that those judgments were rendered on the definition of appropriate Government as contained under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, however, the judgment delivered was in respect of appropriate Government for the purpose of Contract Labour Regulation of Employment Act. Based on that ratio the contention is that as the petitioners are a Company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, whose share holding is fully owned by the Central Government and which is under the directions and control of the Central Government, the appropriate Government would be the Central Government. Though the Apex Court earlier under the Industrial Disputes Act, in Hindustan Aeronautics, Ltd. (vide supra) had taken the view that the appropriate Government is the State Government it is contended that that view no longer holds, in view of the subsequent judgment of the Apex Court in Air India Statutory Corporation [1997 (1) L.L.N 75] (vide supra).

6. On the other hand on behalf of the respondents their learned counsel contends that at the highest the judgment in the case of Air India Statutory Corporation [1997 (1) L.L.N 75] (vide supra), should be read prospectively and net retrospectively Learned counsel for that purpose relies on the judgment in the case of Managing Director, Electronics Corporation of India Ltd v. B. Karunakar [1992 (2) L.L.N 385]. Learned counsel points out that the Apex Court has not held that the view earlier taken was not the correct view All that the Apex Court has said considering the discussions in various paragraphs that after the development of law in particular other authority and instrumentality of the State and the public law interpretation the earlier law based on private law interpretation was no longer good law and more so Art. 14. The view now would be that the appropriate Government has to be decided on the new yardstick of public law and not under old common law principles. It is also pointed out that the view in Air India Statutory Corporation (vide supra), has been referred to a Larger Bench in the case of Food Corporation of India Bombay v. Transport of Dock Workers Union [2000 (3) L.L.N 527]. It is, therefore, contended that even if this Court comes to the conclusion that the appropriate Government is the Central Government at the highest the law would be prospective from the rendering of the judgment in the case of Air India Statutory Corporation (vide supra) At the outset it may be noted that whether the judgment of the Apex Court is prospective or retrospective would not be for this Court to decide in view of the law declared by the Apex Court itself as reiterated in Managing Director, Electronics Corporation of India. Ltd., (vide supra). The issue of declaration of law by the Apex Court in so far as constitutional law is concerned first came up for consideration before the Apex Court in Golak Nath v. State of Punjab [A.I.R 1967 S.C 1643] Paragraph 35 of the judgment in Managing Director Electronics Corporation of India. Lid. (vide supra) could be gainfully referred to the following proposition:

“…The Court pointed out that there was an essential distinction between the Constitution and the statutes. The Courts are expected to and they should interpret the terms of the Constitution without doing violence to the language to suit the expanding needs of the society. In this process and in a real sense, they make laws. Though it is not admitted, such role of this Court is effective and cannot be ignored. Even in the realm of ordinary statutes, the subtle working of the process is apparent though the approach is more conservative and inhibitive. To meet the then extraordinary situation that may be caused by the said decision, the Court felt that it must evolve some doctrine which had roots in leaser, and precedents so that the past may be preserved and the future protected. The Court then referred to two doctrines familiar to American jurisprudence, viz., Blackstonian view that the Court was not to pronounce a new rule but to maintain and expound the old one and therefore, the Judge did not make law but only discovered or found the true law. That view would necessarily make the law laid down by the Courts retrospective and operation. The Court, therefore, preferred the opinion of Justice Sri Cardozo which tried to harmonise the doctrine of prospective overruling with that of stare decisis expressed in Great Northern Railway Company v. Sunburst Oil and Refining Company [287 US 358]. The Court also referred to the decisions subsequent to Sunburst and to the “Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent)” issued by the House of Lords recorded in 1966 1 W.L.R 1234 and pointed out that the modern doctrine as opposed to the Blackstonian theory was suitable for a fast moving society. It was a pragmatic solution reconciling the two doctrines The Court found law but restricted its operation to the future thus enabling it to bring about a smooth transition by correcting its errors without disturbing the impact of those errors on the past transactions. It was left to the discretion of the Court to prescribe the limits of the retroactivity. Thereby, it enabled the Court to mould the reliefs to meet the ends of justice. The Court then pointed that there was no statutory prohibition against the Court refusing to give retroactivity to the law declared by it. The doctrine of res judicata precluded any scope for retroactivity in respect of a subject-matter that had been finally decided between the parties. The Court pointed out that the Courts in this land also by interpretation, reject retroactivity of statutory provisions though couched in general terms on the ground that they affect vested rights. The Court then referred to Arts. 141 and 142 to point out that they are couched in such wide and elastic terms as to enable this Court to formulate legal doctrines to meet the ends of justice. The only limitation therein is reason, restraint and injustice.”

However, while so holding the Court laid down the following propositions:

“(1) The doctrine of prospective overruling can be invoked only in matters arising under our Constitution.

(2) It can be applied only by the highest Court of the country, i.e, the Supreme Court as it has the constitutional jurisdiction to declare law binding on all the Courts in India.

(3) The scope of the retroactive operation of the law declared by the Supreme Court superseding its earlier decisions is left to its discretion to be moulded in accordance with the justice of the cause or matter before it.”

Subsequently the Apex Court has also applied the doctrine as to whether the law declared would be prospective or retrospective in respect of various statutes.

6A. It is thus clear that it would not be open to this Court to set out or state whether the judgment of the Apex Court should be read prospectively as was contended on behalf of the respondents, if that construction has to be given.

7. I find, however, that it is not necessary to consider and discuss that principle as in Air India Statutory Corporation [1997 (1) L.L.N 75] (vide supra) the issue before the Apex Court was the provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970. The Apex Court though it took the view that the decision taken in Heavy Engineering (vide supra) which considered the definition of appropriate Government under the Industrial Disputes Act, nonetheless specifically made it clear that the law declared in so far as appropriate Government is concerned was for the purpose of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970. The portion set out and emphasis supplied in earlier part of the judgment would make that clear. In other words, the law declared in Air India Statutory Corporation (vide supra) would be binding on all Courts in India considering Art. 141 in so far as the provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act. 1970 is concerned. The law declared would be the ratio decidendi of the judgment in Air India Statutory Corporation (vide supra) The provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act were not in issue. The issue was the provisions of the Contract Labour Regulation of Employment Act. It may be true that the definition considered and the judgment discussed was the appropriate Government under the Industrial Disputes Act. But merely because of that it cannot be said that the Apex Court also so held for the Industrial Disputes Act. In fact, the Apex Court made it clear that it was for the purpose of the Contract Labour Regulation of Employment Act. Further reason is that the judgment in Hindustan Aeronautics, Ltd., (vide supra) was by a Bench of three Judges. The Apex Court itself has declared that a co-ordinate Bench cannot overrule another co-ordinate Bench. It is in that context that the Apex Court said that the decision was for the purpose of that Act. It is thus clear that the Apex Court itself when it set out that the definition of appropriate Government is from the inception, said it for the purpose of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970. This becomes further clear in the reference made to the larger Bench in F.C.I Bombay (supra). Here also the Apex Court while referring the judgment in Air India Statutory Corporation (vide supra) to a larger Bench has referred it for the purpose of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 In F.C.I Bombay [2000 (3) L.L.N 527] (vide supra) also what was in issue before the Court was the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act. 1970. It would thus be clear that the law declared in Air India Statutory Corporation (vide supra), and which has been referred to a larger Bench by the Apex Court in F.C.I Bombay (vide supra), was in so far as the provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970. It is needless to say that the law declared would be the ratio decidendi of the matter. In the matter of Air India Statutory Corporation (vide supra) what was in issue was the notification issued under S 10 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 to abolish contract labour in various offices. Therefore, the Apex Court was considering the definition of the appropriate Government in respect of the issuance of a notification under S. 10. It is not for this Court to go into the aspect as to whether that law also will be said to be a law declared in so far as the Industrial Disputes Act is concerned. The Apex Court has clearly set out that interpretation would be the law in so far as the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, is concerned. That being the view in my opinion in so far as the law declared by the Apex Court in Air India Statutory Corporation (vide supra), would be restricted to the ratio of that case namely the definition of appropriate Government under that Act and the power to issue a notification more specifically under S. 10 of the Act.

8. The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is an Act which regulates the relationship between the employer and workmen. It does not depart from the earlier common law principles of master and servant. The Act only imposes certain conditions and obligations on the employer in the matter of conditions of services of its workmen. The Act also provides in what event an industrial dispute can be referred for adjudication. At this stage, it may be noted that in Bombay Telephone Canteen Employees' Association, Prabhadevi Telephone Exchange v. Union of India [1997 (2) L.L.N 1038], the Apex Court on the same reasoning of the advancement of law had proceeded to take the view of industry. The view was taken by a Division Bench, of the Apex Court. The matter thereafter came up before the Apex Court in General Manager, Telecom v. S. Srinivasan Rao [1998 (1) L.L.N 326], when a Bench of three-Judges of the Apex Court has taken the view that the law as declared in Bangalore Water Supply Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa [1978 (1) L.L.N 376 and 657], continues to hold the field and hence did net approve of the view taken in Bombay Telephone Canteen Employees Association, Prabhadevi Telephone Exchange (vide supra). Reference is made herein to that judgment of Bombay Telephone Canteen Employees Association, Prabhadevi Telephone Exchange (vide supra) and also to an earlier Judgment in the case of Physical Research Laboratory v. K.G Sharma [1997 (2) L.L.N 668], as those Benches of the Apex Court had proceeded on the footing of advancement of the law considering Art. 14 of the Constitution of India and the expanded view of “State” and other authority under Art. 12.

9. In so far as the petitioner herein are concerned, who is an appropriate Government had been decided earlier by the Apex Court in the case of Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. v. Their workmen (vide supra), in so far as the Industrial Disputes Act is concerned. That was the judgment rendered under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act itself. The Apex Court after considering the matter held in so far as Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (vide supra), the petitioner herein, the appropriate Government was the State Government. In that case the dispute arose in respect of the establishment of the Government Company at Barackpore, West Bengal. The State of West Bengal had made a reference. It is no doubt true that in Air India Statutory Corporation [1997 (1) L.L.N 75] (vide supra) this judgment has been noted. However, while referring to the judgment in Air India Statutory (vide supra) the Court has noted that the judgment in both in Air India Statutory Corporation (vide supra) and Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. (vide supra) was of a co-ordinate. Benches consisting of three Judges. In other words today there is a judgment directly in the field in so far as the Industrial Disputes Act is concerned, in Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. (vide supra). There is then the other judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Air India Statutory Corporation, etc. (vide supra) which was deciding the issue of appropriate Government under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, as set out earlier and needs no repetition. Though Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. (vide supra) was referred to in Air India Statutory Corporation, etc. (vide supra) as per the law explained and declared by the Apex Court itself, another co-ordinate Bench of the same Court cannot reverse the law declared by another co-ordinate Bench. In the case of Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. (vide supra) the judgment was by a Bench of three Judges of the Apex Court. The view taken in so far as Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, based on public law principles bore in mind the effect of a notification which brought a change in the status of the workmen and creation of a new relationship from the earlier existing relationship. By issuance of the notification the contractor gives way to the principal employer, who becomes the employer.

10. It is also a normal principle of interpretation that even if the same expression is used in two different legislation, even in cognate legislation, it does not follow that the same meaning must be assigned to the expression or words It is always a rule of interpretation that the interpretation must be based in the context of the Act itself The expression “State or other Authority” in so far as Art. 12 of the Constitution of India is concerned, whether it is the State Government or the Central Government is relevant to the extent of either Part III of the Constitution of India or the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction by the High Court under Art. 226 and/or Art. 227 of the Constitution of India. In so far as the definition of “appropriate Government” under the Contract Labour Regulation of Employment Act is concerned, as the power conferred under S. 10 is to abolish contract labour, the Apex Court considered the expanding contours of this expression and that the organisations involved were controlled or under the authority of the Central Government found it necessary to take the wider interpretation of expression “appropriate Government” Apex Court, however, bore in mind the fact that it was deciding the matter under the provisions of the Contract Labour Regulation of Employment Act, and therefore made it clear that the said definition from its inception is for the purpose of the said Act. It will be clear for this reason also the ratio in Air India Statutory Corporation [1997 (1) L.L.N 75] (vide supra), is restricted to the ratio of that case.

11. The other issue to my mind would be whether considering the definition of appropriate Government under the Industrial Disputes Act and as all the decisions considered were rendered considering that definition, would it be possible for this Court to drew the same inference in so far as appropriate Government is concerned under the Industrial Disputes Act. Two things prevent the Court from considering that aspect. Firstly the matter itself in Air India Statutory Corporation (vide supra), has been referred to by the Apex Court to a Larger Bench. There is also the judgment on appropriate Government by co-ordinate Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Hindustan Aeronautics. Ltd. (vide supra). In my view, therefore, the definition of the appropriate Government as set out in Hindustan Aeronautics, Ltd. [1975 (2) L.L.N 235] (vide supra), would be the law declared in so far as the Industrial Disputes Act is concerned. Once that be the law declared the complaints were maintainable, as the complaint was filed under the provisions of Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act.

11A. It may be mentioned at this stage that the arguments were advanced as to whether the plea for the first time could be raised before this Court in the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction having not been raised before the Court below Both sides have cited various judgments for and against. In my view, however, for the view that is taken by me, that issue need not be gone into as I have taken the view that for the purpose of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the view taken in Hindustan Aeronautics. Ltd. [1975 (2) L.L.N 235] (vide supra), on “appropriate Government” under the Industrial Disputes Act continues to be the law declared by the Apex Court.

12. It was also contended that pursuant to notification, dated 3 July 1998, issued by the Central Government, the State Government has been conferred power in respect of the public sector undertakings and their subsidiaries. Corporations and autonomous bodies as listed in the notification to make a reference under the Industrial Disputes Act in respect of those Central Public Sector Undertakings and their subsidiaries. Corporations and autonomous bodies so listed. The said notification has been issued after the judgment in Air India Statutory Corporation case [1997 (1) L.L.N 75] (vide supra), perhaps considering the view on appropriate Government taken therein. What will be the effect of the said notification under the Industrial Disputes Act as also Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act. The notification of 3 July 1998 presumably proceeds on the footing that even though in the definition of appropriate Government under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, those Corporations, bodies are not included, for the view taken in Air India Statutory Corporation (vide supra) it is the Central Government that is the appropriate Government. The power under S. 39 of the Industrial Disputes Act is to delegate the powers of the appropriate Government. The Central Government in exercise of its powers under S. 39 has appointed the State Government as its delegate. The State Government therefore in respect of the establishments undertakings of the said notified organisations, situated in so far as that State is concerned, can now make the Reference, even if it is not the appropriate Government but as the delegate of the Union Government. That, however, does pot mean that if in law the appropriate Government is not the Central Government the notification confers such a power. The law in so far as the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is the same even after the judgment in Air India Statutory Corporation The notification would then be ultra vires the definition of appropriate Government as set out under the Act or will have to be read down. As already held earlier for the purpose of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. the definition of appropriate Government is the same as approved in Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. [1975 (2) L.L.N 235] (vide supra). In so far as Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act is concerned, even if notification of 3 July 1998 is considered, considering the earlier discussion, the appropriate Government would be the same as before the judgment in Air India Statutory Coloration (vide supra). The Courts under the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act would have jurisdiction to decide all disputes irrespective of the notification of 3 July 1998. wherein the appropriate Government is the State Government, as was the position, until the judgment in- Air India Statutory Corporation (vide supra) in spite of the notification, dated 3 July 1998. The notification of 3 July 1998 cannot override the provisions of S. 2(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act The notification would have to be read in consonance with S. 2(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act. So read, it is only in those cases where the appropriate Government is the Central Government that powers can be exercised. Otherwise it will be State Government that will be the appropriate Government. Even assuming that the State Government has exercised powers pursuant to the notification of 3 July 1998 on the basis that the appropriate Government was the Central Government that also would be immaterial, for if otherwise the State Government itself is the appropriate Government, mere reference to a wrong notification or power would not take away the power that the State Government had to make the reference. Therefore, in my opinion the notification of 3 July 1998, will make no difference in so far as the provisions of the M.R.T.U and P.U.L.P Act are concerned. The appropriate Government then and now would be the same as was existing prior to the day the Apex Court delivered the judgment in the case of Air India Statutory Corporation (vide supra). At the highest, all that the notification means is that whenever in respect of the said undertakings, Corporations and autonomous bodies, to the extent the Central Government could exercise power as the appropriate Government for the purpose of the Act, that power now can also be exercised by the State Government as its delegate.

13. We now come to the merits of the matter. It is no doubt true that the Respondents have taken me through the evidence of the parties. Two things emerge from that. Firstly, that the Apprenticeship under the Apprenticeship act had been completed much earlier that is sometime between 1982–1983. Those persons who had undergone that apprenticeship pursuant to the in house scheme finalised by the petitioner herein, were offered training under the new scheme. One of the letters, all of which are similar whereby such persons were asked to join the scheme is on record. In that letter the trainees were informed that the management is pleased to offer you an opportunity for specialised training in the trade of fitter for the period of one year from the date of their joining the petitioner. During the said period they were to be paid a stipend of Rs. 440. It was made clear that they would not be entitled to any other payment or allowance during the training period. The letter further sets out that in case the performance is found unsatisfactory at any time during this period their training would be terminated at the discretion of the management without any notice and assigning any reason. The offer was made with the condition that if the same was acceptable then the offer should be accepted and acknowledged thereto. The letter indicates that the offer was accepted. In terms of that scheme those who were taken on training were informed by letter of 20 September 1989 that it was being extended up to 31 December 1989, it is at that stage that the trainees who had approached the Court through their counsel made the statement which has been earlier referred to. In a related development, another writ petition came to be filed before the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court, That petition was by the union and filed on behalf of those who had been given training under the company's training scheme. A learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court directed the petitioner herein to provide suitable employment in wage Group B to 35 persons whose names were fisted in Annexure 4 to that petition except those who had been given appointment. The petitioner herein went in appeal. The Apex Court clarified that the order was to consider the claim of the 35 trainees for appointment and that their case should be considered considering their suitability and complying with the rules but barring that they should be given priority in the matter of employment in relation to other. One other aspect is that the training scheme started sometime in March, 1988 and for the period of one year but was subsequently extended. It is in the light of this that the case of the respondent has to be considered. It is no doubt true that the Court's attention has been invited to the fact that the persons referred by respondent No. 1 were also working overtime and were being paid for that time. But to my mind, both the Courts below have committed errors of jurisdiction in allowing the complaint in not considering two important aspects. Firstly, the trainees approached this Court on the ground that their services should not be terminated. Before this Court a statement was made on behalf of the petitioner that the cases of the trainees would be given preference in filling up of the vacancies. This statement was accepted on their behalf. Once the statement was accepted, what it meant is that trainees accepted that they were not in regular employment and they would be happy if their case was considered for regular employment as and when vacancies arise and by giving preference to them. Secondly, when the letter of offer was made it was clear that it was for a training and on payment of a stipend and if the trainee was agreeable to terms and conditions they should acknowledge acceptance of the same. The trainees accepted the same. This aspect has not been gone into by the Courts below. The Labour Court misdirected itself in considering the earlier period of apprenticeship which has nothing to do with the special training programme of the company. The two were distinct and different. In between the said period there was no relationship between the said trainees and the petitioner until they were offered the special training by letter of 17 March 1988 or on or about that date. To my mind therefore as both the Courts below have misdirected, themselves on this aspect the orders are liable to be set aside. Thirdly, the judgment of the Apex Court in cases of similarly situated trainees who had approached the Allahabad High Court was not considered.

14. The other fact is that on behalf of the petitioner, an affidavit was filed that the trainees were in fact offered employment in terms of the assurance made to this Court. I do not propose to enter into that arena as contempt petitions filed, are pending before this Court. Suffice it to say, that the grievance is that what was offered was not regular employment but temporary or for a short period. Many members of the petitioner therefore did not apply by giving up the permanent job they had or that the offer made was for a temporary period they preferred not to join the temporary job least they lost their regular job considering their earlier experience. To my mind when the statement was made on behalf of the petitioner it was to offer the said trainees regular job and not temporary job. In the light of that though I am allowing the petition, petitioner to consider the cases of those trainees either who had not applied or who had applied but were offered temporary job and did not accept the same. To such persons petitioner to make an offer as and when regular vacancies arise for consideration. In the event they fulfil required qualification then to consider them for regular job. These observations are independent of the proceedings which are pending before this Court for contempt of this Court's order.

15. With the above observations. Rule made absolute in terms of prayer Cl. (a).

16. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. PA to give ordinary copy of this order to the parties concerned. Certified copy expedited.