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Dilipkumar J. Jain v. State Of Maharashtra And Another
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner, Dilipkumar J. Jain, challenged by way of this Criminal Writ Petition the Judgment and Order dated 28th February 1994 of the Additional Sessions Judge, Greater Bombay, which had dismissed his Criminal Revision Application No. 15 of 1993. That Revision was directed against the Metropolitan Magistrate's Judgment and Order dated 11th December 1992, which had dismissed the petitioner's Complaint Case No. 78.Misc/1992 (filed under sections 193 and 471 IPC read with section 195 Cr.P.C.) and had also rejected his application for a search warrant.
Background facts (as stated in the opinion): The petitioner had earlier filed Complaint Case No. 18.S/1992 under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 against respondent No.2 (Mohammed Tamboli), proprietor of Bombay Traders, alleging issuance of dishonoured cheques. In those NI Act proceedings respondent No.2 filed an application for discharge and annexed two receipts: one allegedly signed by the petitioner's erstwhile servant Lekhu and another purportedly signed by the petitioner. The petitioner alleged both receipts were forged and therefore filed the second complaint (Case No. 78.Misc/1992) under sections 193 and 471 IPC read with section 195 Cr.P.C., and applied for a search warrant under section 94 Cr.P.C.
The Metropolitan Magistrate rejected the second complaint and the search warrant application on the ground that the alleged forgery had arisen during the pendency of judicial proceedings (the NI Act case) and that only the Court could file such a complaint under section 195 Cr.P.C. The petitioner moved in revision (Criminal Revision No.15 of 1993), which was dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge. The petitioner then approached the High Court by way of the present writ petition.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a private complaint under sections 193 and 471 IPC is maintainable where the accused has produced only a copy of an allegedly forged document (i.e., whether the bar under section 195(1)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C. is attracted when only a copy is produced).
- Whether the Magistrate was obliged to proceed under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and direct an investigation (including sending disputed documents to a handwriting expert) upon the petitioner's allegation of forgery, or whether such an application was premature.
- Whether the petitioner could use State machinery (e.g., seek search warrants under section 94 Cr.P.C.) at the stage when the main complaint under section 138 NI Act was pending, or whether that use was improper/premature.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's (Petitioner's) Arguments — as recorded in the opinion
- The Magistrate should have proceeded under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and ordered investigation, including sending the disputed receipts and letter to a handwriting expert to determine whether they were forged or signed by the petitioner's erstwhile servant Lekhu or by the petitioner.
- There was no bar under section 195(1)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C. to the private complaint because the accused had produced only a copy of the disputed receipts (not the original), and therefore the private complaint was maintainable.
- To support these contentions counsel relied upon several authorities (listed in the opinion) to substantiate the proposition that when only a copy of the forged document is produced, section 195(1)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C. does not apply.
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of opposing counsel's submissions beyond noting that Mr. Salvi, the learned A.P.P., was heard.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| AIR 1950 (37) Privy Council 34, Sanmukhsingh v. The King | Cited by petitioner to support the proposition that when only a copy of an allegedly forged document is produced the bar under section 195(1)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C. does not apply. | The Court recorded that the petitioner relied on this authority (among others) and accepted the legal position advanced: where only a copy is produced the section 195 bar is not attracted. |
| 376 Supreme Court Reports (1963), Budhu Ram v. State Of Rajasthan | Cited by petitioner for the proposition that production of a copy (and not the original) of an allegedly forged document does not attract the bar under section 195(1)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C. | The Court treated this authority as part of the body of decisions supporting the petitioner's contention and accepted the proposition as settled law for purposes of the case. |
| 1988 Cri. L.J. 427, Sushil Kumar v. State of Haryana | Cited to substantiate the contention regarding non-attraction of section 195 where only copies are produced. | The Court noted reliance on this authority and accepted the general legal proposition advanced by the petitioner. |
| 1989 Cri. L.J. 760, Ramnarain v. State of Rajasthan | Cited to support the same rule about the inapplicability of section 195 when only copies of the disputed documents are produced. | The Court acknowledged the citation and regarded the cited authorities collectively as showing the legal position that the bar under section 195 is not attracted in such circumstances. |
| 1998 Cri. L.J. 1565, Sachinda Nand Singh v. State of Bihar | Cited to reinforce the petitioner's proposition on section 195's non-attraction when only copies are tendered. | The Court treated this authority as part of the supporting jurisprudence and accepted the underlying proposition in favour of the petitioner on this narrow point. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court conducted a two-part analysis corresponding to the petitioner's core contentions.
- On the question whether the bar under section 195(1)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C. applied when only copies of the disputed documents were produced, the Court held that the legal position is well-settled: when only a copy of the alleged forged document (and not the original) is produced before the Court, the bar under section 195(1)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C. would not apply. The Court therefore accepted the petitioner's submission on this point and found the Metropolitan Magistrate's contrary conclusion (that the complainant had no locus and that the Court ought to have filed the complaint) erroneous.
- On the second contention — that the Magistrate was obliged to proceed under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and to refer the documents for handwriting expert opinion — the Court disagreed with the petitioner. The Court accepted the view of the learned Additional Sessions Judge that the complainant appeared to be attempting to use State machinery prematurely to collect evidence in his favour. The Sessions Judge had held, and the High Court agreed, that the application for investigation/handwriting examination at that stage was premature because there was no finding by the Magistrate that the documents were in fact forged, and the main NI Act complaint (section 138) was still pending. The Sessions Judge's discretion to refuse to initiate such investigative steps was endorsed.
- The Court reconciled these conclusions by noting that, although the bar under section 195 did not apply in the specific factual circumstance of only copies being produced, the Magistrate's refusal to order investigation under section 156(3) was a permissible exercise of discretion because the application was premature and amounted to an attempt to enlist State machinery for evidence collection while the primary criminal proceedings remained pending.
- The Court observed that the Additional Sessions Judge's overall approach was partly in favour of the petitioner (on the section 195 point) but was correct in refusing the relief sought in revision (on the question of ordering investigation at that stage). The High Court found no reason to upset the Sessions Judge's discretionary conclusion that the application for handwriting examination and search warrants was premature.
Holding and Implications
Holding: Criminal Writ Petition No. 521 of 1994 is partly allowed.
Core ruling (as implemented): The High Court held that the criminal complaint in Case No. 78.Misc. of 1992 (filed under sections 193 and 471 IPC read with section 195 Cr.P.C.) is maintainable because the bar under section 195(1)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C. does not apply where only a copy of the disputed document is produced. The Court directed the learned Magistrate to proceed in accordance with law.
Direct consequences and implications:
- The private complaint (Case No. 78.Misc. of 1992) is declared maintainable and the Magistrate has been directed to proceed in accordance with law.
- The Court declined to compel the Magistrate to order an investigation under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. or to send the documents for expert handwriting examination at the stage when the main NI Act complaint was pending, treating such steps as premature and an improper use of State machinery for evidence collection.
- The opinion accepts as settled the narrow legal proposition that the bar under section 195(1)(b)(ii) is not attracted when only copies of the allegedly forged documents are produced; beyond that, the Court did not direct immediate investigative measures.
The opinion does not announce or claim to lay down any broader novel precedent beyond applying established principles to the facts of this case; its orders affect the parties by holding the complaint maintainable and by directing the Magistrate to proceed in accordance with law.
Disposition: Criminal writ petition partly allowed; complaint in Case No. 78.Misc. of 1992 held maintainable and Magistrate directed to proceed in accordance with law.
1. This Criminal Writ Petition is filed by the petitioner/original complainant-Dilipkumar J. Jain, being aggrieved by the Judgment and Order dated 28th February, 1994, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Greater Bombay in Criminal Revision Application No. 15 of 1993. By the impugned Judgment and Order, the learned Additional Sessions Judge dismissed the Revision Application of the complainant/petitioner herein, which he had filed against the Judgment and Order dated 11th December, 1992, passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, 29th Court, Dadar, who had dismissed the complainant's complaint, which he had filed under sections 193 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code read with section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
2. Few facts, which are required to be stated, are as follows:—
3. The present petitioner had filed C.C No. 18.S/1992 against respondent No. 2.original accused for the offence punishable under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. In those proceedings, the accused/respondent No. 2.Mohammed Tamboli filed an application for discharge. The case of the complainant was that he was the Manager of H.B Jain, a firm doing wholesale business of various items of consumer goods. Respondent No. 2 was the Proprietor of Bombay Traders, a firm doing trading in some items of consumer goods. The said firm of respondent No. 2 purchased and took delivery of some merchandise from the petitioner's firm S.B Jain, in payment of which Bombay Traders issued cheques worth Rs. 57,48.10 paise in favour of the petitioner's firm. They were dishonoured. Therefore, the petitioner filed the above Complaint Case No. 18.S/1992 in the Court of the Metropolitan Magistrate, 29th Court, Bhoiwada, under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, against respondent No. 2, he being the proprietor of the said Bombay Traders, whose cheques had bounced.
4. Thereafter, respondent No. 2 filed an application for discharge and along with the discharge application annexed copies of two receipts — one signed by the erstwhile servant Mr. Lekhu of the petitioner's firm, purportedly showing having received back some materials and the other one, signed by the petitioner, purportedly showing having received the payment of the said cheques, which were dishonoured.
5. The petitioner's story is that he had a doubt that the first receipt, which was signed by his erstwhile servant Lekhu, was forged and he was certain that the second receipt was also forged, as, according to him, he had not signed any receipt. Hence complaint being Complaint Case No. 78.Misc/1992, under sections 193, 471 of the Indian Penal Code read with section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, against respondent No. 2 came to be filed by him. This complaint was filed by him when his first complaint under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, which he had filed against respondent No. 2 was still pending.
6. The petitioner alleged in this second complaint that respondent No. 2 was using copy of the forged documents in order to escape the liability in a Criminal Case. He also averred that either respondent No. 2 had earlier stolen or got stolen the letter-heads of the petitioner's firm as he was regularly coming there and was having good relations with the firm's staff or respondent No. 2 had fabricated the letter heads of the petitioner's firm in order to facilitate the commission of forgery. It is his story that he used one such copy in his discharge application and it was quite possible that some more letter-heads might be lying in respondent No. 2's office or residence. He, therefore, applied for search warrant under section 94 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
7. The learned Magistrate of the 29th Court, Bhoiwada, however, rejected Complaint Case No. 78.Misc./1992 on the ground that forgery had come to light during the pendency of judicial proceedings of Case No. 18.S of 1992 (which the complainant had filed under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, against respondent No. 2). The learned Magistrate further held that the said complaint could be filed only by the concerned Court under section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. He rejected the petitioner's application for search warrant also as a corollary to the rejection of the Complaint Case No. 78.Misc./1992. Being aggrieved by the said order of rejection of his complaint as well as his application for search warrant, the petitioner approached the Sessions Court and filed Criminal Revision Application No. 15 of 1993. The learned Additional Sessions Judge also, by his impugned Judgment and Order dated 28th February, 1994, dismissed his Revision Application. It is against this order, that the petitioner has approached this Court.
8. Mr. Bharadwaj appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the learned Magistrate ought to have proceeded under section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, when it was a specific allegation of the complainant that there was forgery of the receipts, which allegedly his erstwhile servant Mr. Lekhu had committed. According to him, the learned Magistrate ought to have sent the disputed receipts and the letter to the handwriting expert to affirm whether those documents were really signed by Lekhu or whether they had been signed by the complainant. It is the grievance of the petitioner's Advocate that instead of following this procedure, the learned Magistrate proceeded under Chapter XV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and hastily dismissed the complaint under section 203. He also argued that in the present case, since the accused had produced only a copy of the disputed receipt and the letter, private complaint by the aggrieved party was maintainable and that there was no bar under section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. To substantiate his arguments, Mr. Bharadwaj relied upon number of authorities. Some of them were as follows:
(1) AIR 1950 (37) Privy Council 34, Sanmukhsingh v. The King, (2) 376 Supreme Court Reports (1963), Budhu Ram v. State Of Rajasthan ., (3) 1988 Cri. L.J 427, Sushil Kumar v. State of Haryana, (4) 1989 Cri. L.J 760, Ramnarain v. State of Rajasthan, (5) 1998 Cri. L.J 1565, Sachinda Nand Singh v. State of Bihar. All the authorities are cited by him to substantiate his argument that when the accused produced copy of the forged document, there was no bar under section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
9. I have heard Mr. Bharadwaj at length on this point, so also Mr. Salvi, the learned A.P.P appearing for the State. The legal position on this point is well settled and there is almost no grey area, that indeed when what is produced before the Court is only a copy of the forged document and the original forged document is not produced, then bar under section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, would not apply. Therefore, on this point, the submissions advanced by Mr. Bharadwaj can be accepted and it will have to be held that the finding of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate 29th Court, Dadar, was erroneous inasmuch as he erroneously held that the complaint filed by the complainant was not tenable as the Court ought to have filed the complaint and that the complainant had no locus standi to file the present complaint (the second complaint), in view of section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He gave a finding that the Court ought to have filed a complaint which was obviously wrong.
10. The Revisional Court, has correctly accepted the submission of Mr. Bharadwaj on this point that when only a copy of the disputed document, which is alleged to be a forged document, is tendered in the Court, bar of section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not attracted. However, the second limb of argument of Mr. Bharadwaj that the learned Magistrate ought to have sent the disputed receipts for investigation to the handwriting expert, and that he was bound to proceed under section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is not acceptable. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, was of the view that the complainant, by making this application, was trying to make use of State machinery for the purpose of collecting evidence which was not proper. The learned Additional Sessions Judge also thought that the application of the complainant was premature at that stage and that the concerned Court where the disputed documents were filed, would have to consider the exact nature of the documents on record and that the original documents would have to be brought on record, which might give rise to the Court to proceed under section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. In my opinion, the finding of the Additional Sessions Judge is correct and I do not find any reason to differ with the said finding.
11. The present position as far as the case in hand is concerned, is that there is no finding from the lower Court that the disputed documents are forged documents. No such finding is as yet given by the lower Court. It is also true that the complainant is seeking to use the State machinery at this stage to collect evidence in his favour. This is improper and has to be avoided. Mr. Bharadwaj has been harping on the point that bar of section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is not attracted. This is no doubt an important point for consideration. However, having considered that point in favour of the petitioner, the next point is, whether the application of the complainant to send the allegedly forged receipt to the hand-writing expert at this stage is proper or not. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has held that it is premature and I agree with that finding. The main complaint filed under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is still pending and; hence, application of the complainant under sections 193 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code in Case No. 78.Misc. of 1992 was thought to be a premature application and the learned Additional Sessions Judge was correct in refusing the relief prayed for by the petitioner in this Revision Application.
12. After hearing both the Advocates at length and after going through the impugned judgment of the Revisional Court, I find that the learned Additional Sessions Judge, while holding in favour of the complainant as far as legal position under section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for the offence punishable under sections 193 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, has not stated in so many terms that the private complaint filed by the petitioner is maintainable as there is no bar of section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He has simply dismissed the Revision Application while partly holding in favour of the petitioner. His finding in para 10 of the Judgment against the petitioner also need not be interfered with. As far as the finding in para 10 of the impugned Judgment about discretion of the Magistrate under section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is concerned, the learned Additional Sessions Judge is right and I agree with his finding. In view of this position, the prayer of the writ petition will have to be modified as follows:—
13. Criminal Writ Petition No. 521 of 1994 is partly allowed and it is held that the criminal complaint in Case No. 78.Misc. of 1992, is maintainable and the learned Magistrate is directed to proceed in accordance with law. Writ petition is disposed of accordingly.
Criminal writ petition partly allowed.
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