1. Arbitration Petition No. 148 of 1997 has been filed for passing a decree in terms of the Award dated 3rd April, 1995 made by the learned Arbitrator Shri R.R Chari and numbered as Award No. 121 of 1995. It is the case of the petitioners that the petitioners and the respondents are closely related. The petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 are the husband and wife respectively. Respondent No. 1 is their son. Respondent No. 2 is the wife of their son Mr. Anil. Respondent No. 3 Mr. Arun is their another son. Respondent No. 4 is the daughter-in-law being wife of their son Mr. Arun. Respondent No. 5 is the sister of petitioner No. 1 and respondent No. 6 is a legal representative of deceased daughter of the petitioners by name Anju Sawhney. Respondent Nos. 7 and 8 are the business concerns of the family. According to the petitioners, an agreement was reached between the parties on 12th November 1994 whereby the parties decided to refer their disputes and differences to a Sole Arbitrator. The Sole Arbitrator made his award which is dated 3rd April, 1995. The parties to the agreement unconditionally accepted the award. On the same day they also executed a deed of partition partitioning the property in terms of the award. There is no petition filed raising objections to the award within the time allowed by the law. Mr. Sanjay Sawhney, who is the legal representative of the deceased daughter of the petitioners by name Anju Sawhney, has filed a petition being Arbitration Petition (Lodging) No. 264 of 1998 praying for an order setting aside the award dated 3rd April 1995. That petition has been filed beyond time and therefore, there is a prayer for condonation of delay in filing that petition. Respondent Nos. 3 and 5 support the petition. The petition has been opposed only by respondent No. 1 Mr. Anil. According to the petitioners, respondent No. 1 Mr. Anil is not entitled to oppose the petition because he has already derived and accepted the benefits under the award. Petition No. 1 has filed an affidavit dated 3rd September 1997 stating the details of benefits, which have been derived by respondent No. 1 Mr. Anil under the award.

2. The learned counsel, appearing for the petitioners, submits that in the present case, there is a written agreement to refer the disputes to arbitration. The award of the Arbitrator has been accepted by all the parties to the award. Respondent No. 1 has derived benefits out of the award and therefore, according to him respondent No. 1 is estopped from challenging the award. In support of this propostion, he relies upon judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Kale v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, AIR 1976 SC 807. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the award does not itself create rights in the immoveable properties, which are dealt with by the award. The award requires documents to be executed by the parties for making declarations/transfers mentioning the award effective and therefore, according to the learned counsel, it was not necessary to register the award in terms of the provisions of Section 17 of the Registration Act. For this proposition, he relies on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Mrs. Tehmi P. Sidhwa v. Shib Banerjee & Sons Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1974 SC 1912. The learned counsel submits that the parties are closely related. They agreed to refer their disputes to a Sole Arbitrator. The award of the Arbitrator has not only been signed in acceptance by all the parties, but has also been acted upon by the parties. The learned counsel, relying upon the observations of the Supreme Court in its judgment in the case of Vaidya Harishankar Laxmiram Raiyaguru of Rajkot v. Pratapray Harishankar Rajyaguru of Rajkot, (1988) 3 SCC 21, submits that considering the close relationship between the parties and their conduct only for technical objection the Court cannot decline making of a decree in terms of the award. He also relies on the observations of the Supreme Court in its judgment in the case of Bijendra Nath Srivastava (dead) through LRs. v. Mayank Srivastava, AIR 1994 SC 2562. In so far as the objection raised by Mr. Sanjay Sawhney to the award is concerned, the learned counsel submits that even if it is assumed that Mr. Sanjay Sawhney has raised the objection within time, according to the learned counsel, Mr. Sanjay Sawhney is not entitled to raise any objection to the award because according to the learned counsel, it is admitted position between the parties that the entire property, which is the subject matter of the award, was owned by Mr. Balakram Hitkari, who is the father of the petitioner No. 1, who died on 28th August 1971. Some of the properties were also held by his wife Durgadevi Hitkari, who died on 9th November 1991. There are wills left behind by both Balakram Hitkari and Durgadevi Hitkari. However, none of the wills has yet been probated and respondent No. 1 Mr. Anil, who has filed the petition for obtaining probate of these wills has agreed to withdraw those probate petitions. In the submissions of the learned counsel, as the entire property is left behind by Balakram Hitkari and Durgadevi Hitkari, Anju Sawhney, who is the mother of Mr. Sanjay Sawhney, who has raised the objection, would have no interest in the property left behind by Balakram Hitkari and Durgadevi Hitkari during the life time of her father petitioner No. 1 and therefore, according to the learned counsel, therefore, Anju Sawhney had no right, title or interest in any of the properties, which are subject matter of the arbitration award. The learned counsel submits that an amount of Rs. 60 lakhs, is directed to be paid to Anju Sawhney out of sale consideration of one of the properties. According to the learned counsel this direction has been issued by the arbitrator and accepted by the parties. In the submission of the learned counsel as Mr. Sanjay Sawhney has no right to claim any more benefits than have been awarded in relation to the properties that are subject matter of the award, he is not entitled to challenge the same. The learned counsel also submits that therefore, even if the objection raised by Mr. Sanjay Sawhney that his mother has not signed the agreement to refer the disputes to arbitration as also the arbitration award is taken to be correct then what can be said is Anju Sawhney is not a party to the arbitration agreement and the award and therefore, the award would not be binding on her. According to the learned counsel in any case, the award does not deprive Anju Sawhney or her heirs or any of their right in the property, which are subject matter of the arbitration agreement or the arbitration award on the contrary it confers some benefits on Anju Sawhney to which she is not entitled to in law.

3. The only petition filed for objecting the award is filed by Mr. Sanjay Sawhney. The learned counsel appearing for Mr. Sanjay Sawhney did not argue or make submissions that Anju Sawhney of whom the objector Mr. Sanjay Sawhney is the son, had any interest in the property that was subject matter of the award. However, the only submission that was made by the learned counsel relying on judgment of this Court in the case of Vallabh Pitte v. Karsingdas Govindram Kalani, AIR 1963 Bom 157 was that as Anju Sawhney had not signed the arbitration agreement, the Arbitrator had no jurisdiction to pass the award and therefore, award should be set aside.

4. Shri Tulzapurkar, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 1 Mr. Anil submits that according to the award withdrawal of the probate petition filed by him were condition precedent for the arbitration award to come into force. According to the learned counsel, the probate petitions have not yet been withdrawn by him and therefore the award cannot have any effect. The learned counsel, relying on a notice dated 29th March 1995, which was received by him from the arbitrator and which has been filed by him along with his Affidavit dated 22nd March 1999, further, submits that the arbitration agreement was not at all signed in November, 1994 as claimed by the petitioners. According to him, the arbitration award and the partition deed which is executed in terms thereof all come into existence on the same day namely 3rd April, 1995. According to the learned counsel, therefore, the entire proceedings of making the award are sham and bogus and therefore, the Court should not pass a decree in terms of the award. The learned counsel further submits that according to Section 14 of the Arbitration Act, the award is required to be filed, with the documents which were received by the arbitrator. The arbitrator in the award has said that he has returned the documents and therefore, according to the learned counsel, the conduct of the arbitrator amounts to misconduct and therefore, on this ground also the award is liable to be set aside. The learned counsel submits that by the award, an amount of Rs. 60 lakh is directed to be given to Anju Sawhney who even according to the petitioners, had no interest in the property and therefore according to the learned counsel giving of the amount of Rs. 60 lakh to Anju Sawhney reduces the share of respondent No. 1 in the property. He further submits that by the will of Balakram Hitkari dated 19th July 1966 he had left his entire property to his wife Durgadevi Hitkari and by her Will dated 11th June 1991 she had left her entire property to respondent No. 1. Respondent No. 1 has filed a probate petition for obtaining probate of the Wills dated 19th July, 1966 and 11th June, 1991. According to the learned counsel, therefore by the award injustice has been done to him as most of the properties which ought to come to him exclusively have been allotted to others. The learned counsel further submits that his conduct of accepting benefit under the award therefore cannot be considered as having accepted the award because according to the learned counsel, he is in any case entitled to that property.

5. In the light of these rival submissions if the records of the case is perused it is clear that the parties to these proceedings are closely related. There were disputes among the members of the family which were to be resolved by making reference to arbitration. The first question that arises for consideration is whether the award was liable to be registered under Section 17 of the Registration Act. In this connection the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Mrs. Tehmi P. Sidhwa, referred to above, lays down that if the award itself does not operate to create interest in immoveable property but contemplates some documents to be executed for making the award effective then the award is not compulsorily registerable under Section 17 of the Registration Act. The observations of the Supreme Court in para 5 of the Mrs. T.P Sidhwa's case (AIR 1974 SC 1912) read as follows:

“5. It would be noticed that the award itself does not purport or operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future any right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent, of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, in respect of the immoveable property, as contemplated under Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act. It merely creates a right to obtain another document which will, when executed, create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any such right, title or interest. The award directs Sahib Banerjee and Sons Private Ltd. to execute such documents as may be necessary for declaring the one-fourth share of the appellants in the said property and also to execute such documents as may be necessary for transferring the said property and the lease from the Delhi Improvement Trust to the joint names of themselves and the appellants. It therefore, squarely falls under Section 17(2)(v) of the Registration Act.”

6. In so far as the present award is concerned, perusal of the award shows that there are three immoveable properties with which the award deals and in the award there are directions issued for execution of documents for making the award effective. It is further to be seen that by clause 3, 4 of the award all the parties to the award have been directed to sign and execute documents and writings for making the award effective. It is thus clear that there is no right created by the award itself in the immoveable properties. Rights in the immoveable properties are to be created by documents to be executed by the parties and therefore in terms of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in T.P Sidhwa's case (AIR 1974 SC 1912) the award cannot be said to be compulsorily registerable. So far as the objection raised by Mr. Sanjay Sawhney is concerned, in my opinion Mr. Sanjay Sawhney is not at all entitled to raise any objection to the award. A person can raise the objection to the award only if it is his case that by the award some rights of his, have been curtailed or denied to him. Mr. Sanjay Sawhney is claiming through his mother Anju Sawhney. As rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners, Anju Sawhney has not interest whatsoever in the property that was subject matter of arbitration proceedings. Whatever directions in her favour are found in the award have been made by the arbitrator for her benefit though she does not have any interest in the property and therefore, in my opinion, Mr. Sanjay Sawhney is not entitled to raise any objection of the award. So far as the objection of Mr. Sanjay Sawhney that Anju Sawhney have not signed the arbitration agreement and therefore, the arbitrator has no jurisdiction to proceed with the arbitration is concerned, in my opinion, even if it is assumed that Anju Sawhney has not signed the arbitration agreement therefore anything said in the award would not be binding on her. In any case as I find that Anju Sawhney has no interest in the property, it cannot be said by the award any of her right has been adversely affected. There-fore, the objection raised by Mr. Sanjay Sawhney is devoid of any substance. So far as the objections raised in the affidavits filed i by respondent No. 1 are concerned, in my opinion, the conduct of respondent No. 1 of accepting the arbitration agreement and signing the same or signing the partition deed and accepting the benefit under the award, estop him from raising any objection to the award. In this regard the observations made by the Supreme Court in its judgment in Kale's case referred to above are relevant. Perusal of the observations shows that the Supreme Court has applied estoppel even in a case where the Supreme Court assumed the document to be compulsorily registerable. Paragraph 38 of the judgment reads as follows:

“38. Rebutting the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Sharma for the respondents contended that no question of estoppel would arise in the instant case inasmuch as if the document was to be compulsorily registrable there can be no estoppel against the statute. In the first place in view of the fact that the family arrangement was oral and the mutation petition was merely filed before the Court of the Assistant Commissioner for information and for mutation in pursuance of the compromise, the document was not required to be registered, therefore, the principle that there is no estoppel against the statute does not apply to the present case. Assuming, however, that the said documents were compulsorily registerable the Courts have generally held that a family arrangement being binding on the parties to it would operate as an estoppel by preventing the parties after having taken advantage under the arrangement to resile from the same and try to revoke it. This principle has been established by several decisions of this Court as also of the Privy Counsel. In Kanhai Lal v. Brij Lal, 45 Ind App 118 atp. 124 : (AIR 1918 PC 70 at p. 74), the Privy Council applied the principle of estoppel to the facts of the case and observed as follows”:

“Kanhai Lal was a party to that compromise. He was one of those whose claims to the family property, or to shares in it, induced Ram Dei, against her own interests and those of her daughter, Kirpa, and greatly to her own detriment, to alter her position by agreeing to the compromise, and under that compromise he obtained a substantial benefit, which he has hitherto enjoyed. In their Lordships opinion he is bound by it and cannot now claim as a reversioner.”

7. Observations of the Supreme Court in para 39 of the same judgment are also pertinent, which reads as follows:

“39. This Court in Dhiyan Singh v. Jugal Kishore, 1952 SCR 478 : (AIR 1952 SC 145) observed as follows:

“We do not think the fact that there was a voluntary compromise whereas here there was the imposed decision of an arbitrator makes any difference because we are not proceeding on the footing of the award but on the actings of the parties in accepting it when they need not have done so if the present contentions are correct.

Even if the arbitrator was wholly wrong and even if he had no power to decide as he did, it was open to both sides to accept the decision and by their acceptance recognise the existence of facts which would in law give the other an absolute estate in the properties they agreed to divide. That, in our opinion is a representation of an existing fact or set of facts. Each would consequently be estopped as against the other and Brijlal in particular would have been estopped from denying the existence of facts which would give Mst. Mohan Dei an absolute interest in the suit property.”

In view of the principle enunciated in the aforesaid case it is obvious that respondents 4 and 5 would be estopped from denying the existence of the family arrangement or from questioning its validity.”

8. So far as the objections raised by respondent No. 1 that the agreement of arbitration was not signed on the day on which it is shown to have been signed and it was signed on the day on which the award was made is concerned, in my opinion, even if it is assumed that the arbitration agreement was not signed in November, 1994 as claimed and that it was signed on 3rd April, 1995, the conduct of the parties of signing that agreement and accepting the award and executing further documents pursuant to that award has to be construed as existence of an arbitration agreement between the parties. The observations of the Supreme Court in para 6 of its judgment in the case of Vaidya Harishankar Laxmiram Rajyaguru of Rajkot are pertinent (1988 (3) SCC 21), which reads as follows:

“6. The main objection to the award is that there was no written agreement signed by both the parties to refer the disputes to arbitration. It is clear from the narration of facts that the parties had agreed to refer the dispute to arbitrator. The award signed by both the parties, about which there is no factual dispute, reiterated the fact that the parties had agreed to refer the dispute to the arbitration of the said arbitrator and that he made an award. All these are in writing and signed by all the parties. This, in our opinion, in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case can certainly be construed to be a proper arbitration agreement in terms of Section 2(a) of the Act. In this connection reference may be made to the observations of this Court in Prasun Roy v. Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority, AIR 1988 SC 205: (1987) 4 SCC 217 where all the relevant authorities on this point have been discussed. See also in this connection the decision of the Judicial Committee in Chowdhri Murtaza Hossein v. Mst. Bibi Bechunnjssa, (1875-1976) 3 IA 209, 220. The observations in the said decision were made in different context. But in the present context, it is clear that the conduct of the parties that there was an arbitration agreement and by signing two awards it could be said that the parties had agreed to refer the diputes in writing to the arbitration of the named arbitrator. This agreement was done twice, firstly by signing an endorsement below the award and secondly, by entering into an agreement in the form of a letter dated August 14, 1978 (Ex. 40).

9. In so far as the objection about the arbitrator returning the documents which was produced before him are concerned, in my opinion, it would be an irregularity. The Supreme Court has observed in para 10 of the same judgment as follows:

“10. In Guru Nanak Foundation v. Rattan Singh and Sons, (1982) 1 SCR 842: (1981) 4 SCC 634 : AIR 1981 SC 2075. Where this Court observed that interminable, time consuming, complex and expensive Court procedures impelled jurists to search for an alternative forum, less formal, more effective and speedy for resolution of disputes avoiding procedural claptrap and this led them to the Arbitration Act. However, the way in which the proceedings under the Act are conducted and without an exception challenged in Courts, has made lawyers laugh and legal philosophers weep. This Court further observed that experience shows and law reports bear ample testimony that the proceedings under the Act have become highly technical accompanied by unending prolixity, at every stage providing a legal trap to the unwary. With respect, we could not agree more in the facts and the circumstances of this case.”

10. It is further to be seen that the Supreme Court in its judgment in Brijendra Nath Srivastava's case (AIR 1994 SC 2562) referred to above has said that the conduct of the arbitrator of returning the documents which were produced before him by the parties cannot be regarded as a misconduct in the conduct of the proceedings or an error in making the award and therefore the Court could not be justified in setting aside the award on that ground. The observations are to be found in paragraph 30 of its judgment in Brijendra Nath Srivastava's case (AIR 1994 SC 2562), which reads as follows:

“30. It has also been observed by the High Court that large number of documents were filed by party No. 1 before the arbitrator vide paper bearing 103/347-348.Kha and that out of 50 serial numbers in the list all the documents except those mentioned at serial numbers 20 and 50, were returned by the arbitrator on December 1, 1966, after he had already made the award and a few days before filing it in the Court. The High Court has referred to the provisions of Section 14 of the Act which lays down that the “arbitrator shall cause the award, together with any deposition and documents which may have been taken and proved before them, to be filed in Court” and has held that in view of the said statutory duty it was not correct on the part of the arbitrator to return the documents mentioned in the list (paper No. 103/347/348.Kha) after making the award. According to the High Court the arbitrator deviated from the judicial standard expected of him as an arbitrator in returning these documents. The High Court has not indicated the nature of these documents and it is not clear whether they were part of the evidence produced before the arbitrator. The explanation offered for the return of the documents was that Bhupendra Nath being the karta of the family often needs the documents in connection with the management of the family property, was rejected by the High Court on the view that Bhupendra Nath had ceased to be Karta as soon as the agreement dated January 3, 1966 was entered between the parties and it was not for him to manage joint property but for the respective parties to manage the properties falling to the share of each in accordance with the decision of the arbitrator if and when confirmed by the Court. In the absence of any material to show that the documents which were returned by the arbitrator to party No. 1 were part of the evidence produced before the arbitrator it cannot be said that the arbitrator was at fault in returning the said documents to party No. 1 after making the award. Moreover the said conduct of the arbitrator cannot be regarded as a misconduct in the conduct of the proceedings or an error in making the award so as to justify the setting aside the award. We are, therefore, unable to uphold the findings recorded by the High Court in setting aside award on ground of misconduct.”

11. The said conduct of the arbitrator cannot be regarded as a misconduct in the conduct of the proceedings or an error in making the award so as to justify the setting aside the award.

12. Now lastly in so far as the submission of respondent No. 1 that withdrawal of the probate petition was condition precedent for making the award affective and therefore as the probate proceedings have not been withdrawn, the award cannot become effective is concerned, in my opinion, the conduct of the petitioners of signing the partition deed thereafter accepting benefit that has flown to him under the award as also his conduct of filing precipe before this Court for withdrawal of probate proceedings, disentitles him to prosecute the probate proceedings further. An inference can be safely drawn from the conduct of the respondent No. 1 that he has given up his right which he had claimed under the probate proceedings and he has disentitled himself to continue with the probate proceedings and therefore for the present probate proceedings have to be taken as withdrawn though actually they have not been withdrawn by respondent No. 1. In my opinion one thing that guides the Court in dealing with the objections raised is that the arbitration relates to properties of family. Parties to the proceedings are closely related. The parties have accepted the award in 1995 and have divided the properties pursuant to that award. The parties have been conducting their affairs in terms of the award for the last four years. Therefore, in my opinion considering the conduct of the parties it will not be in the interest of justice to disregard the award at this stage. It will result in flaring up of disputes between the parties and unsettle the settled transactions. In this view of the matter in my opinion the petitioners deserve the relief that they have claimed in the petition. The petition is therefore granted in terms of prayer clause (a). In so far as Arbitration Petition Lodging No. 264 of 1998 is concerned it is dismissed. Drawing up of the order in terms of decree is accepted.

Order accordingly.