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Laxmibai A. Wagle v. Income Tax Officer

Bombay High Court
Mar 30, 1999
Smart Summary (Beta)

Judgment Summary — N.P. Chapalgaonker, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, Laxmibai A. Wagle (now deceased; represented by legal representatives), an individual assessed to Income-tax and Wealth Tax and a partner in A.G. Wagle, owned agricultural land in Goa (Matriz Nos. 510 and 512). For the assessment year 1984–1985 she disclosed receipts of Rs. 1,98,625 from Zuari Agro Chemicals Ltd. for water drawn from her agricultural land and appended a note claiming that the receipts were capital in nature and therefore not taxable. For subsequent assessment years (1985–1986 through 1988–1989) she similarly disclosed receipts from Zuari Agro Chemicals Ltd. and claimed them as not taxable; assessments for those years were completed.

On 26-3-1991 the Income-Tax Officer issued notices under section 148 seeking to re-open the assessments for assessment years 1984–1985 to 1988–1989. The petitioner sought clarification by letter dated 15-4-1991 whether notices were issued under section 147(a) or 147(b) and requested a copy of the reasons recorded under section 148; she was thereafter asked to appear before the Income-Tax Officer. The petitioner filed a writ petition challenging the validity of the section 148 notice(s) and seeking quashing of the notice and prohibition on further proceedings.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a notice under section 148 (read with section 147) is valid where the income in question was fully disclosed by the assessee in returns and accepted by the Assessing Officer (i.e., can the assessment be re-opened merely because the Assessing Officer has changed his view).
  2. Whether the requirement to record reasons for issuing a section 148 notice includes a statutory obligation to communicate those recorded reasons to the assessee before issuing the notice.
  3. Whether information consisting only of a change of view, internal audit opinion, or mere points of law (as opposed to new material facts) can constitute “information” that justifies reopening under section 147(b).
  4. Whether a notice under section 148 read with section 147 must specify whether the re-opening is contemplated under clause (a) or clause (b) of section 147.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (Shri V.K. Bodke)

  • The receipts were fully disclosed in the Income-tax and Wealth-tax returns and described as capital receipts; the Assessing Officer accepted that position in original assessments, so the Assessing Officer cannot re-open the case merely because he believes that acceptance was a mistake.
  • Recording and communication of reasons: unless reasons are recorded and communicated to the assessee, issuance of notice under sections 147 and 148 is not contemplated and the re-opening is without jurisdiction.

Respondent's Arguments (Shri S.R. Rivonkar)

  • If the Assessing Officer failed to appreciate that disclosed receipts were taxable (i.e., accepted the assessee's contention without proper application of mind), he has jurisdiction to re-open the assessment under section 147 read with section 148.
  • Impliedly contests the submission that reasons must be communicated prior to notice; seeks to rely on the Assessing Officer's recorded opinion to justify reopening.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Maharaj Kumar Kamal Singh v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Bihar and Orissa, I.T.R. Vol. XXXV (1959) Interpreted “information” (in section 34(1)(b) of the then Act) to include information as to the true state of law (e.g., judicial decisions). If a judicial decision was not considered by the AO and later comes to his knowledge it may justify reopening. The court noted this principle but observed that in the present case the Department does not contend that judicial decisions were missed; thus this precedent did not permit reopening where the AO had merely changed his view on the same disclosed facts.
A.L.A. Firm v. Commissioner of Income-tax (I.T.R. reference in text) Alongside Maharaj Kumar Kamal Singh, treated “information” as potentially including judicial decisions. Referenced in support of the interpretive principle concerning “information,” but not held to authorize reopening on the facts before this court where no new judicial decision or fresh material was shown to have come to the AO's attention.
Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. Income-Tax Officer, (1961) ITR Vol. XLI p. 191 (Constitution Bench) A duty on the assessee to disclose all primary facts bearing on assessment; however, intention/conclusions drawn from facts are matters of inference. If AO had no material to believe non-disclosure, AO had no jurisdiction to reopen after statutory period; minority noted that mere error of interpretation by AO does not justify reopening. The Court relied on the governing principle that reopening cannot be predicated merely upon the AO's different interpretation of fully disclosed facts; it emphasized the narrow scope for reopening assessments under the pre-amendment law.
Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, New Delhi, 1979 ITR Vol. 119 p. 996 Held that a point of law cannot be treated as “information” under section 147(b) for the purpose of re-opening an assessment; letters from Government relying on such points likewise are not “information.” The court cited this authority to support the proposition that legal points or internal opinions do not amount to new “information” justifying reassessment; applied to distinguish the present facts where only a changed view was relied upon.
Commissioner of Income-Tax v. Rasiklal C. Nagri, 1992 ITR Vol. 193 p. 665 (Gujarat High Court) Where all primary facts necessary for assessment were disclosed, and no new information was received, reassessment proceedings were vitiated. The court treated this decision as directly analogous: in the present case primary facts were disclosed and no new information was shown to have been received by the AO, so reassessment was unjustified.
Coca-Cola Export Corporation v. Income-Tax Officer, AIR 1998 SCW 1665 Held that a notice under section 148 read with section 147 need not specify whether the action is contemplated under clause (a) or clause (b) of section 147. The court applied this holding to reject the petitioner's submission that failure to state whether reopening was under section 147(a) or 147(b) rendered the action bad.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a statutory and factual analysis limited to the materials in the file and the arguments advanced. The key points of its reasoning were:

  1. Statutory framework: The court reviewed section 147 as it stood prior to the amendment effective 1-4-1989 and section 148, emphasizing that the pre-amendment law provided a narrow, well-defined scope for reopening assessments — either where there was an omission/failure by the assessee to make a return or to disclose fully material facts, or where the Assessing Officer, by reason of information in his possession, had reason to believe income had escaped assessment.
  2. Nature of the disclosure: The court found the facts undisputed that the receipts from Zuari Agro Chemicals Ltd. (for water from the agricultural source) had been disclosed in the returns and explicitly characterized as capital receipts; that position had been accepted by the Assessing Officer in the original assessments; and no fresh information had been shown to have been received by the Assessing Officer.
  3. Recorded reasons: The Assessing Officer had recorded an opinion stating he believed the receipts were revenue in nature and therefore under-assessed, and had issued the section 148 notice. The court held (i) recording reasons is a statutory requirement to show application of mind, (ii) the reasons need not be communicated to the assessee as a pre-condition to issuing a section 148 notice, and (iii) the court is entitled to examine those recorded reasons in judicial review. Thus the petitioner's contention that non-communication of reasons invalidated the notice was rejected.
  4. Role of “information” and precedents: The court surveyed authorities interpreting “information” (including whether points of law, judicial decisions, or internal audit opinions constitute “information”) and concluded that where the only basis for reopening is a changed view by the Assessing Officer on facts fully disclosed and earlier accepted by the AO, that alone does not constitute fresh “information” under the pre-amendment statutory scheme. The court relied on authorities (including Calcutta Discount Co., Indian & Eastern Newspaper Society, and Rasiklal) to support the proposition that reassessment is impermissible where primary facts were already disclosed and no new material has been brought to the AO's attention.
  5. Requirement to state clause (a) or (b): The court relied on the Supreme Court decision in Coca-Cola Export Corporation to hold that a notice under section 148 read with section 147 need not specify whether reopening is under clause (a) or clause (b) of section 147; the petitioner's objection on this point was therefore rejected.
  6. Application to present case: Given that (a) the receipts were disclosed and accepted, (b) no new information or overlooked judicial pronouncement was shown to have arisen, and (c) the Assessing Officer's change of view alone was relied upon by the Department, the court concluded that reopening the assessments under the pre-amendment section 147 read with section 148 was not justified.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The court allowed the writ petition and quashed the notice dated 17-5-1991 purportedly issued under section 148 read with section 147, holding that reopening of the assessment in pursuance of that notice was not justified.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The specific section 148 notice dated 17-5-1991 was declared invalid and quashed, so the respondent Income-Tax authorities could not proceed with reassessment on that basis.
  • The rule made absolute and no costs were awarded.

Broader implications:

  • The court reaffirmed the narrow scope for reopening assessments under the pre-amendment sections 147 and 148 where primary facts were already disclosed and no fresh information was established; it emphasized that a mere change of opinion by the Assessing Officer does not constitute fresh information to justify reassessment.
  • The opinion did not purport to lay down any new, broad precedent beyond applying existing authorities to the facts at hand; the decision is confined to the statutory framework and the undisputed factual matrix presented in this case.

Notice for re-opening assessment quashed.
Show all summary ...

N.P Chapalgaonker, J.:— This is a petition by Laxmibai A. Wagle (now deceased through her legal representatives), challenging the validity of a notice issued under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, praying for quashing the said notice and an order of prohibition preventing the respondent Income-tax authorities from proceeding in furtherance of the said notice. The petitioner assessed as an individual for the purpose of Income-tax and Wealth Tax, is also a partner in a partnership firm A.G Wagle. She owns various properties including agricultural land at Sanco Alois (Goa), bearing Matriz Nos. 510 and 512. She had shown in her returns for the assessment year 1984–1985 that she has received a sum of Rs. 1,98,625/- from Zuari Agro Chemicals Ltd., in consideration of water drawn by them from the agricultural land of the petitioner. A note explaining the exemption of this amount from tax liability was appended to both statements of wealth and income submitted by her. Note reads:

“7. The assessee during the year received a sum of Rs. 1,98,625/- (Rupees One lakh ninety eight thousand six hundred and twenty five) from Zuari Agro Chemicals Limited, Zuari Nagar, Goa, in consideration of the water drawn by them subsisting on the assessee's agricultural land situated at Sancoales, Goa, bearing Matriz No. 510 and 512. The assessee claims that the water subsisting in the assessee's agricultural land is a capital asset and the amount received by her is in the nature of capital receipt. Hence not taxable under the Income Tax Act, 1961.”

2. In the assessment year 1985–1986, the petitioner disclosed in the Income Tax as well as in the Wealth Tax returns that she has received a sum of Rs. 3,22,936/- from Zuari Agro Chemicals Ltd., in consideration of the water drawn by them from the source located in the agricultural land and it was also stated that the amount is not taxable under the Income-tax Act. Similarly, in the following assessment years 1986–1987, 1987–1988, and 1988–1989, the income received by the petitioner was disclosed in the Income-tax returns, by the petitioner in consideration of the water drawn by Zuari Agro Chemicals Ltd. Income Tax assessment and the Wealth Tax assessment for the said periods was done and the orders were passed. Thereafter, on 26-3-1991, a notice under section 148 was received by the petitioner seeking to re-open the case of the petitioner for the assessment years 1984–1985 to 1988–1989. In reply to the said notice, a letter was sent by the petitioner on 15-4-1991, seeking a clarification from the Income-Tax Department whether the said notices have been issued under section 147(a) or under section 147(b) of the Income-tax Act. She also asked for the copy of the reasons recorded before issuing notices under section 148 of the Income-tax Act. On 23-5-1991, the petitioner was asked to appear before the Income-Tax Officer, Ward-I, Panaji, Goa. The petitioner, therefore, filed this writ petition, challenging the validity of the notice and for quashing the same.

3. Shri V.K Bodke, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that since the fact of receipt of a particular income and the nature of the income was disclosed fully in the Income-Tax and Wealth Tax returns and the claim of the petitioner that the said income was not taxable, was accepted by the Income-Tax Officer, it is not now within the competence of the Income-tax Officer to re-open the case on the ground that he had taken a mistaken view. It is also contended that unless reasons are recorded and are communicated to the assessee, a notice under sections 147 and 148 is not at all contemplated and, therefore, the order is without jurisdiction.

4. Shri S.R Rivonkar, the learned Counsel for respondent Income-Tax authorities defended the notice and submitted that in a case where the Income-Tax Officer did not notice that the income disclosed is taxable and accepted the contention of the assessee without proper application of mind, he has jurisdiction to re-open the case under section 147 read with section 148 of the Income-tax Act.

5. Section 147, as it stood before the amendment, which came into effect from 1-4-1989, was as under:

(a) the Assessing Officer has reason to believe that, by reason of the omission or failure on the part of an assessee to make a return under section 139 for any assessment year to the Assessing Officer or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year, income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for that years, or

(b) notwithstanding that there has been no omission or failure as mentioned in clause (a) on the part of the assessee, the Assessing Officer has in consequence of information in his possession reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for any assessment year,

he may, subject to the provisions of sections 148 and 153, assess or reassess such income or re-compute the loss or the depreciation allowance, as the case may be, for the assessment year concerned (hereafter in sections 148 and 153 referred to as the relevant assessment year).”

6. Therefore, section 147 was permitting the re-opening of the assessee's case and assess or reassess the income escaped, only if (a) the Assessing Officer has reason to believe that there is an omission on the part of the assessee to make a return under section 139 for any assessment year to the Assessing Officer or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary; (b) even if there is no such failure on the part of the assessee, but if the assessing officer has, in consequence of information in his possession, reason to believe that the income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for any assessment year. Thus, the law, as it stood before the amendment made by the Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987, gave a well defined narrow scope for reopening of the assessment. He could do so if the fact of receipt of a particular income is not disclosed by the assessee or he has received information giving him reason to believe that the income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment.

7. Section 148 deals with the requirement to issue notice before assessment or reassessment is made under section 148 and sub-section (2) makes it mandatory that the Assessing Officer shall, before issuing any notice under that section, record the reasons for doing so. The petitioner contends that since the assessee has disclosed the information, re-opening is permissible only if there is some information to the Assessing Officer, which necessarily means a material which was not there in existence when the assessment was made.

8. The facts relating to this case are not in dispute. The income which the assessee received from Zuari Agro Chemicals Ltd., for the sale of water from a source which was situated in the agricultural land, was disclosed. It is contended that they are capital receipts, not taxable. The position was accepted by the Assessing Officer. No fresh information is received by the Assessing Officer and the Assessing Officer, on 26th March, 1991, recorded an opinion noting that:

“The assessee has claimed that receipts are of capital nature. I am of the opinion that these receipts are of revenue nature. I therefore have reasons to believe that the income is chargeable to tax is underassessed. Notice under section 148 is to be issued to reopen the assessment.”

and, thereafter, issued notice under section 148.

9. The first contention raised by the petitioner's Counsel that the reasons should have been communicated to the assessee has no foundation in the statutory requirement. Requirement of recording reasons may be for different purposes. Requirement of recording reasons in a speaking and reasoned order is different from the requirement of recording reasons before an authority reopens a case. They are to be recorded to ensure that he has applied mind and has considered the material which permits him to reopen the case. In judicial scrutiny, the Court would be entitled to examine those reasons, but the notice under section 148 is not required to contain reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer. We, therefore, reject the contention that the re-opening is bad inasmuch as the reasons are not communicated to the assessee. We also find that reasons have been recorded and those reasons can be read from the original file which has been made available by the Counsel for the respondents.

10. Shri Rivonkar invited our attention to two Supreme Court Judgments in Maharaj Kumar Kamal Singh v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Bihar and Orissa, I.T.R Volume XXXV-1959 and in A.L.A Firm v. Commissioner of Income-tax, I.T.R Vol. 189 page 285. Interpreting the word “information” as occurring in section 34(1)(b), the Supreme Court held that the word “information” may also be as to the true and correct state of law and so would cover information as to relevant judicial decisions. If a judicial decision, like Judgment of the High Court is not considered by the Assessing Officer and if it subsequently, comes to his knowledge, he would be justified in re-opening assessment under section 34(1)(b) of the then Act. It was observed by the Supreme Court in Maharaj Kumar Kamal Singh v. Commissioner of Income-Tax Bihar and Orissa (supra), that the word “escape” in section 34(1)(b) was not confined to cases where no return had been submitted by the assessee or where income had not been assessed owing to inadvertence or oversight or other lacuna attributable to the assessing authorities. Even in a case where a return had been submitted, if the Income-Tax Officer had erroneously failed to tax a part of the assessable income, it was a case where that part of the income had escaped assessment within the meaning of that provision.

11. In Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. Income-Tax Officer, Companies District I, Calcutta, 1961 ITR Vol XLI pg 191, five Judges of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court per majority, held that it was the duty of the assessee Company to disclose all the facts which had a bearing on the question, but the intention of the assessee behind a particular transaction was a matter of inference. The law did not require the assessee to state the conclusion that could reasonably be drawn from the primary facts. If the Income-Tax Officer who issued notice under section 34 of the then Act did not have any material before him for believing that there had been any material non-disclosure because of which an under-assessment had taken place, he had no jurisdiction to issue notice after the expiry of four years from the Assessment year. Even in the minority judgment, Hidyatullah, J. observed:

“if it be merely a question of interpretation of evidence by an Income-Tax Officer from whom nothing has been hidden and to whom every thing has been fully disclosed, then the assessee cannot be subjected to section 34 merely because the Income-tax Officer miscarried in his interpretation of evidence.”

12. When the assessment was sought to be re-opened on the ground of opinion of an internal audit party of the Income-Tax Department, it was held by the Supreme Court in case of Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, New Delhi, 1979 ITR Vol 119 p. 996, that a point of law cannot be regarded as “information” within the meaning of section 147(b) of the Income-Tax Act, 1961 for the purpose of re-opening an assessment. Similarly, the letters issued by Government of India placing reliance on it cannot be treated as “information” to the Income-Tax Officer to initiate re-assessment proceedings.

13. In the case of Commissioner of Income-Tax v. Rasiklal C. Nagri, 1992 ITR Vol 193 page 665, a division bench of Gujarat High Court considered a case where the assessee had appended a note clarifying that the income from the interest is not shown, but share in the income from the firm has been shown. The assessee in his returns had appended a note to the effect that the interest earned by his wife from the firm was not shown in view of the decision of the Tribunal for an earlier year. The Income-Tax Officer, while framing the assessments, included the share income which the wife had received from the firm in the total income of the assessee. The Income-Tax Officer did not, however, include the interest received by the wife from the firm in the total income of the assessee. The assessment was completed and thereafter, it was sought to be re-opened under section 148, read with section 147 of the Income-Tax Act, 1961. It was held by the Gujarat High Court that the Income-Tax Officer knew that the assessee had included the wife's share income in his total income. Therefore, all primary facts necessary for assessment were disclosed by the assessee in the original assessment proceedings and no new information was received by the Income-Tax Officer justifying the reassessment proceedings. Therefore, the reassessment proceedings were vitiated.

14. In the case before us, it is not the case of respondent Income-Tax Department that the Assessing Officer did not notice Judicial Pronouncements or that his opinion was based on a disclosure made that these are capital receipts and now he wants to reopen the case since he has changed his opinion and now he or his successor feels that the income is revenue receipts. This can, hardly, be a ground for reopening assessment under section 147 read with section 148 of the Income-Tax Act, 1961 as it then was.

15. Income-Tax Act is a taxing statute. The provisions of this Act will have to be construed strictly. Therefore, unless there is a clear case, which would give the Assessing Officer to exercise the jurisdiction to reopen the assessment under section 148 read with section 147 of the Income-Tax Act, 1961, it would not be valid and proper. Shri Bodke wanted to submit that the inquiry whether the action contemplated is under section 147(a) or under section 147(b), was not replied and, therefore, the action is bad. We do not accept this submission. The Supreme Court Judgment in Coca-Cola Export Corporation v. Income-Tax Officer, AIR 1998 SCW 1665, has answered the submission and the Supreme Court has held that a notice under section 148 read with section 147 need not specify whether the action is contemplated under clauses (a) or (b) of section 147.

16. For the reasons stated above, we allow the writ petition, quash notice dated 17-5-1991 issued by the Income-Tax Officer Ward I, purporting to be under section 148, read with section 147 and hold that in pursuance of this notice re-opening of the assessment is not justified. With these observations, rule made absolute for the above reasons. No order as to costs.

Notice for re-opening assessment quashed.