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Minguel Francis D'Costa v. Sultan Gulamali Karim And Others

Bombay High Court
Feb 23, 1999
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Concise Analytical Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

On 12-10-1996 the Petitioner filed Short Causes Suit No. 5671 of 1996 in the City Civil Court, Bombay seeking an injunction restraining Respondent No. 1 from disturbing the petitioner's possession of premises at 7.C, Ground floor, Sunbeam Chambers, New Marine Lines, Mumbai 400020, claiming tenancy.

The City Civil Court Judge found that the dispute appeared to be between landlord and tenant and that the City Civil Court lacked jurisdiction; accordingly the suit was withdrawn on 15-10-1996 with notice to Respondent No. 1. On the same day the petitioner filed Suit No. 1794 of 1996 in the Court of Small Causes, Bombay, for declaration that he was tenant and for injunction against dispossession.

Respondent No. 1 filed Suit No. 5852 of 1996 (for mandatory injunction to remove the petitioner and other reliefs) and took out Notice of Motion for interim reliefs. The petitioner filed an affidavit in reply to that Notice of Motion and raised an objection under section 9-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, asking that the jurisdictional objection be decided as a preliminary issue.

The respondent amended the plaint (Chamber Summons No. 5403 of 1996), prompting the petitioner to file an additional affidavit in reply dated 14-3-1997. The amendment changed the suit’s nature to one for recovery of possession. The learned Judge framed issues, heard advocates and answered the preliminary issue against the petitioner by a judgment dated 21-3-1997 (marked Exh. H), and by a separate order put the property in the possession of the Receiver. The order dated 21-3-1997 is the subject of the present writ/civil revision petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the trial court was correct in dismissing the preliminary objection raised under section 9-A of the Code of Civil Procedure and in proceeding with interim relief (including appointment of a Receiver) before deciding the jurisdictional issue.
  2. Whether, after amendment of the plaint to seek recovery of possession, the valuation of the subject matter of the suit exceeded the pecuniary jurisdiction of the City Civil Court, rendering that court without jurisdiction.
  3. Whether section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act applied (i.e., whether the relationship between the parties was that of landlord and tenant thereby attracting the Rent Act and ousting the trial court's jurisdiction).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • Challenge to the trial court's refusal to treat the jurisdictional objection (raised under section 9-A) as a preliminary issue before granting interim relief, and objection to the appointment of a Receiver and the hearing of the Notice of Motion before jurisdiction was decided.
  • Submission that after amendment the suit sought recovery of possession which changed the valuation of the suit's subject matter and thus exceeded the pecuniary jurisdiction of the City Civil Court.
  • Raised objection under section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act that the relationship between the parties was landlord and tenant, invoking the Rent Act's jurisdictional consequences.

Respondent's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • Submitted that jurisdiction must be decided on the basis of pleadings in the plaint and not on the basis of the written statement; impliedly, where the plaint alleged a master-servant relationship, the court had jurisdiction.
  • Argued that the question of valuation (pecuniary jurisdiction) arises only when the issue is raised (typically by the filing of a written statement), and because no written statement was filed (even after two years), the trial court could examine pecuniary jurisdiction at a later stage.
  • Defended the trial court's approach of proceeding with interim matters given the circumstances (including that possession was with the Court Receiver) and the absence of a settled defence by written statement.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by examining the two principal jurisdictional objections and the conduct of the parties and the trial court:

  1. On the trial court's factual/pleading reliance: The trial court had characterized the plaintiff's pleadings as alleging a master-servant relationship "as and by way of abundant caution" and therefore concluded section 28 of the Rent Act did not attract. The High Court found that observation "quite illegal and unwarranted" because where the defendant has expressly raised an objection under section 28 (claiming a landlord-tenant relationship), the court cannot brush aside the operation of section 28 by relying on a plaintiff's cautious averments in the plaint. In other words, when jurisdiction is challenged, the Court must examine the question seriously rather than treat the plaintiff's averment as dispositive.
  2. On pecuniary jurisdiction and valuation after amendment: The High Court criticized the trial court for failing to value the suit on the basis of the relief actually sought after the plaint was amended. The court emphasized that once relief is amended, the court must value the subject matter and, if found beyond its pecuniary jurisdiction, return the plaint or require payment of appropriate court-fee—rather than being influenced by subsequent circumstances such as possession being with a Receiver. The trial court's approach of answering pecuniary jurisdiction in the affirmative without appropriate valuation was faulted.
  3. On the effect and operation of section 9-A, Code of Civil Procedure (as introduced in the State of Maharashtra): The High Court explained section 9-A requires that when an objection to jurisdiction is taken at the hearing of an application for interim relief, the Court must determine that jurisdictional issue as a preliminary issue before granting or setting aside interim relief. The provision also allows the Court, notwithstanding subsection (1), to grant such interim relief as it may consider necessary pending determination of the jurisdictional preliminary issue. The High Court interpreted section 9-A to mean that jurisdictional objections may be raised at the interlocutory stage and need not await filing of a written statement; the court can even suo motu examine jurisdiction. Consequently, the trial court erred in postponing consideration of jurisdictional questions until issues were framed following a written statement.
  4. On litigational conduct and delay: The High Court commented at length on the petitioner's failure to file written statement for a prolonged period (two years) and criticized the common practice of endless adjournments and delay in filing written statements. The court stressed that defendants have a statutory duty to file written statements promptly, and that trial courts should curb the tendency to extend time indefinitely. The High Court tied this practical observation to the case's facts, noting the absence of a filed written statement hindered framing of issues at an earlier stage and contributed to the piecemeal interim litigation that had already reached the High Court.
  5. Remedial analysis: Based on the above, the High Court concluded the impugned order of 21-3-1997 required interference. The appropriate remedial measure was to stay that order temporarily and remand the matter to the trial court to decide jurisdictional issues as preliminary issues in accordance with section 9-A and with proper valuation procedures.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: Civil Revision Application is allowed; the order dated 21-3-1997 in Notice of Motion No. 5403 of 1996 / Suit No. 5852 of 1996 is stayed for three months and the matter is remanded to the trial court to decide jurisdictional issues as preliminary issues.

Direct consequences and directions given by the Court

  • The operation of the trial court's order dated 21-3-1997 is stayed for three months from the date of the High Court's order.
  • The matter is remanded to the trial court to decide the jurisdictional issues (including those under section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act and pecuniary jurisdiction) as preliminary issues in accordance with section 9-A of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • The Petitioner is directed to file a written statement, if desired, within four weeks from the High Court's order; beyond that no further time is to be granted by the trial court.
  • After filing the written statement, issues pertaining to jurisdiction (including pecuniary jurisdiction) must be framed and decided within six weeks thereafter; these issues are to be heard and decided afresh, free from the impugned observations made in the earlier order.
  • If the trial court finds it lacks jurisdiction, appropriate orders shall be passed and the order dated 21-3-1997 shall stand set aside.
  • If the trial court finds it has jurisdiction, the stay of the Notice of Motion No. 5403 of 1996 will be vacated and the earlier order will become operative.
  • The Civil Revision Application is allowed; parties are to appear before the trial court on 3-3-1999; the Registrar is directed to send the copy of the Judgment to the lower court immediately.

Broader implications

The opinion emphasizes procedural enforcement of section 9-A (Maharashtra) to require preliminary adjudication of jurisdictional objections raised during interlocutory proceedings, and it critiques lax practice regarding filing of written statements and framing of issues. The opinion did not purport to establish or discuss new binding precedent beyond the application and enforcement of the legislated procedure under section 9-A and procedural obligations described above.

Note: This summary extracts and synthesizes only the information expressly contained in the provided opinion. No additional facts or external authorities have been introduced.

Show all summary ...

1. On 12-10-1996 the Petitioner filed a suit as Short Causes Suit No. 5671 of 1996 in the City Civil Court, Bombay against Respondent No. 1 for injunction restraining him from disturbing the petitioner's possession on premises bearing No. 7.C, Ground floor, Sunbeam Chambers, New Marine Lines, Mumbai 400020. The Petitioner claims his tenancy over this premises. While hearing interim application, the learned Judge found that the dispute is really between the landlord and tenant and the City Civil Court has no jurisdiction. Therefore, on 15th October, 1996 the said suit was withdrawn with notice to Respondent No. 1. On the same day, the petitioner filed a suit for declaration as Suit No. 1794 of 1996 in the Court of Small Causes at Bombay against the Respondent No. 1 for declaring that he was tenant of the respondent No. 1 in respect of the aforesaid premises and also for the injunction restraining defendant No. 1 from dispossessing the petitioner from the suit premises without due process of law.

2. In the meantime, respondent No. 1 also filed a suit bearing No. 5852 of 1996 for mandatory injunction to direct the petitioner to remove himself from the suit premises and for other reliefs. The respondent took out Notice of Motion for interim reliefs in the said. The Petitioner had filed Affidavit in reply to the said Notice of Motion. The Petitioner raised in the reply an objection under section 9-A of the Code of Civil Procedure as to the jurisdiction of the City Civil Court to entertain the said suit and prayed to the court that the said objection to the jurisdiction be decided as preliminary issue. Thereafter the Respondents through Chamber Summons No. 5403 of 1996 amended the plaint with the result that the petitioner was required to file an additional Affidavit in Reply dated 14-3-1997 to the amended plaint. As consequence of the amendment, the nature of the suit was changed as one for recovery of possession. The Ld. Judge after hearing the respective Advocates answered the said preliminary issue against the petitioner by his judgment dated 21st March, 1997, as marked Exh. H and by a separate order the property was put in possession of the Receiver. It is this order dated 21st March, 1997 which is coming under challenge in this writ petition.

3. The learned counsel for the Petitioner Mr. Anturkar during his argument raised two points; one is that whether the court below was right in dismissing the preliminary objection raised by the Petitioner under section 9-A of the Code of Civil Procedure and by separate order the premises was put in possession of the Receiver and whether Notice of Motion taken by Respondent for interim injunction could be heard before issue regarding jurisdiction is decided. Secondly, since the suit was amended as one for possession, the valuation of the subject matter of the suit exceeds pecuniary jurisdiction of City Civil Court and City Civil Court has no jurisdiction.

4. He also raised objection pertaining to jurisdiction under section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act. I have gone through the impugned order passed in Notice of Motion No. 5403 of 1996 on 21st March, 1997. In the impugned order, the Lower Court has framed following issues:

“1. Does the defendant prove that this Hon'ble Court has no jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit since the relationship is of landlord and tenant and therefore covered under section 28 of the Rent Act, as stated in para 11 of the A.R

2. Does the defendant prove that this Hon'ble Court has no pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain and try the present suit as stated in Para 15 of the Affidavit in reply.

5. In Para 8 of the City Civil Court's Order, following finding has been entered:

“It is the case of the Plaintiff that the defendant was the servant and was not in use, occupation either as a tenant or as a licensee. As far as prayer (a) is concerned, the same has been inserted in the Plaint as and by way of abundant caution. Hence, therefore, today as can be seen for as the said issue of jurisdiction is concerned wherein according to the defendant section 28 of the Rent Act is attracted. The averments in the Plaint points out a case of relationship of master and servant and not landlord and tenant. Hence, therefore, as far as the said issue is concerned, the same is answered in the affirmative holding that this Hon'ble Court has jurisdiction to entertain and try the present suit.”

6. This observation of the Lower Court is quite illegal and unwarranted. The learned counsel for the respondent Mr. Nusrat Shah submits that the jurisdiction of the Court has to be decided on the basis of the pleadings in the plaint and not on the basis of the written statement. On principle what the learned counsel for the respondent has stated is correct so long as the jurisdiction is not questioned by the Opponent. But here in this case, the defendant has raised objection to the jurisdiction on the basis of the section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act. According to him he is a tenant. Therefore, the issue has been arising whether the petitioner is tenant in respect of the suit premises or not. Therefore, section 28 will attract. If section 28 is attracted, then the mandate of the Section has to be followed. The Court cannot brush aside the operation of section 28 by saying that the plaintiff has made averments in the plaint their relationship exists between the parties was of Master and servant by way of abundant caution.

7. The second point is with regard to pecuniary jurisdiction. Regarding this point, the lower Court has observed thus:

“It appears that after passing of the order of the Hon'ble High Court the events having taken place, the plaint came to be amended and additional prayers came to be inserted. Today, admittedly, as far as the possession is concerned, the same is with the Court Receiver. Hence, therefore, even as far as the second aspect of pecuniary jurisdiction is concerned, the same is answered in the affirmative holding that this Hon'ble Court has jurisdiction to entertain and try the present suit.”

8. Quite strange attitude has been adopted by the trial Court. The trial Court has no alternative except to value the suit on the basis of relief sought in the suit. The Court cannot be carried away by the circumstances under which amendment of the relief was sought. Where once the relief is amended, valuation of the subject matter of the suit must be done and return the plaint, if it is found it has no pecuniary jurisdiction or if it is found still within the pecuniary jurisdiction, ask the plaintiff to pay the court fee it is found deficit and proceed with suit.

9. The learned counsel for respondent argued that the question of valuation of the suit property will arise only when the issue regarding the same is raised. In order to raise such issue written statement has to be filed. Even after lapse of two years the petitioner did not choose to file written statement. Therefore, examination of pecuniary jurisdiction can be examined at appropriate time. Therefore, he tried to defend the order impugned in this case. Several decisions have been cited before me by either parties. I do not think that it is necessary to discuss all these decisions for the reasons stated below:

10. As I pointed out earlier, the Lower Court cannot postpone the consideration of the question regarding jurisdiction both pecuniary or otherwise when it was raised. section 9-A of Code of Civil Procedure formulates that before passing any interim relief or vacating any order, of interim relief. These two questions have to be gone into by the court below under section 9-A. Therefore, in my view, the order impugned requires interference. In this context, it is necessary to refer to section 9-A of Code of Civil Procedure which was introduced in State of Maharashtra. section 9-A of Code of Civil Procedure reads as under:

“Where at the hearing of application relating to interim relief in suit, objection to jurisdiction is taken, such issue to be decided by the Court as a preliminary issue,

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Code or any other law for the time being in force, if, at the hearing of any application for granting or setting aside an order granting an interim relief, whether by way of stay, injunction, appointment of a receiver or otherwise, made in any suit, an objection to the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain such suit is taken by any of the parties to the suit, the Court shall proceed to determine at the hearing of such application the issue as the jurisdiction as a preliminary issue before granting or setting aside the order granting the interim relief. Any such application shall be heard and disposed of by the Court as expeditiously as possible and shall not in any case be adjourned to the hearing of the suit.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), at the hearing of any such application, the Court may grant such interim relief as it may consider necessary, pending determination by it of the preliminary issue as to the jurisdiction.”

11. The learned counsel for the respondent had argued that the question of pecuniary jurisdiction and the preliminary objection can be considered by the Court only when the issue was framed. In this case, written statement was not filed even after two years. Objection to jurisdiction can be examined by the Court as and when written statement filed by the petitioner and issues framed. This contention of the respondent has to be rejected. The language of section 9-A makes it amply clear that objection regarding jurisdiction can be raised in the interlocutory stage. It need not have waited till filing of written statement. Court can even suo motu examine the jurisdictional aspect of the case if it struck to court. Therefore, compulsion of section 9-A is that before interim order is passed or is vacated, jurisdictional aspect has to be examined by the court as a preliminary steps. Legislature policy is clear and unambiguous that a court which lack jurisdiction need not unnecessarily go into the legal entanglement between the parties and waste time on it.

12. At this juncture, I have to point out a disturbing situation that has arisen in this suit. The suit was filed in 1996. Till today, as submitted by the Counsel for the respondent, the petitioner, didn't choose to file written statement, though several orders came to be passed by the trial court. Because of this non-filing of the written statement, the issues arising in the suits could not be formulated by the court below. If that has been done on a priority basis then the court would have disposed of the above two issues before entertaining any application for interim order. Nowadays, we find in the actual practice, the litigants are fighting for their immediate benefits. They are not very much alert for their responsibilities. When a suit is filed before the trial court on receipt of the notice, in a sense of urgency the defendant should appear and file his defence if he decides to contest the suit. That is the statutory duty of a defendant. But even today, practice followed is what we were following in colonial days. The said tendency is allowed to continue in the Civil Courts in India, and no urgency ever is shown in filing written statement. The trial courts are exercising their discretion in extending the time for filing written statements endlessly by mere asking. One of the grounds for delay of litigations, particularly Civil litigations in Civil Courts is the non-fulfilment of the statutory duty cast upon the parties. This case is the finest example of such situation. Had the written statement is filed in a sense of urgency, definitely the trial court would have framed issues on these two points that touch up on the jurisdiction of the trial court. Without doing that, the parties are fighting for the interim relief. It has already completed its first round of litigation only on interim reliefs upto the High Court and this is the second round. At the same time, the actual defence which would have been raised by the defendant by filing written statement is lacking. Of course, according to Mr. Anturkar, the issue need not be raised or not necessarily be raised by written statement alone. It can be raised at any point of time either in the interim application or otherwise. Without disputing that position, I hasten to add that, that will not take away responsibility of the defendant of filing written statement with sense of urgency. The issues are normally raised only after filing of written statement. By other interim application the important issues are not necessarily raised.

13. In the given situation, the objection relating to the jurisdiction might have been raised in the reply for interim application also. But that is different question. Here, the defendant has committed as serious lapse before raising jurisdictional question in not filing the written statement. The old age practice and impression of the litigants is that they can take adjournments for filing the written statement endlessly and courts also does not intend to put any limitation on exercising their discretion in this regard. There are cases where the written statements are not filed for 3/4 years. At interim stages, the matter comes for several times upto High Court and Supreme Court. The Lower Courts have to discourage this tendency. Endlessly giving time for filing written statement has to be curtailed strictly. Courts have to fix a time frame within which time all pleadings in a case are completed. If written statement is not filed within the time frame fixed, the court should not entertain the written statement thereafter.

14. In view of this situation, I pass the following order:

(i) There shall be an order of stay the operation of the order dated 21st March, 1997 passed in Suit No. 5852 of 1996 and Notice of Motion No. 5403 of 1996 impugned in this case for three months from today. The matter is remanded back to the trial Court for deciding the jurisdictional issues as preliminary issues.

(ii) The Petitioner is directed to file written statement, if he so desires, within four weeks from today, beyond which no time should be granted by the trial Court. After filing the written statement, in the event of the framing of issue pertaining to the jurisdiction including that of the pecuniary jurisdiction be decided within six weeks thereafter. Issues regarding jurisdiction should be heard and decided afresh untrammelled by the observation made in the impugned order.

(iii) In case the trial court finds that it has no jurisdiction to try the suit, appropriate orders shall be passed according to law and in that event, the order passed in Notice of Motion No. 5403 of 1996 on 21-3-1997 shall stand set aside.

(iv) In case the Court finds that it has jurisdiction to try the suit, the stay ordered in respect of Notice of Motion No. 5403 of 1996 stands vacated and the order becomes operative.

15. With the above directions, Civil Revision Application is allowed and matter is remanded back as directed above. Parties to appear before the Court below on 3-3-1999.

16. The order must be communicated to Court below immediately.

17. C.C expedited.

18. The Registrar is directed to send the copy of the Judgment to the Lower Court immediately.

Order accordingly.