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Abdul Hameed Abdul Gafoor And Another v. State Of Maharashtra And Another

Bombay High Court
Jan 13, 1999
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Writ Petition No. 1601 of 1991)

Factual and Procedural Background

The writ petition challenges the judgment and order dated 20 December 1991 of the Court of Sessions, Malegaon, which dismissed Criminal Appeal No. 46 of 1989 filed by original accused Nos. 2 and 3 and confirmed the Judicial Magistrate's order for return of property. The petitioners were original accused Nos. 2 and 3 in Criminal Case No. 17 of 1989 before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Malegaon.

The prosecution alleged that complainant Noor Khan owned two 54" Grieves Cotton Co. powerlooms which he let on an 11-month rent agreement (dated 31 December 1987) to accused No. 1 (Mohd. Hanif). Accused No. 1 paid full rent for the term but, on expiry (1 December 1988), the looms were not returned and accused No. 1 had sold them. A complaint was registered (Crime Registration No. 125 of 1988 under IPC 406) and the looms were seized from accused Nos. 2 and 3 during investigation.

Charge-sheet was filed against accused Nos. 1–3 for offences under Sections 406, 420 read with Section 34 IPC. The Magistrate found the complainant to be the owner and that accused No. 1 had disposed of the looms contrary to the lease; he convicted accused No. 1 under Section 406 IPC, acquitted him under Section 420 IPC, acquitted accused Nos. 2 and 3 on criminal charges, and ordered under Section 452 CrPC that the two powerlooms (seized from accused No. 2) be given to the complainant.

Accused Nos. 2 and 3 appealed to the Sessions Judge, who by judgment dated 20 December 1991 confirmed the Magistrate's order. The present writ petition seeks to challenge that return-of-property order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Magistrate and Sessions Courts were correct in ordering, under Section 452 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, that the seized powerlooms be delivered to the complainant instead of returning them to the persons from whose custody they were seized (accused Nos. 2 and 3).
  2. Whether the normal rule that property should be restored to the person from whose possession it was seized must yield when the original ownership and entitlement to possession of the complainant is established on the evidence.
  3. Whether the High Court should interfere under Section 482 CrPC with the concurrent findings of the two lower courts that the complainant was the owner and entitled to possession, thereby justifying the return of the property to him under Section 452 CrPC.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (original accused Nos. 2 and 3) Arguments

  • It was argued (by Mr. Shaikh for accused Nos. 2 and 3) that the Magistrate erred in ordering delivery of the two powerlooms to the complainant because the looms were seized from accused Nos. 2 and 3 and hence should be returned to them.
  • To support this, the appellants relied on authority (N. Madhavan v. State of Kerala) establishing that ordinarily property should be restored to the person from whose custody it was taken and that departure from that rule is permissible only on particular facts.
  • They also relied on the decision in Swaroopchand v. Leela which emphasizes the normal rule of restoration to the person from whose custody the property was seized and that departure is only where there is no dispute or doubt about the title of the person from whom property was seized.

Prosecution / Complainant's Position (as reflected in the record)

  • The recorded prosecution case and findings establish that the complainant Noor Khan owned the two powerlooms, had let them on lease to accused No. 1 for 11 months, and that accused No. 1 dishonestly sold them to accused Nos. 2 and 3.
  • The Magistrate found documentary and identification evidence of ownership to be convincing and that accused Nos. 2 and 3 failed to show title to the seized looms.
  • On that basis, the prosecution's position as accepted by the courts was that the complainant was entitled to custody of the looms under Section 452 CrPC notwithstanding that the looms were seized from accused Nos. 2 and 3.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
N. Madhavan v. State of Kerala, 1979 Cri LJ 1197; (1979) 4 SCC 1; AIR 1979 SC 1829 The Court observed that on disposal of property under the old Section 517 CrPC the general rule is to restore property to the person from whose custody it was taken; departure from that rule is permissible depending on facts. The High Court noted the principle but held that the facts of N. Madhavan (a gun seized from accused where no offence was proved and no other claimant existed) were different and that the authority did not assist the petitioners in the present case.
Swaroopchand s/o. Bacchraj Kothari v. Smt. Leela w/o. Ramsingh Suryanwanshi, 1991 (1) Bom CR 501 Reiterates that normally property should be restored to the person from whose custody it was seized under Section 452 CrPC; departure from that practice is only where there is no dispute or doubt that the property seized belonged to that person. The Court held that the facts in Swaroopchand were different (difficulty in proving discovery memorandum and title), so that decision did not assist the petitioners here.
1981 Bom CR 860 : 1982 Cri LJ 46 Holds that where initial title was of the complainant and the accused had only permission to use and had promised in writing to return, and the accused cannot establish title even prima facie, the court should exercise jurisdiction under Section 452 to direct possession to the complainant. The High Court relied on this principle to support returning possession to the complainant where the complainant's initial title was established and the accused failed to establish title.
ILR (1984) Bom 2712 (at page 2715) Holds that the words "entitled to possession" in Section 452 should not be narrowly construed to mean only the person from whose custody property was seized. The High Court cited this to support a broader interpretation of entitlement under Section 452, permitting delivery to the true owner rather than merely to the person from whose custody it was seized.
1985 Cri LJ (NOC) 28 States that it cannot be held as a uniform rule that the person producing articles or from whom articles were seized is alone entitled to custody under Section 452 where the accused is acquitted; example given where machine seized from accused was returned to the owner-lessee. The High Court applied this principle in reasoning that the complainant, as owner and lessor, was entitled to custody of the machine/looms and that the accused (though acquitted) was not necessarily entitled to their return if he could not establish title.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by analyzing statutory scope and the findings of fact by the courts below:

  1. Scope of Section 452 CrPC: The Court observed that powers under Section 452 are summary in nature and do not adjudicate civil rights. However, the phrase "entitled to possession" should not be given such a narrow meaning that delivery is ordered only to the person from whose possession the property was seized.
  2. Precedent and principle: The Court reviewed authorities cited by the appellants (including N. Madhavan and Swaroopchand) which generally recognize restoration to the person from whose custody property was taken, but noted these authorities allow departure depending on circumstances and that the facts of those cases differed from the present facts.
  3. Application to facts: The Court found (on the concurrent findings of the Magistrate and Sessions Court) that the complainant was the original owner of the two powerlooms, that they were let to accused No. 1 on lease, and that accused No. 1 dishonestly sold them to accused Nos. 2 and 3. The Magistrate found the documentary and identification evidence establishing ownership convincing, and that accused Nos. 2 and 3 failed to prove title to the seized looms.
  4. Permissibility of departure from normal rule: Given the established ownership of the complainant and the inability of accused Nos. 2 and 3 to show title (even if they claimed bona fide purchase), the Court reasoned a departure from the normal rule (return to person from whose custody property was seized) was justified.
  5. Section 482 CrPC: The Court stated it found no reason to interfere under Section 482 CrPC with the concurrent findings of the two courts below that supported delivery to the complainant; it expressed that non-return to the complainant would result in a failure of justice.
  6. Limitation and remedy: The Court reiterated that where there is a dispute involving civil principles of title, the criminal court is not the appropriate forum to decide such civil controversies; an aggrieved person may approach the Civil Court for appropriate relief.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

Writ Petition No. 1601 of 1991 is dismissed.

The direct effects of the decision on the parties are:

  • The order of the Magistrate (affirmed by the Sessions Judge) directing that the two seized powerlooms be delivered to the complainant, Noor Khan, is upheld.
  • No order as to costs was made.
  • The Court expressly left open the avenue for any person aggrieved by the return order to seek relief in the Civil Court, noting the criminal court is not the forum to decide disputed civil-title questions.

Broader implications: The opinion applies existing principles about the exercise of Section 452 CrPC and confirms that where ownership/entitlement of the complainant is proved and the person from whose custody property was seized cannot establish title, a criminal court may order delivery to the owner. The judgment does not announce any novel legal principle beyond applying cited authorities to the facts of the case.

Show all summary ...

1. This writ petition is preferred, being aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 20th December, 1991 passed by the Court of Sessions, Malegaon, dismissing the appeal preferred by the appellants (Original accused Nos. 2 and 3) and confirming the order passed by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Malegaon, about the return of property.

2. Few facts need to be narrated, which are as follows:

The petitioners in this writ petition, were original accused Nos. 2 and 3 in Criminal Case No. 17 of 1989, on the file of the court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Malegaon. Three accused, namely, Mohd. Hanif Vali Alia Sardar, Abdul Hamid Hafij Abdul Gafur and Sarvar Abdul Hamid, were charge-sheeted for the offences punishable under Ss. 406, 420 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code.

3. The prosecution case was that the complainant Mr. Noor Khan, who was the resident of Malegaon and who was running powerlooms of Grieves Cotton Co., Ahmedabad make, was the owner of two powerlooms, which were 54″ (inches) in size. Due to his old age, the complainant was not using those powerlooms. On 31st December, 1987, one Abdul Majid, who was a Dalai of Malegaon, came to the complainant, Noor Khan, along with accused No. 1 Mohd. Hanif Vali Alia Sardar, and told the complainant that accused No. 1 was desirous of taking his looms on rent. The complainant agreed to let out his two powerlooms to accused No. 1 and an agreement came to be entered into between the complainant and accused No. 1 with respect to those powerlooms. The powerlooms were thus let out by the complainant to accused No. 1 at the rate of Rs. 75/- per month for each powerlooms for a period of 11 months. This agreement was dated 31st December, 1987. As per the agreement, accused No. 1 paid an amount of Rs. 1,650/- to the complainant as full rent of two powerlooms for a period of 11 months on the same day. When the term of the agreement was over, the complainant visited the house of accused No. 1 on 1st December, 1988. He found that the said powerlooms were not with accused No. 1. He learnt that accused No. 1 had sold those powerlooms to somebody else. He, therefore, lodged a complaint with the Azad Nagar Police Station, Malegaon. Thereafter the Investigating Officer concerned, reduced the complaint in writing and registered the complaint as Crime Registration No. 125 of 1988 (IPC 406) on 7th December, 1988. Thereafter the Investigating Officer investigated the offence, recorded statements of the concerned witnesses and seized Muddemal property viz., the powerlooms from the possession of accused Nos. 2 and 3. After completing investigation, charge-sheet came to be filed against accused Nos. 1 to 3 in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Malegaon for offences under Sections 406, 420, I.P.C read with Section 34, I.P.C The accused appeared in the Court, charge was framed against them, they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. Their defence was that of total denial. The learned Magistrate, after recording the evidence, gave a finding that the prosecution had proved that the complainant was the owner of the said Muddemal property and that accused No. 1 was entrusted with the Muddemal property. He also gave a-finding that the prosecution had proved that accused No. 1 had disposed of the said property i.e two powerlooms in violation of the agreement made between the complainant and accused No. 1.

4. The learned Magistrate gave a finding supported by reasoning that the complainant was the owner of those two powerlooms. Accused Nos. 2 and 3 claimed to be the owner of those powerlooms and that though some documents were produced by accused Nos. 2 and 3, they were not pertaining to the Muddemal property, but were relating to other powerlooms owned by accused Nos. 2 and 3. He gave clear-cut finding that documentary evidence produced by the complainant in respect of the ownership of Muddemal property was convincing and trustworthy as identification of the powerlooms which were of Grieves Cotton Co., Ahmedabad make tallies with the Muddemal property seized by the police. He thus, came to the conclusion that the Muddemal property viz., those two powerlooms belonged to the complainant and not to accused Nos. 2 and 3. He, therefore, convicted accused No. 1 for offence punishable under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code, though acquitted him for offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code as the said offence was not proved by the prosecution. He also acquitted accused Nos. 2 and 3. As far as order with regard to the return of Muddemal property under Section 452 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was concerned, he ordered that the Muddemal property viz., two powerlooms seized from accused No. 2, custody of which, during the pendency of the trial, on his application was given to accused No. 2, be given to the complainant.

5. Against the said order of the Magistrate, the original accused Nos. 2 and 3 filed Criminal Appeal No. 46 of 1989 in the court of the Sessions Judge, who by his judgment dated 20th December, 1991 confirmed the order passed by the Magistrate and dismissed the appeal. It is against this order of return of property to the complainant that the present writ petition has been filed.

6. I have heard all the Advocates at length. It is to be kept in mind that the scope of power under Section 452 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is summary in nature and an order thereunder does not adjudicate upon the civil rights of the parties and the person aggrieved. Mr. Shaikh appearing for original accused Nos. 2 and 3 submitted that it was an error on the part of the magistrate to pass an order handing over custody of those two powerlooms to the complainant, when they were seized from the custody of accused Nos. 2 and 3 and those two powerlooms had to be returned to accused Nos. 2 and 3 only. To substantiate his arguments he relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of N. Madhavan v. State Of Kerala, reported in 1979 Cri LJ 1197 : ((1979) 4 SCC 1 : AIR 1979 SC 1829), so also Swaroopchand s/o. Bacchraj Kothari v. Smt. Leela w/o. Ramsingh Suryanwanshi, reported in 1991 (1) Bom CR 501. In the Supreme Court case relied upon by Mr. Shaikh, the proposition of law laid down is that when it is a question of disposal of property under Section 517 (old Criminal Procedure Code), the Court has got discretion as to the disposal of the property, and that the general rule is that it should be restored to the person from whose custody it was taken. The Supreme Court has further stated that departure from this statutory rule can be made depending upon the facts of the case and also laid down as to when such departure is permissible. In that case, the property in question was a gun, which was seized from the accused. It was ultimately proved that no offence was committed with that gun. The question then arose as to whom the gun should be handed over as there was no other claimant. The Supreme Court said that considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case, in such an eventuality it should be given to the accused because it was seized from him. Thus, this case does not come to the rescue of the petitioners.

7. Mr. Shaikh also relied upon the decision in the case of Swaroopchand S/o. Bacchraj Kothari v. Smt. Leela w/o. Ramsingh Suryawanshi, reported in 1991 (1) Bom CR 501. Here also the same proposition is laid down for return of property under Section 452 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. It says that normally the property should be restored to the person from whose custody it was seized and that the departure from this statutory rule of practice is not to be lightly made. This proposition is, however, qualified by the next proposition that departure from this statutory rule is only made when there is no dispute or doubt that the property in question was seized from the custody of such person and belonged to him. (Emphasis supplied by me). This was the case of theft and hence question of title was important. In this case, the Sessions Judge held that the discovery memorandum was not proved and it was difficult to accept the title of the applicant who claimed to be the owner of the property in question. The accused in that case was discharged and the ornaments which were the subject-matter in that case, were returned to the owner (accused).

8. In the present case at hand, the facts are entirely different. There is no dispute about the ownership of the complainant. Those two powerlooms did belong to the complainant Noor Khan. There is also no dispute that there was an agreement between the complainant and accused No. 1 that they were let out to accused No. 1 for the period of 11 months only. Thereafter accused No. 1 dishonestly sold them to accused Nos. 2 and 3. That is how they came to be in possession of accused Nos. 2 and 3. The guilt of accused No. 1 is duly proved by the prosecution. He has been convicted for the offence of criminal breach of trust. It might be that accused Nos. 2 and 3 have purchased the said two powerlooms from accused No. 1 and it might be their case that they were bona fide purchasers of the powerlooms, but that does not mean that just because accused Nos. 2 and 3 were acquitted by the Court, the property should not go back to the original owner, with respect to whose ownership and possession both the Courts below have given concurrent finding. In 1981 Bom CR 860 : (1982 Cri LJ 46), it is laid down that, “where the initial title of the property was that of the complainant and the accused only got permission to use it for some time and had promised in writing to return to the complainant and accused could not establish title even prima facie, it was a fit case where court should exercise jurisdiction under Section 452 and direct possession of property to complainant. The facts of this case and the earlier two judgments cited by the learned Advocate for the petitioners are different and are not of any help to him.

9. The words used by the Legislature in Section 452, “entitled to possession” cannot be given narrow meaning so as to order the delivery of property only in favour of a person from whose possession it was seized. If a property is seized from a thief or from a person who is not legally in possession of the same, it cannot be ordered to be returned to him merely because the property was seized from that person. (ILR (1984) Bom 2712 at page 2715). It cannot be held as uniform rule that person producing articles or from whom articles are seized is alone entitled to custody under Section 452, where accused happens to be acquitted. (1985 Cri LJ (NOC) 28). In this case a machine was seized from accused facing trial under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code. The complainant, who was the owner of the machine leased it to accused which was not returned by the accused on expiry of lease. The complainant in this case was held to be entitled to custody of the machine as owner and not the accused.

10. Where there is no rival claim and the accused claiming the property to be belonging to him has not satisfactorily accounted for the same, the’ Court should make a departure from the normal rule and should consciously pass order as to return of the property which is the subject-matter of the trial. In the present case at hand, there is concurrent finding given by both the Courts below that the prosecution has established, beyond reasonable doubt that not only the complainant was owner of those two powerlooms, but that the property seized from accused Nos. 2 and 3 was the very same property, which was given on lease by the complainant to accused No. 1. I do not find any reason to interfere with it under section 482 of the code. In fact, if the property is not given back to the complainant, there will be failure of justice.

11. Admittedly it is not the function of Criminal Court to decide the question involving principles of civil law, if there is dispute between parties claiming return of property. There is no bar to a person aggrieved by this order to approach Civil Court for appropriate order. Hence following order:

Writ Petition No. 1601 of 1991 is dismissed. No order as to costs.

12. Petition dismissed.