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Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Indian Smelting And Refining Co. Ltd.

Bombay High Court
Jan 5, 1998
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Factual and Procedural Background

The reference arises under section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, from an order of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The assessee is a public limited company manufacturing ingots, billets and castings. The relevant accounting year is the calendar year 1979 (assessment year 1980-81).

During 1979 the excise authorities issued three show-cause notices alleging underpayment of excise duty. Two notices together sought Rs. 66,80,096 and a third notice dated May 7, 1980 sought Rs. 23,42,687, the total being Rs. 90,22,783. The assessee denied liability in response to the notices but, in its 1979 accounts, made a provision of Rs. 90,22,800 and claimed that provision as a deduction for computing income.

No adjudication or demand was raised during the relevant previous year. Adjudication occurred later, in December 1982, when the excise authorities accepted the assessee's cause and dropped the proceedings initiated by the show-cause notices.

The Income-tax Officer allowed a deduction of Rs. 66,80,096 but disallowed Rs. 23,42,687 on the ground that that particular show-cause notice had been received after the accounting year ended. The assessee appealed to the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). The Commissioner (Appeals) concluded that the show-cause notices only initiated proceedings and did not create an accrued liability; he rejected the assessee's claim for Rs. 23,42,687 and (according to the order) enhanced the assessment by the amount earlier allowed by the ITO.

The assessee appealed to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, which allowed the assessee's appeal and directed that deduction of Rs. 90,22,783 be allowed. The Revenue challenged the Tribunal's order and referred the following question of law to this court:

“Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in holding that the assessee is entitled for deduction on the provision made in the books amounting to Rs. 90,22,783 merely on the strength of receipt of a show-cause notice from the excise department?”

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the receipt of show-cause notices (without a demand or adjudication during the relevant accounting year) creates an accrued liability in praesenti so as to permit a deduction of the provision (Rs. 90,22,783) from the assessee's income for the accounting year 1979?

Arguments of the Parties

Revenue's Arguments

  • The controversy is squarely covered by this Court's decision in Standard Mills Co. Ltd. v. CIT ([1998] 229 ITR 366), which holds that show-cause notices do not give rise to any actual liability.
  • In the present case the assessee was served only with show-cause notices, it did not admit liability and it actively refuted the allegations; the show-cause proceedings were ultimately dropped in December 1982, hence no deduction can be claimed for 1979.

Assessee's Arguments

  • Although the assessee showed cause and denied liability, it nevertheless made a provision in its 1979 accounts and treated the amount as deductible in computing income.
  • Reliance was placed on Shrikant Textiles v. CTT ([1971] 81 ITR 222) to support deductibility of the provision.
  • After the excise proceedings were dropped in December 1982, the amount was added back to the assessee's income under section 41(2) in the subsequent year; the assessee argued this supports the correctness of permitting the earlier deduction (i.e., that the disputed amount was treated in subsequent year).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Standard Mills Co. Ltd. v. CIT, [1998] 229 ITR 366 (IT Reference No.95 of 1990) Held that show-cause notices do not give rise to an actual liability; contingent liabilities are not deductible even under mercantile accounting; expenditure deductible must be towards a liability actually existing in the year of account. The court applied the ratio directly: it found the facts of the present case to be identical and concluded there was no present liability in praesenti, so the provision could not be allowed as a deduction.
Kedamath Jute Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. CIT, [1971] 82 ITR 363 (Supreme Court) Authority for the proposition that where a liability clearly exists under a statute, deduction cannot be denied merely because the assessee disputes the liability. The court cited this case as an exception to the general rule, noting that it applies where statutory liability is clearly established; it recognized the principle but found it inapplicable on the facts because no statutory demand or crystallised liability existed here.
Shrikant Textiles v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City II, [1971] 81 ITR 222 Illustrates that where a demand notice (under rule 9(2) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944) is issued calling for payment, the amount may be an ascertained or crystallised liability and deductible; contingent liabilities are not deductible. The court considered and distinguished this authority: in Shrikant a demand notice under rule 9(2) had been issued, whereas in the present case only show-cause notices were served (and later withdrawn), so the precedent did not support the assessee's claim and in fact the ratio was adverse to the assessee.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court confined its analysis to the narrow legal question posed and proceeded by reference to earlier precedents dealing with when an accounting provision constitutes an allowable deduction for income-tax purposes.

  1. The court reiterated the settled principle (as stated in Standard Mills) that deductible expenditure must relate to a liability actually existing in the year of account; contingent liabilities (liabilities de futuro) are not deductible even under mercantile accounting.
  2. The court examined the factual matrix: in the year 1979 no demand was raised by the excise authorities; the assessee was only served with show-cause notices; the assessee denied liability and showed cause refuting the allegations; the excise proceedings were ultimately dropped in December 1982.
  3. Applying the principle from Standard Mills, the court concluded there was no present accrued liability (liability in praesenti) in 1979. The entry in the assessee's accounts was thus based on a “purely contingent liability” and could not be treated as deductible expenditure for income-tax purposes.
  4. The court considered the assessee's reliance on Shrikant Textiles and distinguished it because Shrikant involved a demand notice under rule 9(2) of the Central Excise Rules which crystallised a liability; no such demand had been made in the present case.
  5. The court acknowledged Kedamath Jute as authority for the proposition that where liability is clearly created by statute, disputing the liability does not preclude deduction; but found that exception inapplicable because here there was no crystallised statutory liability or demand.
  6. The assessee's submission that the amount was added back under section 41(2) in a subsequent year was noted, but the court did not consider it a sufficient reason to allow the original deduction for 1979, and declined to direct any revision for the subsequent year; instead the court suggested the assessee may raise the point with the Tribunal when giving effect to the opinion.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The question referred to the court is answered in the negative and in favour of the Revenue.

Implications: Based on the court's holding, the assessee is not entitled to deduct the provision of Rs. 90,22,783 made in its 1979 accounts solely on the basis of receipt of show-cause notices. The court treated the claimed liability as contingent and therefore not deductible in the relevant year.

The court did not give any direction to revise the subsequent year's assessment (where an addition under section 41(2) was made); it left it open for the assessee to raise that point before the Tribunal when the Tribunal gives effect to this opinion. The court disposed of the reference with no order as to costs.

Certified copy expedited (as recorded in the opinion).

Show all summary ...

Dr. B.P Saraf, J.:— By this reference under section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal has referred the following question of law to this court for opinion:

“Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in holding that the assessee is entitled for deduction on the provision made in the books amounting to Rs. 90,22,783 merely on the strength of receipt of a show-cause notice from the excise department?”

2. The assessee is a public limited company engaged in the manufacture of ingots, billets and castings. The assessee was liable to pay excise duty on the manufacture of ingots and billets, which it was paying regularly. The accounting year of the assessee is the calendar year. This reference pertains to the assessment year 1980-81, the relevant previous year being the calendar year 1979. In this year, the excise authorities felt that the excise duty paid by the assessee had not been correctly calculated. Accordingly, two show-cause notices were issued asking the assessee to show cause as to why demand should not be made for payment of a further sum of Rs. 66,80,096 by way of excise duty. Another show-cause notice was issued on May 7, 1980. The amount mentioned therein was Rs. 23,42,687. The total amount mentioned in the three show-cause notices was Rs. 90,22,783. The assessee did not admit any liability and showed cause accordingly. No adjudication was made during the relevant previous year nor any demand was raised against the assessee. The adjudication was made much later in December, 1982, when the cause shown by the assessee was accepted and the proceedings initiated by the above three show-cause notices were dropped. However, the assessee made a provision for a sum of Rs. 90,22,800 in its accounts of the accounting year 1979 itself on the basis of the show-cause notices and claimed deduction in respect thereof in the computation of its income. The Income-tax Officer allowed deduction for a sum of Rs. 66,80,096 and rejected the claim for the balance amount of Rs. 23,42,687 on the ground that the show-cause notice in respect of the said amount had been received by the assessee after the end of the accounting year. The assessee appealed to the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) against the above disallowance. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), on examination of details of the claim, found that the assessee had merely been served with show-cause notices asking it to explain why certain demand should not be raised. He referred to rule 10 of the Central Excise Rules and observed that the notices in question only resulted in the initiation of proceedings for raising additional demand. He was of the opinion that no liability had accrued by the issue of the show-cause notices. The Commissioner (Appeals) took note of the fact that the cause shown by the assessee was later accepted and the proceedings initiated pursuant thereto were dropped by the excise authorities. He also observed that there was no demand in this case at any point of time. In view of the above, he not only rejected the assessee's claim for deduction of Rs. 23,42,687, but also enhanced the assessment by the amount allowed by the Income-tax Officer, i.e, Rs. 66,80,687. The assessee appealed to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal against the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). The Tribunal held that having made a provision for a sum of Rs. 90,22,800 on the basis of the show-cause notices the assessee was entitled to claim deduction of the said amount in the computation of its income. The Tribunal, accordingly, allowed the appeal of the assessee and directed the Income-tax Officer to allow deduction of Rs. 90,22,783. Aggrieved by the above order of the Tribunal, the Revenue is before us with this reference under section 256(1) of the Act. We have heard Mr. T.U Khatri, learned counsel for the Revenue, who submits that the controversy in this case is squarely covered by the decision of this court dated March 21, 1997, in I.T Reference No. 95 of 1990, Standard Mills Co. Ltd. v. CIT, [1998] 229 ITR 366, wherein it has been held that show-cause notices would not give rise to any actual liability. Learned counsel pointed out to us that in the instant case, the assessee had been served with show-cause notices only. The assessee did not admit the liability or any part thereof and showed cause refuting the allegations made in the show-cause notices. Our attention was drawn to the fact that the cause shown by the assessee was accepted by the excise authorities and the proceeding initiated by the show-cause notices was later dropped in December, 1982. The question of claiming deduction in such a case, according to learned counsel, cannot arise.

3. Mr. S.J Mehta, learned counsel for the assessee, submits that though the assessee showed cause in pursuance of the notices in question and denied any liability, it also made a provision for the amounts mentioned in the show-cause notices. Learned counsel submits that according to the assessee it was a liability which was deductible in the computation of its income. Reliance is placed in support of this contention on the decision of this court in Shrikant Textiles v. CTT, [1971] 81 ITR 222. Mr. Mehta, however, does not dispute that the cause shown by the assessee was accepted by the excise authorities and in December, 1982, the proceedings initiated by issuance of the show-cause notices were dropped. He also did not dispute the fact that no demand had been raised against the assessee pursuant to the show-cause notices at any point of time. He, however, pointed out that on the proceedings being dropped by the excise authorities in December, 1982, the amount in question was added back under section 41(2) of the Act in the subsequent year to the income of the assessee. Learned counsel submits that, in that view of the matter also, the question referred to us should be answered in favour of the assessee.

4. We have carefully considered the rival submissions. The question referred to us for our opinion is whether the assessee is entitled to deduction of the amount in question as a liability merely on the strength of the show-cause notices issued by the excise authorities. This court had occasion to deal with identical controversy in Standard Mills Co. Ltd. v. CIT, [1998] 229 ITR 366. In that case also, the assessee claimed deduction for the amount mentioned in the show-cause notice issued by the excise authorities. The contention of the assessee before the court was that the fact that no order had been passed by the concerned authorities rejecting the cause shown by the assessee was not relevant in determining the allowability of the deduction on account thereof. Repelling the above contention, this court observed (page 370):

“Law is well-settled that expenditure which is deductible for income-tax purpose is towards a liability actually existing in the year of account. Contingent liabilities do not constitute expenditure and cannot be the subject-matter of deduction even under the mercantile system of accounting. The income-tax law makes a distinction between the actual liability in praesenti and a liability de futuro which, for the time being, is only contingent. The former is deductible but not the latter.”

5. It was further observed (page 371):

“The question to be decided in each case, therefore, is whether any present liability has accrued against the assessee which has to be decided by taking into account all the circumstances of the case. There may also be cases where the liability clearly exists under a statute. In such a case, as held by the Supreme Court in Kedamath Jute Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. CIT, [1971] 82 ITR 363, deduction cannot be denied on the ground that the assessee is disputing the liability. Similarly, where a demand of tax or duty is served on the assessee maintaining the mercantile system of accounting in the accounting year, the amount so demanded would be deductible as an accrued liability even though the assessee objects to it and seeks to get the order of the concerned authority reversed, subject, however, to any statutory provision to the contrary (viz., section 43B of the Income-tax Act, 1961, as inserted by the Finance Act, 1983, with effect from April 1, 1984, which provides that certain liabilities can be deducted only on actual payment ).”

(emphasis* supplied)

6. On consideration of the facts of that case, it was held that there was no actual liability in praesenti. It was observed (page 371):

“No demand was raised against the assessee of any amount. What was served on the assessee by the Collector was merely a show-cause notice. The assessee did not admit any liability and showed cause refuting the allegations made in the show-cause notice. Even according to the assessee there was no accrued liability… Obviously, there was no liability actually existing against the assessee in the year of account. It was merely a contingent liability, which might or might not arise. That being so, the amount in question cannot constitute expenditure for the purposes of income-tax.”

7. The ratio of the above decision squarely applies to the facts of the present case. In this case also there was no actual liability in praesenti no demand was raised against the assessee. What was served by the Collector on the assessee was merely a show-cause notice. The assessee did not admit any liability and showed cause refuting the allegations made in the show-cause notices. In fact, in the instant case, the cause shown by the assessee was accepted by the excise authorities and proceedings initiated by the show-cause notices were dropped. It is thus clear that the liability claimed by the assessee as a liability on account of excise duty was merely a contingent liability which cannot constitute expenditure for the purposes of income-tax.

8. Mr. Mehta, learned counsel for the assessee, referred to the decision of this court in Shrikant Textiles v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Bombay City Ii.*, [1971] 81 ITR 222. We have carefully considered the above decision. In that case, a demand notice was issued by the officers of the Central Excise Department under rule 9(2) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, calling upon the assessee to pay the excise duty mentioned therein within 10 days from the date of the notice. That is not so in the case before us. As stated earlier, in this case, there was no demand notice. The claim of the assessee was based merely on show-cause notices which too were ultimately withdrawn. At no point of time was any demand, raised by the excise authorities nor was any payment made by the assessee.

9. There was no ascertained or crystallised liability. The entry in the accounts was based on a purely contingent liability. No deduction can be allowed in respect of such amounts. The above decision thus has no application to the facts of the present case. In fact, the ratio of the said decision goes against the assessee in this case which is clear from the following observation in that case (page 226):

“Where these entries relate to ascertained and/or crystallised liabilities, the amounts thereof must justly be allowed as deductions for computation of income. There was agreement that where these debit entries made are in respect of contingent liabilities, the amounts mentioned in the debit entries could not be allowed as expense.”

10. In view of the above, the question referred to us is answered in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. Mr. Mehta, learned counsel for the assessee, submits that the Revenue should be directed to revise the case of the assessee for the subsequent assessment year in which this amount had been added to its income under section 41(2) of the Income-tax Act. We do not think it necessary to give any such direction. The assessee may point out this fact to the Tribunal at the time of giving effect to the opinion of this court. Reference disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.

11. Certified copy expedited.