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Laxman Malhari Sable v. State Of Maharashtra .
Factual and Procedural Background
The incident giving rise to the criminal proceedings occurred on 6 January 1989. The petitioner was tried before the Sessions Judge, Alibag, who by judgment and order dated 6 February 1997 found the petitioner guilty of an offence punishable under section 304, Part I of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to ten years' imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 5,000/-, with default R.I. for one year. The order of sentence proceeded on the assumption that the minimum sentence would be imprisonment for ten years.
The material facts found by the Trial Court (prima facie) were that the petitioner had entered the house of the Chief Officer of Khopoli Municipal Council unarmed, where the Chief Engineer (deceased Yeshwant Patil) was present and a revolver belonging to the deceased was on a nearby teapoy. The deceased fired the first shot, which made two holes in the petitioner's coat. The second shot injured the petitioner's son, Tukaram. The third shot, by the petitioner's own hand, caused the death of the deceased. The central short factual question identified in the opinion is whether the petitioner was exercising a right of private defence and, if so, whether that right was exceeded.
The petitioner's appeal was admitted by the court on 11 February 1997 and criminal bail (Criminal Application No. 529 of 1997) was granted on 17 February 1997. On 20 February 1997 an application for the petitioner's disqualification as a municipal councillor was filed by Councillor Kisan Ganpat Shelar under section 44 of the Maharashtra Municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats and Industrial Township Act, 1965 ("Municipal Councils Act"). The petitioner, who belongs to the denotified Wadar Tribe, had been elected President of the Khopoli Municipal Council in December 1996 and his tenure was likely to expire in December 1997.
The Collector, Raigad, by order dated 1 April 1997 allowed the disqualification application, holding the petitioner disqualified from holding the office of Councillor from Ward No. 17 under sub‑section (3) of section 44 of the Municipal Councils Act, and further, under sub‑section (8) of section 51 of the Act declared the office of President of the Khopoli Municipal Council vacant and directed that the vacancy be filled by election. The petitioner filed an appeal against the Collector's order to the State Government on 3 April 1997, which was pending at the time of this opinion.
The present petition sought suspension of the execution and operation of the order of conviction and sentence passed by the Sessions Judge on 6 February 1997 by invoking section 389(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, in the circumstances of this case (where conviction may cause disqualification from holding public office and the disqualification order has already been made by the Collector), the execution and operation of the conviction and sentence should be suspended under section 389(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (and/or under the High Court's inherent jurisdiction under section 482).
- Whether, on the facts as found prima facie by the Trial Court, the petitioner was acting in exercise of his right of private defence and, if so, whether that right had been exceeded (a factual and legal question relevant to conviction).
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| V. Sundararamireddi v. State, 1990 Cr LJ 167 | The expressions "judgment" and "order" must be understood in context; an order of conviction forms part of the judgment. A convicted person who challenges the judgment on appeal may seek suspension of execution of the sentence, and may also seek suspension of the operation of the conviction where necessary. | The court relied on the Sundararamireddi view (as reflecting the High Court's approach) to support the proposition that suspension of the operation of a conviction is a competent relief in appropriate cases under section 389 and/or section 482. |
| Rama Narang v. Ramesh Narang, (1995) 2 SCC 513 | Section 389(1) of the CrPC can extend to staying the operation of an order of conviction where the conviction will result in disqualification (illustrated by section 267 of the Companies Act). The appellate court must be specifically apprised of the consequence (such as disqualification) because section 389(1) requires reasons to be recorded in writing for any order granting suspension. | The court treated Rama Narang as placing beyond controversy the power of a High Court under section 389(1) (and, if necessary, under section 482) to suspend the operation of an order of conviction in a fit case where otherwise irreparable damage (such as continuing disqualification) would follow. |
| State of T.N. v. A. Jaganathan, (1996) 5 SCC 329 | Where any detriment caused by non‑suspension (for example stipendary or other monetary benefits) can be revived or made good if the conviction is later set aside, suspension of conviction should not be granted merely for trifling or revivable disadvantages. Discretion to suspend may not be appropriate in such cases. | The court distinguished Jaganathan on the facts, noting that Jaganathan did not contradict Rama Narang's principle but emphasised that suspension should not be used for trifling or revivable consequences. The present case was found not to be analogous to the "trifling" situations described in Jaganathan. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court first noted the procedural posture: the appeal was admitted on 11 February 1997 and bail had been granted on 17 February 1997. It then set out the key factual matrix, including the Trial Court's findings about the sequence of shots and the central legal question of private defence.
The court considered three relevant authorities (Sundararamireddi, Rama Narang and Jaganathan) and analysed the legal principles they establish. From Sundararamireddi it observed that an order of conviction is part of the judgment and that suspension of execution of sentence or of the operation of the conviction is a cognizable relief on appeal in a proper case. From Rama Narang the court took the focused principle that section 389(1) can be invoked to suspend the operation of a conviction where the conviction would produce a disqualification under another statute, and that the appellate court must be informed so that reasons can be recorded. The court also accepted Rama Narang's position that High Courts may, where appropriate, exercise jurisdiction under section 482 if needed.
The court then addressed Jaganathan, which emphasised that suspension should not be routinely granted where the disadvantage caused by non‑suspension is trivial or can be remedied if conviction is ultimately set aside. The court reconciled Jaganathan with Rama Narang by treating Jaganathan as not running counter to the proposition that suspension may be granted where irreparable damage (such as permanent disqualification from office) would otherwise follow.
Applying these principles to the present facts, the court observed that prima facie the petitioner appears to have acted in exercise of private defence. More importantly for the suspension question, the petitioner had been elected President of the Municipal Council (in capacity as a member of the denotified Wadar Tribe) in December 1996; his term was due to expire in December 1997. A Collector's order dated 1 April 1997 had declared him disqualified and declared the office vacant, with an election direction. The petitioner had appealed that Collector's order to the State Government and that appeal was pending.
The court emphasised the decisive legal consideration derived from the cited precedents: whether the damage that would flow from non‑suspension could be undone if the appeal succeeded. The court concluded that here the damage — the loss of a public office and the attendant consequences of disqualification for the remainder of his tenure — could not be undone by a later successful appeal. Given this risk of irremediable harm, and viewing the prima facie findings on private defence together with the peculiar facts (including the petitioner's elected public office and the short remaining tenure), the court found a case to exercise its discretion in favour of suspension under the discussed provisions.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court made the rule absolute in terms of prayer (a).
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The court granted the relief sought in prayer (a) — that is, it ordered suspension (made the rule absolute) in the terms prayed in the petition. In context, this relief suspends the execution and operation of the conviction and sentence so as to prevent the immediate consequences (notably disqualification from holding the municipal office) from taking effect while the appeal and related proceedings remain pending.
- No broader precedent beyond application of the established principles: The court applied existing authorities (as summarised above) to the specific facts and exercised its discretionary power; the opinion does not announce a new broader legal rule beyond the settled principles extracted from the cited decisions.
Order accordingly.
1. Rule. By consent, rule made returnable forthwith. Heard both sides.
2. We have admitted the appeal of the petitioner on 11th February, 1997 when we had granted him liberty to file a separate application for bail. Criminal Application No. 529 of 1997 for bail was granted by us on 17th February, 1997 in the peculiar facts and circumstances which may briefly be indicated as under:
3. The incident in question took place on 6th January, 1989. Pending trial of the petitioner for the offence punishable under section 302 of Indian Penal Code, he was elected as Municipal Councillor of Khopoli Municipal Council in December, 1996. The learned Sessions Judge, Alibag by his judgment and order dated 6th February, 1997 held the petitioner guilty of offence punishable under section 304, Part I of Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for a period of ten years and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- in default to suffer R.I for one year. The order of sentence proceeds on the assumption that minimum sentence would be imprisonment for a period of ten years.
4. The facts held proved by the Trial Court prima facie suggest that the petitioner had entered the house of the Chief Officer, Khopoli Municipal Council, unarmed where the Chief Engineer of Khopoli Municipal Council deceased Yeshwant Patil was sitting with the Chief Officer. The revolver belonging to the deceased was kept on the teapoy nearby. After some talk, the deceased fired the first bullet from his revolver which caused two holes in the Safari Coat worn by the petitioner Laxman. The second bullet fired by the deceased, caused injury in the stomach of Tukaram, son of the petitioner. Undoubtedly, the third bullet which has caused death of the deceased was fired by the petitioner. The short question is about the right of private defence, if any, and it being exceeded.
5. As stated earlier, the appeal was admitted on 11th February, 1997 and we granted bail to the petitioner on 17th February, 1997. On 20th February, 1997, an application was made by a Councillor of the Khopoli Municipal Council viz. Kisan Ganpat Shelar against the petitioner praying for petitioner's disqualification under section 44 of the Maharashtra Municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats and Industrial Township Act, 1965 (for short the Municipal Councils Act). It appears that the petitioner belongs to the Denotified Wadar Tribe and in December, 1996 in view of the amended provisions, he has been elected as President of the Municipal Council in his capacity as a municipal councillor belonging to the denotified tribe. His tenure is likely to come to an end in December, 1997.
6. In the application made by Kisan Shelar for disqualification of the petitioner, Collector, Raigad has passed an order on 1st April, 1997 allowing the application and holding that the petitioner is disqualified to hold the office of the Councillor from ward No. 17 in view of provisions of sub-section (3) of section 44 of the Municipal Councils Act. The Collector has passed a further order under sub-section (8) of section 51 of the said Act declaring the office of the President of Khopoli Municipal Council vacant and directing that the said vacancy be filled in as per the election programme to be specified by a written order. Against the said order dated 1st April, 1997 passed by the Collector, the petitioner has filed an appeal before the State Government on 3rd April, 1997 which is pending.
7. This petition has been preferred praying that having regard to the above mentioned facts and circumstances, the execution and operation of the order of conviction and sentence passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Alibag on 6th February, 1997 be suspended by invoking the powers confirmed by section 389(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
8. Our attention has been invited to three decisions on the point. They are as under:
i) V. Sundararamireddi v. State, 1990 Cr LJ 167. This was a case where several public servants belonging to Irrigation Department and also some contractors were convicted by the Special Court for various offences of misconduct. The question arose about the powers of the Appellate Court under section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure dealing with the suspension of sentence pending the appeal. Jayachandra Reddy, J. (as he then was) speaking for the Court observed in para 11 of the judgment on pages 169, 170 of the report as under:
“11. In our view, these two expressions viz. ‘judgment’ and ‘order’ have to be understood, whenever they occur in any particular section of the code, in the context in which they are employed. An order of conviction, as we have already noted, is a part of the ‘judgment’ and the same is followed by a sentence, if awarding of sentence is necessary. But even if the Court finds a person guilty of an offence and releases him either under the provisions of section 360 of the Code or under the provisions of the Borstals Schools Act or the Children Act, nevertheless, it amounts to an order of conviction, forming part of the judgment as a whole. We must also bear in mind that the Code has nowhere defined the expressions ‘judgment’ or ‘order’. When once it is accepted that a convicted person in his appeal challenges the judgment as such, pronounced against him by a Criminal Court, it is axiomatic that he can ask for suspension of execution of the sentence, if there is a sentence. He can as well ask for suspension of the operation of the conviction which is a part of the judgment, if that becomes necessary in a given case.”
(Emphasis supplied)
9. The concluding portion underlined by us clearly suggests that once it is accepted that convicted person challenges the judgment in appeal, it is axiomatic that he can ask for suspension of the execution of the sentence. He can as well ask for suspension of the operation of conviction which is a part of the judgment if that becomes necessary in a given case. In the result the Division Bench came to the conclusion that order of suspension of the operation of the judgment, that is to say, the conviction need not be disturbed. Apart from section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Division Bench also referred to the powers of the High Court under section 482 of the code. The relevant observations are to be found in para 14 of the judgment before recording the conclusions in para 15 of the judgment at page 171.
ii) In Rama Narang v. Ramesh Narang, (1995) 2 SCC 513, the Apex Court had occasion to consider the scope of the provisions of section 389 of the Code where the Delhi High Court and this Court had passed different orders. On the question of the effect of the order of suspension of the order of conviction for the purpose of section 267 of the Companies Act dealing with the disqualification of the director who has been convicted by Court for offence involving moral turpitude in para 16 of the judgment at pages 524, 525 of the report the Apex Court observed as under:
“16. In certain situations the order of conviction can be executable, in the sense, it may incur a disqualification as in the instant case. In such a case, the power under section 389(1) of the Code could be invoked. In such situations the attention of the Appellate Court must be specifically invited to the consequence that is likely to fall to enable it to apply its mind to the issue since under section 389(1) it is under an obligation to support its order ‘for reasons to be recorded by it in writing’. If the attention of the Court is not invited to this specific consequence which is likely to fall upon conviction how can it be expected to assign reasons relevant thereto? No one can be allowed to play hide and seek with the Court; he cannot suppress the precise purpose for which he seeks suspension of the conviction and obtain a general order of stay and then contend that the disqualification has ceased to operate.”
10. Dealing with the scope of the provisions of section 389(1) and section 482 of the Code, the Apex Court observed thus in para 19 of the judgment at page 527.
“19. That takes us to the question whether the scope of section 389(1) of the Code extends to conferring power on the Appellate Court to stay the operation of the order of conviction. As stated earlier, if the order of conviction is to result in some disqualification of the type mentioned in section 267 of the Companies Act, we see no reason why we should give a narrow meaning to section 389(1) of the Code to debar the Court from granting an order to that effect in a fit case. The appeal under section 374 is essentially against the order of conviction because the order of sentence is merely consequential thereto; albeit even the order of sentence can be independently challenged if it is harsh and disproportionate to the established guilt. Therefore, when an appeal is preferred under section 374 of the Code the appeal is against both the conviction and sentence and therefore, we see no reason to place a narrow interpretation on section 389(1) of the Code not to extend it to an order of conviction, although that issue in the instant case recedes to the background because High Courts can exercise inherent jurisdiction under section 482 of the code if the power was not to be found in section 389(1) of the Code. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay was not right in holding that the Delhi High Court could not have exercised jurisdiction under section 482 of the code if it was confronted with a situation of there being no other provision in the Code for staying the operation of the order of conviction. In a fit case if the High Court feels satisfied that the order of conviction needs to be suspended or stayed so that the convicted person does not suffer from a certain disqualification provided for in any other statute, it may exercise the power because otherwise the damage done cannot be undone; the disqualification incurred by section 267 of the Companies Act and given effect to cannot be undone at a subsequent date if the conviction is set aside by the Appellate Court. But while granting a slay of (sic or) suspension of the order of conviction the Court must examine the pros and cons and if it feels satisfied that a case is made out for grant of such an order, it may do so and in so doing it may, if it considers it appropriate, impose such conditions as are considered appropriate to protect the interest of the shareholders and the business of the company.”
iii) In State Of T.N v. A. Jaganathan., (1996) 5 SCC 329, the question arose in the light of the similar prayer made by the persons convicted of the offences punishable under sections 392, 218 and 466 of Indian Penal Code and other offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act. High Court in revision against the concurrent order of conviction and sentence, had granted stay under section 389(1) of the Code and had suspended the conviction and sentence. The State of T.N approached the Apex Court. It has been observed in para 3 of the judgment distinguishing Rama Narang's case (supra) as under:
“In Rama Narang case the conviction and sentences both are suspended on the reasoning that if the conviction and sentences are not suspended the damage would be caused which could not be undone if ultimately the revision of the appellants of that case was allowed. But in the present case, we find that in the event the revision against their conviction and sentences are allowed by the High Court the damage, if any, caused to the respondents with regard to payment of stipend etc. can well be revived and made good to the respondents. If such trifling matters are taken into consideration, we think, then every conviction will have to be suspended pending appeal or revision involving the slightest disadvantage to a convict.”
11. In view of the above, the Apex Court took the view that having regard to the fact that one of the respondents was a police inspector convicted under sections 392, 278 and 466 of Indian Penal Code and other respondents were public servants convicted under the Prevention of Corruption Act, this was a case where discretionary powers to suspend the conviction either under section 389(1) or section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure should not have been exercised.
12. We have considered the above mentioned three judgments and in our view the Apex Court has emphasized the question of establishing as to whether if the conviction and sentence were not suspended, the damage that would be caused would not be undone if ultimately the petitioner's appeal was allowed. This is not a case of trifling claim of stipendary allowance as in Jaganathan's case (supra). On the question of the power of the Court to grant stay of the judgment and order of conviction and sentence, the matter has been ultimately placed beyond any controversy by the Apex Court in para 19 of its judgment in Rama Narang's case (supra). Similar view has been expressed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in para 14 of its judgment in Sundararamireddi's case (supra). There is nothing in the judgment in Jaganathan's case which militates against the view expressed by the Apex Court in Rama Narang's case holding that the High Court has such power either under section 389 or section 482 of the Code.
13. Coming to the facts of the present case, we have already indicated the unfortunate circumstances leading to the incident where the deceased picked up his revolver and fired at the petitioner and then at the petitioner's son. Prima facie it appears to us that this was undoubtedly a case of the petitioner acting in exercise of his right of private defence. Having admitted the appeal, we granted him bail. He belongs to denotified Wadar Tribe and as such has been elected as a Councillor and is now the President of the Municipal Council for one year. The period of one year is likely to expire in December, 1997. Under the circumstances, in our view, a case is made out for exercise of the discretion in favour of the petitioner. What is at stake is his holding a public office. The likely damage cannot be undone even if he ultimately succeeds in the appeal. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, we are inclined to make the rule absolute in terms of prayer (a). Hence rule is made absolute in terms of prayer (a).
Order accordingly.
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