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Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Mohammad Fasahatullah Khan
Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
Complaint (ULP) No. 108 of 1983 was filed before the Industrial Court, Nagpur, by respondent Mohammad Fasahatullah Khan under S. 28 read with item (9) of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971. The complainant challenged a chargesheet-cum-suspension order dated 12 March 1983, alleging that under subject No. 65 of the 1956 settlement no workman could be suspended beyond ten days and that his suspension period expired on 21 March 1983, so he should have been reinstated from 22 March 1983. The Industrial Court (Member) by order dated 3 March 1987 found the Corporation guilty of unfair labour practice and directed payment of full wages with costs of Rs. 500.
The Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation (the Corporation) challenged that order by filing Writ Petition No. 1240 of 1987 before this Court. Because two earlier Single Judge decisions on the same point were in conflict, the Single Judge (Deshpande, J.) framed questions of law and referred the matter to a Division Bench for decision. The contested legal factual matrix centers on whether Joint Committee resolutions (specifically a 1974 resolution fixing the maximum suspension period at 90 days) could validly alter the 1956 settlement which fixed suspension ordinarily at 10 days.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Joint Committee can bring about alterations, modifications or changes in the settled conditions of service of an employee (in particular, non-monetary service conditions)?
- Whether the period of ten days fixed by the 1956 Settlement could be extended by the Joint Committee (which was constituted and re-constituted after that resolution) so as to justify extending suspension pending enquiry to 90 days?
Arguments of the Parties
Respondent / Original Complainant (Mohammad Fasahatullah Khan) — principal contentions
- The Joint Committee could not alter conditions of service unless there was a settlement as contemplated under S.2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 — i.e., a valid settlement signed by the parties in the prescribed manner.
- Clause 81 of the 1956 Settlement provided that nothing shall be done which will adversely affect present service conditions, including rights and privileges of workers; the resolutions extending suspension were said to breach that clause.
- The resolutions passed in the Joint Committee meetings (resolution No. 729(3)(b) and resolution No. 732) cannot be called 'settlements' under S.2(p) unless they satisfy rule 58 of the Central Rules or rule 62 of the Bombay Rules (prescribed form, signature by authorized body, and joint forwarding to competent authority).
- The Joint Committee had no locus to pass resolutions affecting service conditions; such changes must result from bilateral settlements between management and recognised unions.
- The extension of suspension beyond ten days removed a vested right and violated principles of natural justice because (it was argued) there was no opportunity provided to the delinquent employee to be heard before extension.
- Relied upon several authorities (Workmen of Delhi Cloth & General Mills; Jay Engineering Works; Co-operative Store Ltd v. Bhambri; Adil K. Patel v. Tata Iron & Steel; Life Insurance Corporation v. D.J. Bahadur) as laying down the law about what constitutes a settlement under S.2(p) and the need to comply with prescribed rules for a settlement to be binding.
Petitioner / Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation — principal contentions
- The Corporation contended that subject No. 65 of the 1956 settlement (ten-day suspension) was superseded/modified by subsequent Joint Committee resolutions (notably resolution No. 732 passed on 18/19 July 1974 in the 45th meeting) extending suspension up to 90 days, and therefore the Corporation was not guilty of unfair labour practice.
- The Corporation relied upon statutory Service Regulations framed under S. 40 of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950 — in particular regulation 83(a) which provides that a decision on suspension shall be given within 90 days, after which the employee is to be treated as not suspended unless extension is permitted in exceptional cases. The Corporation submitted that Joint Committee resolutions brought the settlement into conformity with the statutory regulation.
- During proceedings counsel for the Corporation placed copies of various settlements and argued that the Joint Committee was created by those settlements and its scope and competence had been expanded by the 1961 and 1968 settlements to cover "all matters affecting employees" and make Committee decisions binding (subject to Corporation/Government approval where required).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Workmen of Delhi Cloth and General Mills, Ltd. v. Delhi Cloth & General Mills, Ltd. [(1969) 3 SCC 302 : A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1851] | Authority relied on by respondent to support the principle that an agreement cannot be treated as a settlement under S.2(p) unless statutory/formal requirements (rules 58/62) are satisfied. | The Court records that the respondent relied on this authority as laying down the requirement that a 'settlement' must meet prescribed formalities; the Court considered these precedents but, when resolving issues, examined the specific statutory/regulatory matrix and the origin of the Joint Committee's power. |
| Jay Engineering Works, Ltd. v. Fourth Industrial Tribunal, Calcutta [1977 (2) L.L.N. 548] | Similar principle invoked by respondent about formal requirements for a settlement under S.2(p). | Noted by the Court as part of the group of authorities relied upon by respondent to contest the bindingness of Joint Committee resolutions; Court proceeded to analyze the settlements and statutory regulations to reach its conclusion. |
| Co-operative Store, Ltd. v. Ved Prakash Bhambri [1989 (1) L.L.N. 414] | Authority cited for the narrow view of what constitutes a settlement under S.2(p) and the need to comply with formal rules. | Recognised by the Court as one of the cases the respondent relied upon; the Court nevertheless based its decision on the text of successive settlements, the Joint Committee's agreed scope, and statutory service regulations. |
| Adil K. Patel v. Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. [1994 (2) L.L.N. 100] | Again cited for the proposition that a settlement must satisfy the formal statutory rule requirements to be binding as a 'settlement' under S.2(p). | Cited by respondent; the Court acknowledged these authorities but proceeded to hold that the Joint Committee decisions (even if not 'settlements' in strict S.2(p) sense) are binding between the parties as agreements deriving from valid prior settlements. |
| Life Insurance Corporation of India v. D.J. Bahadur [1980 (2) L.L.N. 575] | Relied on by respondent but the Court noted the Supreme Court judgment was not applicable to the issues in the present reference. | The Court explicitly stated that a perusal showed the judgment was not applicable to present facts and issues, and therefore did not form part of the Court's operative reasoning. |
| Brooke Bond India Ltd. v. Workmen [1981 (2) L.L.N. 286] | Explains that a settlement is binding only on parties to the agreement; when unions represent workmen, settlements may be arrived at between employer and union, but authorization rules of the union are relevant. | The Court relied on the quoted paragraph to support the proposition that settlements bind parties to them and to note that authorization of representatives matters; the decision was used to reinforce that the Joint Committee — created by prior settlements — could act within its agreed scope. |
| Fabril Gasosa v. Labour Commissioner [1997 (2) L.L.N. 55] | Clarifies that the settlement under S.2(p) and rule 58 is a written settlement; it cannot be varied except by written instrument duly signed by parties. | The Court cited this Supreme Court observation to note the general rule about written settlements, but proceeded to state that the present question did not require deciding whether the Joint Committee resolutions were settlements under S.2(p); even if not, they operate as binding agreements between the parties. |
| D.C. Tonge v. Maharashtra State Transport Kamgar Sangathana [1985 (2) L.L.N. 112] | Shows that breach of a circular implementing an agreement may amount to breach of an agreement and be binding between the parties. | The Court relied on this case to support the proposition that even instruments that may not be 'settlements' in strict form (for example circulars or agreements) can be binding on the parties and enforceable. |
| Petroleum Employees Union v. Industrial Court, Maharashtra, Bombay [1980 (1) L.L.N. 537] | Holds that a management's letter confirming an oral understanding can amount to an agreement binding on the management though it may not be a 'settlement' in strict S.2(p) sense. | The Court used this authority to illustrate that non-formal instruments (letters, confirmations) derived from union-management understandings can be binding — supporting the view that Joint Committee decisions can operate as binding agreements. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded by careful textual and contextual analysis of the successive written settlements (1952, 1956, 1961, 1968), the Joint Committee's constitution and functions under those settlements, the Joint Committee resolutions of the 1970s (notably resolutions Nos. 716, 729(3)(b), 732 and 741), and the statutory Service Regulations framed under S.40 of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950 (in particular regulations 80, 82 and 83(a)). The reasoning unfolded in the following major steps:
- Analysis of settlements: The Court compared the 1952 and 1956 settlements (which originally limited ordinary suspension to 10 days but contained provisions allowing longer suspension in 'special cases') with the 1961 and 1968 settlements, which broadened the Joint Committee's scope. Clause 45 of the 1961 settlement and Clause 9 of the 1968 settlement expressly stated that "all matters affecting the employees will fall within the scope of the Joint Committee" and that Joint Committee decisions would be binding (subject to Corporation/Government approval where required). The 1968 settlement expressly superseded earlier arrangements regarding constitution and scope of the Joint Committee.
- Factual tracing of resolutions: The Joint Committee passed a series of resolutions in the 43rd–45th meetings which progressively adjusted the maximum suspension period; resolution No. 732 (18/19 July 1974) fixed the permitted higher side of suspension at 90 days. The 48th meeting adopted resolution No. 741 which deleted an earlier clause regarding suspension period "in view of" the Joint Committee's resolution (No. 729/732). The Court limited the issues to whether the Joint Committee could effect such a change and whether the 10-day period fixed in 1956 could be extended by the Joint Committee.
- Statutory/regulatory context: The Court examined the Service Regulations (framed under S.40 of the Road Transport Corporation Act), especially regulation 83(a) which provides that a decision shall be given within 90 days from date of suspension and if no decision is reached within 90 days (except where delay is due to the employee), the employee shall be treated as if not suspended; the Corporation may extend 90 days in exceptional cases. The Court noted that the 1952 and 1956 settlement clauses limiting suspension to 10 or 60 days were inconsistent with regulation 83(a), and the 1961 settlement extended the maximum to 90 days "in keeping with the statutory provision."
- Competence of the Joint Committee: The Court observed that the Joint Committee was a creation of legally valid settlements and that the parties had agreed in the 1961 and 1968 settlements that Joint Committee decisions would be binding on the parties (subject to approvals where required). Given that the Joint Committee's charter included "all matters affecting the employees" and that the 1968 settlement divided demands into monetary (to be dealt separately) and non-monetary (to be handled by the Joint Committee), the Court concluded that the Joint Committee was competent to bring about alterations in settled conditions of service that related to non-financial matters.
- Natural justice / hearing contention: The Court addressed the contention that the resolution deprived an employee of a hearing before extension of suspension and found this contention without merit. The Court reasoned that the resolutions provided a joint forum and procedures (including referral to a sub-committee and regular review), and that there was no prior provision in the 1956 Settlement entitling an employee to a hearing before an extension of suspension. The Court noted practical difficulties in conceptualizing an entitled "hearing" as a legal right in the context of extending the suspension period and concluded that the resolution brought the suspension period in line with the statutory regulation and did not unlawfully withdraw vested rights.
- Effect even if not a formal "settlement": The Court expressly stated it was not necessary to decide whether the impugned Joint Committee resolutions constituted a settlement under S.2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Even if the resolutions were not 'settlements' in the strict statutory sense, the Court held they amounted to agreements or instruments binding between the parties (deriving origin and sanctity from legally valid prior settlements), and precedent (D.C. Tonge; Petroleum Employees Union) supported enforcing such instruments between the parties.
- Reliance on authorities: The Court cited and relied on Supreme Court and other authorities (Brooke Bond; Fabril Gasosa) to explain legal principles about what constitutes a settlement and the binding force of agreements originating from employer-union arrangements. The Court used these authorities to reinforce that where parties have created a Joint Committee by valid settlements and agreed to be bound by its decisions (subject to necessary approvals), the Joint Committee's decisions within its agreed scope are binding.
Holding and Implications
Holding: Both points of reference were answered in the negative: the Joint Committee was competent to bring about alterations, modifications or changes in settled conditions of service of an employee insofar as those changes pertained to non-financial matters; and the Joint Committee was competent to extend the period of suspension pending enquiry fixed at ten days by the 1956 Settlement (so as to permit a 90-day maximum in the circumstances described).
Implications:
- The Court concluded that the Joint Committee resolutions (notably resolutions that resulted in fixing a 90-day maximum suspension pending enquiry) are within the Committee's competence when they concern non-monetary service conditions and are consistent with the statutory Service Regulations (regulation 83(a)).
- Even if the resolutions are not 'settlements' in the strict sense under S.2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act, they are binding between the parties as agreements or instruments deriving from earlier valid settlements.
- Practically, the reference resolves the conflict between earlier contrary Single Judge decisions and clarifies that the Joint Committee's decisions in the described field have binding effect; accordingly, the Court directed the office to place Writ Petition No. 1240 of 1987 for final hearing before the appropriate Single Bench (i.e., the Division Bench answered the referred legal points and returned the writ for final disposal).
- The opinion does not expressly state that it creates any distinct new legal doctrine beyond resolving the identified conflict between Single Judge decisions; its immediate consequence is to determine the competence of the Joint Committee on these questions and to guide the subsequent final hearing of the writ petition.
Marlapalle, J.:— Complaint (ULP) No. 108 of 1983 came to be filed before the Industrial Court, Nagpur, under S. 28 read with item (9) of Sch. IV of Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1971 for short), by respondent Mohammad Fasahatullah Khan against Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation challenging chargesheet-cum-suspension order, dated 12 March, 1983. The case of the original complainant was that as per subject No. 65 of the settlement, dated 25 April, 1956, no workman of the Corporation could be suspended for a period beyond ten days and as the period of his suspension was over on 21 March, 1983, the suspension order, dated 12 March, 1983, ought to have been withdrawn and the complainant ought to have been taken on duty from 22 March, 1983. The complainant, therefore, alleged unfair labour practice as set out under item (9) of Sch. IV of the Act of 1971 on the part of the Corporation inasmuch as there was a breach of the settlement, dated 25 April, 1956, by not allowing the petitioner to resume duties from 22 March, 1983, onwards.
2. The said complaint was opposed by the Corporation by filling its written statement and it was contended that subject No. 65 of settlement, dated 25 April, 1956, was superseded/modified by subsequent Joint Committee's resolution, dated 18/19 July, 1974, in the 45th meeting of the Joint Committee in which period of suspension was extended up to 90 days. The Corporation, therefore, claimed that it was not guilty of any unfair labour practice, as alleged. The learned Member of the Industrial Court did not agree with the reasoning given by the Corporation and by his order, dated 3 March, 1987, held the Corporation to be guilty of the unfair labour practice under item (9) of Sch. IV of the Act of 1971, and the complaint was allowed. He further directed the Corporation to pay full wages along with costs of rupees five hundred.
3. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Member of the Industrial Court on 3 March, 1987 in Complaint (ULP) No. 108 of 1983, the Corporation filed Writ Petition No. 1240 of 1987 and prayed for quashing and setting aside the order passed by the Industrial Court, before this Court. As per the appellate said rules, as amended by this Court. Writ Petition No. 1240 of 1987 came to be placed before the learned Single Judge (M.S Deshpande, J.), for final hearing. It was brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge by the respective parties that on the subject of the writ petition, mere were two earlier judgments, which are contrary to each other and both the judgments were delivered by two respective Single Benches inasmuch as in Writ Petitions Nos. 255, 256, 259 and 267 of 1982 and Writ Petitions Nos. 1913 and 1914 of 1981 decided on 1st, 2nd and 3rd March, 1982 by the learned Single Judge (R.S Padhye, J.) and another Writ Petition No. 436 of 1982 decided on 20 November, 1985 by the learned Single Judge (Patel, J), there was difference of opinion and findings in both the judgments were contrary to each other on the same point of law. In his oral judgment, dated 17 September, 1992, the learned Single Judge (M.S Deshpande, J.), has recorded respective findings, which were contrary to each other and, therefore, directed the office to place the petition before the learned Chief Justice for referring the matter for decision by Division Bench of this Court. The relevant portion of the order passed by the first Single Judge (R.S Padhye, J), reads as under;
“It is not disputed by anybody that U-6 is the Settlement of 1968 and it defines the functions and the powers of the Joint Committee. It is also not disputed that according to this settlement, all matters affecting employees fall within the scope of the working of the Joint Committee and that the decision of the Joint Committee was to be binding on both the parties. If this was the settlement and if the 48th meeting of the Joint Committee was specifically set up under this settlement as specifically pointed out in the introductory part of C-16, one fails to understand as to why C-17, which was a decision taken in this 48th meeting of the Joint Committee, could not be treated as a settlement modifying the earlier settlement U-4 of 1956.”
4. The relevant finding in the subsequent petition recorded by another learned Single Judge (Patel, J.), as is reproduced in the judgment by Deshpande, J., is as under:
“There is not such of the difference between the scope and functions of the Joint Committee under the two Settlements of 1961 and 1968. However, the relevant one would be the latter settlement of 1968. The Joint Committee thereunder was empowered to look into all matters affecting employees will fall within the scope of the Joint Committee. It is nowhere specified or at least not pointed out to me that all matters referred to therein could embrace within its fold even alteration, modification or change in the terms of earlier settlements. In my opinion, the functions of the Joint Committee cannot bring about alternations, modifications or changes, in the settled conditions of service of an employee and no right can accrue to the petitioner-Corporation to unilaterally cancel item (49), in the absence of any consensus on the point, in the meeting held for the purpose.”
5. In view of the contrary views taken in the aforesaid two decisions of Single Judge Benches, Deshpande, J., in his oral judgment, dated 17 September, 1992, in the present petition, held that it was necessary that the controversy be resolved by a larger Bench and, therefore, he framed the following question for decision by the Division Bench:
“Whether the Joint Committee cannot bring about alterations, modifications or changes in the settled conditions of service of an employee and whether the period of ten days fixed by 1956 Settlement could not have been extended by the Joint Committee, which has been constituted and re-constituted after the resolution was passed, in pursuance of the Settlements of 1956, 1961 and 1968?
The matter was therefore, placed before the learned Chief Justice, who has passed necessary orders and thus, Writ Petition No. 1240 of 1987 has been referred to a Division Bench for decision. The points for consideration by the Division Bench as referred by Deshpande, J., are as under:
(i) Whether Joint Committee cannot bring about alterations/modifications or changes in the settled conditions of service of an employee?
(ii) Whether period of ten days fixed by 1956 Settlement could not have been extended by the Joint Committee, which has been constituted and re-constituted after that resolution was passed in pursuance of the Settlements of 1956, 1961 and 1968?
6. On our directions, the parties have placed on record copies of settlements signed on 27 March, 1952, 25 April, 1956, 23 January, 1959, 27 June, 1961, 21 October, 1966, 31 January, 1968 and 15 October, 1994 as well as settlements signed in 1973 and 1977 between State Transport Corporation and its unions representing all the employees. For the purpose of our decision, we are concerned with the clauses regarding provision for period of suspension as well as constitution of Joint Committee with its scope of functioning and entering into settlements or passing resolutions in respect of the matters concerning service conditions of the employees.
7. In the settlement of 1952, Cl. 18 reads thus:
“Ordinarily the period of suspension will be 10 days, but in special cases, maximum period can be 90 days as prescribed in the Service Code. In such cases, the approval of the Chief Labour Officer will, however, be obtained.”
In 1956 Settlement, there were in all 81 clauses and Cls. 41, 49, 65, 80 and 81, which are relevant for our consideration, are reproduced as under:
“41. After 15th June, 1955, no changes in service conditions of workers will be made without mutual agreement.
49. Any employee working for 180 days including weekly offs and other holidays continuously will be brought on the time-scale of pay and will get call the benefits available to time-scale workers. Any absence on account of authorised leave will not be treated as break for the above purpose and will not also count for service.
65. Ordinarily the period of suspension will be 10 days but in special cases the maximum period can be 60 days provided prior permission of the Chief Labour Officer is obtained and the latter is satisfied that there is a prima facie case of a serious nature against the employee concerned.
80. A Joint Committee should be constituted for enforcing this settlement and for moving grievances of workers. It should also ensure proper implementation of all terms of the agreements, settlements and decisions of the Joint Committee and also see that no party does anything prejudicial to the rights and privileges of the S.T Corporation or its employees. The implementation Committee referred to in demand No. 1(b) shall comprise of three persons nominated by the Corporation and three persons nominated by me ST. Workers Federation.
81. Nothing shall be done, which will adversely affect the present service conditions including rights and privileges of workers.”
It is thus clear from the above Cls. 65 and 80 that the maximum period of suspension which was limited to ninety in the Settlement of 1952, was reduced to sixty day and for the first time, a Joint Committee was constituted with specific subjects notified within its purview or in other terms, the area of operation of the Joint Committee was laid down and more particularly, the Joint Committee was constituted for enforcing implemention of the settlement and removing grievances of the workers as well as to ensure that no party does anything prejudicial to the rights and privileges of the State Transport Corporation or its employees.
8. We need not refer to the 1958 Settlement for the present purpose. In 1961 Settlement, Cls. 42, 43 and 45, which are relevant for the present purpose, need to be reproduced and they are as under:
“42 and 43 Joint Committee:
There will be a Joint Committee consisting of three representatives of the Corporation and three representatives of the federation. The meeting of the Joint Committee will be held once very month provided there is agenda. Once every six months, the General Secretaries of the Divisional Units of the Federation and one employee from each of the units nominated by the Federation, will be entitled to attend the meeting of the Joint Committee as observer. While considering the time table of any division under Cl. 26(f) above, one representative of the Federation from the division concerned shall be entitled to attend and be heard by the Committee. One person nominated by the federation shall be entitled to attend each of those meetings of the Joint Committee as observer on which there is otherwise no observer. Every observer shall be entitled to T.A and D.A
The Vice-Chairman of the Corporation shall be the Chairman of the Joint Committee. The procedure of Masselley Joint Works council shall be followed for the conduct of the meetings. The secretary shall be a worker.
45. Interpretation of the settlement. All matters affecting the employees will fall within the scope of the Joint Committee. The decisions of the Joint Committee will be binding on both the parties subject to Corporation and Government approval where required. In case there is no decision for any reason on any issue, the same will be decided by the Corporation. The Corporation shall before deciding give an opportunity to the Federation representative to be heard.
The Joint Committee will inter alia be competent to consider any anomalies noticed in the pay-scales.”
It is clear that Cl. 80 in 1956 Settlement pertaining to formation of the Joint Committee is different from Cl. 45 in the 1961 Settlement inasmuch as area of operation of the Joint Committee has been enlarged and it is specifically provided (hat all matters affecting employees will fall within the scope of the Joint Committee and the decisions of the Joint Committee will be binding on both the parties subject to Corporation and Government approval where required. On the other hand, the Joint Committee in 1956 Settlement was constituted only to ensure proper implementation of the settlement and to address itself on the grievance of the employees. It is also pertinent to reproduce Cl. 48 of 1961 Settlement and it reads thus:
“48. All privileges, rights, advantages, facilities and amenities existing immediately prior to this agreement shall unless otherwise expressly provided be continued. The decisions of the Joint Committee and the implementation committee and previous settlements or awards shall be considered as in force or effective unless modified by this settlement.”
9. Coming to the last relevant Settlement of 1968, reference is necessarily to be made to Cl. 9, which reads as under:
“9. Reconstitution of Joint Committee:
In view of the new situation created on account of the recognition of four unions at the State level, it was found necessary to revise the constitution of the Joint Committee. The Joint Committee to now consist of four representatives of the Corporation and representatives of the four recognised unions as indicated below:
1. M.S.T Workers' Federation 8 Members
2. Maharashtra S.T Mazdoor 8 Members 3. Provincial Rashtriya Motor Kamgar Union, Nagpur 1 Member 4. Motor Kamgar Panchayat, Amraoti 1 Member
The meeting of the Joint Committee should beheld once every month provided there is agenda. The Vice-Chairman of the Corporation should be the Chairman of the Joint Committee and the Secretary should be a worker. All matters affecting the employees will fall within the scope of the working of the Joint Committee. The decision of the Joint Committee should be binding on both the parties subject to Corporation and/or Government approval where required. In case there is no decision for any reason or any issue, the same will be decided by the Corporation. The Corporation shall, however, before deciding such issues give an opportunity to the representatives of all the four recognised unions (one each) to be heard.
This arrangement is in supersession of the earlier arrangements concerning the constitution and scope of functions of the Joint Committee.”
It is, therefore, clear that by incorporating CL9 in the Settlement of 1968, all the earlier arrangements concerning the scope of functions of the Joint Committee were superseded and scope of working of the Joint Committee was in pari materia with the provisions contained in 1961 Settlement. However, representation of the workers on the Joint Committee was changed in view of recognition of four unions at the State level. It is also pertinent to note at this juncture the preamble of 1968 Settlement and the short recital of the case in the relevant para in the said settlement provided as under:
“During the deliberations of the third meeting of the negotiating committee held on 6th/7th/8th March, 1968, it was unanimously decided that in view of the inordinate delay which lengthy discussions on all the 64 demands would entail, there should be a package deal covering the four major demands, viz.,:
(1) revision of scales of pay;
(2) linking of dearness allowance with the cost of living index;
(3) increase in existing allowances and grant of new allowances; and
(4) arbitration in disputes relating to bonus calculations.
It was further decided that the remaining demands be dealt with by the Joint Committee already set up and functioning.”
10. The above preamble of 1968 Settlement goes to show that it was agreed between the parties that the charter of demands was divided into two parts, namely, monetary demands and non-monitary demands and it was further decided between the parties that monetary demands will be settled separately, which were actually discussed and settled in the first two meetings of the negotiating committee and the non-monetary demands were to be discussed and settled by the Joint Committee. It was in this view of the agreement between the parties that Cl. 9 was incorporated in the settlement re-constituting the Joint Committee with specifically setting out the subjects under its purview
11. The Joint Committee in its 43rd meeting passed resolution No. 716 to the effect that maximum period of suspension would continue to be 60 days and thereafter permission of extension of suspension period beyond 120 days need not be sought from the Chief Labour Officer. The Joint Committee in the next meeting, i.e, 44th meeting passed resolution No. 729(3)(b) extending the maximum period of suspension pending enquiry from 60 days to 120 days. By Resolution No. 732 passed on 18th/19th July, 1974 in the 45th meeting of the Joint Committee, it was decided to modify the earlier resolution No. 729(3)(b) for the words “at the statutory figure of 120 days” appearing in second line of (b) of the said resolution words “at 90 days” should be substituted and accordingly change was substituted in the last line of settlement of resolution No. 729 substituting the figure 90 days for the figure 120 days. By this resolution, the period of suspension permitted on the higher side was fixed at 90 days and we are concerned with this resolution, which was relied upon by the petitioner-Corporation before the learned Member of the Industrial Court in Complaint (ULP) No. 108 of 1983. The issues referred by Deshpande, J., have, therefore, to be answered in relation to this resolution No. 732, which has resulted into maximum period of suspension, which was fixed at ten days by the 1956 settlement and extended to ninty days by the said resolution passed in the 45th meeting of the Joint Committee.
12. In the 48th meeting of the Joint Committee held on 21st and 22nd January, 1975, resolution No. 741 was passed in respect of several items concerning to the service conditions of employees like reimbursement of medical experience, free passes to the children of S.T employees, exemption to the Corporation from E.S.I, Act, establishment of hospital for S.T employees, advance increments to typists, incentive scheme to the workshop staff, filling in of vacancies arising out of implementation of the revised depot staff structure, gratuity fund regulations, grant of special disability leave to employees injured by the accident while on duty and suspension period pending enquiry. In the said meeting, it was decided to delete clause regarding period of suspension in view of the Joint Committee resolution No. 729(3)(b), dated 21 June, 1974. In was this resolution, which was was held to be a settlement modifying earlier Settlement of 1956 by Padhye, J., in his judgment, dated 2nd and 3rd March, 1982. However, we are not required to decide whether resolution No. 741 passed by the Joint Committee was a settlement or not.
13. The learned counsel Sri Khan, appearing for the original complainant/employee, while urging to answer both the issues referred by Deshpande, J., in the affirmative has contended that—
(a) no condition of service could be changed unless a settlement as contemplated under S. 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is signed between the parties, namely, petitioner-Corporation and the unions representing employees therein;
(b) as per Cl. 81 of the 1956 Settlement, it was agreed between the parties that nothing shall be done, which would adversely affect the present service conditions including rights and privileges of workers; and
(c) the resolution No. 729(3)(b) passed in the 43rd meeting of the Joint Committee and resolution No. 732 passed in the 45th meeting of the Joint Committee cannot be called as settlement as defined under S. 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
The learned counsel has vehemently submitted before us in this regard that the Joint Committee had no locus standi, in the eye of law, to enter into a settlement or pass any resolution affecting service conditions of the employees and such a course ought to have been adopted only by negotiations culminating into settlements between the management of the petitioner corporation and the recognised unions. He contends that by no stretch of imagination, the resolution passed in the 43rd and 45th meetings of the Joint Committee could be called a settlement as defined under S. 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. He has concluded his arguments by submitting that the Joint Committee could not bring about alterations, modifications or changes in the settled service conditions of employees and period of ten days fixed by the 1956 Settlement could not have been extended by resolutions passed in the Joint Committee's meeting though the Joint Committee was constituted in pursuance of the settlements entered between the parties and in support of his contentions, he has relied upon the following judgments:
(i) Workmen of Delhi Cloth and General Mills, Ltd. v. Delhi Cloth and General Mills, Ltd., [(1969) 3 SCC 302 : A.I.R 1970 S.C 1851].
(ii) Jay Engineering Works, Ltd. v. Fourth Industrial Tribunal, Calcutta, [1977 (2) L.L.N 548].
(iii) Co-operative Store, Ltd. v. Ved Prakash Bhambri, [1989 (1) L.L.N 414].
(iv) Adil K. Patel v. Tata Iron and Steel Company, Ltd., [1994 (2) L.L.N 100].
All these judgments lay down a law that an agreement signed between the parties, namely, management and unions could not be termed as a settlement as defined under S. 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, unless the provisions of rule 58 of the Central Rules under the Industrial Disputes Act or rule 62 of the Bombay Rules under the Industrial Disputes Act are satisfied it is a settled position in law that an agreement between the management and unions to be called as a valid and binding settlement, it is necessary that it ought to be set out in the prescribed form, copies thereof must be sent jointly to the competent authority as stipulated in the rules (for bilateral settlement) and such a settlement should be signed by a competent body duly authorised by the union. The learned counsel for the employee contended that the resolutions passed by the Joint Committee in its 43rd and 45th meetings extending the maximum period of suspension pending enquiry from ten days to ninety days could not satisfy the above mentioned tests and hence, they could not be termed as settlements as defined under S. 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act and unless these resolutions satisfy these tests for a valid, and binding settlements, they could not alter, modify or change the settled conditions of service of employees. The learned counsel for the employee has also relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Life Insurance Corporation of India v. D.J Bahadur, [1980 (2) L.L.N 575]. However, a perusal of the said judgment would indicate that it is not applicable to the facts of the present case inasmuch as the issues involved in the present reference are not covered by the said judgment.
14. As already observed hereinabove, we have to confine our findings only to the specific issues referred by Deshpande, J., and examine the rival contentions with reference by the change brought about in the maximum period of suspension pending enquiry from ten days to ninety days. It is pertinent to observe that by the 1952 Settlement, which has been confirmed in Reference (IT) No. 115 of 1949, it is stipulated that ordinarily the period of suspension would be ten days, but in special cases, maximum period would be ninety days as prescribed in the Service Code and in such special cases, approval of the Chief Labour Officer will, however, be obtained. It is, therefore to be noted that period of ten days of suspension pending enquiry was liable to be extended to ninety days in special cases with a rider that approval thereof was to be obtained from the Chief Labour Officer of the petitioner-Corporation. It, therefore, implies that the Corporation had a discretion to extend the period of suspension pending enquiry from ten days up to ninety days and it could not be said that ten days' period was the maximum period prescribed for suspension pending enquiry. The contention of the employee before the Industrial Court that extension of period of suspension pending enquiry beyond duration of ten days amounted to an act of unfair labour practice under item (9) of Sch. IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act inasmuch as it was a breach of 1952 Settlement is not supported by the mere fact that discretion was always vested with the management to extend the period of suspension pending enquiry beyond ten days.
15. By the 1952 Settlement, it was decided between the parties (as can be seen in the last clause of the settlement) that a Joint Labour Consultation Committee consisting of Motor Transport Controller, General Manager, Deputy General Manager (Administration) and Chief Labour Officer and the President, General Secretary and Secretary of the recognised union would be set up immediately to discuss and finalise issues arising out by the settlement and to see that the present conditions of service of workers would not be adversely affected. It is further stated in the said clause that the object of the Committee was to see that harmonious relationship between State Transport Corporation and its employees was maintained so as to increase the efficiency and make nationalisation a grand success. The 1956 Settlement changed the name of the Joint Labour Consultation Committee as Joint Committee almost for the same purposes. The primary aim of this Joint Committee was to oversee implementation of the settlement and to ensure that no party did anything prejudicial to the rights and privileges of the other party. Thus, role of the Joint Committee was very limited in both the settlements, namely, Settlements of 1952 and 1956.
16. Clause 45 in the 1961 Settlement for the first time has enlarged the scope of working of the Joint Committee and it is stated that all matters affecting the employees would fall within the scope of the Joint Committee and decisions of the Joint Committee will be binding on both the parties Subject to Corporation and Government approval where required. The Joint Committee is thus a creation of the legally valid and binding settlements with specific scope of functions and it was further agreed between the parties in no uncertain words that the decisions of the Joint Committee would be binding on them subject to Corporation and Government approval where required. It implies that in the matters where Corporation or Government approval was not required, decisions of the Joint Committee would be binding on both the parties automatically. We then come to the 1968 Settlement and it has to be read with specific reference to its preamble as reproduced hereinabove. The preamble of the 1968 Settlement shows that both the parties agreed to divide demands in two categories, namely, financial and non-financial demands and that non-financial demands would be discussed and settled by the Joint Committee. Clause 9 of the said Settlement of 1968 reiterates the scope of working of the Joint Committee and its decisions being binding on both the parties as was stipulated in the 1961 Settlement with further details of enlarging representation of the unions on the Joint Committee. To repeat, we observe that the Joint Committee is a creation of the legal and valid settlements entered into between the parties and by these settlements, the parties have agreed on the scope of working of the Joint Committee and decisions of the Joint Committee to be binding on the parties. Without entering into a question as to whether such decisions of the Joint Committee amount to a legal and binding settlement as contemplated under S. 2(p) or the Industrial Disputes Act, it is sufficient to observe that the parties have agreed in terms of these Settlements of 1961 and 1968 that the decisions of the Joint Committee would be binding on them and these decisions more particularly pertain to the service conditions, which do not involve monetary benefits or monetary demands. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the Joint Committee is a legal forum created by a valid and binding settlement between the parties and decisions of the Joint Committee regarding service conditions are binding on both the parties. On a specific query, it was revealed that no grievance has been at any time made by any of the unions operating amongst the employees of the State Transport Corporation regarding decisions of the Joint Committee and this is a sufficient proof of the fact that decisions of the Joint Committee have been always accepted to be binding on the management as well as all the unions representing all employees of the Corporation. Viewed in this background, there cannot be any dispute that the Joint Committee was competent to bring about alterations, modifications or changes in the settled conditions of service of employees so long as such alterations, modifications or changes pertain to non-financial matters.
17. On our oral directions, Sri Bobde, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-Corporation, submitted a copy of the Bombay State Transport Employees' Service Regulations as well as a copy of discipline and appeal procedure framed under regulation 80 of the said Service Regulations. The Service Regulations have been framed under S. 40 of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950, under which the state transport corporation was established. Needless to mention that these service regulations have statutory force and govern the service conditions of the employees. Regulation 80 empowers the Corporation to frame discipline and appeal procedure, which has been so done by the Corporation, regulation 82 states that an employee charged with any act of misconduct is liable to be suspended by the corporation pending enquiry in accordance with the procedure prescribed under regulation 80, whereas regulation 83(a) states that in the case of suspension, the decision shall be given within ninety days from the date of suspension and if no decision is arrived at within 90 days for any reason, except for the employee's own default, the employee will be eligible to be treated after expiry of 90 days as if he had not been suspended, provide that the corporation shall be competent to extend the period of 90 days in exceptional cases. Clause (b) of regulation No. 83 provides for payment of subsistence allowance during the period of suspension pending enquiry. A perusal of regulation 83(a) clearly shows that maximum period of suspension pending enquiry ordinarily was 90 days after which employees was treated as if not suspended and he would be entitled for full salary. It is also clear that in exceptional cases, the corporation is competent to extend the period of 90 days in respect of suspension pending enquiry. The clause regarding maximum period of suspension pending enquiry in the 1952, Settlement was contrary to the provisions of regulation 83(a). However, it is to be noted that this regulation has been framed as it appears (from the copy of the Regulations supplied) on 18 November, 1955, i.e, after 1952 settlement was signed. Clause 65 of the 1956 Settlement regarding maximum period of suspension pending enquiry being fixed at 60 days was also contrary to the provisions of regulation 83 (a) and for the first time, by the 1961 Settlement and rightly so, the maximum period of suspension pending enquiry was extended to 90 days in keeping with the statutory provision. These words statutory provision are clearly implied to refer to regulation 83(a) of the State Transport Employees' Service Regulations. Regulations 716(3) and 729 passed in the 44th and 45th meetings of the Joint Committee respectively have, therefore, taken into consideration the maximum period of suspension pending enquiry being fixed at 90 days under regulation 83(a) of the Service Regulations and these resolutions have not resulted into any adverse change in the conditions of service applicable to the employees.
18. Sri Khan then contended that the impugned resolutions regarding period of suspension pending enquiry have adversely affected the service conditions, which is in breach of the Cl. 81 of the 1956 Settlement as referred to hereinabove and such a change was not permitted under that settlement inasmuch as the impugned provision does not provide for an opportunity of being heard to the delinquent employee while extending the period of suspension from ten days to 90 days or any period beyond 10 days and this results into violation of principles of natural justice. Such a change has resulted into withdrawing the vested rights in favour of an employee as compared to rights available in the 1956 Settlement. In view of this, it is contended by Sri Khan that the resolutions being in breach of the terms of the settlement are illegal and not binding on the individual employees of the corporation. He also stressed an additional point that Joint Committee is not a forum, which has a valid status in the eye of law to pass such resolution altering conditions of service. In this regard, it is pertinent to reproduce regulation 729(3)(b), which reads as under:
“It was decided that the maximum period of suspension should be set at the statutory figure of 120 days. But the G.M should issue administrative orders whereby every case of such disciplinary action where proceedings have not ended (at the hands of the competent authority) within 60 days in reported in a statement from every week to the Central office. In case it is not possible to finalise the cases even within 80 days, a detailed note on each case-not on its merits, but only on the question as to why it has not yet been completed-should be forwarded by each Divisional Controller (Administration), who should put up all such cases before a sub-committee, consisting of the G.M and the two General Secretaries of the State level recognised unions, which will meet every month regularly in order to see how best each such case can and should be disposed of within a maximum period of 120 days.…”
This resolution of the 44th meeting of the Joint Committee was modified in the 45th meeting of the Joint Committee inasmuch as the figures of 120 days were substituted by the figures 90 days. However, reading the original resolution with the modifications, it is clear that all such cases wherein enquiry could not be completed within 60 days are required to be referred to a sub-committee consisting of General Manager and two General Secretaries of the state level recognised unions, which would meet every months regularly in order to see how best each such case could not should be disposed of within a maximum period of 90 days. The resolution itself has provided a joint forum to examine all such cases and, therefore, the contention of Sri Khan that there is no opportunity of being heard, which has resulted into violation of principles of natural justice, is without merits. Even in Cl. 65 of the 1956 Settlement, there was no such provision of an employee being heard while extending the period of suspension beyond ten days in exceptional cases. In fact, it is difficult to contemplate a hearing to be offered to the employee for extending the period of suspension in case the disciplinary proceedings pending against him could not be completed within the stipulated period of suspension pending enquiry and a delinquent employee could not claim such hearing as a matter of a legal right. All that the impugned resolution has done is to bring the period of suspension pending enquiry on par with the statutory period, namely, maximum period of 90 days in normal circumstances set out in regulation 83(a) of the State Transport Employees' Service Regulations and, therefore, such a resolution could not be termed as illegal or even for that matter, a resolution affecting existing service conditions adversely.
19. Regarding the status of the Joint Committee to pass such resolution, we may safely refer to a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Brooke Bond India Ltd. v. Workmen, [1981 (2) L.L.N 286), wherein in the concluding paragraph, it is observed as under, in Para. 6, at page 291:
“The language of S. 18(1) clearly shows that the settlement will be binding only ‘on the parties to the agreement.’ The definition of ‘settlement’ in S. 2(p) of the Act also states that ‘settlement’ means a settlement arrived at ‘between the employer and the workmen.’ So, normally, in order that a settlement between the employer and the workmen may be binding on them, it has to be arrived at by agreement between the employer and the workmen. Where the workmen are represented by a recognised union, the settlement may be arrived at between the employer and the union. If there is a recognised union of the workmen and the constitution of the union provides that any of its office-bearers can enter into a settlement with the management on behalf of the union and its members, a settlement may be arrived at between the employer and such office-bearer or bearers. But, where the constitution does not so provide specifically, the office-bearer or bearers who wish to enter into a settlement with the employer should have the necessary authorization by the executive committee of the union or by the workmen…….”.
In the instant case, the Joint Committee, as observed hereinabove, is a creation of the legal and valid settlements entered between the management and unions of the respondent-Corporation. It could be termed as a legal body authorised to pass resolutions and scope of such resolutions is clearly stipulated in the Settlement of 1968 as well as 1961 Settlement with a further rider that all such resolutions will be binding on the parties. We, therefore hold that the Joint Committee was competent to pass the impugned resolutions, i.e, resolutions 729(3)(b) and 732. If the petitioner-Corporation had relied upon regulation 83(a) of (he Service Regulations, perhaps Deshpande, J., himself would have decided the petition and we fed that there would not have been any occasion to make the instant reference.
20. Our view regarding powers of the Joint Committee is also fortified by a recent judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Fabril Gasosa v. Labour Commissioner, [1997 (2) L.L.N 55], and the relevant observations of the Apex Court read thus, in Para. 14, at page 60:
“A conjoint reading of S. 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act and rule 58 supra of the Central Rules unmistakably shows that the settlement contemplated by the said provisions is a written settlement and not an oral settlement. It is not in dispute that the 1986 Settlement was a written settlement arrived at between the parties. It could not, therefore, be varied or modified except by a written settlement or by a written memorandum duly signed by the parties incorporating the terms of the so-called understanding….”
21. For deciding the present points of reference, it is not necessary to consider whether the impugned resolutions amount to a settlement as defined under S. 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Even if such resolutions are not amounting to a settlement in the strict sense as defined under S. 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act, such decisions will have to be held to be binding between the parties even if they are termed as agreements validly signed between the parties and have the trappings of a settlement. In the case of D.C Tonge v. Maharashtra State Transport Kamgar Sangathana reported in [1985 (2) L.L.N 112], it was alleged by some employees of the petitioner-Corporation that the Corporation had failed to implement terms of the agreement/settlement. Subject 6 of that settlement provided for promotion and it was decided that Corporation would prescribe details of tests/procedure for such internal promotions. Some of the employees approached the Industrial Court by filing a complaint under S. 28 read with item (9) of Sch. IV of Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971, alleging that the Corporation had failed to follow the procedure prescribed vide a circular in pursuance of the said settlement. When the matter finally came to this Court, a learned Single Judge of this Court held that even a breach of the circular amounted to breach of a valid agreement between the parties and the terms of the said circular were binding between the parties.
21A. In another case, namely, case of Petroleum Employees Union v. Industrial Court, Maharashtra, Bombay, [1980 (1) L.L.N 537], a Division Bench of this Court had an occasion to decide the status of a letter addressed by the management to the Union in pursuance of an oral understanding. The management and union had signed an agreement on the question of bonus and it was agreed that the said settlement will cover only the employees earning less than Rs. 1,600 per month. It appears that there was further oral understanding that the Corporation would pay an ex gratia amount to the employees earning more than Rs. 1,600 per month and this oral understanding was confirmed by a letter issued by the management to the President of the union. This Court held that such letter confirming the oral agreement between the parties was an agreement though it may not be a settlement in the strict sense of a settlement defined under S. 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act and it was binding on the management. In the instant case, the Joint Committee is a forum provided under the Settlements of 1952, 1961 and 1968 with stipulated subjects falling in its purview and we are of the considered view that this Joint Committee was competent to pass the impugned resolutions, which amount to valid agreements between the parties and as long as such agreements derive their origin and sanctity from legally valid and binding settlements, we see no reasons as to why such agreements altering, changing or modifying conditions of service cannot be accepted to be within purview of the Joint Committee. In any case, all that the Joint Committee in the instant case has done is to bring maximum period of suspension on line with the statutory provision set out in regulation 83(a) of the Service Regulations, as observed hereinabove.
22. In the result, we answer both the points of reference in negative and we hold that the Joint Committee was competent to bring amount alterations, modifications or changes in the settled conditions of service of an employee in so far as changes, alterations or modifications pertained to non-financial matters and the said Joint Committee was also competent to extend the period of ten days of suspension pending enquiry fixed by the 1956 Settlement. We accordingly direct the office to place Writ Petition No. 1240 of 1987 for final hearing before the appropriate Single Bench.
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