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Anna Manikrao Pethe v. School Tribunal, Amravati And Aurangabad Division, Amravati, And Others

Bombay High Court
Sep 18, 1997
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Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was initially appointed as an assistant teacher on a purely temporary basis for the academic years 1986–87, 1987–88, and 1988–89 at Daduji Pethe Vidyaiaya, managed by respondent 2 and headed by respondent 3. The petitioner was not a trained teacher and was appointed temporarily against a permanent vacancy, with all temporary appointments approved by the Education Officer. He was not appointed for the academic year 1989–90 and did not raise any grievance at that time.

After passing his Bachelor of Physical Education degree in 1990, the petitioner attempted to report for duty on April 19, 1990, but was not allowed, alleging an oral termination of service. He filed Appeal No. 42 of 1990-A under Section 9 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 before the School Tribunal, which granted an ex parte stay on April 23, 1990, later confirmed on September 3, 1991. Due to non-implementation of the stay, the petitioner filed a contempt petition which was disposed of after he was allowed to join duty on September 21, 1991.

The School Tribunal eventually dismissed the petitioner’s appeal and vacated the interim orders on August 25, 1992. Concurrently, respondent 4 was appointed as a trained graduate teacher in June 1989 against the permanent vacancy on probation and continued until his sudden termination in September 1991, allegedly due to the petitioner’s stay orders. Respondent 4 filed Appeal No. 215 of 1991-A, which was allowed by the School Tribunal on August 25, 1992, ordering his reinstatement with continuity of service and back wages. The petitioner was discontinued thereafter, and he challenged both tribunal orders.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioner, having been appointed temporarily and later acquiring a Bachelor of Physical Education degree, was entitled to reinstatement or permanent appointment against the permanent vacancy.
  2. Whether the certificate dated February 21, 1989, issued by the management created any legal or vested right for the petitioner’s reinstatement or continued service.
  3. Whether the termination and appointment procedures followed by the respondents complied with Section 5 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977.
  4. Whether the petitioner qualified as a “trained graduate” for appointment under the applicable rules and government resolutions.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

  • The petitioner claimed entitlement to reinstatement based on a certificate dated February 21, 1989, which allegedly assured reappointment upon completion of his Bachelor of Physical Education degree.
  • He contended that he was orally terminated and was entitled to relief under Section 9 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977.
  • He relied on a Government resolution dated June 6, 1983, and relevant rules to assert that his Bachelor of Physical Education degree qualified him as a trained graduate eligible for appointment.

Respondents’ Arguments

  • The management contended that the petitioner was appointed only on a temporary basis and had no vested right to permanent employment.
  • They argued that the certificate dated February 21, 1989, was unreliable, not addressed to anyone, and did not create any binding obligation to reinstate the petitioner.
  • The respondents maintained that the appointment of respondent 4 was legal and proper, conducted through a public advertisement and with approval from the Education Officer, fulfilling the statutory requirements under Section 5 of the M.E.P.S Act.
  • They asserted that the petitioner did not complete the B.Ed course despite being sponsored and given leave, thus failing to qualify as a trained teacher during his temporary tenure.
  • Respondents argued that the appeals filed by both the petitioner and respondent 4 should be disposed of together due to their interconnected nature.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
U.P Shiksha & Education Board v. Rajender Prasad Gupta [1996 (2) L.L.N 53] Termination without notice of an untrained teacher who failed to undergo required training is not illegal. The court applied this precedent to affirm that the petitioner’s termination was lawful as he did not complete the required B.Ed training despite opportunities.
Hindustan Education Society v. Sk. Kaleem Sk. Gulam Nabi [1997 (1) L.L.N 1028] Temporary appointments do not confer permanent status; permanent vacancies must be filled per Section 5 of the M.E.P.S Act. The court relied on this precedent to hold that the petitioner’s temporary appointments did not entitle him to permanent employment and that the appointment of respondent 4 was lawful.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the petitioner’s claim of entitlement to reinstatement based on his temporary appointments and subsequent acquisition of a Bachelor of Physical Education degree. It found that the petitioner was initially appointed purely on a temporary basis against a permanent vacancy, with all appointments approved by the Education Officer, and that he was not appointed for the academic year 1989–90 without objection.

The court examined the certificate dated February 21, 1989, and concluded it was unreliable and did not create any vested right or binding obligation for reinstatement. The certificate was not addressed to any party and contained internal inconsistencies regarding the petitioner’s service duration and assurances.

It was further noted that the petitioner was sponsored for a B.Ed course but failed to acquire the qualification within the relevant period, undermining his claim to trained teacher status. The petitioner only sought admission to the B.P.Ed course after his temporary employment had ceased, and did not object when the vacancy was advertised publicly.

The court applied established legal principles from precedent cases, emphasizing that temporary appointments do not confer permanent status and that permanent vacancies must be filled following statutory procedure under Section 5 of the M.E.P.S Act. The appointment and subsequent reinstatement of respondent 4, a trained graduate appointed after due process, were lawful.

The court also highlighted the necessity for School Tribunals to frame and decide preliminary issues concerning the recognition of the school, legality of appointment procedures, and approval by the Education Officer before proceeding to merits in cases under Section 9 of the M.E.P.S Act.

Holding and Implications

The court’s final decision was to reject the writ petition and discharge the rule, thereby upholding the orders of the School Tribunal dated August 25, 1992 which dismissed the petitioner’s appeal and confirmed the reinstatement of respondent 4.

The direct effect of this decision is that the petitioner is not entitled to reinstatement or permanent appointment against the permanent vacancy, and the appointment of respondent 4 was valid and lawful. No new precedent was set; rather, the court reaffirmed existing legal principles regarding temporary appointments, qualifications for trained teacher status, and statutory procedures under the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977.

Show all summary ...

Marlapalle, J.:— The petitioner, on passing his B.A Examination, came to be appointed for the first time as an assistant teacher on purely temporary basis for a period from July 1, 1986 to April 30, 1987, vide appointment order, dated June 30, 1986, issued by respondent 3, who is the headmaster of Daduji Pethe Vidyaiaya, run by respondent 2, Education Society. At the end of academic year 1986–87, he was discontinued and a fresh appointment order, dated June 30, 1987, was issued to him again on purely temporary basis for the period from July 1, 1987 to April 30-, 1988, i.e, for the academic year 1987–88. The service of the petitioner was again discontinued from May 1, 1988, at the end of the academic year and for the next academic year 1988–89, he was issued a fresh appointment order, dated June 30, 1988, on a purely temporary basis for the period from July 1, 1988 to April 30, 1989. The petitioner was not a trained teacher and he was appointed purely on temporary basis against a permanent vacancy. His temporary appointments, as mentioned hereinabove, were duly approved by the Education Officer and he was not appointed for the academic year 1989–90 and he did not raise any grievance in that respect against respondents 2 and 3.

2. It appears that the petitioner pass his Bachelor of Physical Education Degree (One year degree course) in the summer of 1990 and statement or marks issued by the Amravati University declaring the petitioner having passed the said Bachelor of Physical Education Examination in second class has been brought on record. The petitioner contends that he was relieved by the authorities of the Physical Education College on April 18, 1990, and he went to respondent 3 school to report for duty on April 19, 1990. As he was not allowed to report for duty, the petitioner alleged oral termination of service and filed Appeal No. 42 of 1990-A under S. 9 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977, before the School Tribunal at Aurangabad, along with an application for stay. The learned Presiding Officer of the School Tribunal by his order, dated April 23, 1990, granted ex parte stay to the alleged oraltermination and the stay order was confirmed subsequently on September 3, 1991. It is further contended that as respondents 2 and 3 did not implement the ex parte interim order, dated April 23, 1990, passed by the School Tribunal, the petitioner filed Contempt Petition No. 139 of 1990 before this Court and the said contempt petition came to be disposed of by order, dated September 24, 1991, in view of the fact that the petitioner was allowed to join the duty by respondents 2 and 3 on September 21, 1991, Thereafter, it appears that on hearing both the parties, i.e, the petitioner and the school management, the learned Presiding Officer of the School Tribunal, Amravati and Aurangabad Division, Amravati, was pleased to dismiss the Appeal No. 42 of 1990-A filed by the present petitioner and the interim orders, dated April 23, 1990 and September 3; 1991, were vacated by order and judgment, dated August 25, 1992. The petitioner has assailed the said judgment and order, dated August 25, 1992, rejecting his appeal.

3. Few additional facts which are not disputed between the parties and which are gathered from the record and proceedings called from the School Tribunal also need to be mentioned. For the academic year 1989–90, respondents 2 and 3, management and headmaster respectively were called upon by the Education Officer to fill in the post of assistant teacher by appointing a trained graduate teacher by following due procedure, The management accordingly released an advertisement in daily Hindustan Newspaper in May, 1989 and in response to the said advertisement, 29 candidates had applied including the present respondent 4. Interviews were conducted on June 8, 1989, and the present respondent 4, who is a trained graduate, came to be appointed as assistant teacher. Physical Training Instructor (P.T.I) against the said permanent vacancy on probation for a period of two years by appointment order, dated June 21, 1989. Respondent 4 joined on July 20, 1989, and he was to complete the probation period on July 19, 1991 The said appointment on probation was duly approved by respondent 5 Education Officer and accordingly respondent 4 was continued in service by respondents 2 and 3 and he was allowed to complete the probation period also. However, all of a sudden, by order, dated September 19, 1991, issued by respondent 3, the service of respondent 4 came to be terminated with effect September 20, 1991, solely on the ground that the School Tribunal, Aurangabad granted stay in favour of the present petitioner. Respondent 4, aggrieved by the said termination order, dated September 19, 1991, approached the School Tribunal and filed Appeal No. 215 of 1991 A under S. 9 of the Maharasthra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions and Service) Regulation Act, 1977 (hereinafter referred to as M.E.P.S Act for short).

4. The present petitioner was impleaded as respondent 5 in the said Appeal No. 215 of 1991-A and he had filed his written statement opposing the present appeal filed by respondent 4 contending, inter alia, that respondent 4 was appointed as a stopgap-appointment while the petitioner was sent on deputation to completehis B.P.Ed, degree and that in view of S. 10 of the Civil Procedure Code, Appeal No. 215 of 1991-A was required to be stayed.

5. The present respondents 2 and 3 also have filed their written statement in Appeal No. 215 of 1991-A and while accepting the factual position as brought out in the said appeal by the appellant, the appointment of the present respondent 4 in pursuance of the directions given by respondent 5 and procedure followed for such appointment was contended to be legal and proper and that respondent 4 has acquired a permanent status as an assistant teacher when the termination order, dated September 19, 1991, was served on him and the said termination was issued solely for the reasons that the School Tribunal had confirmed the ex parte stay order on September 3, 1991, and the present petitioner had initiated contempt proceedings before this Court that is Contempt Petition No. 139 of 1990 against the management. Respondents 2 and 3 have further submitted before the School Tribunal that the present respondent 4 could not have been removed but for the orders passed by the School Tribunal and the filing of contempt petition and that both the appeals, namely, Appeal No. 42 of 1990-A and Appeal No. 215 of 1991-A were required to be disposed of together. The learned Presiding Officer of the College Tribunal by a judgment and order, dated August 25, 1992, has allowed the Appeal No. 215 of 1991-A and has directed respondents 2 and 3 to reinstate respondent 4 in the post of Physical Education Teacher (P.T.I) with continuity of service and back-wages within 40 days. This order has been implemented by respondents 2 and 3 and in pursuance of the judgment and order passed by the School Tribunal in Appeal No. 42 of 1990-A, the present petitioner came to be discontinued from service and respondent 4 has been reinstated. The petitioner has challenged both the orders, namely, order in Appeal No. 42 of 1990-A and order in Appeal No. 215 of 1991-A passed by the School Tribunal on August 25, 1992.

6. The orders passed by the School Tribunal have been challenged mainly on two grounds, viz., that the management had made a commitment by issuing the certificate, dated February 21, 1989, that on completion of his B.P.Ed degree, the petitioner would be reinstated and hence the management was estopped from appointing any other teacher in the vacancy available when the petitioner was studying for his Bachelor of Education course; and that the findings of the College Tribunal that the petitioner was not qualified for appointment as assistant teacher as he possessed B.A, B.PEd qualifications and he could not be called as a trained teacher.

7. The appointments of permanent teachers in the private schools are governed by S. 5 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977, which reads as under:

“5. Certain obligations of management of private schools.— The management shall, as soon as possible, fill in, in the manner prescribed, every permanent vacancy in a private school by appointment of a person duly qualified to fill such vacancy:

Provided that, unless such vacancy is to be filled in by promotion, the management shall, before proceeding to fill in such vacancy, may be, the Education Officer, Zilla Parishad, whether there is any suitable person available on the list of surplus persons maintained by him for absorption in other schools, and in the event of such person being available, the management shall appoint that person in such vacancy.

(2) Every person appointed to fill a permanent vacancy shall be on probation for a period of two years. Subject to the provisions of Sub-secs. (3) and (4), he shall, on completion of this probation period of two years, be deemed to have been confirmed.

(3) If in the opinion of the management, the work or behaviour of any probationer, during the period of his probation, is not satisfactory, the management may terminate his services at any time during the said period after giving him one month's notice, or salary of one month in lieu of notice.

(4) If the services of any probationer are terminated under Sub-sec. (3) and he is reappointed by the management in the same school or any other school belonging to it within a period of one year from the date on which his services were terminated men the period of probation undergone by him previously shall be taken into consideration in calculating the required period of probation for the purposes of Sub-sec. (2).

(4-A) Nothing in Sub-secs. (2), (3) or Sub-sec. (4) shall apply to a person appointed to fill a permanent vacancy by promotion or by absorption as provided under the proviso to Sub-sec. (1).

(5) The management may fill in every temporary vacancy by appointing a person duly qualified to fill such vacancy. The order of appointment shall be drawn up in the form prescribed in that behalf, and shall state the period of appointment of such person”.

8. Coming to the challenge to the impugned orders on the two grounds as mentioned hereinabove (in support of second challenge regarding the petitioner being a trained teacher), the petitioner has relied upon the Government resolution, dated June 6, 1983, issued by the Government of Maharashtra wherein it has been stipulated that the one year course of Physical Education conducted by the H.V.P Mandal's Degree College of Physical Education at Amravati, affiliated to the Nagpur University has been approved to be a qualification for trained graduate teachers. In addition, the petitioner has relied upon Cl. 2(1)(ii) of Sch. B to the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as M.E.P.S Rules, for short). As per the said provisions, it is noticed that even a graduate with degree in Physical Education from Amravati University is eligible to be treated as a trained graduate for appointment as assistant teacher in secondary schools and Junior Colleges of Education. It is, therefore, held that the petitioner was qualified for being considered as a trained graduate for appointment as teacher for the first time in April/May, 1990, that is, on his acquiring the Bachelor of Education Degree. However, this alone does not come to the help of the petitioner for allowing the present petition.

9. The second ground of challenge is based on the certificate, dated February 21, 1989, allegedly issued by respondent 3 to the petitioner. The said certificate states that “the petitioner has been working for the last five years, he was being sent through the college for admission in your college. On acquiring the higher qualifications, the school will have no restrictions on the petitioner and on completion of the said qualifications, he would be reappointed”. The School Tribunal has held that the said assurance of the management cannot be held to be legal even if it is accepted that respondents 2 and 3 had issued the said certificate and that respondents 2 and 3 did not have a statutory obligation to continue the said employee after filling up the vacancy by following due procedure and after obtaining approval to such appointment by the Education Officer, that is, respondent 5. We are of the view, on perusal of the said certificate, dated February 21, 1989, that the certificate is not reliable and it cannot be held to be creating any vested right in favour of the petitioner to continue in service or seek fresh service with respondents 2 and 3 and that the said certificate in any way did not bind respondents 2 and 3 to continue the petitioner in service. First of all, the certificate is not addressed to anyone and hence it content to say that “he is being deputed for admission in your college,” is meaningless. Secondly, the certificate says that the petitioner has been working for the last five years whereas for the first time, the petitioner came to be appointed by order, dated June 30, 1986, on a temporary basis and by the time the said certificate was issued, the petitioner had worked purely on temporary basis during three academic years with respondents 2 and 3. In addition, the certificate states that respondents 2 and 3 will have no restrictions or binding on the petitioner and immediately the next sentence states that petitioner will be reappointed in service.

10. There is one more very vital factor which also requires to be considered to hold that the certificate, dated February 21, 1989, is totally unreliable and that the petitioner in spite of having been deputed for acquiring the B.Ed qualifications by respondent 2, he failed to do so till the summer of 1989, that is, till his last tenure which expired on April 30, 1989. The petitioner has brought on record at Annexure V, an application from addressed to the Government College of Education, Yavatmal, which is affiliated to the Amravati University for admission of the petitioner to the B.Ed course during the academic year 1987–89 and the said application form has been duly recommended by respondent 3 on March 10, 1987. The said application has been filled in by the petitioner and it is clearly stated that the petitioner has joined for the first time on July 1, 1986. Respondent 2 has given a declaration that the petitioner was being sponsored for the admission to the B.Ed course and he will be given leave as required during the said period and further that during the course of studies for B.Ed as well as for two years thereafter, he will be continued in the post of assistant teacher. It is an admitted position that the petitioner did not acquire the B.Ed qualifications in spite of his case being recommended and/or sponsored by respondents 2 and 3. The reliance of the petitioner to claim relief of reinstatement/reappointment with respondents 2 and 3 is, therefore, without any merits.

11. It is also material to note that the petitioner for the first time seems to have sought admission in the B.P.Ed course (One year degree course) only in the academic year 1989–90 and he was not in the employment of respondents 2 and 3 from May 1, 1989, onwards. Respondents 2 and 3 published an advertisement to fill in the post on permanent basis which the petitioner occupied on temporary basis and admittedly, the petitioner has not taken any objection when the said advertisement was issued. If the petitioner was convinced that respondents 2 and 3 have given him a written assurance to continue him in service or reappoint him in service on completion of his B.P.Ed course, nothing prevented the petitioner from submitting a representation to respondents 2 and 3 and register his protest or claim on the said post which was being filled in by respondents 2 and 3 at the directions of respondent 5, by issuing a public advertisement. This behaviour of the petitioner also goes to prove that there was no such assurance or commitment given by respondents 2 and 3 as contended by the petitioner on the basis of the certificate, dated February 21, 1989.

12. In the case of U.P Shiksha & Education Board v. Rajender Prasad Gupta, [1996 (2) L.L.N 53], similar situation had arisen wherein an untrained teacher was appointed and he was given an opportunity to undergo training which he did not avail and ultimately his service was terminated without any notice. The Supreme Court in 1996 (2) L.L.N 53 (vide supra), held that the order of termination without notice cannot be said, to be illegal specially when the petitioner was an untrained teacher and he did not undergo required training as prescribed by the Government for appointment as a trained teacher in spite of the fact that he was provided with an opportunity by the management. In the instant case also, the petitioner was admittedly provided with an opportunity to join the B.Ed course for the academic session 1987–89 and he did not acquire the B.Ed degree till April, 1989, that is, till his discontinuation on April 30, 1989.

13. In another case, viz., Hindustan Education Society v. Sk. Kaleem Sk. Gulam Nabi, [1997 (1) L.L.N 1028], respondent 1 was appointed against a clear vacancy on June 10, 1992, with the stipulation, in Para. 3, at page 1029:

“Your appointment is purely temporary for a period of 11 months from June 11, 1992 to May 10, 1993, in the clear vacancy. After expiry of the above period your service shall stand terminated without any notice”.

The High Court had held that the said teacher was regularly appointed and had directed his regularisation in service. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the directions of the High Court by relying upon S. 5 of the M.E.P.S Act and observed as under, in Paras. 5 and 6, at page 1030.

“In view of the above and the order of appointment, the appointment of the respondent was purely temporary for a limited period. Obviously, the approval given by the competent authority was for that temporary appointment. As regards permanent appointments, they are regulated by Sub-secs. (1) and (2) of S. 5 of the Act according to which the management shall, as soon as possible, fill up, in the manner prescribed, every permanent vacancy in a private school by appointment of a person duly qualified to fill in such vacancy. Every person so appointed shall be put on probation for a period of two years subject to the provisions of Sub-secs. (4) and (5). He shall, on completion of the probation of period of two years, be confirmed. Under these circumstances, the appointment of the respondent cannot be considered to be a permanent appointment ….”.

14. It is thus clear that the Supreme Court has held that the temporary appointees are not entitled to claim permanent status and unless such permanent vacancies are filled in as per S. 5 of the M.E.P.S Act, the temporary appointees cannot have any grievance. The facts in the case of Hindustan Education Society, [1997 (1) L.L.N 1028] (vide supra), are similar to the present case inasmuch as the petitioner was an untrained teacher and during the relevant three years, he was appointed on purely temporary basis during each academic year. His case, is therefore, governed by the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Hindustan Education Society (vide supra). In addition, it is also clear from the records that there was no termination order issued against the petitioner at any time by respondents 2 and 3 and his grievance of oral termination with effect from April 19, 1990, is without any basis. The Tribunal has rightly relied upon the first proviso to rule 6(2) of the M.E.P.S Rules and the impugned judgment does not suffer from any errors apparent on the face of the record.

15. While disposing of this petition, we deem it appropriate to observe that when such applications under S. 9 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977, are filed before the School Tribunals by the teachers challenging any act of termination on the part of the management, it will be necessary for the Tribunal to frame and decide three preliminary issues, viz., whether the school was a recognised school as defined under the M.E.P.S Act, whether the appointment of the concerned teacher was made as per S. 5 of the M.E.P.S Act and the Rules thereunder; and whether such an appointment has been approved by the Education Officer in pursuance of the provisions of the Act as well as the rules framed thereunder including the Government resolutions issued from time to time regarding reservations, etc. These preliminary points are required to be framed and decided before the appeal proceeds on merits and even if such points are not raised by any of the parties to the appeal, it would be proper on the part of the Tribunal to frame such issues suo motu before examining the merits of the case. In case the findings to any of the preliminary issues are in the negative, the appeal must fail then and there itself, so far as the relief of reinstatement/continuation in service is concerned.

16. In the result the writ petition is rejected and the rule is discharged. There shall be no order as to costs.